The Typology of Civilian Control
3.2.1. Military Autonomy
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interests and resources, and to prevent any misuse of the military by civilian authorities.
3.2.1. Military Autonomy
Previous literatures suggest that the area where military could play role in politics is limited to certain area of defense policy. Civilian authorities still hold right to make defense policy but they must do so in close consultations with the military. The military role is limited to that of providing advice to civilian authority and making the technical detail to follow up and implement the policy that has been made by civilian authorities. The term close consultations are referring to a more bottom-up process rather than top-down process. This implies that civilian authorities shall take into serious consideration any of military’s proposal. This step is important to ensure that civilian will not make decision based on their political needs and interests or open the possibility of military involvement in politics due to grievances.
The existence or non-existence of military autonomy will define which type of civilian control. If the military has their autonomy, there is a greater possibility for the establishment of an objective control and, on the contrary, the absence of military autonomy tends to create a subjective control.
In the case of Taiwan, the military-society segregation started to receive greater attention after the lifting of the martial law. It went in parallel with the introduction of democracy in Taiwan.49
49 Yang, Military Politics in the Transition to Democracy, p. 271.
During the period under martial law, the military possessed an excessive role in domestic politics. They were not only dealing with external defense affairs but also involving in preserving domestic stability. The
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military worked as party’s tool to establish control over the society. The separation between the military and society simply did not exist.50
The introduction and development of democracy change the whole landscape of military role in politics. The military role in politics changed from a sort of Nation Builder in Edmunds, Forster and Cottey’s term into National Security.51
The termination of the Expediency Act in 1991, the disbandment of the Garrison Command and other repressive apparatus that previously were very dominant in maintaining domestic security during Lee Teng-hui era were some of the efforts to clearly define the boundaries between the military and non-military organizations. During Lee Teng-hui era, the separation between the military and
Taiwan military started to focus on external defense and leaving rather than national security as a whole. Previously, the military’s main task was to protect the state from external threat and internal vulnerability. The later referred to communist infiltration and Taiwan independence movement. The introduction of integral boundaries culminated with the lifting of the martial law. Military’s responsibility for domestic security were taken over by police authorities and other related governmental organs.
50 Monte R. Bullard clearly describes the military role as the agent of political socialization in his work.
His work defines the non-existence of military-society separation. However, he tends to argue that this absence of separation does not necessarily mean that there is a lack of civilian control. In fact, this overt political role of the military was one of the most important reasons behind the development of Taiwan economy. See Monte R. Bullard, The Soldier and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan’s Development, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997.
51 Edmunds, Forster, and Cottey distinguishes military role within society into five categories, i.e.
National Security, Nation Builder, Regime Defence, Domestic Military Assistance, and Military Diplomacy. The National Security role means that the military role is limited to defend the society from external threat that might threaten the security of the society. Meanwhile, the Nation Builder role means that the military is a key agent of nation-building. For detail see Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster and Andrew Cottey, “Armed Forces and Society: a Framework for Analysis” in Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey, Eds., Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, pp. 1-22.
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society started to grow. The heated debate over two national defense laws was actually an attempt to reach consensus among related-parties on the extent the military role in politics.
The introduction of the two laws which took place during Chen Shui-bian era normatively set the organizational boundaries between the military and civilian. The boundaries were clearly defined in which the military was positioned under full civilian control. The military was not only subject to executive control –by the Minister of Defense– but also subject to legislative oversight from Legislative Yuan.
Taiwan has been able to create a normative framework for civilian control.
In conclusion, the military did have their autonomy with the enactment of two national defense laws during Chen Shui-bian tenure. However, this autonomy was without flaws. An example of these problems concerned with the MND power, according to the National Defense Law and the Ministry of National Defense Organization Law, to make important personnel decision which previously held by the CGS.52
The decision to concentrate power on the hand of civilian authorities could have two consequences. First, this strategy could lead to military intervention.
Concentrating power on the hand of civilian, including those often regarded as
“military decision” such as personnel policy could threaten military interests and values. As Croissant has argued, the safety of military interests and resources are among two endogenous factors that might provoke military intervention.53
52 Chase, “Defense Reform in Taiwan,” p. 368.
If this is the case, the goal of de-politicization of the military will fail. Second, if such decision is taken place in a segregated civilian camp, the application of subjective control would be more likely to happen. The civilian authorities could misuse the personnel
53 Croissant, “Riding the Tiger”, pp. 362-363.
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policy as tool to attract support from the military men to win political contest against their rival. In Taiwan case, the personnel policy could be considered as civilian penetration to military area.54
The existence of integrated boundaries will also lead to military’s repositioning to be above politics. Meaning, the military will place their loyalty to the state and will not follow any party’s ideology. This is also an important feature in the establishment of objective control.
In the case of Taiwan, military loyalty to the constitution is one particularly important issue in the establishment of civilian control due to the long history of party (KMT)-military connection. The statement of loyalty to the constitution in Taiwan is often regarded as an assurance for military neutrality in politics. Fravel notes that in the wake of the 2000 presidential election, the then chief of general staff (CGS) Tang Yao-ming pledged “to the would-be commander-in-chief that the armed forces will be loyal and defend the national security of the Republic of China.”55 The similar statement of loyalty was also vowed by General Tang after the election. In addition, General Tang has also ordered the top brass of the military to gather at Mt. Yangmin to relieve suspicions about the DPP’s pro independence activity.56
To conclude with, Taiwan military during Chen Shui-bian era did have their autonomy. However, the military area was quite limited. In a way, this indicated the strong civilian political institutions and the weak political power of the military.
Whether or not Taiwan would enjoy objective control is depending on the other two indicators.
It indicates the establishment of integral boundaries to ensure military autonomy.
54 The analysis of the personnel policy case will be given on the Interpenetration part.
55 Fravel, “Toward Civilian Supremacy,” p. 66.
56 Tzeng, Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Taiwan, pp. 152-153.
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