匯率低估之國際規範合致性的探討

行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫 成果報告

匯率低估之國際規範合致性的探討

研究成果報告(精簡版)

計 畫 類 別 ： 個別型

計 畫 編 號 ： NSC 100-2410-H-004-039-

執 行 期 間 ： 100 年 08 月 01 日至 101 年 07 月 31 日

執 行 單 位 ： 國立政治大學國際經營與貿易學系

計 畫 主 持 人 ： 楊光華

計畫參與人員： 碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：莊雅涵

碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：張凱媛

公 開 資 訊 ： 本計畫可公開查詢

中 華 民 國 101 年 11 月 02 日

中 文 摘 要 ： 人民幣低估是否有違 WTO 規範一節，目前各家見解甚為分

歧，更多之研究投入，不但有助於未來爭端之法律性解決，

甚至可能使爭端止息。本計畫對目前爭鳴之百家論點進行交

叉比對分析──包括 GATT 第十五條、非違反控訴、補貼及傾

銷等論點，並以國際法解釋的角度，探索相關 WTO 規範之妥

適解釋；其次，藉著追蹤美國國內針對人民幣低估之相關可

能立法，評估其與上述 WTO 規範之合致性，並預測其執行之

成效；最後，基於 WTO 爭端解決機制之特性、以及 WTO 過往

處理強權（superpower）間高度爭議性問題之經驗，試析相

關爭議訴諸 WTO 後之可能演變、對 WTO 機構本身之影響、甚

至對全球貨幣與貿易體制所可能帶來之衝擊。本研究之完成

將得以釐清是否有必要修正 WTO 相關條文使其得以處理上述

爭議，同時亦可提供國內貨幣主管機關匯率政策的 WTO 適法

性參考。

中文關鍵詞： 匯率低估，匯率戰爭，匯率操縱，關貿總協定，國際貨幣基

金，出口補貼，平衡稅

英 文 摘 要 ： Whether currency undervaluation violates relevant WTO

rules is subject to debate, and the more research is

devoted to it, the better for the controversy to be

resolved, or even prevent disputes. This study

cross-examines currently existing arguments, including the

analysis of GATT:XV, non-violation complaint,

subsidies, and dumping, in order to explore the

appropriate interpretation of relevant provisions in

accordance with VCLT. Moreover, the study analyzes

the relevant U.S. bills targeting currency

undervaluation for their WTO-consistency, and

predicts their implementing effects. Last, based on

the nature of DSB, and the experience of WTO

adjudicating body on highly controversial cases

between superpowers, this study tries to discuss the

possible development when the case is brought to the

DSB as well as the potential impact to the WTO bodies

and the global monetary and trading systems. This

study aims to clarify whether there is a need to

amend relevant WTO provisions in order for the WTO to

address the trade effect derived from currency

undervaluation. It also can provide the monetary

authorities reference for the WTO-consistency of its

exchange rate policy.

