The Perception of China Threat and Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian Era

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. The Perception of China Threat and Civil-Military. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Relations in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian Era. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Student: Broto Wardoyo Advisor: Prof. Arthur Ding. 中華民國. 2010 年 6 月.

(2) Chapter 1 Introduction. My intention in this thesis is twofold. First, I am intending to explain the type of civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian presidency. The typology of civilian control in my thesis is referring to Huntington’s division of civilian control, i.e. subjective and objective civilian control. 1 Second, I am also intending to explain the. 政治大. correlation between external threat and civilian control. In this case, the term external. 立. threat is referring to the threat from China or I would simply term it as China threat.. ‧ 國. 學. The reason why I am interesting to explain the correlation between external threat and civilian control is because most studies on civilian control in Taiwan are more. ‧. focusing on the domestic politics or identity politics as an independent variable that. y. Nat. sit. explains civilian control. 2 If any of these studies are ever focusing on the external. n. al. er. io. threat as explaining variable, the conclusion would be the lack of correlation between. i n U. v. the two. Specifically, this thesis will rely on the structural theory on civil-military. Ch. engchi. relations developed by Michael Desch. 3 However, unlike Desch which argues that the source and degree of threat will define the degree of civilian control, I argue that the 1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations,. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957, especially chapter 4. For a critique to Huntington, see for example Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 7-10. 2. Most assessments on civilian control or civil-military relations in Taiwan are focusing on the. democratization process and its influence to the establishment of civilian control or civil-military relations. For detail see the Literature Review and Limitations. 3. Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment, Baltimore. and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999. 1.

(3) source and degree of threat will only influencing civilian control if there is a congruency of threat perception among civilian groups. It is this congruency of threat perception among civilian groups which will define the type of control. This chapter’s main aim is to provide background on civilian control in Taiwan as well as an outline of this thesis.. 1.1.. Background. The assessment on civilian control in Taiwan is usually divided into two periods: the. 政治大 The lifting of the martial law in 1987 is regarded as a mark for the establishment of 立 period under the martial law and the period following the lifting of the martial law.. objective or democratic civilian control. The lifting of the martial law is also. ‧ 國. 學. considered as the mark for the implementation of democratization process in Taiwan. 4. ‧. The establishment of a democratic society supposedly leads to the establishment of a. sit. y. Nat. democratic or objective civilian control. In the case of Taiwan, however, the result of. io. er. democratization process is not a democratic or objective civilian control but rather a subjective one. This thesis will seek the answer of why such an opposite result. n. al. appeared.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Taylor Fravel writes that “since 1987, Taiwan has made considerable progress toward achieving civilian supremacy.” 5 His understanding of civilian control is covering three components: the military is politically neutral or does not involve in politics, the military is under a democratic control by democratically-elected political 4. One could argue, however, that the democratization process started with the introduction of the. Democratic Progressive Party or the introduction of direct presidential election or, even went back further to the introduction of Tangwai (opposition) movement. Since this is not the focus of my research, I would not enter such a debate on this matter. 5. M. Taylor Fravel, “Toward Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan’s. Democratization” in Armed Forces and Society 29:1 (Fall 2002), p. 58. 2.

(4) institutions, and the military does not intervene in society’s civil and economic life or in other word the military is clearly distinct from the society. His finding –covering only the period of 1947 to 2000– indicates an improvement in military’s political neutrality, democratic oversight, and military’s social responsibility (see Table 1.1) Fravel also suggests that “the KMT has already established a tradition of partial civilian control over the armed forces through a commissar system.” 6 His indication implies that during the period under martial law, the term civilian control was not referring to democratic civilian control with the three indicators mentioned. 政治大 control according to Huntington is characterized by military’s allegiance to certain 立. above but referring to a sort of Huntington’s subjective control. In short, subjective. groups, military’s involvement in politics as government tool to exercise power, and. ‧ 國. 學. an unclear task or mission. 7 However, in this case it is not clear whether the control. ‧. was conducted by civilian leadership within the party or by the party. The control. er. io. sit. y. Nat. itself was conducted with the implementation of Political Commissar System (PCS).. Table 1.1. Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan, 1949-2000 Source: Fravel, “Toward Civilian Supremacy”, pp. 60-61 and 64-65 Indicators Status, 1949-1987 Political • Loyalty to the KMT • Loyalty to the neutrality and Chiangs, not constitution, even government if changed • No appointment of • 20 percent to 30 percent military membership on active duty KMT Central and officers and Standing Committees limited involvement of • Senior domestic posts retired officers in filled by active and civilian retired officers government. n. al. 6 7. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. •. •. •. Ibid, p. 63. Italics added. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 80-81. For detail see Chapter 2. 3. Status, 1987-2000 Repeated declarations of loyalty to the constitution Memberships on KMT Central and Standing Committees by active officers eliminated and by retired generals reduced to < 5 percent (1993) Dominance in EY of retired generals in MND, NSC, and NSB positions.

(5) •. •. •. Participation in votemobilization efforts and official appointment process. •. •. Extensive involvement in domestic policies through the martial law institutions of the Taiwan Garrison Command and National Security Council. •. Clear and defined external security mission. •. •. Forces broadly representative of society at rank levels. •. ‧ 國. •. io. al. Constitutional supremacy of chief executive as commander-inchief. •. Management and supervision of the military by executive agencies. •. Legislative oversight and monitoring. •. n. •. •. •. sit. Nat •. •. ‧. Professional military culture. 學. •. •. •. 政治大. 立. Democratic control. Explicit internal security mission of suppression of communist rebellion and opposition to the regime Growth of professionalism in 70s and 80s Officers corps dominated by Mainlanders, not Taiwanese. •. y. •. No involvement in selection of government officials, elected or appointed No involvement in formulation and administration of domestic policy, especially internal security. Ch. er. •. v ni. Constitutional separation, but overruled by the Temporary Provision. engchi U. •. •. Two-track system whereby Chief of the General Staff reported directly to the President, not the EY. •. Effectively none, due to the lack of opposition representation in Legislative Yuan. •. •. •. 4. Retired generals serves as special advisors to the president Isolated rumors of votemobilization activities. Elimination of internal security role, except the Coast Guard (1992) Political Warfare Department of MND maintains right to wiretap Explicit internal security mission focus on defending the island against potential PRC missiles attack or invasion (1992) Development of training program Taiwanese Chief of General Staff appointed (1999) Officer corps increasingly representative of society Recognition by the military of President as commander-in-chief (1996) Establishment of NSC as key policy advisory body for national security (1994) Passage of National Defense Law (2000) Passage of Defense Ministry Organization Law (2000) Monitoring by LY through National Defense Committee (1992) Regular interpolations of Defense Ministry and MND staff (1992).

