Source: Drilling Info International via BBC, July 2013
Oil is important for both governments, contributing greatly to the running of the basic governmental functions, including the payment of workers’ salary. During partition period, it was hoped that the mutual dependency would create an economic symbiosis: The South
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needed Sudan’s infrastructure (pipeline, processing facilities and marine terminal) to transfer and export oil at Port Sudan whereas Sudan needed the oil from the South in the form of transit fees and other payments to make up the loss from the split (Dziadosz, 2012). However, oil dispute got deeper after the partition as Sudan decided to demand the southern government high transit fees to make up for the lost income it suffered due to secession. In fact, about 98%
of state revenues in South Sudan and over half in the united Sudan relied on the oil sales before the split. In response to Khartoum’s demand, South Sudan halted all oil production and
exploitation activities.48 Although the two sides resumed the talks on oil payments in July 2012 and signed an agreement in August, outstanding disputes over the contested regions with rich oil deposits have continued to this day.49
China-Sudan Relations: Before and After Partition
China and Sudan enjoyed robust diplomatic, economic and strategic cooperation over the last two decades—ever since Jiang Zemin initiated China’s reengagement in Africa in 1996.
As China’s economy grew, the country’s foreign policy strategy in Sudan evolved. However, the split of Sudan has cast doubts on the bilateral relations with Sudan and the newly independent South Sudan. Beijing preferred multilateral engagement in the regional crisis. However, China’s trade policy, especially arms sales to the Khartoum government seemed to contradict the principle of non-interference (Sparks, 2011).50 Also, until 2007, Beijing opposed UN resolutions to deploy peace-keeping forces in Darfur (Alessi and Henson, 2012). Yet after the UN
involvement, China became the first country, and the only permanent Security Council member, to send troops to the UN missions in Darfur and the South Sudan (Shinn, 2011).
The real boost to China-Sudan economic relations came in the 1990s with the
development of the oil sector and Sudan’s isolation from the larger international community.
The NPC’s (National Party Congress) seizure of power in 1989 and Sudan’s deteriorating relationship with the West pushed the government to look for a non-Western investor to develop its oil sector. Beijing offered Sudan a business partner and, despite of an unstable
48 “China welcomes oil deal between Sudan, South Sudan,” Xinhua, 2012-08-06, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-08/06/c_131765167.htm;
49 “China welcomes oil deal between Sudan, South Sudan,” Xinhua, 2012-08-06,
50 “China and South Sudan,” Saferworld Briefing, August 2012.
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security environment, Chinese energy firms enjoyed a favorable investment climate – much to the objection of the United States (Wuoi, 2012). Khartoum’s need for an investor coincided with China’s growing demand for oil. Currently, China gets nearly one-third of its import from Africa, world’s third largest oil producing region, and Sudan is the second largest regional exporter to China. A non-OPEC producer, Sudan sold 66% of its oil to China in 2011 and CNPC is currently the largest investor in the country (Alessi and Henson, 2012; Zhao, 2011).
China’s oil investment in Sudan’s energy sector began in the late 1990s. Before the split of Sudan, China developed oil fields initially operated by Chevron, which withdrew from Sudan when US placed sanctions on Khartoum. Beijing also built pipelines to transport crude from central Sudan to the port on the Red Sea. CNPC has remained the biggest international player in Sudan’s oil industry with its 40% stake in Sudan’s Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). CNPC also continued to provide field services and construction, and built two pipelines for Sudan (Raghavan, 2012). Driven by CNPC’s investments, Sudan’s proven oil reserves increased to 6.7bb/l in 2010, from 0.3bb/l, in 2000 (Li, 2011).
China faced some difficulties in the aftermath of the partition. Chinese interests have become a primary target of the southern rebels. In April 2012, 29 Chinese workers were abducted by insurgent groups in the oil rich province of Kordofan. In the same year, president of the Chinese oil consortium based in Juba was expelled by the Southern government. China, however, still maintains certain advantages in the newly independent South thanks to its early engagement. Chinese financial institutions and construction companies have been waiting for the situation to be stabilized to take full part in the development of the South Sudan’s
economy. These are all suggest the growing scope of Chinese involvement in the region, largely driven by its energy needs, but also a consequence of the US-led policies that provided China a more comprehensive, albeit more precarious, route to take in Sudan.