英文關鍵詞： currency undervaluation, currency war, currency

manipulation, GATT, IMF, export subsidies,

countervailing duty

匯率低估之國際規範合致性的探討（結案報告） 頁 1

報告內容

一、 前言

政府對匯率的干預在某些情況下可能刺激出口、減緩進口，而遭致貿易對手國之關

切、甚至可能被要求停止干預以利幣值回升。譬如

70 年代，美國即曾指德國、日本等

出超國操縱匯率；80 年代，美國亦要求包含日本與臺灣在內的亞洲國家，必須放手讓

本國貨幣升值，以利進口；近年來，隨著與中國之間的貿易赤字擴大，要求人民幣升值

已儼然成為中美貿易談判之主軸。不僅如此；美國國會接二連三地對人民幣低估提出因

應法案1，要求行政部門利用多邊（如 WTO, IMF）之機制、或單邊之手段（如平衡稅、

反傾銷稅之課徵），反擊匯率操縱國（主要指中國）之不當貿易競爭，更使中美貿易關

係高度緊張。

長期以來雖多為美國指摘其享有大量出超之貿易對手國操縱匯率，但自

2008 年金

融海嘯後，主要已開發國家為了復甦經濟，策略性地本國貨幣維持低檔的做法已引發新

興市場國家的不滿。巴西財長蒙迪嘉（Guido Mantega）即曾公開指稱美、日、歐等已

開發國家競相貶值貨幣之做法，陷全球於「匯率戰爭（currency war）」之中

2

。這樣的

指控儘管是憂心巴西里拉(Real)相對於世界主要貨幣持續升值，削弱巴西之出口競爭力，

不過也不是無的放矢，因為英、美的確是採取極為寬鬆的貨幣措施。當利率已無可降的

空間時，甚至發行貨幣以購買長期公債，抑制公債之殖利率，使貨幣持續走貶（如美國

的「第二回合量化寬鬆政策（Quantitative Easing II, QE2）」）；至於日本，於 2010 年

九月不但宣告中止了其

6 年來未曾干預日圓匯率之記錄，並在日圓急升至 15 年來之新

高後，兩度進場打壓日圓，急速回貶之幅度，舉世側目。

儘管美、日均聲稱上述措施乃是為了維持經濟之穩定、降低失業率、避免通貨緊縮

等總體經濟目的，並無意藉之獲取貿易上不公平之競爭優勢，因此絕非操縱匯率；但類

1 _{早在 2003 年 9 月參議院即曾提案對所有中國進口貨物加徵 27.5%之關稅，以反映人民幣之低估水準。}

S. 1586 (108th _{Congress)。之後，2007 年參議院之提案：Strengthening America’s Trade Laws Act (S.364, 110}th

Congress), Stopping Overseas Subsidies Act (S.974, 110th _{Congress) 兩者皆授權 ITC 對中國等非市場經濟體}

課徵平衡稅，並明定非國會同意，行政部門不得取消「非市場經濟地位」之認定。在眾議院則有Trade Law

Reform Act of 2007(H.R. 708), Nonmarket Economy Trade Remedy Act of 2007 (H.R. 1229), Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act of 2007 (H.R. 2942)等提案，後者(H.R. 2942)明定貨幣匯率嚴重失調（即外國貨幣嚴重地 偏離其應有之價值）構成可課徵平衡稅的補貼。在第111 屆國會（2009-2010），則有 Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act (H.R. 2378), Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act of 2009 (S. 1027), Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2009 (S. 1254), Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2010 (S. 3134)等 提案。2010 年提案多以 2007 年提案內容為基礎，即為了解決符合匯率操縱「意圖」要件之困難，改以 「根本性匯率失調（fundamentally misaligned）」取代「操縱（manipulation）」。Claude Barfield, Congress and Chinese Currency Legislation, inTHE US-SINO CURRENCY DISPUTE:NEW INSIGHTS FROM ECONOMICS,POLITICS AND LAW 29,30(Simon Evenett, ed., 2010).

2 _{World is in “currency war:”Brazil, REUTERS, Sep. 27, 2010. 「匯率戰爭」在 1930 年代大蕭條時，被用來}

匯率低估之國際規範合致性的探討（結案報告） 頁 2

似的辯解亦出現在中國堅持無法任由人民幣快速升值之理由中。無論上述國家是否有

「以鄰為壑」的意圖，全球經濟之風險無疑已因此升高。誠如

WTO 在其與 OECD,

UNCTAD 聯合於 2010 年提供給 G-20 國家之報告中所觀察的，「匯率市場之動盪以及

可能被視為故意追求匯率誘發（exchange-rate-induced）之比較利益的政府決定」正在使

全球經濟蒙上陰影

3

。WTO 報告中強調失序之匯率波動是總體經濟問題，無法藉貿易保

護措施改善，但選擇貿易保護措施卻很容易引發報復，而嚴重威脅到全球之就業與成長，

因此建請

G-20 成員秉持國際合作的精神以解決上述全球經濟問題

4

。

遺憾的是

2010 年 G-20 在首爾舉行之峰會並未就如何調整貿易失衡、緩和匯率緊張

達成共識，因為一直抱怨人民幣低估的美國，反在首爾會議上成為巴西、中國甚至是德

國抨擊的對象──指摘其藉

QE2 刻意壓抑美元之幣值。這樣的氛圍其實並不令人意外，

因為美財長蓋特納在韓國慶州舉行之

G-20 財長會議中，一改過去要求人民幣升值的策

略，轉為建議各國之經常帳盈餘或赤字不得逾其

GDP 之一定比率（傳聞 4%，但其後遭

蓋特納否認），之後便批評聲浪不斷，德國梅克爾總理於赴首爾峰會前，甚至公開對媒

體表示絕不同意上限之設定，其後亦有中國官員揶揄蓋特納的想法根本是計畫經濟時代

的產物

5

。這樣的前奏曲，再加上美國新增的

QE2 正好給予對手可攻擊之弱點，自然使

得峰會荒腔走板

6

。最後，關於經常帳餘額上限之問題，峰會僅背書

G-20 財長會議已達

之共識──即經常帳之失衡應維持在永續水平，然而過量時應降低，並同意在

IMF 等

國際組織之技術協助下，於

2011 年上半年發展「指標準則（indicative guidelines）」以

便及時指出需防範之巨額失衡

7

。至於美國原所關切之人民幣低估問題，「首爾行動計

畫（Seoul Action Plan）」除重申 G-20 財長會議公報內容──即應「朝向更市場主導性

之匯率體系、強化匯率之彈性以反映經濟之基本面，並避免競爭性之貶值」外，僅多了

一項共識：

「允許享有足夠外匯存底之新興市場對於日趨高估之彈性匯率採取因應政策」，

包括謹慎設計的「總體審慎措施（macro-prudential measures）」

8

。最後這個部分據悉

乃應巴西等近來面臨「熱錢」困擾之國家要求而特別新增！

對於美方而言，上述峰會的結果當然不令人滿意，尤其難對國內疾呼應對低估之人

民幣採取具體行動者交代，是以歐巴馬於會後也不諱言此結果並非全壘打，但算是重要

3 _{WTO, Report on G20 Trade Measures (May 2010 to October 2010), p.3, available at http://www.wto.org.} 4 _Id.