(6) •. •. Civilian expertise in security affairs. •. No civilian research centers or experts. •. •. Internal autonomy of the military. •. Extensive KMT political commissar system within all of the armed forces. •. •. Silence on 2-28 and “White Terror”. •. •. Mandatory military education program in all schools Military ownership of media assets. •. 立. 政治大. •. ‧. Transparency of military activities. io. •. Most information highly classified. n. al. •. er. Nat. •. •. 學. ‧ 國. •. Reconciliation and healing for past abuses “Demilitarization” of culture. y. •. •. sit. Social responsibility. •. Ch. engchi. i n U. Limited interpellation of Chief of the General Staff (1998) Authority limited by system rotation, lack of staff expertise and lack of statue on information classification Growing numbers of civilian research centers and defense experts Elimination of formal party activities within the military (1993) Freedom to make most day-to-day decisions Public apology for 2-28 and legislation to compensate victims Elimination of military education and allegiance warfare programs Student protests against military human rights and treatment of conscripts MND increasingly transparent, through National Defense Report and website. v. The PCS was the main tool of control in Taiwan during martial law period, which is also common in any Leninist-style governance. In analyzing the case of Taiwan, Cheng Hsiao-shih notes two differences of Taiwan’s PCS from similar tool adopted by other Leninist-style system –his work is particularly dealing with Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). First, the ruling party in Taiwan (the Kuomintang or KMT) did not suffer from severe intra-party conflict that could drag the armed forces into due to the presence of strongman. Second, an analysis of civil-military relations in Taiwan must be made by considering Sun Yat-sen’s three stages of development concept. Sun’s concept refers to revolutionary stages to create 5.

(7) a prosperous and strong democratic republic through three steps, i.e. creation of military dictatorship to suppress anti-revolutionary forces, formation of party dictatorships with the aim of educating people with ideology of the Party (the Three Principles of the People or San Min Chu I), and establishment of constitutional democracy. 8. Figure 1.1. Sun Yat Sen’s three stage of development concept and the development of civilian control in Taiwan. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. During the early time of martial law, military took major role in politics due to several reasons such as the war against Communist and the desire to reoccupy the Mainland. For those two reasons, military penetration to the party was deep and influential. During the mid-1960s and 1970s, military started to disengage from governing for several reasons such as the initial wave of democratization, the successful economic development, the rise of technocrats and middle class in Taiwanese society, the fading myth of armed recovery of the Mainland, the 8. Cheng Hsiao-shih, Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control, Boulder. and Oxford: Westview Press, Inc., 1990, pp. 123-126. 6.

(8) professionalization of the military 9, and the gradual strengthening of constitutional elements in Taiwan politics. 10 All of these factors came as a result of US massive assistance both in military and economic areas. During the final years of martial law period, the call for democracy was mounting. Continuous resistances from opposition party and civil society, internal changes within KMT, and pressures from the US are some of the reasons. In particular, the pressures from the US are important factor in the establishment civilian control through democratization process. 11 The argument is that creating a democratic society would enhance American support following the. 政治大 Following the lifting of martial law, civilian control started to receive greater 立. shift in diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.. attention. The establishment of civilian control was possible with the stronger role of. ‧ 國. 學. the opposition parties, especially the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The DPP. ‧. was consistent in requesting and pressuring for military disengagement from the KMT.. sit. y. Nat. As a result, the military consistently declared their disengagement from the KMT, in. io. n. al. er. particular, and politics, in general, but this neutrality would not apply to the issue of. 9. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Sun Ching-min offers a different opinion on the issue of military professionalization. He argues that. military professionalism of Taiwan armed forces was deteriorating throughout the years instead of strengthening for five reasons: (1) insufficient training; (2) the rigid thinking among military officers; (3) the impact of political warfare system; (4) doctrinal changes; and (5) the impact of formality, hypocrisy, and administrative burdens. See Sun Chin-ming, “Taiwan: Toward a Higher Degree of Military Professionalism” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives, Honolulu: East-West Center, 2001, pp. 65-72. 10. Cheng, Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan, pp. 126-133.. 11. Bernard Cole, Taiwan’s Security: History and Prospects, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, p.. 138. 7.

(9) Taiwan independence. 12 Other word, the military would support KMT if the DPP advocated Taiwan independence. Lee Teng-hui’s term also witnessed a series of constitutional reform. These changes have an impact on the establishment of civilian control. The introduction of new National Defense Law and the Ministry of National Defense Organization Law that produce separation of the military command system and military administration system was one example that proved to be critical in placing military under civilian control. 13 These two laws placed the Chief of General Staff under the Minister of. 政治大 forced the military to be fully placed under civilian control both executive and 立 Defense which was over sighted by the Legislative Yuan. Its mean that the two laws. legislative powers.. ‧ 國. 學. Apart from the abovementioned achievements in the establishment of civilian. ‧. control during Lee’s era, critical assessment must also be pointed out.. sit. y. Nat. Democratization process during Lee’s era did not only bring about progress toward. io. er. the establishment of civilian control but also introduce harsher competition among groups, including among civilian groups, over variety of issues. In his attempt to. al. n. v i n C h conducted steps U acquire full power Lee skillfully that resulted in sidestepping several engchi. strong and important military figures. Lee managed, for example, in removing. General Hau Pei-tsun which was considered as important military strongmen with 12. Yang Chi-lin, Military Politics in the Transition to Democracy: Changing Civil-Military Relations in. the Republic of China (Taiwan), 1949-1994, unpublished dissertation at the University at Albany, State University of New York, p. 240. 13. Arthur Shu-fan Ding and Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “Taiwan’s Military in the 21st Century:. Redefinition and Reorganization” in Larry M. Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century, Carlisle, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999, pp. 253-288 and Michael S. Chase, “Defense Reform in Taiwan: Problems and Prospect” in Asian Survey 45:3 (2005), pp. 366-371. It must be noted that the Legislative Yuan did not pass those laws and those law did not go into effect until Chen’s term. 8.

(10) different view from Lee. Lee was clearly adopted subjective control during his presidency. He took an opposite strategy from that of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo –which preferred direct control over the military– since he understood that he could not act like his two predecessors for a number of reasons including his lack of influence among the military. 14 In conclusion, we may say that during Lee’s tenure, Taiwan was heading to the right direction toward the establishment of civilian control over the military. However, Lee’s tenure also witnessed sharper conflict of identity among Taiwanese. 政治大 reached its peak with the victory of Chen Shui-bian as the president of Taiwan. The 立 political groups. The mounting political rivalry between the KMT and the DPP. military faced a new challenge of placing its loyalty to the new administration. The. ‧ 國. 學. new ruling party also faced similar challenge in their effort to further strengthen. ‧. civilian control. The efforts to establish civilian control, an objective one, was further. sit. y. Nat. complicated by the quarrel between the KMT and DPP. The rivalry grew stronger. io. er. with DPP’s failure to gain majority in the Legislative Yuan. This failure prevented Chen’s government from fully implementing their desired policies in military and. al. n. v i n C hrelated issue suchUas Mainland policy. The KMT and defense affairs and any security engchi. its coalition partner –pan-blue camp– consistently blocked policies taken by the DPP administration to prevent the pan-green from gaining political victory. During the next eight years of Chen Shui-bian presidency Taiwan suffered from persistent political quarrels. How did Chen’s government deal with these quarrels in their attempt to establish civilian control in Taiwan? What type of control would be the result? Those are the questions I would like to address in this thesis. In particular, this thesis will 14. York W. Chen, Fragile Partnership: Taiwan’s Pol-Mil Relations, 2000-2008 paper presented at the. Henry L. Stimson Center on 25 September 2009. 9.

