As part of its quest for oil, China became involved in Sudan starting from the 1990s. As has in the case of Iran, the US-led sanctions have offered a relatively easier access for Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) to fill up the vacuum.45 Furthermore devoid of international support and investment, Sudan had few options other than welcoming Chinese investment.
Hence, under these conditions, China-Sudan energy relations flourished and, along the way, elicited strong criticism by the US. China’s Sudan policy became another issue of contention, adding to the existing policy discord between the Beijing and Washington in the Greater Middle East.
Over time, Beijing’s engagement in Sudan has grown multi-leveled, involving a number of social and political components. In this sense, China-Sudan (and South Sudan, after the partition) relationship has shown two things: First, China is increasingly more capable of engaging the Middle East through a complex set of diplomatic initiatives (multi-track diplomacy). Second, China’s policy in Sudan may be seen as a blueprint for its policy in the whole region as the nation’s power and capability grows. Hence, if China-Sudan energy-driven relations are going to be a benchmark, it is likely that the China-US relations will become more contentious and competitive as the policy discord between the two grows larger.
Without a doubt, Chinese policy-making has been under the influence of the regional and global dynamics even as it tries to shape them to its own interests. In 2012, the deep socio-economic divisions in Sudan led to the partition of the country into north and south. China, a supporter of Khartoum, abstained from taking sides in the beginning of the dispute although it maintained close relations with the central government. However, after the South voted in a referendum for independence, Beijing recognized the new conjecture and the
newly-established state, and set up diplomatic relations with the South Sudan.
However, independence has not brought the anticipated peace in Sudan as disputes between Khartoum and Juba over oil fields and border demarcation remained unresolved.
45 For example, in 1997, Washington’s imposition of sanctions on Sudan allowed China to replace the US oil firm, Occidential, in major oil and pipeline deal that eventually went to China’s CNPC.
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Currently the South Sudan has over 70% of all proven oil fields whereas Sudan has control over the only existing infrastructure to transport and export the extracted oil. Also, the largest oil fields are located near the border areas contested by both sides. Analyzing the situation carefully, China developed a meticulous diplomacy to deal with this complicated situation, at times to such degree that many began to question whether or not China might be revising its traditional diplomacy in the ME. Indeed, Sudan-South Sudan issue has become an intriguing case to test the direction of China’s energy strategy in the Middle East.
This case study offers an investigation into China’s energy policy in the post-split Sudan and the U.S reaction to it. It provides an analysis of the Sudan-South Sudan relations and argues that, abandoning its traditional diplomacy it employed elsewhere in the ME, Beijing has been utilizing a multi-track diplomacy to protect its energy interests in the post-partition Sudan since traditional diplomacy does not fully address the complexity of the conflict and fails to protect China’s national interests. On the other hand, as a systems-based approach to modern interstate relations, multi-track diplomacy assists China to help the two sides (China-Sudan/South Sudan) overcome existing disputes and thereby achieve relative peace.
The dispute between the North and South Sudan is a complex phenomenon. Deep social, political and cultural disagreements contribute to the existing issues. Traditional methods fail to provide a satisfactory solution to the historical distrust and hostility. For example, although major breakthroughs were achieved with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Khartoum and the southern rebels in 2005, efforts made by various governments and international organizations have so far failed to stop clashes across the border areas, let alone solve deep cultural, religious and racial disputes. China, in this regard, is seen to depart from the confines of its traditional ME diplomacy and adopt the multi-level method. Deeper Chinese engagement also adds to the existing China-US policy discord.
In this study, China’s energy policy toward the post-partition Sudan is studied within the framework of its multi-levelled diplomacy and the implications for it on China-US relations. The primary thesis is that as its energy interests are threatened by the split of Sudan and the ensuing border tensions, Beijing has adopted a more comprehensive approach toward the Sudan-South Sudan dispute because the conflict between the two countries is complex,
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seated and multi-dimensional. China’s long, stable and comprehensive relationship with both sides provides the country with the required instruments to address the many aspects of the Sudan crisis. However, multi-levelled approach may also suggest a departure from China’s long-standing traditional Middle East diplomacy. Hence, as it benefits from its greater leverage in Sudan, Beijing’s revamped diplomacy also brings it to a collision course with the US which has been closely involved in the Sudan’s geopolitics well before China.