5 _{G-20 Falls Short of Agreement on Trade Balance, Makes New Plug for Doha, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS}

DIGEST, Vol. 14, No. 40, p.2 (Nov. 17, 2010).

6 _{Sewell Chan & Sheryl G. Stolberg, G-20 Leaders Defer Decisions on Curbing Imbalances, NEW YORK TIMES,}

Nov. 12, 2010 (quoting Dominique Strauss-Kahn, IMF managing director, “This was more a G-20 of debate than a G-20 of conclusion.”).

7 _{G-20 Seoul Communique: The G-20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration, para.9 (Nov. 12, 2010). 2011 年 2 月}

的會議G-20 商定各種關鍵性指標（包括公共債務、財政赤字、民間儲蓄率、民間債務、外部收支平衡）

通過，並於4 月通過做為衡量各項指標之質化與量化之基準，即指標準則。IMF, Fact Sheet: The G-20

Mutual Assessment Process (MAP), 2012.9.26, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/g20map.htm (access 2012.10.25); BBC, G-20 agrees guidelines to measure imbalances, 2012.4.15, at

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13098537 (access 2012.10.25).

匯率低估之國際規範合致性的探討（結案報告） 頁 3

的一壘安打；更直言「人民幣本來就是低估，中國投注巨額的資金干預市場以維持其低

估」

9

。從歐巴馬的發言可知，G-20 峰會並未緩解人民幣低估所引發之緊張，換言之，

美國國內為數不少針對人民幣低估之立法草案有可能獲得進一步之推動，一旦實施可預

期地將引爆貿易大戰、或重大

WTO 爭端。有識者以為中美雙方均了解付諸具體行動後

所可能引發之連銷效應，故尚不至於就此問題輕啟事端，不過由於歐巴馬有競選連任之

壓力、中國領導階層又剛好在

2012 年進行世代交替，難保不會因此擦槍走火，引發燎

原之星星之火

10

。

然而根本的問題還是得回歸到人民幣之低估究竟有無違反國際規範？這個問題，由

於爭論之時間並不算短，故之前即已有零星討論；最近隨著紛爭之白熱化，相關論述更

如雨後春筍，單就歐洲「經濟政策研究中心（CEPR）」於 2010 年四月出版的論文集所

收錄之

6 篇法律分析文章看來

11

，關於人民幣低估是否有違

WTO 規範一節，各家見解

仍然十分分歧，並無定論，換言之，此議題仍存有相當大之研究空間。

或有以為正因此問題在國際規範面具高度爭議性，故實不宜透過

WTO 爭端體系解

決

12

，但類似的看法在日本─軟片案、歐盟─牛肉案以及最近的大型民用航空器案訴諸

WTO 之前皆曾有識者主張過，卻無法阻止這些案子最後走向 WTO 爭端解決之路；縱

使因為美國考慮直接訴諸

WTO 所需負之舉證責任、與 WTO 爭端解決程序之費時以及

勝訴裁決執行之困難等諸多因素，而決定先採取單邊措施──即以中國阻升人民幣匯率

為由，對自中國輸入之產品課徵平衡稅、或甚至反傾銷稅，然而中國若選擇以法律途徑

還擊，則仍會將此糾紛攤於

WTO 架構下檢驗，故 WTO 不可能完全迴避處理相關問題。

這也正是本研究擬探討匯率低估是否與

WTO 規範合致之原因。

事實上，從巴西於

2012 年秋再度在 WTO 具體提案呼籲 WTO 解決會員壓抑幣值所

帶來之貿易衝擊一事看來

13

，匯率低估問題之嚴重性與影響層面絕不僅限於中美之間的

貿易而已。不少新興市場國家，特別是包括台灣在內的不少亞洲央行，在面對美元因寬

鬆的貨幣政策而持續貶值時，為避免貿易失衡皆曾設法阻升本國貨幣；雖然

2010 年 G-20

峰會為新興市場因應匯率高估所採取之「總體審慎措施」提供了一定程度之「避風港」，

但相關阻升與人民幣低估（中國央行亦是採取阻升手段）對貿易產生之衝擊如何區辨？

這個問題顯然會影響與

WTO 相關規範相容性判斷之結論，而值得進一步研究。

9 _{Tom Lasseter , Obama Lashes out at China Money Stance, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,Nov.12,2010.}

10 _{Brazilian Finance Minister Warns of “International Currency War”, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST,}

Vol. 14, No. 33, p.3 (Sep. 29, 2010), quoting Professor Patrick Messerlin’s view.

