Chapter III: KEY SOCIETAL ACTORS IN MYANMAR
3.1 The Tatmadaw
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CHAPTER III: KEY SOCIETAL ACTORS IN MYANMAR
The following section will introduce the relevant actors who are subject to the subsequent analysis. Next to presenting the relevant figures and used sources, background information on actors’ goals and motivation and the circumstances under which actors operate will be briefly introduced. For actors on the level of the central government, special attention will be paid to their economic interests, reforms and performance as well as their foreign relations and strategy regarding ethnic reconciliation. The sections on local Rakhine actors will explain the societal background and how actors interact with the local population.
3.1 THE TATMADAW
For most of Myanmar’s modern history, the Tatmadaw was a textbook example for a praetorian ruler. Next to militaries responsibilities, it assumed all governmental functions. After the dissolution of the Union of Burma, the military in Myanmar moved beyond the traditional function of acting as a security apparatus and became a governing body for decades, monopolising the economy and penetrating all state organs of the single-party state as well as the media. During their reign, generals stressed their role as mere protector of nation and state institutions with the intention to work towards the development of a democratic constitution.
This argumentation and the authoritarian one-military-party system are characteristic for a praetorian ruler. The military administration ruled uncontested through its civil organs the BSPP, SLORC and SPDC from 1962 to 2011.140
3.1.1 C
ONTEMPORARY SELF-
CONCEPTIONToday the Tatmadaw portrays itself a servant to democracy. Military leaders seldom omit mentioning that the military is still a vital security organ, especially in the protection of the Burmese democracy and constitutions. A continued participation in governance is, on their accord necessary, to ensure unity and cohesion and protection of the democratic institutions.
The military now presents itself as “cohesive and bureaucratized force, expert in management of violence, with a professional ethic, a high moral position and potential for
140 Renaud Egreteau, "Military Guardianship and the Search for a Pacted Transition," in Caretaking
Democratization: The Military and Political Change in Myanmar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
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sufficiency”.141 Besides the capability of providing protection, other characteristics of a praetorian army, such as independence and self-ascribed moral superiority, are still evident within the Tatmadaw’s self-perception.
The transition towards democracy was initiated on the junta’s terms in the first place. The armed forces maintain a parental self-perception and intend to stay a major player in politics.142 To stay a relevant actor, the Tatmadaw enshrined its role as a political leader in the basic principles of the constitution.143 Although the military’s control is not absolute anymore, it still qualifies as a praetorian ruler, due to its independence and uncontested presence in state institutions. The factors that contribute to this status are legal immunity for its members, the control of institutions of the civilian government through military officers, exclusive control of the key ministries of Home Affairs, Defence, and Border affairs and a reservation of 25% of the seats in the Legislative Assembly for Tatmadaw personnel. The Tatmadaw furthermore controls local assemblies through a reservation of one-third of the seats.144 This makes the Tatmadaw an independent veto power on national and state level as well as gives it the freedom to operate within the country without any supervision or liability. Additionally, the constitution still grants the commander in chief the right to take over executive and judicative if necessary.145 Thus despite considering itself an institution of a modern democratic state, the Tatmadaw still maintains as many options of getting involved in political decision making as possible.
Generally, the Tatmadaw’s commitment to genuine democratic transition seems subordinate to preservation of power and self-enrichment.
3.1.2 E
CONOMIC INTERESTSDuring military rule, the Tatmadaw controlled policymaking, including the economic sector. This allowed it to reserve profitable sectors for the Tatmadaw-owned holding companies like the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL). Through the implementation of a licence-and-permit system, controlled through military channels, the Tatmadaw leadership secured further opportunities for obtaining rents and strengthened privileged access for Tatmadaw business conglomerates. The generated income did not flow
141 "The Continuing Political Salience of the Military in Post-Spdc Myanmar," Debating democratization in Myanmar 233 (2014)., 262.
142 "Military Guardianship and the Search for a Pacted Transition."
143 "Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar," (Yangon: Ministry of Information, 2008)., 3.
144 "The Continuing Political Salience of the Military in Post-Spdc Myanmar."
145 "Patterns of Persistent Praetorian Behaviour."
