Chapter 3 The driving forces and constraints for Chinese immigration in
3.4 The Kremlin politics factor
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
who have crowded out their some of job opportunities. This has been described as
“Chinese population expansion”, “yellow peril”, “Chinese threat”, etc., which obviously is xenophobic.105 On the other hand, Russian researchers hold that between the late 19th century and the early 20th century, the Chinese immigrated to Russia for economic reasons, which facilitated development in the then Russian labor market and capital market. At that time, a Russian official, Panofsky, said: “Chinese labor play a key role in the region’s economic life. As a country who needs China’s labor force, Russia is gradually become one of the biggest labor service sale market in the world.”106
3.4 The Kremlin politics factor
Russia’s federal government definitely would not allow local governments to destroy the friendly and strategic collaborative partnership between the two countries to correspond to their own strategic interest. Although some leaders, especially in Primorsky and Khabarovsk, were not totally against the border trade, they advocated taking strict measures against Chinese immigrants. Under either Boris Yeltsin or Vladimir Putin, no local officials were allowed to express different opinions from those of the central government over relations with China.107
Yeltsin ever warned Yevgeny Nazdratenko (
Наздратенко
105 Agarkov,Valery and Shatilova, Marina, “Migration is a bad headache in the Russian Far East,”
Itar-Tass Weekly New, (Moscow: Aug., 2002): p1.
), governor of Primorsky Krai, not to place local interest in national policy regarding demarcation problems, and that he must not make any comment until he had approval from Russia’s foreign ministry. Since president Putin took office, he has been committed to increasing
106 杜立克，「淺析俄羅斯遠東地區的人口危機問題」，內蒙古大學學報4 (2003): 97。[Du Like, Qianxi Eluosi yuandong diqu de renkou weiji wenti (An Analysis of the Russian Far East's population crisis) Neimenggu Daxiao Xiaobao (Journal of Inner Mongolia University) 4 (2003): 97.
107 Bodanov, Sergei, “Russian officials discussing situation in Far East,” Itar-Tass Weekly News, (St.
Petersburg: March, 2002): p1.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
centralized state power. For instance, in a reform to the gubernatorial election system, governors would not be directly elected locally; instead, they would be nominated by the president. Moreover, the president could remove any unqualified governor from office anytime. This reform sent a strong signal to all local administrative officers that, unless they must correspond to the central government, otherwise they might lose their job.108 These laws gave the President the authority to remove the duties of local leaders and dissolve local councils which violate federal laws. These changes brought greater coherences to the internal and external policies, and few local administrators questioned the official line of foreign policies in pubic, including China policies.109
Finally, President Putin did just that with Nazdratenko. This had also put an end to a situation: Far Eastern governor could no longer enhance his own prestige and win voters’ support by promoting “China Threat”, jousting with Moscow over attitude toward China, and opposing boundary survey.
Take Viktor Ivanovich Ishaev (Ишаев Виктор Иванович
108 Valery, Vyzhutovich, “Politics between party and Kremlin,” Moscow News, (Moscow: Nov., 2002):
p1.
), governor of Khabarovsk, as an example. He led a campaign “China Threat” and “China Expansion” in the twentieth century. He said in May 1994: “Currently China is expanding toward Russia’s Far East and eliminating Russians.” The governor believed that addictive drugs and crime would flood the border area along with Chinese businessmen. Therefore, he strongly opposed demarcation in Russia’s middle-east border and engaged in a 12-year long struggle for “protecting Bolshoi Ussuriisk Island”. Thereby, he won prestige among Far Easterners, was called a
“Great Patriot”, and was reelected.