11 _{THE US-SINO CURRENCY DISPUTE:NEW INSIGHTS FROM ECONOMICS,POLITICS AND LAW 109-152(Simon}

Evenett, ed., 2010).

12 _{James Bacchus, Don’t Push the WTO Beyond its Limits, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 25, 2010.}

（Bacchus 乃前 WTO 上訴機構首席）

13 _{巴西在 2011 年 4 月即曾提案，建議 「貿易、債務及融資工作小組 (WGTDF)」採取具體行動以分析}

討論匯率與貿易之關係，進而提出解決問題之對案。Brazil, The Relationship between Exchange Rates and International Trade, WTO Doc. WT/WGTDF/W/53, Apr. 13, 2011. WGTDF 根據巴西之提案，在 2012 年 3 月舉辦了研討會，不過並無具體結論。WTO News: WTO Seminar on Exchange Rates and Trade,

匯率低估之國際規範合致性的探討（結案報告） 頁 4

二、 研究目的

更多之研究投入上述議題，有助於未來爭端之法律性解決，避免引發更嚴重的衝突。

事實上，若議題之討論導出愈多不利於一方的有力論證，則有可能使另一方自知理虧而

退讓，進而使爭端止息，這也正是本計畫擬達成之目的之一。

同時，我國也曾如諸多新興市場國家一般，在本國貨幣因外在因素急速升值時，出

手干預，本研究若能區辨是項手段與其他長期阻升幣值措施之貿易效果差異，進而完成

相關干預措施的

WTO 適法性分析，則本研究亦可達成提供我國貨幣主管機關政策擬定

參考之目的。

三、 文獻探討

目前累積之國內外相關研究（見以下參考文獻）有以下論點：

1. 匯率低估之 GATT 第 15 條合致性的探討（多亦探討 IMF 之「匯率操縱」規定以

及

IMF 處理此問題之侷限）：

i. 有以為不易主張違反 GATT 第 15 條者，惟各派理由不盡相同，甚至部分理由相

左：Ahn, Hufbauer et al., Koops, Mattoo & Subramanian, Mercurio & Leung,

Staiger & Skyes (2010.b), Trachtman, Waibel, Zimmermann, 韓龍。

ii. 有以為應有相當基礎得以挑戰匯率低估之 GATT 第 15 條合致性：Marc Benitah,

Ciobanasu, Miranda。

儘管第

i 派似為主流，但第 ii 派之論證更具說服力，且思維方式頗有 WTO 爭端裁

決小組貫有之風格，即以「維也納條約法公約」為依歸，並一一批駁第

i 派學者觀

點中之盲點，因此對未來爭端解決之結果應有一定之影響力。

2. GATT 第 23 條之「非違反控訴（non-violation claim）

：多主張不易成立（Ahn, Staiger

& Skyes (2010.b), Trachtman）。

3. 匯率低估構成禁止性補貼：

i. 肯定者：Magnus & Brightbill，Caryl(JWT 2011Feb)，陳怡蓁。

ii. 否定者：Ahn, Benitah, Mercurio & Leung, Leviton, Staiger & Skyes (2010.a,

2010.b), Trachtman, Waibel, 韓龍。

4. 匯率低估構成傾銷：主張不構成（Staiger & Skyes (2010.b), 韓龍）。

5. 匯率低估違反 GATT 第 2 條關稅拘束義務：Thorstensen, Marçal, & Ferraz。

參考文獻

1. Ahn,

Dukgeun, Is the Chinese Exchange-Rate Regime “WTO-legal”?, in T

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2. Benitah, Marc, China’s Fixed Exchange Rate for the Yuan: Could the United States

Challenge it in the WTO as a Subsidy?, ASIL

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(Oct. 2003).

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55-70 (2008).

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ASIL I

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(Nov. 2003).

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UFBAUER

,

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LYDE

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EE

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paper presented at the

conference on China’s Exchange Rate Policy, Peterson Institute for International

Economics, Washington DC, October 19 (2007).

7. Koops, Catharina, Manipulating the WTO? The Possibilities for Challenging

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its Compliance with the WTO, B

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, Paper 660 (2005).

9. Magnus, John & Timothy C. Brightbill, China's Currency Regime is Legitimately

Challengeable as a Subsidy under ASCM rules, in T

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(Simon Evenett, ed.,

2010).

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Wealth Funds: A New Role for the World Trade Organization, T

HE

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ORLD

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32(8), 1135-1164 (2009).