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into the military’s budged, but directly into the hands of shareholders, the pension fund and the pockets of leading commanders and their families.146 Reforms towards a market-oriented economy, accompanying the democratic transition, now threaten the military’s control over the economic sector. The commercial interests of the military brass, however, remains. Lucrative businesses, including cigarettes, petroleum trade, alcoholic beverages, manufacturing venues and jade and other resources remain in the hands of military officers and their relatives through a complex network of enterprises.147
Article 37 (a-b) of the constitution states, “The Union is the ultimate owner of all the lands and all natural resources above and below the ground, above and beneath the water and in the atmosphere in the Union.”148 Therefore, when it comes to the extraction of natural resources, the central government enjoys all rights and benefits, while single states can only claim a share of the revenue (at best). Additionally, laws to protect private landownership are inadequate and consequently land-grabbing remains salient.149 Since the Tatmadaw still dominates the oil, gas and mining industry, the generals have crucial interests in securing access to resources and soil. It is furthermore in its best interest to prevent single states or resident ethnicities to claim their share. The military secures this capability via the Ministry of Home Affairs, which allows appointing favourable personnel for the administration of states and regions.150
Rakhine state and the adjacent ocean in particular are rich in oil and gas reserves. Only a small margin of the extracted resources are reserved for the domestic market. Over 80 percent are exported to China, which is involved in various other projects in Rakhine State. Next to deep-water ports, an oil and gas pipeline runs from the Bay of Bengal, through Rakhine, to Kunming in China. This pipeline, as part of China’s One-Belt-Road initiative, allows the country to bypass the Malacca-strait and ease resource imports from the Middle East.
Consequently, next to the Burmese government and military, China has a geostrategic interest for peace and stability in the region. India has similarly invested in infrastructure and resource extraction, putting Myanmar in a situation where it has to balance between two rivalling
146 "Myanmar's Military: Back to the Barracks," in Asia Briefing, ed. International Crisis Group (Yangon/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014)., 9-10.
147 Michael Peel, "Myanmar: The Military-Commercial Complex - the Emerging Market Tempts Multinationals but Groups with Links to the Army Loom Large," Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/c6fe7dce-d26a-11e6-b06b-680c49b4b4c0.
148 "Natural Resources of Myanmar (Burma): Ownership, Management, Revenue Sharing and Impacts," (Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Centre (Union of Burma), 2017)., 13.
149 Tom Kramer, "Ethnic Conflict and Lands Rights in Myanmar," Social Research: An International Quarterly 82, no. 2 (2015)., 363-370.
150 "Natural Resources of Myanmar (Burma): Ownership, Management, Revenue Sharing and Impacts.", 14.
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superpowers while caretaking their interests on Burmese soil. As part of this, securing peace and the military’s political leverage over the region is in the Tatmadaw’s best interest. It thus intends to disenfranchise Rohingya and even Rakhine ethnics in political representation, push for expulsion and strengthen the Union-friendly Bamar groups in the state, while protecting the business and investments of strategic partners.
3.1.3 C
OOPERATION WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND ARMED FORCESIn international affairs, the military behaves almost like an independent state organ. The Army Chief Min Aung Hlaing has held talks with political leaders of regional allies, including Narendra Modi,151 Xi Jinping,152 Thailand’s prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha153 and Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Kono.154 The Tatmadaw traditionally had close ties to the Chinese military and fundamentally relied on the supply of Chinese weapons and equipment.
Arms imports from China still account to around 70% of Myanmar’s total weapons imports today.155 With the democratic transition, the Tatmadaw opened up in order to overcome its status as a pariah. After the initiation of Myanmar’s reform process, major western forces initiated cooperation with the Tatmadaw. Hoping to improve the army’s professionalism, adherence to international law and conflict management. Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States launched training and education programs for Tatmadaw soldiers. Existing arms embargos, however, stayed in place. Thus, China, India and Russia remain important military partners. After the 2017 military retaliation, multiple international organisations called to suspend military cooperation with the Tatmadaw.156 In reaction, the EU issued travel bans and tightened the arms embargo157 and the US imposed travel and financial sanctions on Tatmadaw members,158 but other cooperation stayed in place. China, India and Russia continue
151 Joe Kumbun, "The Blossoming Relationship between India and Myanmar," Frontier Myanmar, https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/the-blossoming-relationship-between-india-and-myanmar.
152 "Senior General Min Aung Hlaing Meets with Chinese President Mr Xi Jinping," The Global New Light Of Myanmar, 11.2. 2016.
153 "Senior General Min Aung Hlaing Holds Talks with Thai Pm," news release, 2018.
154 "Foreign Minister Kono Visits Myanmar," news release, 8.6., 2018.
155 Pieter D. Wezeman et al., "Trends in Interntaional Arms Transfers 2017," in SIPRI Fact Sheet (Stockholm:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2018)., 9-10.
156 Cameron Hill, "Defence Cooperation with Myanmar - Australia and Other Countries: A Quick Guide," in Research Paper Series, 2017-18 (Canberra: Parliamentary Library, Commonwealth of Australia, 2017).