Indeed, in line with its traditional practice in many other regional developments,
initially, China approached cautiously toward the Southern drive for independence.51 However, as the referendum drew nearer and when it became clear that the South would secede, Beijing
51 Ibid.
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began to develop relations with the southern interim government. Numerous Chinese investors in the fields of agriculture, telecommunications, financial services and infrastructure moved to the South, aiming to take part in the development of the soon to be independent region (Shinn, 2912; Wuoi, 2012).
With the partition of Sudan, China’s engagement evolved into a trilateral framework.
Beijing maintained close ties with the North while it worked to improve links with Juba, encouraging both sides to negotiate outstanding disputes, most importantly the oil dispute.
Apparently, Beijing realized that in order to protect its energy interests, it needed both sides’
cooperation. Therefore, a negotiated peace has remained a more favorable option to Beijing than a protracted civil war (Traub, 2012).
Among the strengths of Chinese diplomacy are the ability of the PRC to provide financial aid, the experience it gained from the handling of the protracted crisis in Darfur, and its existing energy and other investments on both sides of the border. However, when it became clear that China’s diplomatic efforts in the region did not match its capabilities,52 multi-track diplomacy came into Beijing’s attention as an instrument to bridge the gap between China’s capabilities and its influence. It is obvious that Chinese decision makers renounced from the idea that Beijing should stay out of Sudan’s disputes and limit its engagement to trade needs be modified since traditional energy-driven diplomacy is no longer adequate to address the complex nature of Sudan-South Sudan relations (Alessi and Henson, 2012). However, with its more diversified policy in Sudan and South Sudan, China has come under a greater US pressure. The partition of Sudan has not eased the pressure on China as border clashes persisted, the situation in Darfur remained precarious and the Khartoum government’s isolation from the larger international community continued without any chance for improvement. Hence, as elsewhere in the Greater Middle East, China’s energy policy in Sudan has caused a discord between Beijing and Washington.
52“China’s New Courtship in South Sudan,” Crisis Group Africa Report N°186, 4 April 2012.
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China’s multi-track diplomacy strategy
China’s engagement in pre-partition Sudan was predominantly based on traditional diplomacy. However, the partition has increasingly required China to depart from classic government-to-government interaction. As a result, China moved slowly toward a multi-lateral strategy in Sudan and the South Sudan. Apparently, China’s capacity in implementing these tracks differs considerably since the dispute between Sudan and South Sudan remains multi-leveled with diverse economic, ethnic, political and cultural components. Still, the following tracks remained available for China to reinforce its energy security in the post-split Sudan:
Track one: Traditional government-to-government conflict resolution techniques have been used to bring the two sides together for solution to the existing disputes. In this respect, China has been at the forefront of international efforts. Through official channels, China has continuously encouraged both Khartoum and Juba for a negotiated and reconciliation-based solution to the conflict before and after the partition. Although prior to the partition China stood closer to the North, it did not lose time to establish diplomatic ties with the South well before the referendum. After the referendum took place and the issue of disputed areas and oil payments surfaced, China adopted an impartial standing, making sure that state-to-state ties with both sides would continue without much disruption to energy relations.
Track-two: Track-two involves non-official and non-governmental action to prevent or resolve violent conflict (Dixon and Simmons, 2006). A country’s soft power is often projected through such organizations (NGOs) that act relatively independently from the various apparatus utilized by the state. Chinese NGOs have been active in Sudan in a wide variety of areas
including health, education and agricultural development.53 Beijing is expected to continue with its effort in this realm so that the NGOs would play a more effective role in public diplomacy.
Track-three (Business): Decades-long sanctions that kept Sudan out of the reach of most international investment allowed China to become a major economic actor there. Over the years, Chinese companies have invested in, among others, energy, infrastructure and
53 “China, Africa to build new model for NGO co-op,” Xinhua, 07/11/2012,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012chinaafricaforum/2012-07/11/content_15575890.htm 102
telecommunication sectors. Hence, business diplomacy leads to improved living standards including health, education and an overall improvement in the quality of life in both Sudans.