11. Mercurio, Bryan & Celine Sze Ning Leung, Is China a “Currency Manipulator”?: The

Legitimacy of China’s Exchange Regime under the Current International Legal

Framework, T

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43(3), 1257-1300 (2009).

12. Miranda, Jorge, Currency Undervaluation as a Violation of GATT Article XV:4, in T

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13. Staiger, Robert W. & Alan O. Sykes (2010.a), Currency “Manipulation” and World

Trade: a Caution, in T

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14. Staiger, Robert W. & Alan O. Sykes (2010.b), Currency “Manipulation” and World

Trade, W

ORLD

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9(4), 583-627 (2010).

15. Trachtman, Joel P., Yuan to Fight about it? The WTO Legality of China’s Exchange

Regime, in T

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OLITICS AND

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127-131

(Simon Evenett, ed., 2010).

16. Thorstensen, Vera, Emerson Marçal & Lucas Ferraz, Exchange Rate Misalignments and

International Trade Policy: Impacts on Tariffs, paper in UNCTAD XIII Pre-Conference

Event: Policy Dialogue: Redefining the Role of the Government in Tomorrow’s

International Trade, 26 – 27 March 2012, at http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Sessional

Documents/ditc_dir_2012d1a_Vera.pdf (access 2012.10.25).

17. Waibel, Michael, Retaliating against Exchange Rate manipulation under WTO Rules, in

T

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(Simon Evenett, ed., 2010).

18. Zimmermann, Claus D., Currency Manipulation and the Paralysis of the Law, SSRN

Working Paper Series (2010).

19. 陳怡蓁，中國匯率制度引發之國際經貿爭議研究（政大貿研所未出版碩士論文，

2005）。

20. 韓龍，人民幣匯率的國際法問題（中國：法律出版社，2010）。

四、 研究方法

文獻分析法、法律研究法、事件觀察法、WTO 爭端個案模擬法、組織機構觀察法。

五、 結果與討論

壓低匯率的做法有可能違反相關國際協定下之義務，包括：一、國際貨幣法：IMF

協定第

4 條第 1 項第 3 款禁止操縱匯率（currency manipulation）的規定

14

；二、國際貿

易法：

GATT 第 15 條第 4 項不許以匯兌措施使 GATT 各條規定之意旨無法達成的規定

15

，

以及

WTO 有關禁止出口補貼、關稅拘束的規定（根據凱因斯 1931 年提出之理論：匯

率低估如同出口補貼外加進口關稅

16

）。另外，匯率低估也有可能影響傾銷調查時出口

價格與正常價值的公平比較，而使得調查機關得以採用「推算出口價格(constructed

export price)」做為與正常價值比較的基準。最後，即使認為匯率低估並未違反任何具

體

GATT/WTO 條文，假若對手國得以成功主張影響到其合理期待的市場開放機會，則

14 _{Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Art. IV, Sec. 1 (iii): “… each member undertakes to}

collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates. In particular, each member shall: (i)…; (ii)…; (iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members; and…..”

15 _{General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, Art. XV: 4.}

16 _{Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian, Currency Undervaluation and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New}

Role for the World Trade Organization, THE WORLD ECONOMY Vol. 32 Issue 8, 1135, 1139-1140 (2009). 此國 貿理論可追溯至凱因斯（Keynes），其於 1931 年麥克米蘭財政暨產業委員會提交給英國國會的報告附錄 一（Addendum I to the Macmillan Report）中主張如何增加就業以解決經濟大蕭條的問題：“precisely the same effects as those produced by a devaluation of sterling by a given percentage could be brought about by a tariff of the same percentage on all imports together with an equal subsidy on all exports, except that this measure would leave sterling international obligations unchanged in terms of gold”. John S. Chipman, Protection and Exchange Rates in a Small Open Economy, REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 11(2), 205, 205 (2007) [quoting Keynes’ statement as above].

