The China Threat

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4.1. Framework

4.1.1. The China Threat

Raymond Cohen defines the perception of threat as “anticipation on the part of an observer, the decision maker, of impending harm –usually of a military, strategic, or economic kind– to the state.”⁷⁴

In academic literatures, the term China threat has several understandings.

Herbert Yee and Ian Storey point out that the term is actually came from “the idea that the PRC as a rising power represents a source of regional and international instability.”

The perception of threat, therefore, is referring to what the policy makers perceive as a threat to state security. The perception of China threat, if so, can be understood as how policy makers see and define the threat that came from China. It could be in the form of political, military, economic, diplomatic, or societal consequences.

75 This understanding is a result of five contributing factors, which are: the rise of Chinese economy, the PRC’s authoritarian socialist political system, the PRC’s increasing military capability, the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC which could affect her neighbors, and the rising Chinese nationalism.⁷⁶

Another issue that needs to be settled regarding the term China threat is concerning the question of to whom would China rise becomes a threat. Most literatures dealing with the concept of China threat tend to focus on the framework of

Accordingly, the main component of the China threat is a belief that China’s rising will be un-peacefully. It is understandable then if Chinese government develops and spreads the peaceful rise doctrine in their attempt to contain such belief.

74 Raymond Cohen, Threat Perception in International Crisis, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, p. 4.

75 Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, “Introduction” in Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, Eds., The China Threat:

Perceptions, Myths and Reality, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, p. 1.

76 Ibid, pp. 2-6.

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China-US rivalry.⁷⁷

But, would it be the case to other countries in the region? China rise might possess a danger to US role and position in Asia but it is not necessary the case with the Asian states. David Kang argues that countries in East Asia tend to see China as an opportunity rather than as a threat. For these countries, the rising of China is considered more as a chance rather than a threat. His assessment is based on East Asian countries’ strategy in dealing with China rise. He writes that “East Asian states see substantially greater economic opportunity in China than they do military threat, and hence East Asian states accept, rather than fear, China’s expected emergence as a powerful and perhaps the dominant state in East Asia. They prefer China to be strong rather than weak, and although the states of East Asia do not unequivocally welcome China in all areas, they are willing to defer judgment about what China wants.”

This is the reason why China rise is considered as threatening regional or international stability which in fact should be defined as threatening US role in Asia Pacific region and the world.

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A rather different conclusion on whether or not China rise would become a threat to Asian countries is drawn by Yoichiro Sato. Writing the conclusion part of his edited book (co-edited with Kevin Cooney), Sato argues that smaller countries like Southeast Asian countries, Taiwan, Korea, and India prefer to engage China as opportunity to boost their economies while stronger countries such as the US and

77 Numbers of books and articles are focusing on this topic. One particular worth attention book on China-US competition is the edited volume by Evelyn Goh and Sheldon W. Simon. This book is focusing on China-US rivalry in Southeast Asian. See Evelyn Goh and Sheldon W. Simon, Eds., China, the US, and Southeast Asia: Contending Perspectives on Politics, Security, and Economics, New York and London: Routledge, 2008. In addition, Arthur S. Ding writes an excellent assessment of Sino-US missiles rivalry. See Arthur S. Ding, Sino-US Competition in Strategic Arms, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Relations, 2008.

78 David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, And Order in East Asia, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 197-198.

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Japan tend to see China as competitor even if they also admit the opportunity in doing business with China.⁷⁹

In the case of Taiwan, China, rising or not rising, still constitutes as a source of threat to Taiwan security. However, further assessment is needed to determine the extent and scope of China threat to Taiwan security. Not to mention that this China threat is also interacting with other factors such as US security assurances and Taiwan’s domestic politics.⁸⁰ To determine the extent and scope of China threat, a set of boundaries that must not be crossed by Taiwanese decision makers in dealing with China is required. China has constantly indicated that Taiwan is destined to be part of China’s territory. Any attempts that lead to independence would be considered as threat to Chinese sovereignty and therefore deserves punishment. Taiwan independence or any action directed toward Taiwan independence, hence, is the boundary that must be crossed by Taiwan. This boundary is clearly defined with the enactment of anti-secession law in 2005.⁸¹

Setting the boundary of China threat is only a preliminary step to assess the degree of the threat itself. Michael Chase proposes two indicators if one want to assess the degree of China threat to Taiwan security: by looking at the Chinese What constitutes as attempts directed toward Taiwan independence, however, is not clear and subject to political interpretation.

79 Yoichiro Sato, “Conclusion: China in the Eyes of Asia and America” in Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato, Eds., The Rise of China and International Security: America and Asia Respond, London and New York: Routledge, 2009, pp. 232-241. However, one can be critical over his categorization of

“small” when he puts India in the small countries bracket.

80 Michael S. Chase, Taiwan’s Security Policy: External Threats and Domestic Politics, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008, p. 155.

81 Cheng-yi Lin, “The Rise of China and Taiwan’s Respond: The Anti-Secession Law as a Case Study”

in Issues and Studies 43: 1 (March 2007), pp. 159-188.

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military capabilities and Chinese intention to use force.⁸²

In Taiwan, a democratic country with clear and deep civilian segregation, policy making is subject to political compromises among civilian groups. The real battlefield over the identification of China threat and the policy to cope with China threat is actually inside Taiwan border. Therefore, the assessment of China threat must focus on whose perception is prevailing in the political game. It is not always necessarily the ruling government’s perception which will win the political battle. In some cases, the ruling government’s perception can be blocked by opposition parties or bow to the opposition parties’ wishes due to several reasons.

I would add the strategy to cope with the threat as the other indicator. In some cases, there is a congruent assessment on Chinese military capabilities and agreement on what would cause the intention to use of force but there is an incongruent decision on the strategy to cope with the threat.