Slovakia’s domestic politics (1993-2003)

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This statement would not necessarily mean anything unusual given the fact that Slovakia has come into being after the separation of Czechoslovakia and the offices opened with the former Czechoslovakia remained after 1993 under the administration of the Czech Republic. The author‟s curiosity however, results from the delay of more than ten years that took Slovakia and Taiwan to agree on the mutual opening of the representative offices. Slovakia is in this aspect a singular case among the other three Central-European countries. These opened their offices few years after Taiwan established the first contacts with the region through its economic diplomacy.⁷

This delay is especially striking given Taiwan‟s interest to expand its relations with all the Central European countries Slovakia included (Interview, 2019). Taiwan‟s strategy of people to people relations and economic diplomacy apparently did not find a fertile ground in Slovakia. In which aspect did the country differ from its neighbors that might have resulted in the tardy development of the bilateral relationship? Did actually Slovakia‟s domestic politics or its relations with China play any relevant role?

Closer look on these factors is necessary in order to provide an explanation.

3.3.1 Slovakia’s domestic politics (1993-2003)

According to the framework adopted for this thesis, when analyzing the factors relevant for Taiwan‟s economic diplomacy‟s successful establishment of a dependent relationship, it is necessary to take into consideration the ideological agenda of the ruling elites in the target state. The framework‟s theory assumes that the pro-democratic and pro-human rights oriented leaders would express support to Taiwan, rather than leaders who disregard such values and thus give priority to a stable diplomatic relationship with China (Tubilewicz, 2007).

This was the case for instance in the Czech Republic, where a moral support represented by the liberal values of the President Václav Havel was the leading force of Taiwan-Czech relations. As Tubilewicz points out, it was mostly the shared anti-communist convictions rather than economic considerations that bound Taiwan and the Czech Republic‟s friendship (Tubilewicz, 2007). Havel offered international

7 Hungary opened its ROC's representationin 1990, Czechoslovakia followed in 1991 and Poland established the office in 1992.

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support to Taipei several times by having repeatedly expressed support for the ROC joining the UN (1994, 1996) or having publicly recognized the existence of two Chinas (1995). Havel also acted unconventionally by having officially welcomed the Taiwanese delegation headed by Premier of Taiwan Lien Chan 連戰 (1996), and by having openly announced during the visit of the Chinese delegation headed by Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen 錢其琛 that Taiwan is a political reality which cannot be ignored (Tubilewicz, 2007).

Similarly, Poland‟s foreign policy was building on its own experience with totalitarian regime and often openly criticized China for violating human rights.

Moreover, Poland was the only nation in Central-Eastern Europe that in 1989 demonstrated against the Chinese intervention in the Tian'an men protests (Gregušová, 2005). Poland‟s president Lech Walesa, who was an anti-communist activist, stood with Taiwan and even had the intention to promote relations with Taiwan to official level by visiting the island in his official capacity (Tubilewicz, 2007). Although the Polish-Taiwanese relations were left to unofficial level, Walesa visited Taiwan few times and participated in the presidential and vice presidential inauguration ceremonies of 1996 and 2000 and remained one of the most vocal European supporters of Taiwan (MOFA Taiwan, 2007). As a result, Prague and Warsaw saw the particular benefits of good relations with Taiwan, as both registered a trade surplus with Taiwan in the early 1990s (Tubilewicz, 2007).

Slovakia‟s case was rather different. After the separation of Czechoslovakia, the constitution adopted together with the declaration of independence and national sovereignty, pawn the way for parliamentary democracy in Slovakia. However, the quest of independence, the task of creating a new nation and the legacy of communism that weakened the Slovak civil society as well as the uncertainties resulting from the economic, social, and political changes gave rise to a nationalistic government (Fisher, 2006). The first post-independent government of Slovakia was led by Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar. Mečiar‟s followers were former supporters of communism and of the wartime state‟s Slovak People‟s Party that advocated „national emancipation‟. Similar alliance did not exist in neighboring Central European countries (Szomolányi, 2003).