匯率低估之國際規範合致性的探討（結案報告） 頁 7

可能得以援引

GATT 第 23 條「對非違反協定行為之控訴（non-violation complaint）」

的規定

17

。

所謂的「操縱匯率」，IMF 執董會於 2007 年通過之雙邊監督新決議（Bilateral

Surveillance over Members' Policies, Executive Board Decision—June 15, 2007）釐清何謂

「為取得不公平的競爭優勢所進行之匯率操縱」，同時也將之與所謂的「根本性匯率失

調 （fundamental exchange misalignment）」概念相連結。該決議附件規定

18

：僅限於會

員採取之政策係針對匯率水準（無論該政策是欲使匯率變動或防止變動），且該政策係

以低估匯率之形式確保「根本性匯率失調」以擴大淨出口，該會員才會被

IMF 認定為

操縱匯率。換言之，必須同時具備行為、目的及因果關係。所謂的「根本性匯率失調」

係指會員之經常帳嚴重地偏離了經常帳之均衡，在這種情形，匯率即非處於均衡水準

19

。

然而計算均衡匯率並不容易，

IMF 於 2009 年修訂執行上述決議之「操作準則（Operation

Guidance）」時，即表示基於方法及資料之先天侷限性，不應過度重視均衡匯率的精準

計算，於討論會員匯率及所有影響外部穩定性（external stability）之政策時不應再要求

使用「根本性匯率失調」一詞，而應改用簡明的經濟學術語

20

。不僅匯率嚴重失調不易

認定，如何確立會員的政策意圖係為擴大淨出口，亦為挑戰。因此相關政策被認定為「匯

率的操縱」，進而構成

IMF 義務之違反，並不容易，遑論 IMF 本身欠缺類似 WTO 爭

端解決的機制，僅是透過與會員諮商（Article IV consultations）進行經濟及金融政策之

監督以導正會員匯率的失調，效果顯然相當間接。

至於國際貿易法部分的規範，較有可能於

WTO 成功挑戰匯率低估者應屬 GATT 第

十五條，因為縱然得以主張於出口企業結售外幣時，一國政府因壓低匯率而必須多給付

給前述企業之本國通貨構成

SCM 協定第 1.1(a)(1)之財政補助，且參考 U.S. – Tax

Treatment for FSC (Article 21.5 of the DSU by the E.C., Jan.13, 2002) 案之上訴機構看法，

出口補貼並不會因為是項補貼同時也給予非以出口為條件的對象而使得以出口為條件

部分的出口補貼不成立（WT/DS108/AB/RW, paras. 113-120），而使得匯率低估得以符

合出口補貼之兩大要件，如何證明「受有利益」以及利益之幅度仍然是問題。這個問題

就如同在反傾銷案中公平比較出口價格與正常價值以計算傾銷差額時，如何將匯率低估

幅度納入調查一樣困難。

17 _{General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, Art. XXIII: 1: “If any contracting party should consider}

that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of (a) …, or (b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or (c)…..”

18 _{IMF, Bilateral Surveillance over Members' Policies, Executive Board Decision—June 15, 2007, Annex, at}

http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2007/pn0769.htm#decision (access 2012.10.25)

19 _{IMF, Review of 1997 Decision – Proposal for a New Decision, Companion Paper, Supplement, and Public}

Information Notice, p. 4 (2007.6.21).

匯率低估之國際規範合致性的探討（結案報告） 頁 8

關於匯率低估與

GATT 第十五條之分析已完成學術論文乙篇，除在學術研討會上

發表，並被收錄入論文集專書中外，亦改寫成期刊論文格式投稿，為《貿易政策論叢》

所接受，刊登於該刊第

15 期。全文請見附錄。

附錄

匯率低估問題與 GATT 第十五條之分析

摘 要

儘管各國享有貨幣主權，但刻意壓低匯率的做法卻可能違反各國在相關國際協定

（包括國際貨幣協定、國際貿易協定）下之義務，本文即對可能違反之規範之一：

GATT

第

15 條第 4 項之規定進行探討。依據維也納條約法公約所規定之解釋原則，闡釋 GATT

第

15 條第 4 項不許以「匯兌措施」致 GATT 各條規定之意旨無法達成之真意。本文主

張

GATT 第 15 條第 4 項所謂之「匯兌措施」應為與「貿易措施」相對應之統稱，故包

含匯率措施而不僅限於國際匯兌、支付及移轉；而所謂的「使條文意旨無法達成」必須

是所採行之匯兌措施具有貿易保護的意圖，以致明顯背離該特定條文之規範目的；而所

妨礙的「條文意旨」，本文認為應係

GATT 第 2 條對關稅減讓之保障。本文同時也說明

GATT 第 15 條第 9 項之規定雖然於匯兌管制與限制部分可能優先於第 4 項適用，但由

於其並不包含匯率措施，故並不能豁免違反第

4 項之匯率操縱行為。最後，本文亦對違

反

GATT 第 15 條第 4 項之壓低匯率行為被訴諸 WTO 爭端解決之可能性，提出剖析以

為結論。

關鍵詞：匯率低估、匯兌措施、貿易措施、條文意旨、關貿總協、國際貨幣基金

Abstract

Although states are entitled to regulate their own currency (the principle of monetary

sovereignty), currency undervaluation may breach states’ specific obligations under

international agreements, such as international monetary or trade agreements. This article

analyzes one of the possibly violated provisions: GATT XV: 4. Based on the interpretation

principles set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it explores the true

meaning of GATT XV: 4, which prohibits any exchange actions from frustrating the intent of

the provisions of the GATT. It argues that the so-called “exchange actions”, just like another

general term, “trade actions” contained in the same provision, is very broad and therefore not

only include international exchange, payment and transfer, but also include exchange-rate

measures. It further explains that the so-called “frustrating” the intent of the provisions

