The Perception of China Threat
4.1.2. The Identification of Threat
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military capabilities and Chinese intention to use force.82
In Taiwan, a democratic country with clear and deep civilian segregation, policy making is subject to political compromises among civilian groups. The real battlefield over the identification of China threat and the policy to cope with China threat is actually inside Taiwan border. Therefore, the assessment of China threat must focus on whose perception is prevailing in the political game. It is not always necessarily the ruling government’s perception which will win the political battle. In some cases, the ruling government’s perception can be blocked by opposition parties or bow to the opposition parties’ wishes due to several reasons.
I would add the strategy to cope with the threat as the other indicator. In some cases, there is a congruent assessment on Chinese military capabilities and agreement on what would cause the intention to use of force but there is an incongruent decision on the strategy to cope with the threat.
4.1.2. The Identification of Threat
Most analysts agree that China is the most important threat to Taiwan security.
However, there is no agreement over the extent of China threat to Taiwan security and how Taiwan should handle the threat. One of the most important, and most cited, sources of China threat to Taiwan security is the Chinese military modernization program, which also includes the rise in defense budget.83
Assessment on Chinese military capabilities has always been an important part of the National Defense Report of the Republic of China or the white paper defense. It
82 Chase, Taiwan Defense Policy, pp. 155-166.
83 The military dimension of China threat to Taiwan security is not the only dimension of China threat to Taiwan security. There are other dimensions such as political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural threats. The framework for this part will focus on military dimension while the next part will include the other dimensions.
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is so important that each report would have a specific chapter on this topic. It is also the focus of most analysts’ studies and writings on the issue of Taiwan security.
However, most of these assessments tend to focus on military hardware, doctrine, tactics, and budget and seldom consider the political dimension in assessing the China threat. Understanding the political dimension of Chinese military capability, including in it is the role of People Liberation Army (PLA) in decision making process, is a key to precisely understand the Chinese intention to use force.84
4.1.2.1. The Actual Threat
It is widely believe that the gap of military capabilities across the Taiwan Strait has been tipping to China’s favor. The gap in cross-strait military balance and defense spending is actually evident. 85 Those gaps are a result of Chinese military modernization program that started to take place during the reign of Deng Xiaoping and a stagnant development in Taiwan’s military modernization program. Chinese military modernization program draws much attention in Taiwan for two reasons:
because this modernization program is directed toward Taiwan86
84 Denny Roy, “PLA Capabilities in the Next Decade: The Influence of Politics” in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai, Eds., Defending Taiwan: The Future Vision of Taiwan’s Defense Policy and Military Strategy, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp. 29-47. See also Maochun Yu, “Political and Military Factors Determining China’s Use of Force” in Steve Tsang, Ed., If China Attacks Taiwan:
Military Strategy, Politics and Economics, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 17-34.
and because this
85 See for example Cole, Taiwan’s Security, chapter 3. Cole provides a handful of data on Chinese military capability on that section while the data on Taiwan military capabilities for the same period is appeared chapter 6, 7, and 8.
86 Ellis Joffe, for example, writes that “the purpose of Chinese military build-up is to enable China to coerce Taiwan into accepting a “one China solution” to the Taiwan problem or to prevent Taiwan from moving toward formal independence.” Ellis Joffe, “The ‘Right Size’ for China’s Military: To What Ends?” in Asia Policy 4 (July 2009), p. 557.
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modernization program has transformed Chinese military capabilities to a degree which Taiwan could no longer enjoy strategic advantage over the mainland.
In response to Chinese military build-up, Taiwan is also developing a military’s modernization program. This program is in part as a response to Chinese military build-up and in part due to the democratization process that took place in Taiwan. Michael Swaine notices that the objective of Taiwan military modernization program is to establish civilian control over the military, to restructure, streamline, and modernize the military to able to meet the growing challenges to Taiwan security, to strengthen the overall national security and strategic planning, and to improve the efficiency and integrity of the procurement process and at the same time to diversify the sources of its weaponry system or to establish an indigenous production.87
There seem to be a congruent opinion among civilian groups in Taiwan on the actual threat from China. There is also no disagreement that Chinese military build-up is further undermine Taiwan security. However, the convergent opinion within civilian camps in Taiwan over the actual military threat from Chinese military build-up does not necessarily lead to a convergent idea of what would be the best strategy to deal with such threat.