109 “Chinese toil in Russia’s Far East.” NINEMSN，20080221, http://news.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=382544&rss=yes.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
“As China is expanding in the Far East,” Ishaev proposed at a Russian federal government foreign affairs work meeting on January 22, 2003, “we must lay down a corresponding China policy.” In reply, Putin said, this question should leave to the country leader and foreign minister to decide. He indicated that a development strategy for Russo-Chinese relationship had already been established in 2001 when the two countries inked the friendly treaty. He emphasized several times the significance of cooperation with regions in China. Regional cooperation between the two countries has brought great interest for both. Promoting development between the two countries would not only gain support from Russia’s highest-level leaders, but it would also encourage local governments and state-owned and private enterprises to participate in economic development in China’s regions. Consequently, the Russian federal government offer great support to regional cooperation with China. With this, the environment for the two countries’ regional cooperation will be further improved.110
Nevertheless, after the gubernatorial election system reform, in order to keep his job, he had to have a change of attitude. Now he is not promoting “China Threat”
and “China Expansion” and has expressed his willingness several times to cooperate with China. While Khabarovsk has abundant natural resources, China owns a colossal market. Therefore, as a vast economic complementariness exists between both, regional cooperation should be raised to a new level. He said in June 2004 that Khabarovsk will aggressively contribute to developing trade cooperation and regional cooperation between Russia and China, such as geological prospecting, gold mining,
110 殷劍平，「中國人在遠東:從『威脅』到促進遠東經濟穩定發展的因素」。俄羅斯中亞東歐研
究3 (2006):24。[Yan Jianping, Zhongguoren zaiyuandong :cong “Weixie” dao cujin yuandong jingji wending fazhan de yinsu (The factors for the Chinese in the Far East: from “Threat” to promote the steady development of the Far Eastern Economy) Eluosi Zhongya Dongou Yanjiu (The Russian Central Asia and East European Studies) 3 (2006):24.]
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
wood processing, etc.111 In order to avoid large-scale protests in Khabarovsk and causing discontent of Moscow, he said on radio, “What may be put under China is merely the remote side of Bolshoi Ussuriisk Island near Tarabarov island (Yinlong island in Chinese), where there are only pastures and no production activity.” His purpose was to decrease residents’ attention to the problem. This reform would ensure Russia’s central government’s China policy and friendly attitude could be completely implemented in the Far East. The Far East’s leader has clearly recognized that he could no longer confront the central government over relations with China like in the 1990s. He had to stop promoting “China Threat” view;
otherwise he would endanger his own career. Even if he backed out occasionally with his attitude toward China after being reelected, he would never be so fearless like he used to be.112
In October 2004, Darkin, Sergei Mikhailovich
111 Valery, Vyzhutovich, “Politics between party and Kremlin,” Moscow News, (Moscow: Nov., 2002):
p1.
(Дарькин, Сергей Михайлович), governor of Primorsky Krai, said regarding cooperation with China, clearly suggesting that Far Eastern local leaders had a change of attitude toward China and that their “China Threat” view had been abandoned. In an interview with Russia’s News and Information Agency, he said, “China is our biggest trade partner.
Developing relations with China’s border area is designated a priority for Primorsky Krai.” Just as Russia’s Izvestia newspaper indicated in October 2004, “Russia’s Far East is drastically changing its attitude toward China. Primorsky Krai’s aggressive attitude has greatly pushed cooperation with China.” Darkin revealed in September
112 殷劍平，「中國人在遠東:從『威脅』到促進遠東經濟穩定發展的因素」。俄羅斯中亞東歐研
究3 (2006):24。[Yan Jianping, Zhongguoren zaiyuandong :cong “Weixie” dao cujin yuandong jingji wending fazhan de yinsu (The factors for the Chinese in the Far East: from “Threat” to promote the steady development of the Far Eastern Economy) Eluosi Zhongya Dongou Yanjiu (The Russian Central Asia and East European Studies) 3 (2006):24.]
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
2005, in the first half of 2005, Primorsky Krai’s trade volume with China had grown 74% from the same period of the last year. In respect of foreign-owned enterprises, China came first (of 524, 209 were Chinese-owned enterprises).113
Since the 1990s, Russia’s anti-Chinese movement has not been always initiated by the people. Some Russian political interest groups intervene with some political background. The so-called “political background” does not refer to their having support from Russia’s highest level leadership or their representing the country’s will.
