In response to the above questions, firstly, we come to Kuiji who cited three theories from Buddhabhumyūpadeśa:4 (1) The first theory holds that all
properties/characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of object, including svalakṣaṇa and
sāmānyalakṣaṇa, are cognized by perception (pratyakṣa) in the concentrated state of mind, whereas according to the Logical Treatises (hetūvidya) (i.e., Nyāyamukha and Nyāyapraveśa) svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa are cognized in the non-concentrated
2 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論（Abhidharmamāhāvibhāṣā）:「唯共相境道能斷煩惱」（T27.820a）。
3 Abhidharmamāhāvibhāṣā 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論:「唯真實作意能斷煩惱。」T27.819.c.28-29.
4 Fodijing lun 佛地經稐, T.26.318.b.16-b.15,
state of mind by perception and inference respectively.5 (2) The second theory holds that only svalakṣaṇa is cognized in the concentrated state of mind. However, in the progress of meditative cultivation sāmānyalakṣaṇa is used as a provisional tool (upāya) that helps the practitioner to cognize the truths in the form of svalakṣaṇa.
Hence, one can provisionally say that the sāmānyalakṣaṇa is also cognized in the concentrated state of mind. According to this theory, the Abhidharma teaching is a provisional teaching for the claim that the cognition of sāmānyalakṣaṇa is capable of eliminating the afflictions. In the final analysis, one eliminates the afflictions through the cognition of svalakṣaṇa.6 (3) The last theory attempts to elaborate the positions favored by both Buddhist Logicians and the Buddhabhumyūpadeśa. That is, since the mind in the concentrated state is free of conception, all of cognitive objects in this state are svalakṣaṇa, which are perceived by pratyakṣa only. Even if a practitioner is able to cognize impermanence, suffering, and so forth, these sāmānyalakṣaṇas are perceived as something within the individual object. Hence these sāmānyalakṣaṇas are also taken as svalakṣaṇa on the level of concentrated state, because they are not separate from the individual object. Accordingly, Truth/Reality (tathatā) should be also taken as svalakṣaṇa only, instead of being taken as sāmānyalakṣaṇa.7 This
5 Cheng weishi lun shuji 成唯識論述記：彼有三說。「有義，二量是散心位，依二相立。不說定心。
若在定心，緣一切相皆現量攝。」由此總緣智亦現量攝，斷惑無失。即由定照共相自體故，說定 心為現量也。
[Answer:] There are three theories [in regard to this question]. (1) “Some holds that two means of valid cognition (pramāṇa) [i.e., pratyakṣa and anumāṇa] are in the non-concentrated state of mind;
they are established in accordance to two characteristics [i.e., svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa]. The mind in the concentrated state is excluded [in this theory]. If all characteristics are cognized in the concentrated state, they are cognized by perception.” (T26.318a27-29) According to this theory, the cognition of the combined support-object (samastâlambanajñāna) is also classified as perception, which is definitely capable of eliminating the afflictions. The concentrated mind is said to be perception simply because [the mind] in the concentrated state illuminates the sāmānyalakṣaṇa itself (svarūpa).
6 第二說，「有義，定心唯緣自相，然由共相方便所引，緣諸共相所顯理者，就方便說名知共相，
不如是者名知自相。由此道理，或說真如名空無我諸法共相，或說真如二空所顯非是共相。」由 此義故，對法等說緣共相智能斷惑者依方便說，實自相觀方能斷之。
(2) “Some holds that in the concentrated state of mind only the particular characteristic is cognized.
However, it is introduced by means (upāya) of the universal characteristic. What is cognized is the truth/principle manifested in the various characteristics of universal. It is provisionally called ‘cognition of universal characteristic.’ It is called ‘cognition of particular characteristic’ when it is not so.
According to this reason, some names ‘suchness’ (tathatā), which is also named ‘emptiness’ (sūnyatā) and ‘selflessness’ (nairātmya), as the universal characteristic of existents. Some says that ‘suchness,’
which is manifestation of two kinds of emptiness, is not universal characteristic.”6 According to this theory, it is a provisional theory held by the Abhidharma to claim that the cognition of universal characteristics is capable of eliminating the affliction. As a matter of fact, it is the discerning of particular characteristics that is capable of elimination.
7 第三說，「如實義者，彼因明論立自共相，與此少異。彼說一切法上實義皆名自相。以諸法上
自相共相。各附已體 不共他故。若分別心立一種類 能詮所詮 通在諸法 如縷貫華 名為共相。
此要散心分別假立 是比量境。一切定心 離此分別 皆名現量。雖緣諸法苦．無常等。亦一一法 各別有 故名為自相。真如雖是共相所顯。以是諸法自實性故。自有相故。亦非共相。不可以其
theory is opposed to the Abhidharma teaching which maintains that only the cognition of sāmānyalakṣaṇa is capable of eliminating the defilements before realizing the final enlightenment.
