Ideologically-driven U.S. policy: The use of democracy.…

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Taking on Morgenthau approach, Domínguez states that the Cold War was the ‘one period in the history of the U.S. policy toward Latin America when ideology was repeatedly more important than balance of power or economic considerations’. He even goes on saying that ‘Ideology was so overpowering that U.S. policy toward Latin America exhibited marked non-logical characteristics’ (Domínguez, 1999: 6). I agree with him on many respects, this is, it is true that ideology was remarkably important, but balance of power and economic factors were still highly important in this time of history for international relations studies. Also, some administrations were considerably more ideological than others, and that would be reflected on the foreign policy that the U.S. would have towards the ROC and Latin America. When ideology was more important, the ROC would see its status increased, as the U.S.

would fight for their cause, or better put, for the U.S. cause using the case of the ROC as a vehicle to fight communism and spread the ideas of democracy or human rights.

Thus, do national policies follow reasonable choices by the governments? According to Bueno de Mesquita, international interactions do follow a reasoned judgement. He continues this argument saying that ‘even war is waged “with reason” rather than without it’. (Little, 2007: 265). Some other authors disagreed with him, holding the idea that the U.S. made poor and irrational policy choices in the name of an ideological fight.

3.3.3. Ideologically-driven U.S. policy: The use of democracy.

During the first half of the twentieth century the key U.S. policies toward Latin America were closer to the idea of an anarchic international system, easily analysed from the perspective of realism. They shaped their policy to gain territory and influence, exclude rival powers and protect and advance their economic interest. But during the Cold War, some illogical responses were seen where just the slightest sign of communism –in some cases the Soviet Union was uninvolved or only marginally- would triggered very costly interventions in the name of the ideological battle. The Cold War marked the battle between two systems, as we have said. It is during this time when ideologically-driven considerations were given a primary role in U.S.

policy. The elites and much of the public believed in the righteousness of their cause, while hating the antagonist system of communism, or what they understood of it. This was clear in inter-American relations. Democracy or anti-communism, were

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constantly being heard as the reasons for interference in Latin American economy, politics, and even an excuse for the use of force –many times considered disproportionate, or inappropriate. The U.S. hasn’t ceased to intervene in Latin American affairs, being military, economically or politically, since many years before the Cold War. Ideological considerations were also there through the 1940s. However, it would be at this moment when the concept of “democracy” would be fundamental.

The first case of ideologically-driven intervention during the Cold War was seen in 1954 with the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. Economic interests were present as the U.S. was trying to protect the United Fruit Company³⁴. Nonetheless, an anti-communist rationale was behind it; the truth is that the relations between Guatemala and the Soviet Union were not relevant, and their communist party was weak. In the end, and as we saw in the previous chapter, U.S. policy towards Guatemala seemed to be closer to business interests or even as seeking domination (Brockett, 2010).

According to Sewell however, the most distinct moment where ideology would pass from a mere part of foreign policy to one of the most important factors to consider was the victory and consolidation of the Cuban revolutionary government in 1959.

The regime type, the values, would acquire then a substantial importance. Even if the Korean War was a crucial moment for the U.S. fight against Communism, it wouldn’t be till this point when ideology would really start to constitute a main cause for intervention in Latin America. This would lead the U.S. government, during different administrations, to use military force to overthrow Latin American governments in the name of the “defence of democracy”. In other words, every time it felt ideologically

“threatened by the prospects of communism”. They didn’t, however “engage in such actions, even when other Latin American governments acted in ways seriously adverse to U.S. interests, if there was no ideological odor of communism”

(Domínguez, 1999: 2)The importance and value of democracy, was however present before the Cuban revolution, we just have to see some of the actions taken by President Truman in 1950. On June 26, he ordered the U.S. air and sea forces to give cover to South Korean armies, also ordered part of the American fleet to go to Formosa to protect the island from a Communist invasion, and some others to battle against a Communist revolt in Indochina. The article that announced these measures

34 The land of the United Fruit Company was expropriated in 1953.

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was named “Democracy takes its stand” (New York Times, 1950), which says a lot about the relevance of the regime type at the time.

During all the years that the Cold War lasted, the constant interferences of the U.S.

government in Latin American affairs were done mainly in the name of anti-communist policies. However, most authors believe that there were no visible, or even likely, soviet threat in the Western Hemisphere, only a few isolated events that probably would not have meant any real danger for the U.S. national security. This is the case of the military intervention in Dominican Republic on 28 April 1965.

President Lyndon Johnson wanted to prevent a “second Cuba” at all cost. As it turned out, there was no such thing. The Soviet Union was not involved and Cuba just partially. Even more surprising, the threat to U.S. economic interest were very little, if any, so in this case the strength of ideology reached a new level (Domínguez 1999, Sewell 2008). At any rate, most of the time the idea of democracy was just another tool used by the different administrations to achieve their goals, an excuse for intervention. Using these values can be better understood when one learn that this approach was reinforced at a time of a ‘rising tide of anti-American sentiment in the region’ which was born out of the region’s desire to be free from U.S. economic supremacy and control (Sewell, 2008: 848). Already during the Eisenhower administration, for example, the policy directed to Latin America was one based on the ‘assumption that economic modernization would eventually lead to a region that was pro-U.S. and democratic’. But Reagan also endorsed promotion of democracy as a key objective during its second term. The centrality of ideology got so far that during the crisis with Nicaragua in the 1980s, President Reagan’s advisers ‘were willing to break the law to supply weapons to the Nicaraguan Resistance (better known as the contras) despite the explicit prohibition of such actions by the U.S.

Congress’ (Domínguez, 1999: 11). The Carter Administration tried to work with the FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front), but the more staunchly anti-communist Reagan Administration would do everything in their power to oust the leftist group. In this particular case the ROC was directly affected, because after the Sandinistas overthrew Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979 –ending the Somozas dictatorship³⁵- it

35 During the Republican Administration of Eisenhower, there was certain sympathy towards

authoritarian governments because they were supposed to be better in the fight against Communism.

This led to the support of the Eisenhower administration to the dynasty of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua since the mid-1930s. The Somozas would become a great ally after the Cold War started in the U.S. battle against communism.

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wouldn’t be long till their Revolutionary Government broke ties with Taipei and swift to Beijing in 1985. In 1990 however, the Sandinistas would lose the elections and the diplomatic relations with the ROC would be reinstated. But this strong drive to promote democracy, and the importance of this kind of ideology would help with Taiwan democratization process in a subtle, but effective, way.