由富勒的社會法理學論資訊隱私權及其規制(I)

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行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫成果報告

由富勒的社會法理學論資訊隱私權及其規制(I)

計畫類別：X 個別型計畫 □ 整合型計畫

計畫編號： NSC

96-2414-H-004 -002

執行期間： 96 年 8 月 1 日至 97 年 7 月 31 日

計畫主持人：陳起行

共同主持人：

計畫參與人員：

成果報告類型(依經費核定清單規定繳交)：精簡報告

本成果報告包括以下應繳交之附件：

□赴國外出差或研習心得報告一份

□赴大陸地區出差或研習心得報告一份

□出席國際學術會議心得報告及發表之論文各一份

□國際合作研究計畫國外研究報告書一份

處理方式：除產學合作研究計畫、提升產業技術及人才培育研究

計畫、列管計畫及下列情形者外，得立即公開查詢

執行單位：國立政治大學法律系

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中文摘要

本計畫為期三年，以富勒所開啟的社會交往法律理論及其發展脈絡為中心，批判並再建構自發性法律規制模式，並將該模式試行於資訊隱私權規制之上。本報告為第一年的工作成果報告。以闡明富勒的法律思想為主;尤其著墨於富勒的人際交往理論，這是富勒理論的主要論點，也是其理論獨特之處。本年度研究成果主要為兩篇論文; 一篇中文論文以闡述富勒人際交往法理學，並用以批判美國最高法院判決 Grosker v. MGM, 以富勒人際交往的法律觀檢討數位著作保護課題兩極化的發展，一篇英文論文則探討德渥金與富勒法律理論上的差異，以及重新建構德握金法律原則以兼顧人際交往觀點的可能。

Abstract

This is a three-year research project. The main objective for the project is to analyze the social interaction theory of Lon Fuller and use it to reconstruct the reflexive model of regulation. This project then applies the improved regulatory model, with the insight of information privacy jurisprudence, to derive a better approach for information privacy regulation. In the first year, the main emphasis is on the elaboration of Lon Fuller’s legal theory. Fuller’s human interactive point of view is especially under review, and two research articles (draft attached) are primarily the result.

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前言報告人研究主題環繞資訊科技對法律的衝擊以及可能帶來法律形成上新的模式兩方面。九十年研究台灣法律資料庫的現狀及未來發展會面臨的課題。該計畫實地訪談了各環節的法律工作者、國內法律資訊工作者，以及相關政府部門的主事官員。部分研究成果發表於中研院出版之調查研究。適當時機，報告人將提出後續進一步的研究計畫，試圖與報告人理論上的研究成果結合。隨後三年，報告人連續在貴會補助下，進行理論研究。分別針對德渥金（Ronald Dowrkin）的裁判理論以及哈伯瑪斯（Habermas)對該裁判理論所提出的批判，進行剖析; 並試著提出補強方案。研究成果發表於中研院歐美所舉辦之美國聯邦最高法院判決評釋研討會，並刊登於該所學術期刊「歐美研究」，該文亦收錄於該所主編之專書：「美國聯邦最高法院判決評釋2000—2003」。德渥金的裁判理論及法哲學，與羅斯(Rawls)的政治自由主義中的公共理性一脈相承，報告人因此進一步探索其間之關連，以及哈伯瑪斯對公共理性所提出之批判。報告人認為這是繼社群主義者對自由主義所提出的批判後，另一波來自社會法哲學的重要攻擊，值得重視。尤其以該項討論為基礎，可以進一步思考隨網際網路盛行的線上爭議解決機制(online dispute resolution)及其在法形成上的意義。報告人這項研究，以Toward a Discursive Public Reason in the Internet World, 先發表於國際法哲學大會，並已出版於東吳法律學報。

德渥金與哈伯瑪斯等的理論，均以國家法律的形成為主要關懷對象，而其對於日益重要的自律(self-regulation)，則不重視。報告人94年以特補樂

(Guenther Teubner) 的自發性法律(reflexive law)為下一個研究焦點。研究過程中，發現美國哥倫比亞大學寇恩（Jean Cohen）教授改良特補樂自發性法律，所提出的新法律典範，值得探索。因此完成論文一篇：The New Legal Paradigm of Jean Cohen and It＇s implication for Public Online Dispute Resolution。該文經貴會補助，發表於美國巴爾的摩舉行的「美國法律與社會學會年會」，並已出版於中研院歐美所所編的「歐美研究」季刊。