(11) also seek the answer of how the threat environment surrounding Taiwan security influencing the type of civilian control.. 1.2.. Methodology. This research will be conducted through both quantitative and qualitative approaches. I will rely mostly on secondary data and analyses from existing academic literatures and primary data from the Ministry of Defense Affairs, Legislative Yuan, Presidential office, and other related agencies’ publications. In addition, I will also use in-depth. 政治大 the period under study to support my argument. 立 Literature Review and Limitations. 學. 1.3.. ‧ 國. interviews with academics and person in-charge of military and defense affairs during. ‧. Most literature on civil-military relations in Taiwan place civilian control in the. sit. y. Nat. context of transition to democracy. They, according to Fravel, treat civilian control or. io. er. civilian supremacy as a dependent variable of the democratization process instead of the interdependent variable that explains the success of democratization process. 15. al. n. v i n C ash the final result ofUtransition to democracy or as one Civilian control is considered engchi of the goals of the transformation from authoritarian to democratic society.. Meanwhile, in historical approach, those studies are usually divided into two major periods, i.e. period under martial law and period following the lifting of the martial law. The lifting of martial law is commonly used as the starting point of transition to democratic civilian control in Taiwan. As a result, most assessments on the issue of civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era are analyzing the issue in the framework of democratization process.. 15. Fravel, “Toward Civilian Supremacy,” p. 58. 10.

(12) Yisuo Tzeng frames the issue of the establishment of civilian control in Taiwan in the context of nationalization of the military. 16 He sees a neutral military, the one that does not involved in practical politics, as an important feature of civilian control. The nationalization of the military (or guojiahua; 國家化) requires the depoliticization of the military and it has four indicators, i.e. decreasing activities and the withdrawal of the KMT party connections in the security sectors, the implementation of rule of law and the cultivation of apolitical, democratic professional norms work through the legislation and enforcement of regulations that. 政治大 promotion strategy adopted by civilian leaders is a political choice regardless of 立 stipulates security officers’ political roles and activities, whether or not the personnel. professional concern, and the way the security sector copes with political. ‧ 國. 學. controversies. The success or failure of that process, according to Tzeng, is. ‧. determined by three factors: threat environment, democratization outcomes, and. sit. y. Nat. party-military legacy.. io. er. A particularly interesting and relevant point with this thesis is Tzeng’s assessment on the existence of China threat which he concludes as having a small. al. n. v i n C h Chen Shui-bianUpresidency (Tzeng’s research stops impact on civilian control. During engchi. at 2007 instead of 2008), Tzeng concludes that “civil-military relations continue to exhibit the general trends toward civilian control and apolitical professionalism, however, the control pattern has gone a bit awry off the path towards the objective control and turned to an uncertain direction.” 17 Three factors are responsible for this uncertainty of direction: i.e. the absence of political will, military’s culture that remains reluctant to follow the reform protocols and resistant to accept civilian 16. Yisuo Tzeng, Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Taiwan, 1986-2007, unpublished. dissertation at George Washington University, 2009. 17. Ibid, p. 197. 11.

(13) control, and the politicization of defense issues by civilian politicians. 18 This conclusion suggests that the existence of civilian control is actually more as a function of democratization devices and party-military legacy rather than threat environment. Specifically, the direction of civilian control over the military in Taiwan is defined by politicization and de-politicization of defense/security issues by civilian politicians. Tzeng also argues that the lack of correlation between threat environment and civilian control is due to the lack of leadership, the ideological incongruence between civilians and the military, and the incoherence within the civilian camps. Moreover,. 政治大 approach or to deal with the threat instead of over the identification of threat itself. In 立 he notices that the incoherence within the civilian camps appears over how to. conclusion, Tzeng argues that the subjective type of control during Chen Shui-bian. ‧ 國. 學. era is a result of the overt-securitization conducted by Chen’s government in order to. ‧. bypass this difference in threat identification.. sit. y. Nat. Another research on civilian control during Chen Shui-bian era that places. io. er. emphasis on the democratization process is the work of York Chen. Chen writes that to understand civil-military relations in Taiwan one must take into consideration the. al. n. v i n democratization process in C Taiwan which influences h e n g c h i U the search for balance in the. relationships between the military and civilian. 19 In addition, he also notices the role of “the absence or evaporation of cultural, institutional, or leadership leverage.” 20 Similar with Tzeng’s conclusion, Chen suggests that Chen Shui-bian tended to adopt subjective control. However, unlike Tzeng, Chen argues that the politicization of the military was an unintended result of tension between DPP and KMT. Chen sees the attempt to establish an objective control at that time as hardly possible due to the 18. Ibid, pp. 197-198.. 19. Chen, Fragile Partnership.. 20. Ibid, p. 1. 12.

(14) high tension in domestic politics. This tension took place in many occasions in which Chen analyze five major cases, i.e. the initiation of doctrinal change, the implementation of arms procurement package (both occurred during the first term of Chen’s presidency), the removal of two Chiangs’ symbolic legacy, the institutionalization of annual Yu-Shan exercises, and the establishment of Taiwangoal Company (the last three cases took place during the second term). In conclusion, Chen makes four conclusions regarding the establishment of civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era. First, Chen Shui-bian’s. 政治大 connection which remains strong. Instead, he made efforts to build a constructive 立. attempts to establish an objective control were not possible due to the KMT-military. engagement of defense policy and took a pragmatic standing on defense reform as. ‧ 國. 學. strategy to win support from the military and to break KMT-party connection. Second,. ‧. the failure to gain majority in the parliament has caused Chen’s government an. sit. y. Nat. inherent weakness in his efforts to create objective control. This problem prevented. io. er. Chen from adopting an objective type of control. Third, Chen’s failure to insert a civilian defense minister also contributes to his failure to establish an objective. al. n. v i n C hto create an institutional control. Fourth, Chen managed design of the MND that is engchi U favorable to the establishment of an objective type of control.. David Kuehn suggests that democratization in Taiwan brought a smooth transition to the establishment of civilian control in Taiwan. 21 He gives credit to civilian leaders’ ability to foster the establishment of civilian control despite of the existing political contestations. The democratization process in Taiwan is the main reason for the absence of military intervention in politics. The existence of strong civilian political institutions is limiting military ability and chance to enter the core of 21. David Kuehn, “Democratization and the Civilian Control of the Military in Taiwan,” in. Democratization 15: 5 (December 2008), pp. 870-890. 13.

(15) political arena. Using Croissant’s framework on military exogenous and endogenous factors of military obedience, Kuehn finds the following result.. Table 1.2. Context factors and their influence on civilian control strategies Source: Kuehn, “Democratization and Civilian Control of the Military in Taiwan,” p. 883 Factor Value Influence on Control Strategies Initial Authoritarian Civilian-dominated one-party Civilians direct course, speed, Conditions regime type regime and scope of democratization; Mode of Transition “from above” military not able to decide over transition its autonomies Military Corporate Increasing democratic Promotes the principles of endogenous ideology professionalization of the political neutrality and civilian factors officers corps supremacy Institutional Sub-ethnic cleavage and inter- Weakens the military’s ability cohesion services rivalries to act as an unitary power group; enables divide and conquer” strategies Economic Decreasing economic activity Reduces material resources of the military independence and increases civilian leverage over the military Military Support for High support rates for Stabilizes civilian elite exogenous civilian regime democratic regime, good position and discourages factors economic performance, no stronger political role of the civic preferences for military military regime Civilian elites Civilian consensus, but lack of Conductive for civilian defense expertise and demilitarization of politics, but political capital hampers stronger civilian role in external defense Civil society Active but peaceful civil Provides public scrutiny and societal mobilization pressure to support official civilian control instruments Security Existential external threat, no Mitigates political conflicts, environment internal threats directs military attention toward external mission International Dependence on military Support civilian efforts to influence support from the US change defense strategy. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. One important note from Kuehn’s work is his assessment that Taiwanese leaders used appeasement in the form of promotion preferences which proved to be an important blocking factor of the establishment of democratic or objective civilian control. Another research by Wei-chin Lee also focuses on the issue of transforming Taiwan’s military from one with strong inclination to the KMT to one with non14.