China’s Multi-Track Diplomacy in Sudan
Foreign policy is carried out through diplomatic, military and economic instruments utilized singularly or in varying combinations. The success of foreign policy depends on the ability of decision makers to apply the right tools to real life situations. In order to be able to read the developments correctly, strategists need to look at them critically and in a holistic manner (Cuthbert, 2005). China’s foreign policy approach to Sudan suggests such strategic decision-making process that departs radically from its classical diplomacy that it has been utilizing elsewhere in the Middle East.
Classical diplomacy is seen to be linear and based on the rationalist discourse. The aim is to achieve conflict resolution and assist peace through state-led action. However, this approach suffers from limitations because of its reductionist and reactive nature. Thus, in response to these shortcomings, a pro-active method has been offered. Distancing itself from any strictly state-centric techniques, the new model bases peacemaking strategies on civil and societal norms. Using appropriate tools, actors from individual, local, regional, national and
international levels make a cohesive network for proactive diplomacy and conflict resolution and transformation (Kumar, 1995).
To this end, the first attempt was made in the early 90s by Joseph Montville who coined the term “track-two diplomacy,” bringing non-state actors into diplomatic action (Diamond and McDonald, 1996). However, it was later understood that putting everything under track-two did not explain the “complexity and breadth” of informal diplomacy. In an attempt to address these shortcomings, Louise Diamond introduced the term “multi-track diplomacy,” attempting to establish a linkage between official and unofficial levels. Then further studies explored and
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expanded on the concept. First, with new tracks, the concept evolved into a four-track model.
Later, with additional tracks, multi-track system (or systems-based approach) gained its current form. Systems-based approach recognizes that the deep-rooted conflicts cannot be solved through mere governmental intervention. Rather, actors such as non-state organizations, civil and business groups, and informal channels need to take part in peace-building to transform deep-rooted crises. Hence, in addition to more traditional applications of conflict resolution, multi-track model seeks to utilize other tracks, or communities, separately or in varying combinations, depending on the nature of situation (Notter and Diamond, 1996).
Figure 10: Systems-based Approach
Source: Diamond and McDonald, 2006
Originally, the nine tracks were structured hierarchically from the most important to the less important. In the model, government occupied the top position. However, such a top-down relationship did not truly reflect the multi-dimensional nature of the model. Diamond and McDonald eliminated the hierarchical structure and redesigned the diagram in which all the tracks operate within a system and interact with each other horizontally. This way “each track is given greater autonomy with their own distinct methods, resources and values” (Diana, 2003).
However, since all linked to the greater system, they operate in relation to each other.
The systems approach embraces a large network of actors (individuals, civil
organizations, government offices, methodologies and venues) to assist international peace-building and provides a link between structural (structures that lead to conflict) and political
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(relationship between conflicting parties) bridges peace-building.46 It is often the case that a conflict creates its own patterns and is ingrained into the larger social system which rationalizes and thus internalizes the conflict. A social system as a unit of analysis could not be resolved but transformed. Hence, rather than conflict resolution, multi-track model aims for conflict
transformation which “refers to the process of moving from conflict-habituated systems to peace systems” (Notter and Diamond, 1996).
Chinese diplomacy in Sudan, especially from the time when the country’s split appeared inevitable, has adopted a multi-leveled approach, utilizing several of the tracks as delineated in the multi-track model. The new policy enabled China to better administer its Sudan policy.
However, it also put China against the US since its policy conflicted with that of the US. Policy discord became even more pronounced as the crisis in Darfur caught greater attention of the international community. China has made certain adjustments to its diplomacy as the pressure mounted, but still maintained its economic and political relationship with both sides in Sudan.
Sudan: History, Conflict and Partition
The conflict between the South Sudan led by Anya Nya guerilla movement and the Sudanese government in the north broke out few years prior to the independence of Sudan (1956) and dragged on until 1972 Addis Adaba Peace Agreement. However, peace did not last long and clashes broke out in 1983 when the South revolted under the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its armed wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).