寇恩教授以性騷擾作為其理論闡明的法律領域。ㄧ個理論若要能經得起考驗，只在理論提出時所展示的法制領域內成立是不夠的，報告人95年因此試著運用寇恩的法律典範於資訊法律之中一項重要又具爭議的法律領域：數位著作法律保護課題。所完成的一篇論文：Digtal Copyright Law-Making and the Future Development of e-Government，先後發表於奧地利薩爾斯堡舉行的第十屆國際法資訊學研討會，以及2008年美國法律與社會學會年會。

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自發性法律最早奠基於系統理論，寇恩對該理論的再建構，實際上反映了美國法理學上，注重法律原則的理想面向。不過，寇恩重視社會自律一節，則並非美國法理學上的主流想法。這方面有一例外，即哈佛法學院的法理學教授富勒（Lon Fuller）。報告人因而決定嘗試帶入富勒的思想，看看理論上是否得以更為融貫，以及以這項新的理論基礎，處理新興資訊科技引起的法律問題，是否更得以發展出回應性更佳的機制。

一．

研究目的報告人認為，富勒雖然未能發展出體系完整的社會法律理論，但是已經為該理論注入相當豐富的養分，正好能夠彌補實證理論上的缺陷。本年度的工作因此在理論方面，將得渥金與富勒理論作一對比，同時探索是否能發展出令二者相補充的理論。藉由波士梯瑪（Postema）三個層次的法律（亦即：國家法形成，國法與社會法形成之間的互動，以及社會人際互動的法律形成等三個層次的法律形成），本研究在制度面，有限度地闡明，得渥金的法律原則確實為能涵蓋三個層次的法律形成，並指出如何能透過納入富勒人際交往的理論，能夠兼顧法形成的三個層次。制度面，本研究以美國最高法院 Grokster v. MGM 有關點對點（p2p）傳輸侵害著作權判決，由富勒人際交往法律理論，做出批判。網路使用著作權模式十分多樣，並且新的使用模式隨科技進展而層出不窮。過去以抽象法律概念欲涵蓋一般太樣而進行規範的方式，受到嚴峻挑戰。如何在不同使用人之間，透過對話及相互理解，化解彼此針對著作保護意見上的歧異，並且網路對話所留下來的社會意義脈絡（social context）更可以提供日後立法，行政規制以及判決上的參考，是目前各國積極研究電子參與(eParticipation)的重要推動力量。

二．

文獻探討台灣就富勒法律思想深入研究的論文尚十分缺乏，本年度的研究成果補足了部分這方面的內容。國外文獻方面，富勒雖然不是法理學研究的重點對象，但一直有文章出現。報告人相信隨著網路帶來規範上的新挑戰，日後重視人際交往的法理，應當是一個值得重視的趨勢。茲將相關外文文獻，探討餘下： * 早期得渥金與富勒的論戰：Dworkin, R., Philosophy, Morality, and

Law-Observations Prompted by Professor Fuller’s Novel Claim, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 668, 1965; Dworkin, R., The Elusive Morality of Law, 10 Vill. L. Rev. 631, 1965; Fuller, L., A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin, 10 Vill. L .Rev. 655, 1965 .

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z 早期哈特（HLA Hart）與富勒的論戰：Hart, HLA., Book Review: The Morality of Law by Lon Fuller, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1965 ; Hart, HLA ., Positivism and the Separation of law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593-629, 1958; Hart, HLA .,The Concept of Law, 1961; Fuller, L., Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 1958; Fuller, L., The Morality of Law ; Nicholson, P., The Internal Morality of Law：Fuller and His Critics, 84:4 Ethics 307, 1974; Ketchen, J., Revisiting Fuller's Critique of Hart-Managerial Control and the Pathology of Legal Systems：the Hart–Weber Nexus, 53 Univ. of Toronto L. J. 1, 2003.

