Summary

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4.4. SUMMARY

Along with most political and societal actors within Myanmar, the USDP’s adherence to the concept of national races remained unchanged. Naturally, in a multi-ethnic state the concept of ethnic nationalism is an effective tool in shaping the national identity and unifying various groups under the umbrella of a diverse nation, declaring unity a precondition for a prosperous state. This process of nation building was initiated decades ago under an authoritarian one-party rule. It provided the leadership a powerful tool to define the country’s natives as well as unwanted elements, as the definitions were imposed top down through state institutions.⁴²⁴ Since majority of Burmese have settled with the concept of an ethnic nation, the USDP had no benefit from departing from the concept, let alone altering it to accommodate Rohingya. On the contrary, together with the citizenship laws it is a convenient tool to argue for their non-belonging.

The USDP government adopted the narrative of Bengali immigrants from previous military governments. The anti-Muslim language of the USPD alternated between denunciations as “Bengali” to a denial of the existence of a Rohingya ethnicity. Especially in the run up for the 2012 by-election, the allegations of illegal immigration or “imported labourers”

gained prominence in public statements by the USDP leadership. In a blunt foray, the president even suggested a deportation. As this was not received favourably outside of Myanmar, he suggested advancing the citizenship verification process, which would de facto change the Rohingya’s status from tolerated to excluded and deprived of any rights.

The party itself appeared not so much as a driving force in spreading inflammatory speech or demanding a harsher course against Muslims. It rather reacted to prevalent sentiments and demands in order to consolidate its position and competitiveness in the elections. The more active elements in the creation of the anti-Muslim narrative were local Rakhine parties and extremist Buddhists, which the USDP government never criticised or regulated. The party climbed on the bandwagon of the growing Islamophobia, motivated by the aim to consolidate by. In this course, it behaved opportunistic but rational. It had previously approached white card holders in order to secure a majority over the RNDP. As competition with the NLD on a national level became the more pressing issue, the USDP clearly sided with nationalist and conservative religious forces and stripped white card holders, mostly Rohingya of their voting rights. The

424 Cheesman, "How in Myanmar “National Races” Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude Rohingya.", 5-10.

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discourse about an alleged Muslim threat allowed the USDP to portray itself as a protector of Buddhist interests. Through implementation of protectionist laws, drafted and lobbied by religious organisations, the USDP formed an alliance with nationalists.

The military’s position towards the Rohingya has evolved, but not changed significantly, during the democratic transition. In sum, the Tatmadaw dedicates itself to democracy, while simultaneously underlining its importance in granting security and stability in the light of ongoing ethnic insurgencies. Hence, it argues for its own independence and inclusion in state institutions to carry out this duty. Consequently, the Tatmadaw’s praetorian character is unbroken. However, it does not strive for absolute power anymore, making it a praetorian guardian. Yet it still portrays itself as the decisive force that is capable of securing political and economic progress. It is obvious that behind the scenes the Tatmadaw also uses these arguments to secure their revenues from resource extraction and protect its business conglomerates.

Concerning ethnic diversity in the country, the military emphasizes and glorifies unity within the Burmese groups as a foundation for peace and progress and propagates an image of historical harmony among resident ethnic groups. Issues involving Rohingya and Rakhine state were long ignored and omitted by the military. As the topic gained salience, the senior general openly said that Rohingya are not considered a part of Myanmar’s national races. The anti-Rohingya narrative took a turn in 2017, as a reaction to previous events, as the Tatmadaw since then directly enriches it with suspected Muslim expansionism, terrorism and resulting anti-terror operations. Securitisation of the Rohingya issue has been reoccurring. Yet the character has recently switched from “illegal immigration” to “terrorism”, which marks a new level and higher intensity military operations. In order to propagate this narrative the military increasingly referred to historic instances of Muslim secession movements. Especially social media platforms serve to propagate more radical depictions of “the Muslim threat”.

Ironically, other ethnic armed groups in Myanmar often aspire independence or at least more autonomy. These groups however, are potential partners and signatories of the nationwide ceasefire agreement, while Muslim insurgents are portrayed as terrorists that cannot be negotiated with. Since the military’s unbroken influence is anchored in the constitution, it is not bound to campaigning and attraction of voters. Therefore it didn’t need to change its public stance before elections or when anti-Muslim players as 969, Ma Ba Tha and Arakan nationalist parties emerged. Its influence on politics and control over lucrative business is threatened by market reforms and the NLD’s intentions to alter the constitution. To remain influential, the Tatmadaw consequently benefits from cultivating images of domestic enemies to the state, as

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it allows them to justify extensive funding and political representation in most Burmese authorities as well as the upkeep of a strong force on Burmese soil.