The internal conflict ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The CPA granted regional autonomy to the South Sudan and guaranteed greater representation in a power-sharing government with the North. It also stipulated a referendum in the south on independence in January 2011. The referendum was held as planned and the Southern Sudanese voted overwhelmingly for partition in January 2011, and the newly independent nation was established in July 2011. In the original agreement, the two sides were agreed to negotiate the outstanding issues within the six-month following the agreement.47 However the
46 “People Building Peace- 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World,” European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999, http://www.peoplebuildingpeace.org/thestories/article.php?typ=refl&id=170
47 See, http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/sudan/conflict-profile/timeline/
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partition brought along a number of questions, including the future of (oil rich) disputed territories and sharing of oil revenues (Medani, 2011).
Originally, the CPA offered a detailed road map for peace. It not only attempted a compromise between the two parties, but also sought internal reconciliation and democratic development in both Sudans. Although the North, which lost one-third of its territory and three-quarters of its oil revenue to the newly-formed southern government, initially showed restraint, conflict broke out soon after the CPA. The South, for its part, was also internally divided and far from controlling many warring factions that violated the terms of the CPA.
Consequently, clashes that first took place between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the border area-insurgency soon evolved into a full scale war between the SAF and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
Problems in present-day Sudan have roots going back to the colonial era under the British ruler that drew the boundary, dividing the country across racial, material and religious lines. Sudan’s internal strife mostly occurred along these boundaries. Although historical animosity is not merely economic, in post-split Sudan border disagreements have been
identified with oil fields (Ottaway and El Sadany, 2012). Before Egyptian and British occupation in the 19th and 20th centuries, Sudan consisted of tribal communities and small kingdoms. In the first half of the 20th century, the British administration separated the region into north and south, perceiving the Muslim-dominated north to be different from the animist and Christian south (Machar, 1995; Woodward, 2011).
Sudan is divided along racial, religious and economic lines. Racism, in this case, plays a greater role than religion (Natsios and Abramowitz, 2011). The split of Sudan has “intersected fundamental problems that existed within both,” further deepening some. The politically unstable North and the economically underdeveloped and internally divided South found their own reason to become suspicious of each other’s intentions. Both countries, although formally decentralized, remained de facto single-party states and neither side showed keen interest in making the peace agreement work (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2011). Today, few years after partition, a number of outstanding issues such as the allocation of oil revenues, border demarcation and mass internal migration still affect the post-split environment (IAE, 2012b).
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Until 2005, political disputes in Sudan were centered on the struggle for greater autonomy and independence by the southern rebels. After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, civil war ended and a period of tranquility ensued. However, with the referendum in 2011, the dispute on energy resources became manifest along the fault lines of political division. Although Sudan and South Sudan are now split, they still are
dependent on each other for the continuity of the oil business. Whereas an estimated 75% of the former Sudan’s oil fields are located in the South, the pipeline and refineries are in Sudan.
Prior to the independence, South Sudan received 50% of the revenue generated in the unified Sudan. Yet this arrangement expired after the peace agreement and talks on the sharing of the oil revenues ended in failure and the halt of the oil production by the South.
Map 4: Oil Industry in Sudan and South Sudan
Source: Drilling Info International via BBC, July 2013
Oil is important for both governments, contributing greatly to the running of the basic governmental functions, including the payment of workers’ salary. During partition period, it was hoped that the mutual dependency would create an economic symbiosis: The South
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needed Sudan’s infrastructure (pipeline, processing facilities and marine terminal) to transfer and export oil at Port Sudan whereas Sudan needed the oil from the South in the form of transit fees and other payments to make up the loss from the split (Dziadosz, 2012). However, oil dispute got deeper after the partition as Sudan decided to demand the southern government high transit fees to make up for the lost income it suffered due to secession. In fact, about 98%
of state revenues in South Sudan and over half in the united Sudan relied on the oil sales before the split. In response to Khartoum’s demand, South Sudan halted all oil production and
exploitation activities.48 Although the two sides resumed the talks on oil payments in July 2012 and signed an agreement in August, outstanding disputes over the contested regions with rich oil deposits have continued to this day.49
China-Sudan Relations: Before and After Partition
China and Sudan enjoyed robust diplomatic, economic and strategic cooperation over the last two decades—ever since Jiang Zemin initiated China’s reengagement in Africa in 1996.