匯率低估之國際規範合致性的探討（結案報告） 頁 9

requires a trade protectionist’s intention so that there is appreciable departure from the intent

of a particular article other than GATT XV: 4. As to which article’s intent is possibly

frustrated by currency undervaluation, it deems GATT II, which secures tariff concession

through tariff binding. On the other hand, this article also analyzes GATT XV : 9. While

GATT XV : 9 may preempt GATT XV : 4 for exchange control and exchange restriction, but

because GATT XV : 9 does not cover exchange-rate measures, it cannot exempt any currency

undervaluation from its violation of GATT XV : 4. In conclusion, this article discusses the

possible difficulties encountered by bringing currency undervaluation to WTO dispute

settlement based on GATT XV : 4 and argues that those difficulties can be overcome.

Key words: currency undervaluation, exchange actions, trade actions, the intent of

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ttA : Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Art. IV, Sec. I (iii): " ... each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates. In particular, each member shall: (i) ... ; (ii) ... ; (iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or ""'-~"'--'!"'--"~:.!..!.

competitive advantage over other members; and ... "

tt:IL : General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, Art. XV: 4.

11.

+ :

Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian, Cun-ency Undervaluation and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New Role ji)r the World Trade Organization, THE WORLD ECO:'JOMY Vol. 32 Issue 8, 1135, 1139-1140(2009). Jl:t.~ ~J1'.~uri!i¥Jl.i.tJT.I!JWT (Keynes)' 1931 if.~jUGNlM

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:t. ~:!tu1ar:P,t!Ja;rk."l ).:J,iWiMi.;1!tJdt Nfi-Ef] M1l! : "precisely the same effects as those produced by a devaluation of sterling by a given percentage could be brought about by a tariff of the same percentage on all imports together with an equal subsidy on all exports, except that this measure would leave sterling international obligations unchanged in terms of gold", John S. Chipman, Protection and Exchange Rates in a Small Open Economy, REVIEW OF DEVELOPME'>T ECONOMICS 11 (2), 205, 205 (2007) [quoting Keynes' statement as above]. 11.

-I- - :

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, Art. XXIII: 1: "If any contracting party

should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of (a) .. " or (b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or (c)., ... "

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;i.t+-t:: ; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, Art.xv: 4: "Contracting parties shall not, by

exchange action, frustrate* the intent of the provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund."

U

+

A : Jorge Miranda, Currency Undervaluation as a Violation of GATT Article XV4, in THE

US-SINO CURRENCY DISPUTE: NEW INSIGHTS FROM ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND LAW 115-126 (Simon Evenett, ed., 2010).

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+:Jt. :

Catharina Koops, Manipulating the WTO? The Possibilities for Challenging Undervalued

Currencies under WTO Rules, AMSTERDAM CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW RESEARCH

PAPER SERIES, 10 (2010); Erik Denters, Manipulation of Exchange Rates in International

Law: The Chinese Yuan, ASIL INSIGHTS (Nov. 2003); *fit ' A ~'!\,"il! $. {;!J ~ ~ik ~a'

J{ 66-67 (2010) 0

U . .:::..

+ :

Michael Waibel, Retaliating against Exchange Rate manipulation under ffTO Rules, in THE US-SINO CURRENCY DISPUTE: NEW INSIGHTS FROM ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND LAW 133, 135 (Simon Evenett, cd., 2010). 1i PIT~~ {;!J ~ 7Jj$t.~#-1M ~I!llt il! $."*,J Ii ' X;flll.~ "T~1It

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ilt~ , J{ 98 ( tf "' lit1t PIT .t...~ , Jit1.f 1T 4» JlIi ' 1995) 0

U':::"+- : Dukgeun Ahn, Is the Chinese Exchange-rate Regime "WTO-Legal'? in THE US-SINO CURRENCY DISPUTE: NEW INSIGHTS FROM ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND LAW 139, 140-141 (Simon Evenett cd., 2010) ( 'J IJfl John Jackson {;!J

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-a -=- +:=.. : See Joel P. Trachtman, Yuan to Fight about it? The WTO Legality of China's Exchange Regime, in THE US-SINO CURRENCY DISPUTE: NEW INSIGHTS FROM ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND LAW 127, 129 (Simon Evenett, ed., 2010).

U-=-+@ : See Bryan Mercurio & Celine Sze Ning Leung, Is China a "Currency Manipulator"?: The Legitimacy of China's Exchange Regime under the Current International Legal Framework, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 43(3), 1257, 1285, 1286 (2009).

-a-=-+ E.. : GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions, Background Paper by the Secretariat: Consultation with Italy (Deposit Requirement for Purchases of Foreign Currency), GATT Doc. BOP/W/51, 25 Sep. 1981.