The NLD finds itself in a position where it tries to adhere to modern and democratic values, but is hampered by powerful elites and a conservative Buddhist majority. To put it all into a pragmatic perspective, Aung San Suu Kyi is not free in her political choices. Although she championed human rights, she also is a Bamar Buddhist and nationalist, which does not give her much room to manoeuvre. As populism and the anti-Muslim narrative enjoys considerable support among the majority of Burmese, she has no other choice but to appeal to public opinion if she wants to secure support. Advocating human rights might have worked when she was the head of the opposition, but as de-facto head of state she has to sacrifice minority rights for public support and cooperation with the still powerful military.⁴²⁵ But the public not only adheres to a xenophobic stance, it is also increasingly pessimistic about democratic and federal institutions and the economic development of the country, which even increases the NLD’s need to secure support from the society’s centre. ⁴²⁶ On top of satisfying the public, she also has to maintain a functioning relation with the Tatmadaw if she wants to advance with the peace process, secure the NLD’s re-election and reform the country. Suu Kyi made the mistake to connect her strategy to constitutional amends that restrain the military’s political dominance and physical presence in disputed areas. The Tatmadaw, reluctant to relinquish political power and income from exploiting natural resources as well as to commit to ethnic inclusion, has so far proven to be an obstacle to reconciliation and to plans to promote economic development in Rakhine State.⁴²⁷ In this nexus, Suu Kyi failed to satisfy her high standards. Ongoing military operation against Shan and Kachin and a failure to address the Rohingya crisis caused widespread criticism which grimly notices the “bizarre prospect of a Nobel Prize winner presiding over a string of ‘concentration camps’ full of Rohingya refugees.”⁴²⁸ Apart from that, she has not achieved any constitutional change that limits the military’s influence or creates mechanisms of accountability. The government-issued investigative commissions have until this day not pointed out any military misconduct in the 2016 and 2017 clearance operations.

425 Perter A. Coclanis, "Aung San Suu Kyi Is a Politician, Not a Monster," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/14/aung-san-suu-kyi-is-a-politician-not-a-monster/.

426 "Myanmar's Stalled Transition.", 3-6.

427 Zoltan Barany, "Burma: Suu Kyi's Missteps," Journal of Democracy 29, no. 1 (2018)., 9f, 14.

428 Andrew Selth, "The Fallen Idol: Aung San Suu Kyi and the Politics of Personality," ABC Religion and Ethics, http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2017/09/12/4733319.htm.

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Suu Kyi’s position towards Rohingya has not changed significantly over time.

Already as champion of the opposition and advocate of refugees, she did not speak out for the Rohingya. On the contrary, she consistently refuses to acknowledge the group’s status as a distinct ethnic group. Even as an oppositional politician, she has relied on the narrative of illegal immigration as the root problem of Rakhine’s societal and economic problems. At no point in time, she has used to term Rohingya. Her commitment to human rights has remained in her speeches, yet she has failed to put words into action by not establishing mechanisms for accountability within Myanmar or admitting human rights abuses. She furthermore adheres to the prevalent Burmese conception of ethnic nationalism. Suu Kyi unchangedly links citizen’s rights to the recognised Burmese national races/ ethnic nationalities. It does accept that multiple ethnic groups constitute one Burmese nation, but the core of ethnic nationalism, ancestral ties to Burmese soil and shared heritage, remains. Burmanisation and efforts for a federal union continue simultaneously, suggesting that the “multi-ethnic nationalism” is envisaged to be dominated by majority Bamar group. What has changed is the way issues in Rakhine are framed.

Just like the military Suu Kyi long named illegal immigration as the core of all problems. To add insult to injury, Suu Kyi and the government frequently deny ethnic cleansing, relativize Rohingya suffering by claiming rapes to be a “terrorist fabrication” accuse them of burning down their own settlements and emphasize Rakhine victims. Similar to the other state actors, securitisation of the Rohingya issue, as a matter of terrorism, has become a standard in the government’s linguistic repertoire. Since ARSA attacked Burmese security forces in 2017, she increasingly refers to matters of terrorism and national security when commenting the events.

In this matter, she sides with the Burmese military.