invariably unwholesome, the second can assume both wholesome and unwholesome forms, the last is exclusively wholesome.
Ill will (byāpāda)
Ill will is used in the suttas as an equivalent for hatred (dosa) and aversion (pa(igha). All three signify resentment directed towards disagreeable persons or objects. Like the other defilements, ill will can either remain inwardly contained or can express itself outwardly.
In the latter form it motivates actions such as killing, harsh speech, outbreaks of violence, etc. Thus we find that in the Potaliya Sutta the word nivara5a is given an extended meaning capable of covering the actions manifesting the internal hindrance:
“This is indeed a fetter, this is a hindrance, that is to say onslaught on creatures…
slanderous speech… angry fault-finding… wrathful rage.”1 Such actions become fetters and hindrances because they stir into activity the fetter and hindrance of ill will, reinforcing its detrimental influence upon moral and spiritual development.
The DhammasaKgaLi defines the hindrance of ill will in its usual way by bringing together its numerous canonical synonyms:
What is the hindrance of ill will? When annoyance springs up at the thought:
‘He has done me harm, is doing, will do me harm; he has done harm, is doing harm, will do harm to someone dear and precious to me; he has conferred a benefit, is conferring, will confer a benefit on someone I dislike and object to;
or when annoyance springs up groundlessly: all such vexation, indignation, hate, antipathy, abhorrence, mental disorder, detestation, anger, fuming, irascibility, hate, hating, hatred, disorder, getting upset, derangement, opposition, hostility, churlishness, abruptness, disgust of heart – this is called the hindrance of ill will.2
The Visuddhimagga explains hatred thus:
It has the characteristic of savageness, like a provoked snake. Its function is to spread, like a drop of poison, or its function is to burn up its own support, like a forest fire. It is manifested as persecuting (dusana), like an enemy who has got his chance. Its proximate cause is the grounds for annoyance.3
1. MLS. 2:27. “Etadeva kho pana saJyojanaJ etaJ nīvaraLaJ yadidaJ pāLātipāto… nindāroso…
kodhūpāyāso…” MN. 1:361-64.
2. Psy. Ethics, pp. 282-83. “Tattha katamaJ byāpādanīvaraLaJ? ‘AnatthaJ me akarī’ti āghāto jāyati.
‘AnatthaJ me caratī’ti āghāto jāyati. ‘AnatthaJ me carissatī’ti āghāto jāyati. ‘Piyassa me manāpassa anatthaJ acarī’ti…, anatthaJ caratī…, anatthaJ carissatī’ ti āgāto jāyati. ‘Appiyassa me amanāpassa atthaJ acari…, atthaJ carati…, atthaJ carissati’ti āghāto jāyati. A::hāne vā pana āghāto jāyati. Yo evarūpo cittassa āghāto pa:ighāto pa:ighaJ pa:ivirodho, kopo, pakopo. saJpakopo, doso, padoso, sampadoso, cittassa byāpatti, manopadoso, kodho, kujjanā, kujjitattaJ, doso, dussanā, dussitattaJ, byāpatti, byāpajjanā, byāpajjitattaJ, virodho, pa:ivirodho, caLdikkaJ, asuropo, anattamanatā cittassa-idaJ vuccati byāpādanīvaraLaJ.” Dhs., p. 232.
3. PP., p. 532. “So caLYikkalakkhaLo paha:āsiviso viya, visappanaraso visanipāto viya, attano nissaya-dahanaraso vā dāvaggi viya, dusanapaccupa::hāno laddhokāso viya sapatto, āghātavatthupada::hāno.”
Vism., p. 398.
Sloth and torpor (Thīnamiddha)
As we saw, the Buddha explains sloth and torpor as a compound hindrance which can be regarded as twofold in terms of its components. The DhammasaKgaLi follows this suggestion through by breaking the compound down into its members and giving separate definitions of sloth (thīna) and of torpor (middha):
What is the hindrance of stolidity [sloth] and torpor? First distinguish between stolidity [sloth] and torpor. In this connection, what is stolidity [sloth]? That which is indisposition, unwieldiness of intellect (citta) adhering and cohering, clinging, cleaving to, stickiness, stolidity [sloth], that is a stiffening, a rigidity of the intellect – this is called stolidity [sloth].
What is torpor? That which is indisposition and unwieldiness of sense (lit.
body), a shrouding, enveloping, barricading within, torpor that is sleep, drowsiness, sleep, slumbering, somnolence – this is called torpor.