(16) partisan character. 22 He asks the question of military loyalty to the new administration which previously was their rival. Lee assessment focuses on DPP-military hatred and how the DPP government built their policies to promote democratic civilian control. His finding suggests that several policies such as “promotion and advancement based on candidate’s ideological inclination as practiced by Taiwan’s political leaders since 2000 will not advance civilian control of the military.” 23 Lee criticizes Chen’s policies which he considered as failed to enhance military professionalism and depoliticization of the military.. 政治大 civilian control in Taiwan, most scholars put emphasis on identity politics as the most 立. Such a literature review indicates that in analyzing the establishment of. influential independent variables. Apart from identity politics, some also give. ‧ 國. 學. emphasis on the role of the US in shaping Taiwan security policy making, and. ‧. including in it is the establishment of civilian control. This thesis limits the analysis. sit. y. Nat. on the external threat perception factor in shaping the civilian control in Taiwan. This. io. er. does not mean that the external factor is the only factor or the most influential factor in shaping civilian control. The conclusion of this research will add another possible. al. n. v i n C h of civilian control explanation on the establishment in Taiwan (see the following engchi U figure).. 22. Wei-chin Lee, “The Greening of the Brass: Taiwan’s Civil-Military Relations since 2000” in Asian. Security 3: 3 (2007), pp. 204-227. 23. Ibid, p. 221. 15.

(17) Figure 1.2. The explanations of the type of civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian Era. 1.4.. 政治大. Thesis Outline. 立. This thesis will be organized as follow: Introduction. ‧ 國. 學. 1.. 1.1. Background. ‧. 1.2. Methodology. Nat. sit. y. 1.3. Literature Review and Limitations. al. n. 2.. er. io. 1.4. Thesis Outline Theoretical Framework. Ch. engchi. 2.1. The Definition of Civilian Control 2.2. Threat and Civilian Control 2.3. Conclusion: Proposed Framework 3.. The Typology of Civilian Control 3.1. Framework 3.2. Assessment 3.2.1.. Military Autonomy. 3.2.2.. Intra-Civilian Rivalry. 3.2.3.. Interpenetration 16. i n U. v.

(18) 3.3. Conclusion 4.. The Perception of China Threat 4.1. Framework 4.1.1.. The China Threat. 4.1.2.. The Identification of Threat 4.1.2.1. The Actual Threat 4.1.2.2. The Intention to Use Force. 4.1.3.. The Strategy to Cope with Threat. 4.2. Assessment 4.3. Conclusion. 立. Conclusion. 學 ‧. ‧ 國 io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. 5.. 政治大. Ch. engchi. 17. i n U. v.

(19) Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework. The goal of this chapter is to build a proposed-framework to explain the type of control and its relations with the congruency of external threat perception among civilian groups. This thesis argues that the type of control is actually defined by the congruency of external threat perception among civilians.. 政治大. This chapter will be divided into four parts. The first part provides the review. 立. of general theory on civilian control. It focuses on the definition of civilian control,. ‧ 國. 學. how to measure civilian control, and the typology of civilian control. The second part explains the external threat as factor that explains civilian control. A debate between. ‧. Harold Lasswell and Michael Desch over the impact of external security environment. y. Nat. sit. to the degree of control will be presented as focal point to develop the framework.. n. al. er. io. This thesis argues that it is the perception of external threat rather than the degree of. i n U. v. threat that has more effect on the type of control. The third part presents a review on. Ch. engchi. the existing literatures on civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era. Finally, a proposed-framework and hypothesis will be the conclusion of this chapter. The hypothesis of this thesis is that “a convergent China threat perception among civilian groups tends to establish an objective type of civilian control.” Two notes are needed to clarify the intention of this thesis. First, this thesis does not argue that the congruency of external threat perception among civilian groups is the only factor that explains the type of civilian control. Second, it does not suggest that the congruency of external threat perception among civilian groups is the most determining factor to the type of civilian control since such conclusion can only 18.

(20) be drawn after making a comparative assessment with the other explaining factors such as domestic politics or external pressure.. 2.1.. The Definition of Civilian Control. What is civilian control referring to? Muthiah Alagappa defines civilian control as “government’s control of the military” and the criterion of civilian control is “the extent to which the armed forces as a whole respond to the direction of the civilian leaders of government.” 24 Meanwhile, Harold Trinkunas defines civilian control as “military compliance with government authority.” 25 But, who should be defined as. 政治大. “civilian leaders”? And what does the term “extent” refer to?. 立. Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster argue that studies on civilian control usually. ‧ 國. 學. refer to “control of the military by the civilian political executive.” 26 It implies that in most cases control over the military does not also include oversight by legislative. ‧. branch and civil society. On the question of the extent of control, an argument that. y. Nat. sit. civilian leaders should deal with the making of security policy and leaving the. n. al. er. io. technical details of the implementation to the military is more accepted than civilian. i n U. v. leaders should responsible to both policy making and implementation.. Ch. engchi. To define the extent of control, Trinkunas divides sphere of control into four areas ranging from external defense, internal security, domestic politics, and state leadership. Civilian control presupposes civilian domination in domestic politics and state leadership. Civilian control will be considered as strong if civilian dominates 24. Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspective,. Honolulu: East-West Center, 2001, p. 5. 25. Harold A. Trinkunas, “Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies: Argentina and. Venezuela” in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42:3 (Autumn 2000), p. 79. 26. Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, “The Second Generation Problematic:. Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations” Armed Forces and Society 29: 1 (Fall 2002), p. 35. 19.

(21) most areas of policymaking and shares authority with the military over some aspects of external defense policy. Meanwhile, weak civilian control refers to military domination over external defense policymaking and shared-authority between military and civilian over internal security policy. 27 The following figure shows Trinkunas’s idea.. Figure 2.1. Weak and strong institutionalized civilian control Source: Trinkunas, “Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies,” p. 85. Weak control. 立. Strong control. 政治大. n. sit. er. io. al. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Nat. Civilian-dominant Shared authority Military-dominant. i n U. v. Another way to measure the extent, or the degree, of civilian control is by. Ch. engchi. looking at whose preferences prevails the most. Michael Desch writes that “the level of civilian control can be determined by whether or not civilians prevail in disagreement with the military.” 28 Civilian control is strong when civilian preferences prevail most of the time and civilian control is weak when military preferences prevails most of the time (see the following Figure).. 27. Trinkunas, “Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies,” pp. 77-109.. 28. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, p. 5. 20.