z 富勒學說主要參考文獻 (這部分並非富勒的所有文獻，而是報告人論文中 有論述者)：Fuller, L., The Morality of Law, 1964; Winston, K., ed., The Principle of Social Order, Selected Essays of Lon Fuller, Revised Ed., 2001; Fuller, L., Law as an Instrument of Social Control and Law as a Facilitation of Human Interaction, 1975:1 BYU L. Rev. 89, 1975; Fuller, L., The Justification of Legal Decisions, 6 World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social

Philosophy 77- (1972).

z 較新討論富勒學說的論文集：Witteveen & Burg ed., Rediscovering Fuller： Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design, 1990。

四、研究方法與結論

報告人本年度研究計畫執行期間，完成所附的兩篇論文，其中 Human Interaction and Legal Principle, 與去年完成的 Digital Copyright Law Making and the Future Development of eGovernment, 均發表於 2008 年 5 月在加拿大蒙特樓舉行的美國法律與社會學會年會。中文論文則已經投稿。誠如前述，一方面網路帶來新的規範上的挑戰，這項挑戰亟需重視人際交往，溝通的理念與制度; 另一方面，網路在適當的理論指引與制度設計之下，可以發展出所需要的這項重人際交往與溝通的平台。本年度報告人繼續在理論以及制度面，探索社會的法律理論以及其對現行資訊法制發展的批判。六.自我評估

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多年在資訊法律及法形成理論上的鑽研，報告人認為今後除了持續在法律爭議及理論上的辯論持續深入之外，也可以開始思考實際經由電子參與理論及實踐上的研究成果，試著將報告人這幾年的專題研究成果融入一項實驗性的網路對話平台，實際觀察理論及實踐上的課題。這兩年，報告人增加與歐美學者的接觸與切磋，無論在電子參與的網路平台設計以及相關法律理論及制度上的研究，均有進展。期待在貴會持續的支持下，能夠發展出現實所需要的電子參與法律形成平台，並進一步與國內外相關學者形成研究團隊，持續研究。

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The Law and Society Association

Welcome: Chi-Shing Chen

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Much of the information on this page is clickable. For example, clicking on a person's name will display all of that pe in the program. Author names preceded by an asterisk * were designated as presenting authors during the submiss

Theoretical Accounts of the Political Work Law Does in Society 3519

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SOCIAL THEORY AND LAW

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Scheduled Time: Sat, May 31 - 4:30pm - 6:15pm Building/Room: conference / RM 19

Title Displayed in Event Calendar: Theoretical Accounts of the Political Work Law Does in Society 3519

Session Participants:

Session Organizer: Christine B. Harrington (New York University)[email protected]

Chair: George Pavlich (University of Alberta)[email protected]

Reflections on the Relations between Habermas and Rawls

*Hugh W. Baxter (Boston University) Human Interaction and Legal Principle

*Chi-Shing Chen (National ChengChi University) The Politics of Conscience and the Asylum Seeker

*Anna Farmer (University of Warwick) Reflexive Law in a Post-Confucian Island

*I-Ming Liao (University of Kaohsiung) Law As Practice

*Thamy Pogrebinschi (Rio de Janeiro State University)

Discussant: Verity Smith (Harvard University)[email protected]

Abstract:

This panel examines the extent to which Marx, Habermas, Dworkin and Teubner’s engagement with legal theo – not just philosophical analysis – is able to formulate sociolegal grounding for inquiry into “the materiality of la law”, and “the internal structure of law”.

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第 1 頁，共 1 頁 The Law and Society Association 2008

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Human Interaction and Legal Principle

Chishing Chen∗

Abstract

Dworkinian legal principle embraces the relationship between law and morality and believes morality can be included into law through arguments of principle in hard cases; however, Dworkin has been consistently insensitive to the relationship of law and society. Dworkinian judge is criticized as conducting monologue in the

adjudicative process. This paper believes such deficiency is not irreparable. Lon Fuller’s social theory of law which emphasizes human interaction and its reflection can contribute to the social dimension of Dworkinian legal principle, if the competing conceptions of social morality Dworkinian judges needs to weigh truly reflect the social interactions that meet the criteria of the morality of duty Fuller advocates. Otherwise, legal principle should not always lead to the one right answer as Dworkin advocates; judges occasionally ought to initiate and guide further social interaction through legal principle. As a result, such legal principle provides the needed responsiveness what Jean Cohen tries to add to her reflexive model of law; it also provides the theoretical basis to resolve the emerging issues of adjudication.