Now this is the stolidity [sloth] and this is the torpor which are called ‘the hindrance of stolidity [sloth] and torpor’.1
When the DhammasaKgaLi speaks of sloth as cittassa akallatā akammaññata,
“indisposition and unwieldiness of intellect (or mind)”, this should be understood to signify the incapacitation of the mind in its function as consciousness, the principal instrument of cognition. And when the text speaks of torpor as kāyassa akallatā akammaññatā, literally “indisposition and unwieldiness of the body,” this should be understood to signify the incapacitation of the “mental body” (nāmakāya) made up of the mental factors (cetasika) concomitant with consciousness. Thence the Dhamma-sa/ga5i A((hakathā, in elucidating these definitions, equates kàya with the “mental body consisting of the three aggregates,”2 i.e., the groups of feeling, perception, and mental formations. Thus sloth represents a state of inertia on the cognitive or intellective side of the mental process, torpor a corresponding condition on the affective, perceptual and volitional sides. The same point is brought out by the Dīghanikāya A((hakathā when it glosses sloth as “a sickness of consciousness” and torpor as “a sickness of the mental factors” or “sickness of the three aggregates,”3 (Wr. tr.) the mental factors being identical with the three mental aggregates – feeling, perception, and volition –
1. Psy. Ethics pp. 311-12. “Tattha katamaJ thīnamiddhanīvaraLaJ? Atthi thīnaJ, atthi middhaJ. Tattha katamaJ thīnaJ? Yā cittassa akallatā, akammaññatā, oliyanā, sallīyanā, līnaJ, līyanā, līyitattaJ, thīnaJ, thiyitā, thīyitattaJ cittassa idaJ vuccati thīnaJ. Tattha katamaJ middhaJ? Yā kāyassa asallatā, akammaññatā, ānāho, pariyonāho, antosamorodho, middhaJ, soppaJ, pacalāyikā, soppaJ, supanā, supitattaJ, idaJ vuccati middhaJ. Iti idaJ ca thīnaJ, idaJ ca middhaJ. IdaJ vuccati thīnamiddha-nīvaraLaJ.”
2. Buddhaghosa, The Expositor (Atthāsilinī), Buddhagosa’s Commentary on the Dhammasangani, the First Book of the Abhidhamma Pi(aka. Translated by Pe Maung Tin. Revised and edited by C. A. Rhys Davids. Pali Text Society Translation Series, nos. 8, 9. 2 vols. (London: Luzac & Co., for the Pali Text Society, 1920-58), 2:485 (hereafter cited as Expositor. “Kāyassāti khandhattaya saKkhātassa nāmakāya-ssa.” Dhs.A., p. 409.
3. “ThīnaJ cittagelaññaJ.” DN.A. 1:189. “MiddhaJ cetasikagelaññaJ; middhaJ khandhattaya gelaññaJ.” Ibid., 3:210.
co-existing with consciousness. Though the DhammasaKgaLi defines torpor with a number of synonyms suggestive of physical sleep, its commentary takes pains to point out that what is intended as a hindrance is not the physical tiredness which necessitates sleep, but the indolence and mental obscuration which accompany sleepiness in the case of unliberated individuals.
The Visuddhimagga follows the lead of the suttas and Abhidhamma in also giving separate definitions of sloth and torpor consistent with those in the other commentaries:
Herein, stiffness [sloth] has the characteristic of lack of driving power. Its function is to remove energy. It is manifested as subsiding. Torpor has the characteristic of unwieldiness. Its function is to smother. It is manifested as laziness, or it is manifested as nodding and sleep. The proximate cause of both is unwise attention to boredom, sloth, and so on.1
Restlessness and Worry (Uddhaccakukkucca)
As in the previous case, here too the Buddha divides this compound hindrance into its two components before recombining them into one: “Restlessness, monks, is a hindrance; worry is a hindrance. Thus the hindrance of restlessness and worry that comes down in the summary by this method becomes twofold.”2 The DhammasaKgaLi again picks up on this method and defines the two terms separately:
What is the hindrance of excitement [restlessness] and worry? What is excitement? That excitement of mind which is disquietude, agitation of heart, turmoil of mind: that is called excitement [restlessness].
What is worry? Consciousness of what is lawful in something that is unlawful; consciousness of what is unlawful in something that is lawful;
consciousness of what is immoral in something that is moral; consciousness of what is moral in something that is immoral: all this sort of worry, fidgeting, overscrupulousness, remorse of conscience, mental scarifying – this is what is called worry. Now this is excitement [restlessness] and this is the worry which are what is called ‘the hindrance of excitement [restlessness] and worry.’3
The Visuddhimagga also gives separate treatment to restlessness and worry, explicating each in terms of the familiar defining categories. With regard to restlessness the treatise says:
1. PP., p. 530. “Tattha thinaJ anussāhalakkhaLaJ, viriyavinodanarasaJ, saJsīdanapaccupa::hānaJ;
middhaJ akammaññatalakkhaLaJ, onahanarasaJ, līnatāpaccupa::hānaJ, pacalāyikā-niddāpaccu-pa::hānaJ vā; ubhayaJ pi arativijambhikādīsu ayoniso manasikārapada::hānaJ.” Vism., p. 397.