.t1-=- + ~ : Id. para. 11.

15

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+

-c :

See Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the IMFIWTO Relationship: the Fund~' Articles ofAgreement and the WTO Agreements, The American Journal of International Law 96(3), 561, 567, 601 (2002) [providing a detailed account of the IMF Executive Board's 1960 decision].

tt..::...+A: PlTtlllli!]:iVt§Uf- (multiple exchange rate)' 5l;f)fj}it&!if~}[email protected]({j;~.It, 41fl.tf.Pr­

.*~T.A4tili~-*.l(.'*~§Ii!]~~,~.m~~Ii!].if·aI}it

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587-588 (

4'

~fJ:tiUIT .:E.~ , :ltHhrfJJ}l& , 1995) •

t:t..::...

+:fL :

Miranda. supra note

+

A, tn.13 at 119.

t:t-=-

+:

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, Art. XVI, para. 2: "The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a contracting party of a subsidy on the export of any product may have hannful effects for other contracting parties. both importing and exporting. may cause undue disturbance to their normal commercial interests, and may hinder the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement."

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A, fn.l3 at 119.

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1* {;IJ +~"lM-f¥: 0 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench ofthe

"World Trade Court": Some Personal Experiences as Member o/the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 36(4), 605, 615-616 (2002).

tt~

+

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:

See Miranda, supra note

+

A, 121 [citing the definitions contained in the Shorter

Oxford English Dictionary].

u:~

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1!9 : General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, Annex 1; Notes and Supplementary Provisions, Ad Article XV, paragraph 4: "The word 'frustrate' is intended to indicate, for example, that infringements of the letter of any Article of this Agreement by exchange action shall not be regarded as a violation of that Article if, in practice, there is no appreciable departure from the intent of the Article. Thus, a contracting party which, as part of its exchange control operated in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, requires payment to be received for its exports in its own currency or in the currency of one or more members of the International Monetary Fund will not thereby be deemed to contravene Article Xl or Article XIIl. Another example would be that of a contracting party which specifies on an import licence the country from which the goods may be imported, for the purpose not of introducing any additional element of discrimination in its import licensing system but of enforcing permissible exchange controls."

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Id.

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t : Gary Clyde Hutbauer, Yee Wong, and Ketki Sheth, US-CHINA TRADE DISPUTES: RISING TIDE, RISING STAKES 19 (2006) [stating that "another specific GATT article needs to be frustrated in an important way before the strictures of Article XV(4) can be invoked."]

U.'::::'

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A : Claus D. Zimmermann, Currency Manipulation and the Para(vsis of the Law, SSRN WORKING PAPER SERIES, para. 112 (2010).

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Art. XXIII: 1: "If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or ... as the result of (a) ... , or (b) the application by another contracting party of any measure,

"whether or not it conflicts with the provisions o/this Agreement, or (c) ... "

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Trachtman, supra note - ..::::., 129.

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IZQ : See Ahn, supra note - - , at 141 [" ... that Addenda present only examples, not the definitive explanation."], also Ioana Ciobana,?u & Erik Denters, Manipulation of the

Chinese Yuan May WTO Members Respond?, GRIFFIN'S VIEW ON INTERNATIONAL AND

COMPARATIVE LAW 9( I), 55, 67 (2008) [" ... does not provide an exhaustive explanation or all the sorts of frustrations that exchange and trade actions may cause."].

ti-IZQ + 1i. : Miranda, supra note + A, 122; Waibel, supra note ..:::..+, 135 [" ... need to show the violation of an explicit GATT prohibition."]' :1f

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it: : Ahn, supra note ­ - , 141 [proposing that "the intent of GATT provisions may be to stipulate articulated rule of conducts for commercial transaction so that the bargained competitive conditions for members' market are not arbitrarily disturbed."]; Marc Benitah, China:~ Fixed

Exchange Rate for the Yuan: Could the United States Challenge it in the WTO as a

Subsidy?, ASIL INSIGHTS (Oct. 2003 ) [after concluding that challenging China's fixed exchange rate as a subsidy in the WTO would not easy, suggesting that there could be other legal avenues, sueh as Article XV, paragraph 4 of the GATT, which "bars signatories from using' exchange rate action' to 'frustrate' the intent of the Agreement"] ;

Ciobana~u & Denters, supra note lZQ+rm, 65-66 [1~+-~ifiit,e,~:1f;;j;t r

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Robert W. Staiger & Alan 0, Sykes, Currency "Manipulation" and World Trade, WORLD TRADE REVIEW 9(4), 583, 599-605 (2010).

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ttJi +.f:: : See also Miranda, supra note + A, at 115.

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A : General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, Art. XV: 9: "Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude: (a) the use by a contracting party of exchange controls or exchange restrictions in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund or with that contracting party's special exchange agreement with the Contracting Parties, or (b) ... "

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