Key Words: Dworkin, Theory of Adjudication, Law and Morality, Law and Society, Community, Human Interaction, Legal Principle, Responsiveness

I. Introduction

Ronald Dworkin is a system builder. In the meantime of a prolonged debate with Hart and his followers, Dworkin first constructed his theory of adjudication based on the right thesis and legal principle in “the Hard Cases”1. With his central thesis intact, Dworkin further developed his legal philosophy based on the theory of interpretation, integrity and equal concern and respect in “Law’s Empire”2. Then,

∗

Chishing Chen, Professor, National ChengChi University, Taiwan; SJD, University of California at Berkeley, School of Law; MS, University of North Texas; Email:[email protected]

1

Dworkin, R., Hard Cases, in Taking Rights Seriously 81-130 (16th printing 1997). This paper advocates the need to look into the law and society part of the debate regarding Dworkin’s theory and will not and cannot discuss the famous Dworkin-Hart debate. The author notices there is another round of such debate has just began since the publication of the Justice in Robes, see Ripstein, A., ed., Ronald Dworkin (2007); Priel, D., Forty Years On, working paper could be obtained from papers.ssrn.com; and Green, S., Dworkin v. the Philosophers: A Review Essay on Justice in Robes, 2007 University of Illinois Law Review 1477 (2007).

2

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equal concern and respect was again the kernel for Dworkin’s political philosophy where distributive equality is the primary issue of concern in “Sovereign Virtue”3. Surely, it must be pointed out that this development of thought is not linear, especially major works included in “Sovereign Virtue” came out before “Law’s Empire”.

“Justice in Robes”4 represents another milestone of Dworkin’s construction, and there is no sign to show that his construction has ended.

This paper intends to raise the attention of another equally important debate which is treated disproportional to the law and morality debate between Dworkin and the legal positivists by the legal community. Frank Michelman first started the critique by naming Dworkinan judges as conducting monologue and the Dworkinian integrity reaches only to the community of the judges and not the whole society and therefore the personified community Dworkin constructed is questionable5. Dworkin has never replied to any of these criticisms and what came close was his reply to Raz’s concept of law which Dworkin considered it sociological and classified it into the criterial as oppose to the interpretive concept Dworkin favors. Dworkin believes such concept was not sufficient enough to yield philosophically interesting “essential feature”6.

This paper wants to further explore the insufficiency of Dworkin’s theory for lacking the social point of view by criticizing Dworkin’s concept of community. Dworkin seems to duplicate his idea of the personified community whose moral agents are judges who try to reach decisions of the community of integrity through the

3

Dworkin, R., Sovereign Virtue (2000).

4

Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes (2006). In this book, Dworkin further elaborates his theory of

interpretation. It is interesting to note that Dworkin further develops the idea of vertical coherence and horizontal coherence and makes him closer to Kant. First in Dworkin, R., Life’s Dominion 146 (1993) and again in Freedom’s Law 83 (1996), Dworkin defined vertical coherence as “a judge who claims a particular right of liberty as fundamental must show that his claim is consistent with the bulk of precedent, and with the main structures of our constitutional arrangement.” And then Dworkin defined horizontal coherence as “a judge who adopts a principle must give full weight to that principle in other cases he decides or endorses.” Here, I think, the horizontal coherence a judge builds through out her career quite likes the maxim Kant used in his categorical imperative and the vertical coherence comes close to the universal law the legal community can uphold. In Dwrokin, R., Justice in Robes 12- 13 (2006), Dworkin further points out that he believes the legal doctrinal concept is an interpretive concept, and hence in the jurisprudential stage, the general account of the legal practice should be one that must find the mix of values that best justifies the practice by studying the aspirational concept of law to determine which values supply the best conception of the doctrinal concept, or which other values best explain the rule of law as a political ideal. “At this stage, reflections on the doctrinal and the aspirational concepts come together.”

