Chapter II: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.3 Major events of violence involving Rohingya since the democratic transition
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2.3 MAJOR EVENTS OF VIOLENCE INVOLVING ROHINGYA SINCE THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
The first years after the inauguration of a civilian government remained relatively calm. But as soon as 2012, violence in Rakhine state increased. Three phases can be observed. The first one is a surge of communal violence close to the 2012 by-elections. The period between the preparations for the 2015 elections until the 2016 ARSA attacks is characterised by institutionalised Rohingya discrimination and disenfranchisment, a relatively low number of violent clashes, but a tangible hostile rethoric. Finally, after the terrorist attacks in 2016 and 2017, a military-run campaign of eviction is present, to which the civil government turns a blind eye.
In 2012, growing hostilities and inflammatory propaganda erupted into intercommunal violence when a rape and murder of a Buddhist woman occurred. After a pacification through the declaration of a state of emergency, the violence re-erupted in October. The attacks on Muslim communities seemed increasingly coordinated, which raised suspicions that they executed as a retaliation to previous attacks. Estimations assume that in total almost 200 people died, mostly on the Rohingya side, 8614 homes were destroyed and more than 100,000 Rohingya ended up displaced.123 In 2013, violence spread to central Myanmar and northern Rakhine, causing at least 44 casualties. After a dispute in a gold shop and murderer of a Buddhist monk, the situation escalated and mobilised mobs engaged in violence and looting.
Other triggering events were cases of sexual assault, attempted murder and false allegations of a planned jihad further aggravated the situation.124
Cheesman (2017a) proposes to categorise violence in Myanmar as communal violence.125 Focusing on events between 2012 and 2014, from localised inter-group violence to large-scale state supported killing and destruction of property, he remarks that they can be characterised as “recurrent, sporadic, direct physical hostility realised through repeated public expressions that Muslims constitute an existential threat to Buddhists”.126 This suits the definition of communal violence as “overtly performed, episodic, recurrent, sporadic, direct physical hostility between self-defining and mutually identifiable ascriptive communities.”127
123 "Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State," in Asia Report (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014)., 8-11.
124 Ibrahim, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's Hidden Genocide., 103.
125 Nick Cheesman, "Introduction: Interpreting Communal Violence in Myanmar," Journal of Contemporary Asia 47, no. 3 (2017b).
126 Ibid., 1.
127 Ibid., 4.
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In this context, explanations for the conflict are typically framed as an expression of common interests of members of one community, which are existentially threatened by another group. It is important to note that communal violence is not rooted in religious adversaries, but that this characteristic is often added through after-the-fact interpretative claims. 128
Initial events that ignite conflicts are also often devoid of an ethnic narrative but rather an expression of local disputes over economic issues, territory, crime or rape. It is assumed that all the involved individuals understand the confrontation in different terms and give differing explanations for its outbreak. Communal violence furthermore assumes that local disputes are integrated by politicians and state authorities into larger frameworks and narratives. They way conflicts are interpreted, framed and conveyed by elites therefore becomes an important part of the analysis. Furthermore, atrocities occurring during military counter insurgencies are not included. While some previous initial incidents might be characterised as communal violence, an opinion that is also advocated by the Burmese government,129 an involvement of government forces in a great amount of cases characterised as ethnic cleansing cannot be overlooked. State security forces either failed or refused to intervene or actively participated in violent acts. The United Nations observed forced population transfers, attacks on political and religious leaders and violence towards Rohingya, all of which involve military personnel. Based on their findings the UN accuses the Burmese government of pursuing a strategy for ethnic cleansing.130
2014 and 2015 saw the implementation of discriminatory laws against Rohingya.
Renewed efforts to pursue citizenship verification did not allow the self-identification as Rohingya. Furthermore, the process to obtain citizenship was complicated by the need to prove Burmese descent prior to the country’s independence. 131 Lastly, Rohingya were effectively barred from participating in elections or fielding own parties or candidates for the 2015 election.132 Apart from that, civil unrest or violence has been relatively calm during these years (see Figure 4).
128 Ibid., 4-7.
129 Smith, " All You Can Do Is Pray": Crimes against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya Muslims in Burma's Arakan State., 86,110.
130 Ibid., 11-15.
131 "Myanmar: The Politics of Rakhine State.", 20-21.
132 "The Myanmar Elections: Results and Implications ", in Crisis Group Asia Briefing, ed. International Crisis Group (ICG) (Yangon/Brussels: International Crisis Group (ICG), 2015)., 2.