157 "Myanmar/Burma: Eu Sanctions 7 Senior Military, Border Guard and Police Officials Responsible for or Associated with Serious Human Rights Violations against Rohingya Population," news release, 06.25.2018, 2018.
158 "Defence Cooperation with Myanmar - Australia and Other Countries: A Quick Guide."
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their arms exports, and Japan and Australia carry on with educational programs.159 Vietnam and Burmese generals recently renewed commitments to cooperation in the defence industry, logistics and medical services.160
3.1.4 E
THNIC RECONCILIATIONRegarding ethnic reconciliation, the military has often been an obstacle. It adheres firmly to basic constitutional principles, formulated in preparations for democratic transition.
These include a non-disintegration of the Union and national unity as well as an involvement of the Defence Services in a national political leadership role in the future state.161 The Tatmadaw thus obstructs commitments to ethnic reconciliation and related autonomy of peripheral states. The few advances in ceasefire agreements, initiated by the Thein Sein government, were contrasted by amplified military clearance operations in northern Myanmar, which even targeted EAOs that had previously signed peace agreements. Other EAOs were even categorically excluded from negotiations. By conducting operations and applying a divide and rule approach, the Tatmadaw aims to secure access to natural resources as well as justify its claim to participate in the country’s political leadership.162 The military’s course has not changed significantly since the NLD took office in 2016. The two divergent actors now struggle to find consensus in the peace process. No change in the constitution can be made without the Tatmadaw’s consent and Aung San Suu Kyi has to acknowledge the military’s course in internal affairs in order to preserve their fragile cooperation. The military aims subordinate EAOs under military command or demands bilateral agreements, while the NLD tries to advance ethnic reconciliation through commitments to federalism. The democratic party has indeed initiated multilateral dialogue in the 21st Century Panglong Conferences, yet the Tatmadaw continues to be more of an obstacle than a partner. It firmly adheres to the principles of non-disintegration and non-secession and continues operations in the north. It additionally insists that signing the National Ceasefire Agreement, designed by the previous government, is a precondition for EAOs to enter negotiations. Simultaneously, it refuses to sign peace deals with certain EAOs,
159 The Myanmar Times, "Japan Affirms Military Ties with Tatmadaw," The Myanmar Times,
https://www.mmtimes.com/news/japan-affirms-military-ties-tatmadaw.html., "Myanmar (Burma): Australia Reaffirms Defence Cooperation with Tatmadaw," Asia News Monitor, Mar 08, 2018 2018.
160 "Vietnam-Myanmar (Burma): Vietnam, Myanmar Promote Defence Cooperation," Asia News Monitor, 06/18/
2018 Jun 18 2018.
161 "Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar."
162 "Beyond Panglong: Myanmar's National Peace and Reform Dilemma," in Myanmar Policy Briefing (Amsterdam: The Transnational Institute, 2017)., 17-26.
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mostly from the Northern Alliance, and objects their participation in the Panglong Conferences.163
3.1.5 J
USTIFYING ACTOR SELECTIONIn sum, the military portrays itself as guarantor of Myanmar’s security and development, increasing its legitimacy as acting as a co-operator of a civil government. It however rejects any threat to its independence and capabilities of securing interests on Myanmar’s soil. Due to ongoing armed conflict within the country, the military’s substantial involvement in economy and resource extraction as well as the reservation of seats in crucial government bodies, the Tatmadaw remains an important political actor until today. Apart from that, it played a crucial role in operations in Rakhine, which disproportionally affected Rohingya civilians. Due to the media attention and popularity of General Hlaing, it can be expected that the Tatmadaw significantly contributes to the formation of opinion in Myanmar. Thus, the analysis is, next to the military’s actions, chiefly concerned with its attitude and comments towards Rohingya The military’s attitude towards Rohingya as well as the self-perception of the military become obvious in Min Aung Hlaing’s annual speeches on Myanmar’s Armed Forces day. The senior general furthermore actively uses social media, where his speeches and positions are presented in Burmese and English translations. With roughly 1.38 million Facebook followers in June 2018, his popularity does not fall short of Aung San Suu Kyi’s, who enjoys 1.98 million followers.164 Given the fact that Hlaing is definitely not as well-known as Suu Kyi on an international stage, the Burmese web-community seems to have a favour for the Tatmadaw’s narrative. Based on his popularity, leading position and communicativeness, the general’s statements will be used in the following analysis to assess the Tatmadaw’s general course, perception of democratic transition and attitude towards Rohingya.