5

Michelman, F., Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986); Michelman, F., Law’s Republic, 97:8 Yale Law Journal 1493 (1988). Such criticism is joined by Juergen Habermas and Drucilla Cornell from different points of view. See Habermas, J., Between Facts and Norms, trans. Rehg, W., 224 (1996); Cornell, D., Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potential for Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1135 (1988).

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process of the principled argumentation. As a result, a true community7 in a society demonstrates the principled feature, like the personified community as a whole, which is grounded in equal concern and respect. Considering simply that in any community in the society there is no adjudicative mechanism parallel to that of the community as a whole suggests that Dworkin’s community theory is flawed. Equal concern and respect in a community in society does not necessary means principled solution of conflict, it could mean open dialog with everyone concerned8.

This paper further believes that the flawed sociological idea of Dworkin can be mended and Lon Fuller’s jurisprudence based on human interaction holds the key. In other words, Dworkin is right to demand judges take an interpretive attitude and view law based on a conception of integrity. He is also right to point out that we would reach such conclusion if we treat each other with equal concern and respect. But the same may not be considered true in any community in society. Any community in a society, even fully developed into a Dworkinian true community, does not have the capacity to adjudicate, like that of the community as a whole. All cases of a

community as a whole reach the community of judges in charge of settling disputes of the whole community. Any adjudicative structure of a community in society, no matter how well institutionalized, is qualitatively different from that of the whole community and does not response to all disputes of the community as a whole. The guiding principle of such community in society cannot be integrity in the sense of a personified community as a whole who speaks consistently in one voice. Instead, treating each other with equal concern and respect requires any community in society open to anyone concerned, including the judges of the community as a whole.

Part one of this paper discusses the critique of the monological aspects of the Dworkin judge by Michelman, Habemas and Cornell. Part two further explores this critique by pointing out where the Dworkinian concept of community is flawed. Part three tries to correct such insufficiency of Dworkin by introducing Fuller’s human interaction conception of law and how such idea can complement Dworkin’s. Part four concludes this paper by demonstrating that this Dworkin-Fuller idea of law is what we need to improve the practice of law in a time of trial crisis.

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Dworkin defines a true community as a community whose members:

1) regard the group’s obligations as special, i.e. holding distinctly within the group and not toward outsiders;

2) accept the responsibilities as personal, i.e. running from member to member directly; 3) see their responsibilities as based on a more general responsibility which requires each

member concerns the well-being of others in the group;

4) suppose that the group’s practices show not only concern but an equal concern for all. See Dworkin, Supra note 2, 199 – 201.

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II. The Critiques of Dworkinian Community of Principle

Legal principle plays a fundamental role throughout the development of Dwrokin’s legal theories. In “Hard Case”, Dworkin differentiates principles from utility, principle as a way of legal argumentation is also differentiated from the argument of policy. For Dworkin, law making, especially judicial law making should be based on principle and not policy or utility. A principled way to approach the law, both as a general attitude9 and in practice, is also the natural result of the Dworkinian right thesis. In nature, both principle and right are characterized by their distributional effects. In practice, only arguments of principle can honor individual right by

requiring the needed “distributional consistency from on case to the next”10. Otherwise, individual right is meaningless.

The association of principles with rights is also significant in another aspect, both theoretically and in practice. Practically speaking, to decide which party of a dispute has the right in hard cases asks judges conduct argument of principle that involves weighing of values. Theoretically speaking, the process of value weighing also involves the incorporating of moral concepts, or named background rights, into the law, which represents an important disagreement with the separation thesis of the legal positivists. Above all, a legal right is an institutional right, and hard cases provide one with the opportunity to redefine and reconstruct the meaning of legal institution. Such redefinition and reconstruction are unimaginable without the argument of principles11.

In Law’s Empire, the concept and practice of legal principle are still central to Dworkin’s theory. Unlike the analytical approach demonstrated in the “Hard Case”, in “Law’s Empire”, Dworkin takes an interpretive approach. In such an approach,

Dwrokin needs to argue that integrity both better fits the legal practice than the conventional and pragmatic description in general and is also the most attractive among the three conceptions of the law. Answering why we should pursue integrity,

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Looking closer, we may still spot some difference of strength of this proposition. In Hard Case, supra note 1, especially 82-4, Dworkin points out that the legislature is competent to pursue arguments of policy and adopts programs that are generated by such arguments. But in Law’s Empire, supra note 2, 176 – 224, legislative coherence, in addition to adjudicative coherence, are also required by integrity. Dworkin begins his chapter on integrity in Law’s Empire with the two principles of political integrity, one of them is adjudicative principle, the other is the legislative principle, which requires “lawmakers to try to make the total set of laws morally coherent”. See supra note 2, 176.