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FIGURE 4-INCIDENTS IN RAKHINE STATE133
A framework of ethnic cleansing seems more suitable for the latest events in 2016 and 2017. An estimated 43.000 refugees fled Myanmar after a military counteroffensive was launched in retaliation for extremist’s attacks on security forces and border posts in 2016. The military operation was criticised for the occurrence of systematic human rights violations such as executions, sexual violence, torture, arson, enforced disappearance and destruction of Rohingya property.134 The situation reached a whole new level in 2017. After a coordinated offensive by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in August 2017 on police posts, the military launched a brutal offensive that “failed to discriminate between militants and the general population.”135 Prior to the military campaign, Rohingya were reportedly relocated, disarmed and put under a curfew, while the military increased its presence and trained and equipped local militias.136 In reaction to the ARSA attacks, the military furthermore carried out a multiphased scorched earth campaign, systematically destroying Rohingya homes. While the first stage occurred in direct reaction to the attacks, the second phase extended over weeks, even
133 Cliondah Raleigh et al., "Introducing Acled - Armed Conflict Location and Event Data," Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010).
134 "Report of Ohchr Mission to Bangladesh: Interviews with Rohingyas Fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016," ed. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
2017).
135 "Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase," in Asia Report, ed. International Crisis Group (ICG) (Brussels2017)., 7.
136 Smith et al., "They Gave Them Long Swords: Preparations for Genocide and Crimes against Humanity against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State, Myanmar."
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Incidents in Rakhine State
Remote Violence Riots & Protest Violence against Civilians Battle Total
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after the “clearance operations” had officially ended.137 A report by a team of Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights observed that the acts of violence towards Rohingya are conducted in a coordinated and systematic manner. Their report challenges the assumption that deaths and destruction of homes were merely collateral damage of a military response operation to previous acts of collective violence. Instead, a purposeful campaign is more likely. The strategy consists of arbitrary arrests mostly targeting the male population, Rohingya leaders and opinion-makers as well as the denial of access to food, livelihood and other commodities of everyday life. Additionally, the destruction of settlements and farming land as well as religious sites and the deliberate spread of trauma through acts of brutality like killings, rape, disappearances and torture have been observed. These acts were committed by military forces and often accompanied by armed Buddhist mobs. Settlements were systematically destroyed and Rohingya were warned of imminent attacks and denounced as “Bengali who do not belong to Myanmar”. This demonstrates on the one hand that the attacks were well coordinated and on the other that the strategy is to destroy Rohingya livelihood in order to prevent them from returning to their homes. These suspicions of ethnic cleansing are underlined by the intended use of a law that allows the government to claim burnt land in order to prevent the return of internally displaced people.138 The UNHCR reports that more than 730.000 Rohingya refugees arrived in Bangladesh since the violent clashes in 2017.139
In summary, the perception of being threatened by Muslims has grown significantly.
This fear explains why the public seldom opposes violence against Muslims or campaigns to achieve ethnic purity. The Burmese government has repeatedly denied that it considers Rohingya as Burmese citizens. It therefore feels not obligated to protect them or allow them citizen’s rights or political participation. Quite contrary, Rohingya are considered illegal Bengali immigrants and their relocation is preferred. The elected Burmese governments have not only politically disenfranchised Rohingya, it has also consciously allowed for a military campaign of ethnic cleansing.
Theories on ethnic and intrastate conflict suggest a variety of possibilities to explain the emergence of an ethnic conflict. In the case of Myanmar, aversions, rooted in colonial history, are now amplified by competing political and societal actors in the political framework
137 "'My World Is Finished' - Rohingya Targeted in Crimes against Humanity in Myanmar," (London: Amnesty International, 2017)., 27-40.
138 Thomas Hunecke, "Mission Report of Ohchr Rapid Response Mission to Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh," (Geneva:
United Nations Human Rights Office Of The High Commisioner, 2017).
139 UNHCR, "Refugee Response in Bangladesh," Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/myanmar_refugees.
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provided by democratisation. A central element of elite-competition is the deliberate manipulation of ethnicity and existing hatred towards a previously designed outgroup. This led to a disenfranchisement of Rohingya and eventually to their violent displacement. The narrative, demonising the Muslim, is spread by religious extremists, but generally adopted by political actors. It revolves around al alleged Muslim threat and intended take-over, which has to be prevented in order to guarantee the survival of Buddhism in Myanmar. The following analysis will identify the involved actors, their attitude towards Rohingya and possible discriminatory actions they have undertaken to maximise their support-base.