Track-four (Citizen Diplomacy): Chinese nationals in both Sudans assist the peace-building efforts in the conflict-hit areas through grassroots mobilization. Interested individuals or groups could act in unison without being hindered by the formality, protocol or government mandate. Citizen diplomacy also enables the participants to get a better sense of international disputes and reflect on their preconceptions, which creates a better environment for mutual understanding.54
Track five (Research, training and education): Track-five diplomacy involves the activities by professionals (thinks tanks) and students (colleges and universities). Scholars are brought together to devise strategies and recommend solutions for a better Sudan-South Sudan relationship. Students, who are considered less constrained by formalities and more creative, offer grassroots assistance for China’s peace-building efforts. Although China’s track-five activity in Sudan and South Sudan are still in its initial stage, Beijing has made considerable improvement in this field, as well.
Beijing opened the first Confucius Institute in 2007 at the University of Khartoum and in 2008 a partnership agreement was signed between China’s Northwest Normal University and University Khartoum for student exchange. In September 2012, South Sudan announced its intention to build five university campuses with $2.5 billion loan from the Chinese
government.55 These efforts are now further upgraded so that the youth on both sides are educated and warring groups are brought together in non-political (peace-building) settings and thus contribute to the mutual understanding and normalization.
Track-eight: This track, that is, funding, is perhaps one of the most important areas that China hopes to play a dominant role. So far, Chinese individuals, NGOs and private companies
54 Bonny Ling, “China’s Peacekeeping Diplomacy,” China Rights Forum, No. 1, 2007,
http://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/oldsite/PDFs/CRF.1.2007/CRF-2007-1_Peacekeeping.pdf
55 Alexander Dziadosz and Hereward Holland, “South Sudan plans China-backed $2.5 billion university project,”
Reuters, September 13, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/13/southsudan-education-idUSL5E8KD83Z20120913 ; “Culture Exchanges between China and Sudan,” Chinese Embassy in Sudan, 2012/03/05, http://sd.china-embassy.org/eng/whjl/t911020.htm
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have carried out significant philanthropy activities in Sudan and South Sudan. Hospitals, schools, roads, dams and irrigation and sewage systems have been built with the funding and expertise provided by various groups and entities from China.
In 2010, the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation announced the plan to establish 13 hospitals for women and children to help decrease the maternal and infant mortality rates (Hui, 2010). In July 2012, delegates from China Charity Foundation opened China-Sudan
Friendship Hospital.56 These efforts are now widened in scope so that the quality of life a larger segment of the populations on both sides would improve and the frequency of mutual
interaction is increased.
Track-nine (Media): Electronic, visual and print media is important in informing and engaging the public on both sides on issues related to peace-building. In this respect, the most important step was taken in 2012 in which China’s CCTV and Sudan’s State Television signed a framework cooperation agreement. Under this agreement, the sides pledged to increase communication and awareness of each other among the general public.57 Beijing has begun to utilize this advantage (of having a strong media presence) for efforts towards creating in Sudan and South Sudan a favorable environment in which both sides are kept informed of each other and people-to-people relations are more normalized.
US Reaction to China’s Sudan Policy
As Mine points out, “the foreign policies and values of the two countries [China and the US] are so divergent that it is unlikely that they will be able to pursue their current modus operandi with respect to… Sudan” (Mine, 2011). Since China maintains close relations with both Sudan and South Sudan, the US anticipates China to revise its relations with the country,
especially with the North Sudan, because of the existing concerns with regards to human rights, religious and ethnic minorities and the continuing civil war with the southern rebels. However, China has been criticized by the US government and (Western) NGOs such as Amnesty
56 “China Charity Foundation Delegates visited Sudan,” Tiens,
http://www.tiens.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=267:china-charity-foundation-delegates-visited-sudan&catid=139:news-a-promotions&Itemid=261
57 “CCTV and Sudan State Television Signed a Cooperation Agreement,” 2012/06/07, http://sd.china-embassy.org/eng/whjl/t939073.htm
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International when Beijing fell short of meeting their expectations. Critiques in Washington often argued that China’s relations and the ensuing deep political and economic commitment in the country prevented it from considering international community’s misgivings on the
Sudanese government. Rather, Beijing maintained close ties with Khartoum, deepened its presence utilizing multiple diplomatic tracks.