(22) Figure 2.2. The level of civilian control Source: Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, p. 6. Worst Military preferences prevail. Mixed. Best Civilian preferences prevail. Meanwhile, Samuel Huntington differentiates civilian control into two categories: objective and subjective civilian control. 29 Huntington argues that civilian control is possible only when the power of military group is reduced. He tends to see civilian control in term of maximizing civilian power, which he termed as subjective. 政治大. control, or maximizing military professionalism, which he termed as objective control.. 立. Furthermore, Huntington’s differentiation lies in three aspects. First, subjective. ‧ 國. 學. control is featuring with intra-civilian rivalry while objective control presupposes a balance of role between civilian and military. Second, as a result of intra civilian. ‧. rivalry, subjective control presupposes military involvement in politics. This rivalry. y. Nat. sit. tends to drag the military to be involved in politics. Meanwhile, objective control. n. al. er. io. terminates military involvement in politics. And finally, subjective control is. i n U. v. characterized by the civilianizing of military while objective control is characterized. Ch. engchi. by the militarizing of military. Other word, in subjective control there is an expanding role of the military while in objective control there is a more focused role of the military to defend the state. In addition, David Goldsworthy suggests that in subjective control “there is a permeation of the military by civilian values or a convergence of interest” while the essence of objective control is the recognition of an autonomous military sphere. 30. 29. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 80.. 30. David Goldsworthy, “Civilian Control of the Military in Black Africa” in African Affairs 80: 318. (January 1981), pp. 53-54. 21.

(23) Another way to differentiate subjective from objective civilian control is by looking at the indicators of military professionalism. In relating civilian control and military professionalism, Alaggapa finds out as the following. 31. Table 2.1. Relating civilian control based and military professionalism Source: Alagappa, Military Professionalism in Asia, p. 7. Professionalism Objective civilian control Subjective civilian control characteristic Expertise Highly specialized management of Military role is no sharply differentiate from violence skill; military role sharply other groups; military and political role differentiated from other social and indistinguishable political roles Social Military’s client is the state and Military’s allegiance is to a specific form of responsibility society; its responsibility is to government, social class, or ethnic group; its defend them from external responsibility is to defend privileged aggression; it is a tool of state position and rights of that government or policy group against other groups in society; as participant and tool in power struggle among different civilian groups, military has an internal focus Corporateness Sharp line between military and No clear divide between military and society; politically and socially society; military is not a distinct group set isolated from society, military is a apart from society; it reflects dominant distinct group with its own value values and divisions in society system and organization. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. sit. y. Nat. io. al. er. In conclusion, the differentiation between subjective and objective control lies. v i n C hof intra-civilianUrivalry, existence engchi. n. in three aspects, i.e. the establishment of clear boundaries of role between civilian and the military, the. and the existence of. interpenetration. My framework to analyze the type of control will be based on these three indicators. 32. 31. Alagappa, Military Professionalism in Asia, p. 7. Alagappa’s indicators of military professionalism. are following Huntington’s ideals. She differentiates Huntington’s ideals of military professionalism which she termed as old professionalism from Stepan’s definition of military professionalism which she termed as new professionalism. For detail of Stepan’s new professionalism see Alfred Stepan, “The New professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Extension” in Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973. 32. Further explanation will be given in the first part of Chapter 2. 22.

(24) 2.2.. Threat and Civilian Control. Another puzzle with regard to the study of civilian control is concerning with the factors that contribute to civilian control. Desch argues that an important explaining factor to the degree of civilian control over the military is the existence of threat. 33 He differentiates threat according to the intensity and the source of threat and concludes the following pattern.. Figure 2.3. Civilian control of the military as a function of threats Source: Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, p. 14. 立. Internal threats. High. 政治大. Low. Poor (Q3). Worst (Q4). Good (Q1). Mixed (Q2). 學. Low. ‧. ‧ 國. External threats. High. In quadrant 1 (Q1), state facing high external threats and low internal threats. y. Nat. sit. supposedly has the most stable civil-military relations. A demanding international or. n. al. er. io. regional insecurity environment is more likely to bring to power a civilian. i n U. v. experienced leadership with extensive knowledge in security affairs. The military. Ch. engchi. focus will be outward due to the high level of external threats that further contributes to their expertise and skill. It will force the military to stay away from politics and the civilians are more likely to rely on sort of Huntington’s objective control by trusting military to fight wars. Both civilian and military will be unified since they have to place national survival as first priority.. 33. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military. I do not intend to explain another explaining variable of. civilian control. To get a preliminary understanding on factors that influencing civilian control see Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations” in Annual Review of Political Science, 2 (1999), especially pp. 222-224. 23.

(25) In the case of both high external and internal threats (Q3), a challenging security situation may bring an experienced civilian leader(s) but lead civilian leader(s) to adopt subjective control due to the existence of high internal threat and use the military in preserving his own needs and interests. High level of internal threat also contributes to the split in both civilian and military. In some cases, a coalition of civilian-military faction in order to preserve power can take place. The similar result can be applied for the low internal and external threats on which an unclear focus of security priority will give place to the split of both civilian and military that may. 政治大 opposite result from that of Q1 can occur in the case of low external threat and high 立. resulted in a coalition of civilian-military factions in the struggle of power. A contrary. internal threat. In this case, military will be inward oriented and tend to be used by. ‧ 國. 學. civilian leader(s) to crack down their political opponents. Military’s client is not state. ‧. but certain groups that rule the country.. sit. y. Nat. An opposite assessment from Desch’s logic is given by Harold Lasswell.. io. er. Lasswell argues that in a challenging international threat environment it will be difficult for civilian authority to control the military than in a relatively benign one. In. al. n. v i n C hbe dominated byUmilitary officers who possess the such circumstances, state will engchi. management, technical operations, and public relations skills. An unfriendly international security environment will force the military to acquire those skills necessary for securing the survival of the state. Under such circumstances, the military can easily use the high degree of threat to manipulate population in order to gather public support and stay in power. 34 In addition, military obedience toward civilian leadership, according to Aurel Croissant, is determined by combination of endogenous (push) and extraneous (pull) 34. Harold Lasswell, “The Garrison State” in The American Journal of Sociology 46:4 (January 1941),. pp. 455-468. 24.

(26) factors. 35 Two important extraneous factors of the military restraint are internal and external security –and the other two are economic development and configuration of civil actors. Meanwhile, the endogenous factor includes ideological coherence, organizational cohesion, economic interests, and the availability of resources. In the case of Taiwan, Fiona Yap finds out that the impact of external and domestic threats to military’s restraint is somehow weak. 36 She contends that in the case of Taiwan three contributing factors to military restraint are poor economic condition, domestic unrest, and a divided legislature.. 2.3.. 政治大 Conclusion: Proposed Framework 立. ‧ 國. 學. Drawing from the abovementioned explanation, this thesis argues that civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian could be explained by looking at the congruency of. ‧. China threat perception among civilian groups. The following is the proposed. sit. y. Nat. framework to analyze civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era. A clear. io. al. er. note must be made not to confuse reader that the independent variable of the type of. n. civilian control is not only the perception of external threat, which this thesis will be dealt with.. 35. 37. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Aurel Croissant, “Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea” in. Armed Forces and Society 30:3 (Spring 2004), pp. 357-381. 36. O. Fiona Yap, Military Restraint in South Korea and Taiwan: Evidence and Lessons, paper presented. at the Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference, April 15-18 2004 at the Chicago Palmer House. David Kuehn assesses the case of Taiwan using Croissant’s framework. The result will be included in the next part. 37. Please bear in mind the limitations of this research as already stated earlier in Chapter 1. 25.