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Except a few months break in 1994⁸, Mečiar dominated Slovakia‟s politics until 1998. His government was known as a quasi-authoritarian and repressive leadership, attracting attention abroad for its anti-democratic restrictions on freedom of the press, connection with organized crime, undemocratic concentration of power in the cabinet and nepotism (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003). Alarming was also the resurgence of anti-Semitism, continuing nostalgia for Slovakia‟s fascist past and discrimination of national minorities (Goldman, 1999). Some experts even claim, that Slovakia was getting closer to a model, where an early post-totalitarian regime transforms to “a successor regime that is likely to be authoritarian or controlled by leaders who have emerged from the previous regime” (Linz and Stepan, 1996 in Szomolányi, 2003)

Despite Slovakia‟s official claims to adhere to the principles of the Western community, any signs of a value-oriented diplomacy as a leading force of foreign relations was absent during the leadership of Prime Minister Mečiar, whose interest in partnership with Russia often made the international community doubt his commitments (Goldman, 1999).

It seems understandable that under the undemocratic conditions, backwardness and discontinuity it was unlikely for Slovakia to develop an interest for Taiwan‟s situation and foster a sentiment of solidarity and activism. By 1998, Slovakia was too absorbed into its domestic violations of moral principles to find energy to introduce a moral stance in its foreign policy and support a small and barely familiar East-Asian country in the Pacific Ocean. Štefanec (Interview, 2019), the president of the Slovak-Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce, similarly argued that “the political situation in the home country set limits on establishing new partnerships.” In the specific case of Slovakia, Štefanec also believes that,

“The political situation in the 1990s characterized by criminalization of the state, struggle against authoritarianism, economic crisis and the search for its own European identity prevented small Slovakia from dealing with relations with selected countries in East Asia. In the 1990s, the Czech Republic with a stronger tradition, a much more experienced diplomatic apparatus and, in particular, a more

8 In 1994, Mečiar was unseated as prime minister by the parliament and a new government under the leadership of Jozef Moravčík was created by the opposition parties. However, the elections held at the turn of September and October 1994 saw Mečiar's HZDS victory and he was thus reappointed prime minister again.

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straightforward democratic development successfully established relations with Taiwan.”

Similarly, Taiwanese diplomats (Interview, 2019) pointed out, that during the government of Mečiar, it was difficult to establish connection with Slovak diplomacy.

However, negotiations became much smoother after the 1998 transfer of power.

In the election campaign of 1998 a broad left-right coalition of five opposition parties (KDH, DU, DS, SDSS, and SZS) formed a single movement, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) led by Mikuláš Dzurinda. Eventually, by taking part in the elections, the movement achieved the transfer of power in which Mečiar‟s authoritarianism lost control. The result of the 1998 parliamentary elections was thus a radical turning point in the political orientation of the country. The newly elected government committed to defend Slovakia‟s foundations for democratization and consolidation as well as lead the country to its integration and membership in NATO and the EU (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003).

Eventually, Slovakia‟s way towards democratic consolidation was strengthened by the 2002 parliamentary elections. With the center-right coalition of the Slovak Democratic and Christian union (SDKU), the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK), the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and the New Citizen‟s Alliance (ANO) Slovakia got rid of the extreme nationalists and moved towards a „consensus of fundamental values‟ reflected mostly in the sphere of foreign policy (Szomolányi, 2003).

The shift from Mečiar‟s repressive administration towards a Western-valued oriented Dzurinda‟s leadership marked a different approach in the Slovak-Taiwanese relations as well. According to Taiwanese diplomats, negotiations with Slovakia became much easier after Mečiar‟s departure from the government. The post 1998 administration seemed to be more open-minded, which showed on the proactive approach of some Slovak diplomats (Interview, 2019). Instrumental in promoting the establishment of bilateral representative offices in 2003 and a long-term supporter of the development of relations between Slovakia and Taiwan was the then Vice Foreign Minister of the Slovak Republic Milan Tancár. Marián Tomášik, who served as the director of the Asia and the Pacific Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs also actively advocated substantive cooperation between the ROC and Slovakia (Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), 2015). The framework‟s assumptions

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regarding the leadership‟s ideological orientation thus seem to be proving relevant in case of the Slovak-Taiwanese relations. It is obvious that the fundamental basis for rapprochement between Taiwan and Slovakia were laid during the administration of Dzurinda, i.e. the leadership the helped Slovakia to comply with the Western international standards and achieve its membership in important international institutions, such as the EU and NATO.