2. See above, p. 64.
3. Psy. Ethics, p. 312-13. “Tattha katamaJ uddhaccakukkucca nīvaraLaJ? Tattha katamaJ uddhaccaJ?
YaJ cittassa uddhaccaJ avupasamo cetaso vikkhepo bhantattaJ cittassa. IdaJ vuccati uddhaccaJ.
Tattha katamam kukkuccaJ? Akappiye kappiya saññitā, kappiye akappiya saññitā, avajje vajja saññitā;
vajje avajja saññitā; yaJ evarupaJ kukkuccaJ kukkuccāyanā, cetaso vippa:isāro, manovilekho, idaJ vuccati kukkuccaJ. Iti idaJ ca uddhaccaJ idaJ ca kukkuccaJ idaJ vuccati uddhaccakukkuccanīvara-LaJ.” Dhs., p. 233.
It has the characteristic of disquiet, like water whipped by the wind. Its function is unsteadiness, like a flag or banner whipped by the wind. It is manifested as turmoil, like ashes flung up by pelting with stones. Its proximate cause is unwise attention to mental disquiet. It should be regarded as distraction of consciousness.1
Worry is explained in the following way:
It has subsequent regret as its characteristic. Its function is to sorrow about what has and what has not been done. It is manifested as remorse. Its proximate cause is what has and what has not been done. It should be regarded as slavery”.2
Doubt (Vicikicchā)
The Buddha explains doubt as principally uncertainty and lack of conviction in regard to four items: the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Sangha, and the training.3 Elsewhere he speaks of perplexity regarding the past, the present, and the future, and again about the removal of doubt in regard to dependent arising.4 The DhammasaKgaLi says:
To doubt, to be perplexed about the Master… the Doctrine… the Order, about the Discipline, about the past, the future, about both the past and the future, as to whether there be an assignable cause of states causally determined – it is this kind of doubt, this working of doubt, this dubiety, puzzlement, perplexity, distraction, standing at cross-roads; collapses, uncertainty of grasp; evasion, hesitation, incapacity of grasping thoroughly, stiffness of mind, mental scarifying that is called perplexity [hindrance of doubt].5
The Dhammasa/ga5i A((hakathā explains that doubt in regard to the Master is doubt as to whether or not any person has existed endowed with the physical and spiritual quali-ties of a Buddha. Doubt regarding the Doctrine is doubt about the existence of the supra-mundane paths, fruits, and nibbāna. Doubt regarding the Sangha is skepticism with respect to the existence of holy persons or the fruitfulness of gifts to the Order. Doubt regarding the discipline questions the effectiveness of morality, concentration, and
1. PP., p. 530. “TaJ avūpasamalakkhaLaJ, vàtābhighātacalajalaJ viya; anava::hānarasaJ.
Vātābhighātacaladhajapatākāviya; bhantattapaccupa::hānaJ, pāsāLābhighātasamuddhatabhasmaJ viya;
cetaso avūpasame ayoniso manasikārapada::hānaJ; cittavikkhepo, ti da::habbaJ.” Vism., p. 397.
2. PP., p. 532. “TaJ pacchānutāpalakkhaLaJ, katākatānusocanarasaJ. Vippa:isārapaccupa::hānaJ, katākatapada::hānaJ, dāsabyaJ iva da::habbaJ.” Vism., p. 398:
3. MN. 1:101.
4. 1bid., pp. 8, 260.
5. Psy. Ethics. p. 260. “Tattha katamaJ vicikicchānīvaraLaJ? Satthari kaKkhati vicikicchati; dhamme kaKkhati vicikicchati; sanghe kaKkhati vicikicchati; sikkhāya kaKkhati vicikicchati; pubbante kaKkhati vicikicchati; aparante kaKkhati vicikicchati; pubbantāparante kaKkhati vicikicchati; idappaccayatā pa:iccāsamuppannesu dhammesu kaKkhati vicikicchati: sā evarūpā kaKkhā kaKkhāyanā kaKkhāyitattaJ, vimati, vicikicchā, dveXhakaJ, dvedhāpatho, saJsayo, anekamsaggāho, āsappanā, parisappanā, apariyodahanā, thambhitatthaJ, cittassa mano vilekho, idaJ vuccati vicikicchānīvaraLaJ.”
Dhs., pp. 233-34.
wisdom in leading to the end of suffering. Doubt regarding the past, future, and both applies to past lives, future lives, and both. And doubt regarding causally determined states is perplexity over the twelvefold formulation of dependent arising.1
It is evident from these definitions and descriptions that the species of doubt classed as a hindrance is skeptical indecision with respect to the fundamental tenets of Buddhist doctrine and practice. The doubt to be abandoned is not the freedom of philosophical inquiry, which the Buddha openly encouraged in those who sought to gain personal conviction of truth, but stubborn disbelief and perplexity regarding the principles needed for higher development. As long as such doubt persists, the mind is too obscured by confusion to embark on the path leading to higher attainments. As the Visuddhimagga says, doubt has the function of wavering, the manifestation of indecisiveness, and it acts as an obstruction to practice.2