(27) Figure 2.4. Proposed framework to analyze the type of civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era. The term congruency refers to the divergent or convergent perception of China threat among civilian groups. This will include two components. The first is the. 政治大. identification of threat and the second is the strategy to cope with those threats. The. 立. identification of threat is referring to two items. The first is the actual threat that came. ‧ 國. 學. from China while the later is the perceived China threat which basically deals with. ‧. China’s intention to use its actual threat. Meanwhile, the second item focuses on whether or not civilian groups in Taiwan believe that China will use its force to. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. sit. occupy Taiwan.. i n U. v. Table 2.2. Independent variable: the congruency of China threat perception among civilian groups Indicators Category Identification of threat Convergent or divergent The actual threat from China China’s intention to use force The strategy to cope with the threat Convergent or divergent. Ch. engchi. Meanwhile, the dependent variable of this thesis, the type of control, as already suggested in the first part of this section, will follow Huntington’s division of subjective and objective control. The indicators of the type of control in this thesis are including the military autonomy or the existence of clear boundaries between civilian and military domain, the nature of intra-civilians relationship or more precisely the existence of intra-civilian rivalry, and existence of interpenetration. 26.

(28) Table 2.3. Dependent variable: the type of control Indicators Objective control Military autonomy Clear The existence of intra-civilian Not exist rivalry Interpenetration Not exist. Category Subjective control Unclear Exist Exist. The thesis only produces one hypothesis as follow. A convergent perception of China threat within civilian tends to create objective civilian control. A more detail explanation of each variable will be made in the following two chapters.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 27. i n U. v.

(29) Chapter 3 The Typology of Civilian Control. Analyzing the civilian control is one of challenging task. The major question is on the issue of how to measure the degree of civilian control. If we follow Desch’s idea to measure the degree of control by looking at whose preferences are more prevailing if there is disagreement between civilian authorities and the military the problem then is. 政治大. does the military dare to publicly voicing different opinion from that of civilian. 立. authorities? 38 To overcome this difficulty, most scholars that deal with the issue of. ‧ 國. 學. measuring the degree of civilian control will have to rely on personal accounts. In the face of such challenge, in this thesis, instead of measuring the degree of control I. ‧. prefer to identify the type of control by following Huntington’s division of civilian. sit. y. Nat. control.. n. al. er. io. This chapter will analyze the type of control adopted by Chen’s government. It. i n U. v. starts with developing a framework on the typology of civilian control. Three. Ch. engchi. indicators will be used in the analysis, which are: military autonomy, the intra-civilian rivalry, and interpenetration. I am assuming the military as solid entity due to the existence of a solid and strict line of command and therefore do not consider intraservices rivalry as equally important to intra-civilian rivalry. The analysis on those three indicators will be the focus of the second part. The final part of this chapter is the conclusion.. 38. An interview with an academic from Tamkang University. This question is off course not the case of. the praetorian type of governances. 28.

(30) 3.1.. Framework. Huntington’s division of subjective and objective control is closely related to military’s political involvement in politics. In simple definition, subjective control is related to an overt involvement by the military in area other than their designated area while objective control related to military neutrality in politics in which the military’s political role is limited to their designated area. This division assumes sharp distinction between the military area and civilian area. There must be clear boundaries that divide the military from the society. The. 政治大 of boundaries must also. existence of these boundaries will define which type of control will prevail. Furthermore, the existence. 立. be accompanied with the. cohesiveness of both the military and civilian. Since the military is required to have. ‧ 國. 學. strict line of command and spirit of togetherness –esprit de corps– one can easily. ‧. assumes that the military would have such cohesiveness. This is not the case with the. sit. y. Nat. civilian. In the case where civilian is solid, military involvement in area other than. io. er. their designated area will be less possible. On the contrary, if civilian is segregated into rival groups the military might easily be dragged to area other than their. al. n. v i n C h to area otherUthan their designated area is not the designated area. Military penetration engchi only factor that can determine the type of control. Civilian penetration to military designated area could also determine the type of control. Huntington’s work on the type of control gives weight on the concept of military professionalism. His understanding of professionalism is closely related to the idea of military neutrality in politics. It is noteworthy that this neutrality means military should play role only in their designated area as explained above. Huntington’s attempt to link military professionalism with the absence of military political role is severely under attacks. 29.

(31) Samuel Finch is among those who refuse the idea to define military professionalism in term of military neutrality in politics. He argues that “higher levels of military professionalization have historically resulted in more institutionalized military intervention of politics and high levels of military autonomy.” 39 His conclusion implies that military will always play role in politics no matter how the civil-military relations look like. Finch then divides the pattern of civil-military relations in the following types: democratic control, conditional subordination, military tutelage, and military control. 政治大. (see Figure 3.1.). 40 The difference between those patterns lies in the degree of military role in politics.. 立. In a consolidated democratic control, the military is fully subordinate to. ‧ 國. 學. civilian authorities. 41 Civilian authorities are responsible to determine the budget and. ‧. defense policy with the appropriate consultation and advice from the military. Civilian. sit. y. Nat. authorities are also responsible to supervise military education and professional. io. er. socialization. If necessary, civilian authorities can make take steps to establish military reforms in order to ensure democratic control. Those are the boundaries of. al. n. v i n C hOn conditional subordination, military area from civilian area. Finch writes that “the engchi U. military reserves its right to intervene to protect national interest” but remain abstain from politics under normal condition. 42 Meanwhile, in military tutelage, the military participate in policy making and exercise oversight over civilian authorities –the later would not be the case of civilian control.. 39. J. Samuel Finch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America, Baltimore and London: The. John Hopkins University Press, 1998, p. 3. 40. Ibid, pp. 38-43.. 41. Ibid, p. 41.. 42. Ibid, p.40. 30.

(32) Figure 3.1. Patterns of Civil-Military Relations Source: Finch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America, p.39. Democratic control Civilian. Military Policy control Conditional subordination Indirect influence in limited scope. Civilian. Military Limited policy control Military tutelage Direct and indirect influence. Civilian. Military Low policy control Military control Political control. Civilian. 立. 政治大. Military. The extent of military role in politics, according to Claude E. Welch, Jr. and. ‧ 國. 學. Arthur K. Smith is depending on four components, i.e. the extent of political. ‧. participation, political strength of the military, strength of civilian institutions, and military-institutional boundaries. 43 The latter component, according to Welch, Jr. and. y. Nat. io. sit. Smith, is the most important component to define civilian control. If the boundaries. n. al. er. are integral –meaning that “the military role and structure are sharply differentiated. Ch. i n U. v. from the other organizations in making up the total system” 44– the pattern of civilian. engchi. control will be objective. Meanwhile, if the boundaries are fragmented the pattern of civilian control will be subjective. In the case where civic polity has integral institutional boundaries, “the degree of interpenetration between the military and civilian authority structures is low.” 45 This is possible when the military has had a good degree of autonomy so that the. 43. Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule, North Scituate, Massachusetts:. Duxbury Press, 1974, pp. 34-77. 44. Ibid, p. 40.. 45. Ibid, p. 44. 31.