But indeed there are some central and local political groups and political bigwigs get involved.114
In respect of this, some objective and fair officials and scholars, such as Amur governor, Vladimir Dyachenko (
In June 2000, the “Federal Affairs and Local Policy Committee” of the State Duma distributed that Chinese forcibly expanded the territory of Russia, such as the Amur Region and the Far East. The government officials and scholars had views about “China Threat” and influenced by “Yellow Peril.”
Владимир Дьяченко), said, “Those who try to provoke the Chinese’ hysteria may have another plan. Chief executives of Chitinskaya, Amur, and Sakhalin believe there is no such thing as the threat of China expansion.” Larin Viktor Lavrentievich (Ларин Виктор Лаврентьевич
113 Sokolova,Viktoria, “Putin believes Russian Far East needs policy of preferences,” Itar-Tass Weekly News, (Moscow: Aug., 2002):p1.
), director of the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of Peoples of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, said, “Opposition against the China expansion to Russia’s Far East was not initiated locally; there are other political powers involved.” These political interest groups and political bigwigs can be divided into two types of people. One type desires to please the West, fish for political capital, and win more support in elections. Lavrentievich commented,
114 Kondrashov, Stanislav, “Politics. Putin in Kremlin and poet on ARBAT ,” Moscow News, (Moscow : July, 2000): p4.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
“Yellow Peril” at least has some benefit for them in the government and the parliament. Another type attempts to draw people’s attention away to avoid urgent problems in their own district in order to maintain their own leadership. The review regarding chief executive of Primorsky Krai Yevgeny Nazdratenko who made an issue of China-Russia demarcation was, “If the protest over demarcation is to distract the residents’ attention from some urgent problems, then the chief executive has successfully achieved his purpose. Now people of Primorsky Krai would rather stand constant salary delays, water and electricity interruption and unemployment than tolerate such things as demarcation.”115
Since Putin assumed office, under the promise of an economic market, the country’s control over the economy has been ceaselessly increased. Russia’s economic environment and market situation have taken a favorable turn. Politically, Putin stresses on creating a powerful regime.116 When reelected in March 2004, he first stressed on undertake a powerful administrative reform. This would systematically guarantee smooth economic development and reform.117
115 于國政，「俄羅斯遠東地區與中國關係的制約因素分析」，國際東歐中亞研究4 (2002): 60。[Yu Guozheng, Eluosi Yuandongdiqu yu Zhongguo guanxi de zhiyueyinsu fenxi (An constraints analysis of the relation between Russian Far East and China) Guoji dongou zhongya Yanjiu (International Eastern Europe and Central Asian Studies) 4(2002): 60.]
He acknowledged that the Russian Far East is an integral part of Russia, but its poor economic situation and demographic conditions make it problematic. Also, he called for Asia-Pacific countries to strengthen political and economic cooperation. Russia’s former Ambassador to China, Igor Rogachev (Игорь Алексеевич Рогачев), also believed that there is no choice but to cooperate with China, the world's most
116 Kondrashov, Stanislav, “Politics. Putin in Kremlin and poet on ARBAT ,” Moscow News, (Moscow : July, 2000): p4.
117 任秀娟，「中國與俄羅斯遠東經貿合作概況追溯與展望」，學術交流4 (2007): 128。[Ren Xiujuan, Zhongguo yu Eluosi yuandong jingmao hezuo gaikuang zhuisu yu zhanwang (Economic and trade cooperation between China and the Russian Far East Overview retrospective and prospects) Xiaoshu Jiaoliu (Academic Exchange) 4 (2007): 128.]
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
populous country and look for common interests.118 Konstantin Pulikovsky (Пуликовский, Константин Борисович), Russia’s president's representative to the Far Eastern federal district, said in an interview with an Izvestia reporter: “The Far East needs the Chinese because we lack hands.” “Those Chinese who have work permits, when they come to some federal subjects, can only bring benefit, not problems.” After China started to implement a strategy for invigorating its traditional industry base in the northeast, he proposed to adjust guidelines on the Far East’s economic and social development in order to correspond with that strategy.119
When inspecting a border section near Fuyuan, China, in May 2002, Tacolibach, head of the Management Bureau, Federal Border Guard Service, Russia, pointed out that the Sino-Russian border situation in the protective region of the Far East border guard was relatively stable, mutual understanding of Sino-Russian border personnel was increasing, and a number of problems had been solved together by both sides.
