CHAPTER 2 Literature Review
2.1 Demographic Theories and the Second Demographic Transition
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CHAPTER 2 Literature Review
The demographic changes that began occurring in Asia in the second half of the twentieth century were preceded by similar trends in Europe. For this reason, many of the main demographic theories were developed in the West to explain the particular changes in behavior in that part of the world. Later scholars noticed the similarity of demographic trends in Asia to those that occurred in the West and proposed that some of these theories may apply outside of the West as well. Other scholars agreed that the demographic changes appeared similar but disagreed that the causes behind them were the same. This chapter gives an overview of theories and approaches for explaining and determining the cause of demographic trends. Section 2.1 summarizes the main relevant Western
demographic theories and section 2.2 outlines important research approaches of existing studies analyzing demographic transition in the West and in the East. Section 2.3 summarizes important recent studies that explain the causes of demographic change in Asia that also include Taiwan in their analyses. Finally, section 2.4 explains the theoretical framework of this research.
2.1 Demographic Theories and the Second Demographic Transition
There are three main approaches to analyzing changes in fertility, marriage, and family formation trends: those that analyze economic causes, those that analyze socio-cultural causes, and those that incorporate both types of causes into their analysis. In this section key theories for each of these approaches will be summarized. Primarily theories from 1980 on will be considered as the demographic changes of interest to this research first emerged in the 1970s.
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The neoclassical economic approach to fertility behavior was introduced by Becker (1960). His focus was to find a better explanation for the fertility trends that contradicted the Mathusian assumption that increased income would result in more children. Becker characterized children as a “consumption good” that is a source of utility for parents and the number of children would be determined by factors like
consumer tastes, “quality” of children (economic quality, not moral), family income, cost of children, and supply (ability to have children and contraception allowing tradeoffs in quantity and quality of children). Becker’s framework, while adding an important facet to the consideration of fertility cannot completely predict fertility choices. In his own words, by adding “tastes,” to his framework it “permits, although it does not predict, fertility differences that are unrelated to "economic" factors.” (p. 211). Becker (1981) argues that the tradeoff between quantity and quality of children is a key determining factor in fertility trends.
Easterlin (1980) used a macroeconomic model to explain the baby boom and subsequent bust of the 1960s and 1970s. He proposed a cyclical model of fertility in which every other generation would vary in relative size, resulting in alternating conditions. Generations with relatively smaller population sizes would have better opportunities for employment while generations with larger population sizes would have worse opportunities. Better opportunities would lead to earlier marriage and higher fertility rates, thus creating the next large generation which would have delayed marriage and lower fertility. Lesthaeghe (2014) points out that the cyclical theory is not supported by the sustained subreplacement fertility that spread through Europe beginning in the 1970s.
Cleland and Wilson (1987) challenge the predominant economic approach to explaining fertility. In examining data from multiple developing countries, they found that surveys only showed drops in desired number of children after fertility rates had already begun falling, proving that an economic model determining fertility preference through demand could not have been the cause. Their study concludes that ideational change is a far more likely to affect fertility behavior.
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Second Demographic Transition theory integrates many different features beyond fertility into one flexible model. The concept was first proposed by Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa in 1986 (Lesthaeghe, 2014). It does not disregard either economic or cultural explanations, but considers them both insufficient when considered alone and
nonredundant when considered together. Though a certain level of development is required for the transition to begin, the main focus of analysis is ideational change.
Unlike many other theories that separate demographic features and look at their causes in isolation (such as theories that analyze fertility without considering marriage), SDT theory incorporates fertility trends, marriage trends, and other life course choices as related to societal changes. The basic premise of the theory initially was that “change in attitude toward the family was seen to affect the whole process of family formation, including the dissolution of unions” (van de Kaa, 2002, p. 6).
The SDT originated as an explanation for demographic phenomena that began in the 1970s, such as “the baby bust, the systematic postponement of marriage and
parenthood, subreplacement fertility, the rise of alternative forms of partnerships, and parenthood outside marriage” (Lesthaeghe, 2014, p. 18112). It is a theory explaining changes in fertility and union formation trends, using Maslow’s theory of shifting needs as the underlying cause of ideational change driving the transition.
Maslow’s theory (1954) predicted that increasing wealth and higher levels of education, such as seen in advanced industrialized countries, would lead to “shifts away from needs associated with survival, security, and solidarity. Instead greater weight is attached to individual self-realization, recognition, grassroots democracy, expressive work, and educational values” (Lesthaeghe, 2014, p. 18113). SDT theory combines Maslowian preference drift with the idea that neither neoclassical economic logic nor cultural features are sufficient explanations for demographic change. Both are integrated into the theory “by treating ideational changes as exogenous influences that add stability to trends over and beyond economic fluctuations” (Lesthaeghe, 2014, p. 18113).