As China’s economy grew, the country’s foreign policy strategy in Sudan evolved. However, the split of Sudan has cast doubts on the bilateral relations with Sudan and the newly independent South Sudan. Beijing preferred multilateral engagement in the regional crisis. However, China’s trade policy, especially arms sales to the Khartoum government seemed to contradict the principle of non-interference (Sparks, 2011).50 Also, until 2007, Beijing opposed UN resolutions to deploy peace-keeping forces in Darfur (Alessi and Henson, 2012). Yet after the UN
involvement, China became the first country, and the only permanent Security Council member, to send troops to the UN missions in Darfur and the South Sudan (Shinn, 2011).
The real boost to China-Sudan economic relations came in the 1990s with the
development of the oil sector and Sudan’s isolation from the larger international community.
The NPC’s (National Party Congress) seizure of power in 1989 and Sudan’s deteriorating relationship with the West pushed the government to look for a non-Western investor to develop its oil sector. Beijing offered Sudan a business partner and, despite of an unstable
48 “China welcomes oil deal between Sudan, South Sudan,” Xinhua, 2012-08-06, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-08/06/c_131765167.htm;
49 “China welcomes oil deal between Sudan, South Sudan,” Xinhua, 2012-08-06,
50 “China and South Sudan,” Saferworld Briefing, August 2012.
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security environment, Chinese energy firms enjoyed a favorable investment climate – much to the objection of the United States (Wuoi, 2012). Khartoum’s need for an investor coincided with China’s growing demand for oil. Currently, China gets nearly one-third of its import from Africa, world’s third largest oil producing region, and Sudan is the second largest regional exporter to China. A non-OPEC producer, Sudan sold 66% of its oil to China in 2011 and CNPC is currently the largest investor in the country (Alessi and Henson, 2012; Zhao, 2011).
China’s oil investment in Sudan’s energy sector began in the late 1990s. Before the split of Sudan, China developed oil fields initially operated by Chevron, which withdrew from Sudan when US placed sanctions on Khartoum. Beijing also built pipelines to transport crude from central Sudan to the port on the Red Sea. CNPC has remained the biggest international player in Sudan’s oil industry with its 40% stake in Sudan’s Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). CNPC also continued to provide field services and construction, and built two pipelines for Sudan (Raghavan, 2012). Driven by CNPC’s investments, Sudan’s proven oil reserves increased to 6.7bb/l in 2010, from 0.3bb/l, in 2000 (Li, 2011).
China faced some difficulties in the aftermath of the partition. Chinese interests have become a primary target of the southern rebels. In April 2012, 29 Chinese workers were abducted by insurgent groups in the oil rich province of Kordofan. In the same year, president of the Chinese oil consortium based in Juba was expelled by the Southern government. China, however, still maintains certain advantages in the newly independent South thanks to its early engagement. Chinese financial institutions and construction companies have been waiting for the situation to be stabilized to take full part in the development of the South Sudan’s
economy. These are all suggest the growing scope of Chinese involvement in the region, largely driven by its energy needs, but also a consequence of the US-led policies that provided China a more comprehensive, albeit more precarious, route to take in Sudan.
Indeed, in line with its traditional practice in many other regional developments,
initially, China approached cautiously toward the Southern drive for independence.51 However, as the referendum drew nearer and when it became clear that the South would secede, Beijing
51 Ibid.
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began to develop relations with the southern interim government. Numerous Chinese investors in the fields of agriculture, telecommunications, financial services and infrastructure moved to the South, aiming to take part in the development of the soon to be independent region (Shinn,
began to develop relations with the southern interim government. Numerous Chinese investors in the fields of agriculture, telecommunications, financial services and infrastructure moved to the South, aiming to take part in the development of the soon to be independent region (Shinn,