In regions where border problems had been solved, no serious problems have taken place.120
Therefore, in the development of bilateral relations, Russia and China should be based on solving strategic and economic issues, expanding trade and economic cooperation, ending border talks to strengthen coordination on international issues, as well as in the United Nations and other the cooperation of international organizations.
3.5 Summary
118 “Russia's China policy and views on China.” XSLX,20031007, http://www.xslx.com/htm/gjzl/dyzz/2003-10-7-14935.htm.
119 “Chinese toil in Russia’s Far East.” NINEMSN，20080221, http://news.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=382544&rss=yes
120 李傳勳，「近年來中俄毗鄰地區政治關係分析」，俄羅斯中亞東歐研究 3 (2003): 12。[Li Chuanxun, Jinnianlai ZhongE pilin diqu zhengzhi quanxi fenxi (In recent years the Sino-Russian political relations between the analysis of adjacent areas) Eluosi Zhongya Dongou Yanjiu (The Russian Central Asia, East European Studies) 3 (2003): 12.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
This chapter summarized the four parts. For the economic factor, in order to inject Russia's overall economic development, it is necessary to develop the rich natural resources of the eastern region. However, this area is sparsely populated and there are underdeveloped infrastructure and light industry. Only a small part of Russian Far East links to other Russian areas and mostly through its neighboring China, Japan and South Korea for economic cooperation. The goods of the border trade between Russian Far East and China like mineral raw materials, timber, fish and other resource products, while Chinese imports cheap food and daily necessities to the Far East, accounting for nearly eighty percentages.
The persistent high mortality rate, low birth rate and population exodus resulted in the negative population growth and the demographic deterioration. Its serious consequences in the economic and social aspects are immeasurable. How to attract immigrants to settle in the Far East and how to effectively organize them are the core issues for the Russian government and the Far East Federation.121
For international strategy factor, Sino-Russian strategic partnership is not an alliance or confrontation, but the cooperative relationship for mutual benefit for in various fields between the two countries. The introduction of Chinese laborers promotes Sino-Russian strategic cooperation. The Sino-Russian strategic cooperative partnership and deepening cooperation, the Sino-Russian territorial issue, and the trend of integration into the Asia-Pacific region are clearer. Chinese migration is precisely the internal problem of Russian Far East, and it should be continuously improve
121 “Fears grow of Chinese flooding into Russia’s sparsely populated Far East.” FT,20061204,
d by management. For foreign labors, Chinese labors should obey Russian laws and Russian Far East Federation will continue to attract labor forces from other CIS countries and neighboring China and North Korea.
http://www.ftchinese.com/story.php?lang=en&storyid=001008238.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
For the geopolitical factor, in recent years, although the Sino-Russian relation has developed and the border problem has been well resolved, the “security dilemma”
between two countries has not been eliminated. With the growth of China and the decline of Russia strength, especially in the economic downturn of the Russian Far East, , the contrast between two adjacent regional population situations is so huge.
Therefore, Russia is suspicious that China will take demographic advantage to seek Far East territory.122
For the Kremlin political factor, because of factional conflict, Russian officers have different opinions on China. Whether Yeltsin or Putin, they do not allow local officials to have different views in the economic downturn relation, destroying the good-neighborly friendship and strategic partnership. In particular, President Putin has always been committed to strengthen the centralization of power. Like the reform of the electoral system, the local governors are nominated by the President instead of the local direct elections. This reform reminds the Chief Executive that they must be consistent with the Central government or they will not get or lose jobs.
122 Гельбрас, В. Г.,“Китайская реальность России,” Москва : Муравей, 2001.[Gelbras, VG, Chinese reality Russia (現實俄羅斯的中國人), Moscow: Ant, 2001.]