(33) civilian authorities cannot interfere in. This autonomy is given over “the management of the formally organized resources of coercion.” 46 To further ensure objective control, the existence of legitimate civilian political institutions that govern effectively is required. These legitimate and effective political institutions would prevent the military from entering the civilian area. In the fragmented boundaries condition, the military is most likely to lose their autonomy. This could take place if civilian authorities are under serious pressures from another civilian group or groups drag the military into area that is not their designated area to gain power.. 政治大 of the military as “the absence of military participation in spheres of politics outside 立. Working exclusively on the case of Taiwan, Fravel defines political neutrality. the limited domain of defense policy.” 47 He even goes further to identify six. ‧ 國. 學. indicators of military political neutrality as loyalty to the constitution, involvement in. ‧. domestic politics, selection of government officials, domestic policy implementation,. sit. y. Nat. clear and defined external security mission, and party involvement. 48. io. er. Drawing from the abovementioned explanation and the theoretical framework available in Chapter 2, I will use the following questions to analyze the type of. n. al. i n C hChen Shui-bian era. civilian control in Taiwan under engchi U. v. 1. Are there integral institutional boundaries that enabled the military to be autonomous? 2. Does the rivalry among civilian groups that potentially drag the military to enter political arena exist? 3. Does the penetration by the military into civilian area or by the civilian into military area exist?. 46. Ibid.. 47. Ibid, p. 63.. 48. Fravel, “Toward Civilian Supremacy,” pp. 63-68. 32.

(34) If we put those questions in table, it will look like the following Table.. Table 3.1. Framework to analyze the type of civilian control Integral institutional Rivalry within civilian Military or civilian boundaries that clearly camps penetration into area segregated the military other than their from the society designated area (military’s autonomy) Exist Exist Exist Does not exist Does not exist Exist Does not exist Does not exist Exist Exist Does not exist Does not exist Exist Does not exist Note:. 立. 政治大. Subjective control Objective control. Assessment. ‧ 國. 學. 3.2.. Result (objective/subjective control). My assessment in the following part will be based on the framework that has. ‧. previously been developed. It starts with the issue of the existence of integral. sit. y. Nat. boundaries that set up military autonomy followed by the assessment on rivalry within. n. al. er. io. civilian camps that open the possibility of military involvement and ended with the. v. question of whether the military or civilian are conducting any penetration to the area that is not theirs.. Ch. engchi. i n U. A clarification of the area is required before I start my analysis. This civilian area is referring to all area other than defense policy and certain part of defense policy. In the defense policy area, both the military and civilian do not have full autonomy and must share responsibilities and rights. The military role is limited to build the technical decision and to give advice as required by civilian authorities –some would say requested by civilian authorities. Other words, the civilian authorities are required to hold consultations with the military in the defense policy making for three reasons: due to the military possession an expertise in defense affairs, to protect military 33.

(35) interests and resources, and to prevent any misuse of the military by civilian authorities.. 3.2.1. Military Autonomy Previous literatures suggest that the area where military could play role in politics is limited to certain area of defense policy. Civilian authorities still hold right to make defense policy but they must do so in close consultations with the military. The military role is limited to that of providing advice to civilian authority and making the technical detail to follow up and implement the policy that has been made by civilian. 政治大. authorities. The term close consultations are referring to a more bottom-up process. 立. rather than top-down process. This implies that civilian authorities shall take into. ‧ 國. 學. serious consideration any of military’s proposal. This step is important to ensure that civilian will not make decision based on their political needs and interests or open the. ‧. possibility of military involvement in politics due to grievances.. y. Nat. sit. The existence or non-existence of military autonomy will define which type of. n. al. er. io. civilian control. If the military has their autonomy, there is a greater possibility for the. i n U. v. establishment of an objective control and, on the contrary, the absence of military. Ch. engchi. autonomy tends to create a subjective control.. In the case of Taiwan, the military-society segregation started to receive greater attention after the lifting of the martial law. It went in parallel with the introduction of democracy in Taiwan. 49 During the period under martial law, the military possessed an excessive role in domestic politics. They were not only dealing with external defense affairs but also involving in preserving domestic stability. The. 49. Yang, Military Politics in the Transition to Democracy, p. 271. 34.

(36) military worked as party’s tool to establish control over the society. The separation between the military and society simply did not exist. 50 The introduction and development of democracy change the whole landscape of military role in politics. The military role in politics changed from a sort of Nation Builder in Edmunds, Forster and Cottey’s term into National Security. 51 Taiwan military started to focus on external defense and leaving rather than national security as a whole. Previously, the military’s main task was to protect the state from external threat and internal vulnerability. The later referred to communist infiltration and. 政治大 with the lifting of the martial law. Military’s responsibility for domestic security were 立. Taiwan independence movement. The introduction of integral boundaries culminated. taken over by police authorities and other related governmental organs.. ‧ 國. 學. The termination of the Expediency Act in 1991, the disbandment of the. ‧. Garrison Command and other repressive apparatus that previously were very. sit. y. Nat. dominant in maintaining domestic security during Lee Teng-hui era were some of the. io. er. efforts to clearly define the boundaries between the military and non-military organizations. During Lee Teng-hui era, the separation between the military and. al. n. v i n C hthe military role as theUagent of political socialization in his work. Monte R. Bullard clearly describes engchi. 50. His work defines the non-existence of military-society separation. However, he tends to argue that this absence of separation does not necessarily mean that there is a lack of civilian control. In fact, this overt political role of the military was one of the most important reasons behind the development of Taiwan economy. See Monte R. Bullard, The Soldier and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan’s Development, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997. 51. Edmunds, Forster, and Cottey distinguishes military role within society into five categories, i.e.. National Security, Nation Builder, Regime Defence, Domestic Military Assistance, and Military Diplomacy. The National Security role means that the military role is limited to defend the society from external threat that might threaten the security of the society. Meanwhile, the Nation Builder role means that the military is a key agent of nation-building. For detail see Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster and Andrew Cottey, “Armed Forces and Society: a Framework for Analysis” in Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey, Eds., Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, pp. 1-22. 35.

(37) society started to grow. The heated debate over two national defense laws was actually an attempt to reach consensus among related-parties on the extent the military role in politics. The introduction of the two laws which took place during Chen Shui-bian era normatively set the organizational boundaries between the military and civilian. The boundaries were clearly defined in which the military was positioned under full civilian control. The military was not only subject to executive control –by the Minister of Defense– but also subject to legislative oversight from Legislative Yuan.. 政治大 In conclusion, the military did have their autonomy with the enactment of two 立. Taiwan has been able to create a normative framework for civilian control.. national defense laws during Chen Shui-bian tenure. However, this autonomy was. ‧ 國. 學. without flaws. An example of these problems concerned with the MND power,. ‧. according to the National Defense Law and the Ministry of National Defense. y. sit. io. er. the CGS. 52. Nat. Organization Law, to make important personnel decision which previously held by. The decision to concentrate power on the hand of civilian authorities could. n. al. Ch. have two consequences. First, this strategy. engchi. v i n could U lead. to military intervention.. Concentrating power on the hand of civilian, including those often regarded as “military decision” such as personnel policy could threaten military interests and values. As Croissant has argued, the safety of military interests and resources are among two endogenous factors that might provoke military intervention. 53 If this is the case, the goal of de-politicization of the military will fail. Second, if such decision is taken place in a segregated civilian camp, the application of subjective control would be more likely to happen. The civilian authorities could misuse the personnel 52. Chase, “Defense Reform in Taiwan,” p. 368.. 53. Croissant, “Riding the Tiger”, pp. 362-363. 36.