Second Demographic Transition theory rejects the conclusion that the First Demographic Transition (FDT) would result in stable populations characterized by zero growth, high life expectancy, and replacement fertility. It furthermore rejects cyclical
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fertility theory proposed by Easterlin (1980), in which economic booms and busts would lead to corresponding fluctuations in fertility. Both of these theories suggest
“equilibrium as the end point” of fertility trends (Lesthaeghe, 2014, p. 18112). SDT instead predicts “sustained subreplacement fertility” combined with “a multitude of living arrangements other than marriage, a disconnection between marriage and procreation, and no stationary population” (Lesthaeghe, 2014, p. 18112). Due to low fertility, migration is a key element in offsetting population decline.
To understand the Second Demographic Transition, it is necessary to compare it to the First Demographic Transition and highlight the changes. There are three main aspects to compare: marriage trends, fertility trends, and social changes. The FDT spanned from the 1860s to the 1960s. The percentage of the population that was married rose and remarriage in cases of widowhood or divorce were the norm. Divorce was uncommon, as was cohabitation. The age at first marriage also dropped, hitting the lowest point in the 1960s. Beginning in the 1970s with the onset of the SDT, these trends sharply changed. First marriage was delayed, overall percentages of married couples decreased, the divorce rate increased, and remarriage became less common. More couples lived together prior to marriage and cohabitation became an alternative to remarriage. For some couples, cohabitation or living separately (“living apart together,”
or LAT) replaced marriage (Lesthaeghe, 2014, p. 18112-18113).
For fertility trends, the First Demographic Transition was characterized by lower ages at first birth and lower fertility rates at later ages due to contraception, though contraception was also prone to failure. The majority of childbearing occurred within marriage and it was unusual for a married couple not to have children. During the Second Demographic Transition fertility was affected by the three revolutions of the 1960s: contraceptive, sexual, and sex (gender). More effective contraception allowed first births to be postponed while the sexual revolution meant lower ages at becoming sexually active. Questioning of divided gender roles and more women working outside the home made delayed birth more desirable for women. The result of later ages for first birth was subreplacement fertility. Additional SDT fertility changes included more
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children being born outside of marriages and more cases of childfree1 couples (Lesthaeghe, 2014).
Finally, the social conditions of the First Demographic Transition were the foundation on which the Second Demographic Transition was built. During the FDT period, society was primarily focused on “increasing household real incomes, improving working and housing conditions, raising standards of health, improving human capital through mass education, and providing a safety net for all via the gradual construction of a social security system” (Lesthaeghe, 2014, p. 118114). To meet these needs, religious and political institutions encouraged the nuclear family unit with a gendered division of labor: this was seen as the best way to meet material needs while protecting morality from the corruption of industrialization. Participation in community organizations was also a key characteristic of this time period, leading to a strong emphasis on solidarity.
Once the material concerns of the FDT were met, “higher order needs” emerged that were associated with the SDT and “centered on a triad: self-actualization in formulating goals, individual autonomy in choosing means, and a claim of recognition for their realization” (Lesthaeghe, 2014, p. 118114). Individualization and nonconformity
replaced solidarity, leading to a rejection of authority, a rise in secularization, withdrawal from community organizations, and alternative choices to the rigid family model.
Relating to gender, the SDT also resulted in more equal roles, higher levels of education for women, and more financial independence for women (Lesthaeghe, 2014).
The Second Demographic Transition was first observed in Northern and Western Europe and some critics doubted the universality of the trend. However, after the
collapse of communism in 1989, the features of the SDT immediately appeared in Central and Eastern Europe (Lesthaeghe, 2010). Southern Europe, initially thought to be an exception to the theory, experienced a delayed but more extreme version of the transition.
Marriage and fertility occurred at even later ages and “scarcely exhibited signs of fertility recuperation after age 30” (Lesthaeghe, 2010, p. 222). Combined with twenty plus
1 Current feminist discourse distinguishes between “childless” and “childfree.” The former is thought to be pejorative because it implies one is lacking something and the latter is considered to support women’s choice to not have children. This research uses the word “childfree” to refer to women who do not have children, whether due to deliberate choice or other factors. “Childless” is not used in order to avoid stigmatizing women who do not have children.
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percent of younger female generations never having children at all, SDT in Southern Europe has resulted in “lowest-low fertility.” Southern Europe also differs from Northern and Western Europe due to its “strong family system” in which children live with their parents until marriage, women may move in with their husband’s family, traditional gender roles are more persistent, and elderly parents rely on their grown children (Lesthaeghe, 2010, p. 223). The family system explains why there was a lag in cohabitation and having children outside of marriage in Southern Europe when compared to Northern and Western Europe: moral values in a culture can delay certain aspects of the SDT (Lesthaeghe, 2010).
Lastly, Second Demographic Transition theory predicts that its demographic changes “are likely to emerge in non-Western societies, provided that they equally develop a greater accentuation of Maslowian “high order needs” in tandem with the growth of solid democratic institutions protecting respect for diversity” ((Lesthaeghe, 2014, p. 118113). Allowances are made for the culturally specific context as “historical path dependency” can result in “heterogeneity in the pattern of the SDT” (Lesthaeghe, 2010, p. 225). Therefore, it is important to test the model using empirical data in each location in which the SDT is suspected to be occurring. Lesthaeghe (2010; 2014) concludes that while some evidence exists to suggest the transition is underway in Asia, more research is needed.