In June 2011, the Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, visited China despite that he faced two international arrest-warrants for war crimes.58 In his three-day visit, Bashir met President Hu Jintao and other senior leaders of the CCP. Prior to the visit, Beijing faced a mountain of criticism from Western governments and civic organizations to cancel the visit or, better yet, arrest Al Bashir once he set foot on the Chinese territory. For example, US
Republican representative from Virginia, Frank Wolf, claimed that “he saw first-hand that China was supplying planes, helicopters and arms that have fueled the conflict,” and added that “now we find that they're welcoming Bashir. What more do we need to know? Lives hang in the balance…The number one supporter of the genocide in Darfur that many people are so concerned about is the Chinese government,"59 Responding the criticism, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei said that Beijing had every right to invite Mr. Bashir and Beijing did not endorse or support in any way the civil war in Sudan.60
Apparently, the split of Sudan into a north and south also signifies a deeper split of the Chinese and US interests: Whereas China remained closer to the government in Khartoum, the US allied itself firmly with Juba in the South. The US support for an alternate pipeline from South Sudan into Kenya or Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC ), in this case, shows the dimensions of great power competition over the natural resources in the divided country.
However, because of its miniscule dependency on the oil from the Middle East and North Africa (and thanks to its growing indigenous production), for the United States, Sudan is a strategic asset more than it is a prospective energy partner. Hence, US strategy is more security-driven.
58 China is a permanent member of the Security Council which urged its members to support the findings of the ICC when it referred Sudan to the court. However, China is not obliged to execute the ICC warrants because it has never signed up to the body. The US is also not a signatory to the ICC and therefore is exempt from its jurisdiction.
59 “Omar al-Bashir, Sudan President, Should Have Been Arrested in China: U.N.” Huffington Post, June, 2011.
60 “Delayed Sudan leader Omar al-Bashir arrives in China,” BBC, June 2011.
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For example, “Washington seeks to counter Islamist movements [in Sudan], some of which have been aided over the years by Khartoum” (Downing, 2011). Furthermore, the US initially anticipated that the Arab Spring, which already took out Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya that shares a narrow borderline with Sudan, would spread over to Sudan, bringing down the Al Bashir government and leading to the establishment of a friendly government.
It may be anticipated that, as the US companies ready themselves to return to the South Sudan, Beijing-Washington policy discord will become more manifest since their economic and strategic interests will clash on a multitude of fronts. In the past two decades, the US remained economically disengaged in Sudan; however, with the emergence of the new southern state warm to Western investment and still suspicious and critical of the Chinese engagement in North Sudan (although China is still the largest investor there), the US now finds a favorable environment to re-launch large scale investment. China and the US will find a greater number of contention points as they promote their geostrategic and economic interests in the country.
Conclusion of the Case: Implications for China-US Relations
Realizing that State-led classical diplomacy has been insufficient in tackling the issues that run deep in Sudan-South Sudan relations, Chinese government has taken the multi-track option. Beijing saw that for the problem was multi-dimensional, actions taken to address it needed to be multi-levelled. Hence China has moved away from traditional diplomacy and adopted a more active model. However, the country’s comprehensive engagement has evoked Washington’s criticism in regards to China’s Sudan diplomacy. Indeed, its revamped policy in Sudan has thus far helped China evade the pitfalls of the partition and protect its interests.
Greater Chinese engagement translates into greater exposure to the West-led
international community. As in the past, China continues to come under pressure on a number of issues related to Sudan such as state visits by high-ranking Sudanese government officials, arms sales to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SDF), energy investment and allegations of
corruption, the Sudan-South Sudan dispute and, last but not the least, the crisis in Darfur. It is clear that China’s Sudan policy is of a special nature because of the country’s level of diplomatic commitment; however, it does not ease the policy discord with the US. Rather, as in elsewhere
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in which China’s engagement is more limited, Beijing and Washington experience policy discord.
In this case study, it is argued that multi-track diplomacy has been a useful instrument for China to facilitate peace between Sudan and South Sudan. It has thus far assisted Beijing to manage the conflict. The reason that China was able to carry out such strategy, which it did not
In this case study, it is argued that multi-track diplomacy has been a useful instrument for China to facilitate peace between Sudan and South Sudan. It has thus far assisted Beijing to manage the conflict. The reason that China was able to carry out such strategy, which it did not