(38) policy as tool to attract support from the military men to win political contest against their rival. In Taiwan case, the personnel policy could be considered as civilian penetration to military area. 54 The existence of integrated boundaries will also lead to military’s repositioning to be above politics. Meaning, the military will place their loyalty to the state and will not follow any party’s ideology. This is also an important feature in the establishment of objective control. In the case of Taiwan, military loyalty to the constitution is one particularly. 政治大 (KMT)-military connection. The statement of loyalty to the constitution in Taiwan is 立. important issue in the establishment of civilian control due to the long history of party. often regarded as an assurance for military neutrality in politics. Fravel notes that in. ‧ 國. 學. the wake of the 2000 presidential election, the then chief of general staff (CGS) Tang. ‧. Yao-ming pledged “to the would-be commander-in-chief that the armed forces will be. sit. y. Nat. loyal and defend the national security of the Republic of China.” 55 The similar. io. er. statement of loyalty was also vowed by General Tang after the election. In addition, General Tang has also ordered the top brass of the military to gather at Mt. Yangmin. al. n. v i n to relieve suspicions aboutC the DPP’s pro independence activity. hengchi U. 56. It indicates the. establishment of integral boundaries to ensure military autonomy.. To conclude with, Taiwan military during Chen Shui-bian era did have their autonomy. However, the military area was quite limited. In a way, this indicated the strong civilian political institutions and the weak political power of the military. Whether or not Taiwan would enjoy objective control is depending on the other two indicators. 54. The analysis of the personnel policy case will be given on the Interpenetration part.. 55. Fravel, “Toward Civilian Supremacy,” p. 66.. 56. Tzeng, Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Taiwan, pp. 152-153. 37.

(39) 3.2.2. Intra-civilian rivalry Following the legislative election in 2001, Taiwan political scene was divided into two major camps: the pan-blue and the pan-green. There were four major parties in Taiwan politics following the 2001 election (and kept the same following the 2004 election). Those are DPP (87/89 seats), KMT (67/79 seats), the People First Party (PFP – 45/32 seats), and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU – 13/12 seats). 57 The panblue camp consisted of KMT and PFP and DPP and TSU formed the pan-green. The. 政治大 policy. There is a simplified tendency when one discusses Taiwan politics to identify 立. two camps’ core difference is over the issue of national identity and Taiwan’s China. pan-blue as pro-unification and pan-green as pro-independence or pan-blue as. ‧ 國. 學. Chinese and pan-blue as Taiwanese. These identifications are neither fully flaw nor. ‧. correct.. Nat. sit. y. Chiung-chu Lin writes that two issues are particularly important in. al. er. io. understanding Taiwan political polarization and Taiwan political parties’ vote-. v. n. gathering strategy. 58 Those issues are the unification vs. independence issue and. Ch. engchi. i n U. political stability vs. political reform. Civilian camp in Taiwan is divided over these two issues in which pan-blue tends to prefer unification over independence and the pan-green is on the opposite. Meanwhile, on the issue of political stability and. 57. The first number indicates each party’s seats after 2001 election while the second indicate those of. 2004 election. The data is taken from Chia-lung Lin and I-chuang Lai, “Taiwan’s Party Reallignments in Transition” in Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao, Ed., Asian New Democracies: The Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan Compared, Taipei: Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, 2006, p. 257, 264, and 266. 58. Chiung-chu Lin, “The Role of Issue in Taiwan’s Politics, 1996-2004” in Issues and Studies 44: 1. (March 2008), pp. 71-104. Lin also covers other two issues which are economic development versus environmental protection and expansion versus contraction of social welfare program. Those two issues play a more limited role in comparison with the other two mentioned here. 38.

(40) political reform, the mapping is a little bit different. Lin argues that it is only KMT that can be regarded as supporter of stability while the other three major parties advocate reform. 59 The role of the later issue –political stability versus political reform– is somehow limited in comparison with the former –unification versus independence. That is why Taiwan political landscape is identified as two confronting blocs that divided over the identity line. The opposite camps in Taiwan politics define the other as rival in almost all issues, including on security affairs. The rivalry between pan-blue and pan-green. 政治大. appears in policy making of any affairs, including defense affairs. The problem with. 立. Taiwan defense policy making lies more on intra-Taiwan relations instead of Taiwan. ‧ 國. 學. extra-relations. 60. ‧. Taiwan experience represents case of attempts to establish civilian control in a society with deep cleavage over national identity. The establishment of civilian. y. Nat. io. sit. control is taking place in a society which has not yet done with its nation building. n. al. er. process. In such case, the possibility that threat perception will be defined by an. Ch. i n U. v. internal interest rather than external is high. This is exactly the case in Taiwan.. engchi. The issue of identity always appears in all subjects as a tool to garner voters. The differentiation between us and them is apparent. Identity issue is considered as the highest priority that debates over any issue is regarded as second priority. Tzeng. 59. Ibid, p. 83.. 60. The problem also occurs in the other sector of society life. In the area of foreign policy, Eugene. Hung-chang Kuan also makes a similar conclusion. His work on Taiwan’s UN policy indicates that the most influencing factors that drive Taiwan’s UN policy is not diplomatic needs or national interests but domestic politics. See Eugene Hung-chang Kuan, “Domestic Politics of Foreign Policy: Explaining the Formulation of Taiwan’s ‘Participate in the U.N.’ Policy” in Issues and Studies 42: 1 (March 2006), pp. 137-162. 39.

(41) shares similar conclusion when he writes that “the interlocking connections between national identity politics and national security is very likely to place strategic doctrine, arms procurements, military training, education, and diplomacy in deadlock caused by identity contestations in political and civil society.” 61 One example that shows the negative impact of rivalry over national identity to the establishment of objective civilian control is the debate over Taiwan arms procurement program. In April 2001, the Bush government offered to sell arms package to Taiwan that included 8 diesel-electric submarines, 12 P-3C Orion maritime. patrol. aircraft,. 立. 治 undersea 政integrated 大. an. surveillance. system,. 4. decommissioned KIDD-class destroyers, and some other items. In late 2001, the. ‧ 國. 學. second offer came that include tanks, helicopters and PAC-3 missile defense system (for detail see Table 3.3). 62 Those were items that Taiwan asked for.. ‧. The debate between pan-blue and pan-green soon took place following the US. y. Nat. io. sit. announcement. DPP government wanted to purchase the weaponry system while. n. al. er. KMT and its associate in the pan-blue rejected the idea. Both camps argued over the. Ch. i n U. v. utility of these weapons for enhancing Taiwan security. After several debates and. engchi. adjustments over the list of weaponry systems to be purchased, in June 2004 Chen’s government put forward a proposal for special defense budget. Michael Chase argues that the decision to use the special defense budget instead of place it in regular yearly budget plan was to avoid the debate over guns versus butter and due to the high cost that the government needed to pay to purchase these already adjusted weapon. 61. Yisuo Tzeng, What’s in a Name? Identity Politics and Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan paper. prepared for MPSA 2006, April 20-23, 2006 in Chicago, Illinois, USA. 62. Michael S. Chase, “Taiwan’s Arms Procurement Debate and the Demise of the Special Budget. Proposal: Domestic Politics in Command” in Asian Survey 48: 4 (2008), pp. 703-724. 40.