After having cited three theories of svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa, Kuiji concludes his position by claiming that he disagrees with the Abhidharma theory. He says:
According to the above analysis, some Abhidharma [texts] hold a view that the cognition which takes sāmānyalakṣaṇa as the object is capable of destroying the defilements.8 The sāmānyalakṣaṇa is thus named for the reason that the
conceptual mind uses class (jāti) to string the various existents on [the level of]
Truth/Reality (tathatā). Some holds that sāmānyalakṣaṇa is named for the meaning (artha) of existents which are grounded in tathatā. The cognition of sāmānyalakṣaṇa is thus named for that which takes this [i.e., sāmānyalakṣaṇa]
as the object. As a matter of fact, the existence of tathatā is real by nature, so it is not sāmānyalakṣaṇa. In reality, the cognition of particular characteristics [i.e., svalakṣaṇa] is capable of destroying the defilements. As explained above, [it is because] sāmānyalakṣaṇa is conceptually designated.9
Kuiji distinguishes two types of sāmānyalakṣaṇa: (1) concepts, such as class and species, which are superimposed upon the real existents by the conceptual mind; (2) the meaning/property of tathatā, which is also depicted as sixteen modes of ākāra-s
與一切法不一不異即名共相。自相亦與一切共相不一異故。」是故彼論與此不同。
(3) “As regards the true meaning [of dharmas] explained here, the logical treatises (hetū-vidya) offer a different account of svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa. They claim that the real object (tattvārtha) of all dharmas are named svalakṣaṇa for the reason that the svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa of dharmas exist separately by themselves and hence are not shared with each other. When the conceptual mind establishes the classes (jāti) of signifier and signified which is applied to dharmas in the similar way that the thread is used to string flowers together. They [class, etc.,] are called “sāmānyalakṣaṇa”. They are conceptual construct in the non-concentrated state. They are the object of inference. All minds in the concentrated state, which are free from conceptualization, are called “pratykṣa”. Even if [in the concentrated state] suffering, impermanence, and so forth, of existents are cognized, they exist in each individual existent. Hence they are called “svalakṣaṇa”. Although the Suchness (tathatā) is disclosed through sāmānyalakṣaṇa, it is not sāmānyalakṣaṇa, because it is the real nature of existents, and because it possesses its own characteristic (lakṣaṇa). It cannot be named “sāmānyalakṣaṇa”
simply because it is neither identical nor different from all existents. It is because svalakṣaṇa is also neither identical nor different from all sāmānyalakṣaṇas.” (T26.318b4-14) As a result, the [Logical]
Treatise holds a view distinct from this (i.e., Buddhabhumyūpadeśa).
8 In Kuiji’s another commentary, Cheng weishi lun biechao 成唯識論別抄, “Abhidharma” is identified as Sthiramati’s Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣyā. See T31.727.a.10-12: 問：何等作意能斷耶？答：總緣 作意觀一切法皆無我性，能斷煩惱。總緣作意者，謂令緣一切法共相行作意。
9 由此義故，對法等說緣共相智能斷惑者，依分別心 於一種類，真如之上，通在諸法，說名共
相。或真如體諸法皆有義，名共相。緣此之智，名共相智。論實，真如法實性故，非是共相。據 實而言，即別相智能斷惑也。共相假立，已如前辨。T.
of Four Noble Truths. Both types of sāmānyalakṣaṇa are the cognitive object of inference. In the case of tathatā, tathatā in itself is viewed as substance, while
“suffering,” “impermanence”, and so on, are viewed as property/meaning (artha) of tathatā. For Kuiji, tathatā itself cannot be conceptually cognized. Hence it cannot be taken as sāmānyalakṣaṇa. In short, as regards the issue whether the cognition of sāmānyalakṣaṇa or svalakṣaṇa leads to the elimination of afflictions, Kuiji clearly disagrees with the Abhdiharma position. The main reason for his disagreement is that the Abhidharma confuses the two aspects of tathatā: tathatā in itself (ti, *svarūpa) and tathatā as property. Tathatā in itself is the ultimate reality which can be directly known only through pure perception. However, one has to cognize “tathatā as property” before one directly perceives tathatā in itself that leads to the final enlightenment.
In this paper I attempt to examine how much the Chinese Buddhists in the 7th-8th century were critically indebted to the Abhidharma heritage in the Yogācāra theory of truth and liberation, even though they took different ontological positions.10 I will also point out that the continuity of Abhdiharma and Yogācāra is grounded in the same matrix of Buddhist cultivation and theorization. For both Abhidharma and Yogācāra, the ontology of svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa cannot fully make sense unless it is understood within the context of meditative practice. In the following, firstly, I will cite and examine some passages in Kuiji’s Cheng weishi lun shuji to see how critically the Chinese Yogācāra scholars adopted the Abhidharma doctrine within a more complicate framework.