87 Michael D. Swaine, “Taiwan’s Defense Reform and Military Modernization Program: Objectives, Achievements, and Obstacles” in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Ed., Dangerous Strait: The US-Taiwan-China Crisis, New York: Columbia University Press, 2005, pp.132-141. See also Andrew L. Ross,
“Taiwan’s Defense Reform: Questions and Observations” in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai, Eds., Taiwan’s Defense Reform, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 16-25; York W. Chen and Martin Edmonds, “An Overview of Taiwan’s Defense Reform” in Martin Edmonds and Michael M.
Tsai, Eds., Taiwan’s Defense Reform, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 63-78. For an assessment prior to Chen Shui-bian era see Alexander C. Huang, Taiwan’s Defense Modernization for the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities, paper prepared for the Conference on War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait, February 26-28, 1999.
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Chinese military modernization program has in fact caused differing opinion among Taiwanese leaders on the strategy to cope with threat. Some argue that Taiwan should not spending money and resources that most likely will only drag Taiwan and China into arm races. Instead, Taiwan should approach Chinese government to enhance cooperation that will minimize the Chinese intention and necessity to use its military forces. Others suggest that Taiwan should pursue tighter relations with the US to ensure US commitment in safeguarding Taiwan security and deter possible Chinese military operation toward Taiwan. Some others are proposing to enhance a defense modernization program so that Taiwan would be able to protect itself if such an attack by China is taken place.88 Therefore, it is equally important to search on the Chinese intention to use force as part of our understanding of China threat.
4.1.2.2. The intention to use force
The main question with Chinese intention to use force is under what circumstances do the Chinese leaders will use their forces in integrating Taiwan into the Mainland.
Susan Shirk argues that for China, Taiwan is a question of regime survival. No regime in China could survive the loss of Taiwan since the loss of Taiwan is a signal of the loss of other areas such as Tibet, Xinjiang, or Inner Mongolia.89
With such a burden, yet the Chinese leaders can do nothing to solve the problem due to the international implications of any military actions. One of the most important factors that Chinese leaders need to consider if they wish to use force in integrating Taiwan into the Mainland is the possible US intervention. Chinese use of force would definitely trigger US intervention, unless if the US perceives that the
88 Interview with scholar from National Chengchi University. See also Logan and Carpenter, “Taiwan’s Defense Budget,” p. 4.
89 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 181-182.
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Chinese decision is due to Taiwan’s provocations. According to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the US must provide any necessary actions to safeguard Taiwan security.
Unless China is willingly to confront US intervention, the Chinese leaders could only lean on US ability to set the stability in the triangular relations between China, Taiwan and the US. However, it must be noted that the US does have influence over Taiwan but the US cannot tell Taiwan what to do as the US wants Taiwan to do.
Knowing that the chance of the use of force is actually limited, since the 1980s Chinese leaders have developed a new approach to integrate Taiwan into the Mainland by relying on economic interdependence or dependence. China has continuously trying to boost economic relations with Taiwan to enhance political integration. However, the economic ties are not necessarily resulted in closer political ties across the Strait of Taiwan. The political integration somehow is on the opposite path from that of economic integration. The closer economic ties turned out to complicate Chinese intention to use force. The use of force would also bring destructions in infrastructure and damage the economy. The Chinese leaders need to precisely count the cost of war that they are ready to pay if they want to use force.
China needs a careful planning of military strike with a sound precision to minimize the cost of war. Military readiness is therefore required.
China is willingly to use force but only if they have to. There are some preconditions for Chinese leaders to adopt the option to use force in integrating Taiwan into the Mainland. Those are the existence of a reasonable Taiwan’s provocations, strategic calculation on the pace of US intervention, and Chinese military readiness.90
90 Steve Tsang, “Drivers Behind the Use of Force” in Steve Tsang, If China Attacks Taiwan, pp. 1-14.
Andrew Scobell develops two options that might be implemented
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by Chinese government to integrate Taiwan.91 The first one is what he termed as coercive option and the later is the capture option. He suggests that the first option is more preferable than the later.92 Furthermore, Joel Wuthnow argues that since 2001 China has been implementing an integrated strategy that includes both cooptation and coercive options.93
China’s decision to adopt new policy initiatives to peacefully settle the Taiwan issue –that dated back in 1980s– resulted in doubt among Taiwanese leaders regarding Chinese intention to use force.
The result of such integrated strategy is still on hold.
94 The 1995-1996 missile crises raised an alarm for Taiwanese leaders to once again consider Chinese intention to use force. Since then, diverse observations over the possibility of Chinese use of force grew. This differing opinion among civilian groups resulted in different opinion on what would be the best strategy to cope with China threat.