10

Dworkin, supra note 2, at 88.

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Dworkin rejects the theory of consent, universality or any natural duty of justice12 as his reason, and grounds integrity on fraternity and community that embrace equal concern and respect. Here, the same arguments for attractiveness also work for legitimacy. Dworkin believes some kind of associative obligation that demonstrates integrity is not only attractive, but can also provide the foundation for members of the community to obey its law13. Dworkin creates a personified community to serve as the moral agent of the community as a whole, and holds that integrity requires that the personified community speaks with one voice and resolves conflicts according to principle and not by compromise. It must be so because general reciprocity14and equal concern15 are adopted as the virtues of the member of the community as a whole.

Unfortunately, I think Dworkin expands his jurisprudence of legal rights, both theoretically as a special case of institutional right and practically with articulated methods of legal reasoning based on the arguments of principle and coherence in the constitutional, statutory and common law settings in “Hard Case”, to a fully grown legal philosophy based on an interpretive approach that emphasizes integrity and associative obligation in “Law’s Empire” without realizing the important difference between legal rights and social norms. The criticism of the lacking of dialogue in Dworkin’s arguments of principle, i.e. Hercules is a loner16, is more evident after such expansion since Dworkin must but he cannot reconcile his theory of the integrity of the society as a whole17 with his long held strong judicial internal point of view18.

12

Id., 194.

13

He believes that “a political society that accepts integrity as a political virtue thereby becomes a special form of community, special in a way that promotes its moral authority to assume and deploy a monopoly of coercive force.” Dworkin, supra note 2, at 188. Later in the same chapter, he further qualifies such community with the virtues of general reciprocity and equal concern and respect; in other words, such community is a community of principle in short.

14

Dworkin explains “the reciprocity we demand cannot be a matter of each doing for the other what the latter thinks friendship concretely requires. … The reciprocity we require for associative obligations must be more abstract, more a question of accepting a kind of responsibility we need the companion ideas of integrity and interpretation to explain.” Dworkin, supra note 2, 198 - 9.

15

In addition to equality and concern, if members of a community also recognize their group responsibility are special and personal, then the community becomes a true community that can exercise its coercive forces legitimately. Dworkin, supra note 2, 199 – 202.

16

“… What is lacking is dialogue. Hercules, Dworkin's mythic judge, is a loner. He is much too heroic. His narrative constructions are monologues. He converses with no one, except through books. He has no encounters. He meets no otherness. Nothing shakes him up. No interlocutor violates the inevitable insularity of his experience and outlook. Hercules is just a man, after all. He is not the whole community. No one man or woman could be that.” Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 5, at 76. This criticism is also quoted by Habermas, supra note 5, at 224.

17

The society as a whole consists of not only the judicial community but also various communities in the society.

18

“The question is: whose integrity? Dworkin says that legal integrity “"asks the good citizen, deciding how to treat his neighbor when their interests conflict, to interpret the common scheme of justice to which they are both committed."” But in what sense is that true? It is not, after all, citizens who are immediately called upon for the work of legal integration. The narrativistic theory of law as integrity

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The flaw really starts early in Dworkin’s theory of adjudication. Dworkin advocates that a theory of adjudication must meet two requirement: it must have an aspect of history to establish the legality of the adjudication, what follows is the existence of the ‘fit’ stage to test what legal decisions or decision chains can be considered the controlling laws or chains of precedents for the case under dispute; it must also have the stage of justification where the adjudicator chooses one conception that coheres the best with the political morality embedded in all previous decisions from the set of competing conceptions of social morality contained in decisions that pass the fit stage. The problem occurs at the selection of the competing conceptions of social morality. Dworkin’s strong and exclusive judicial internal point of view

actually does not really care whether the competing conceptions of social morality the adjudicator need to select from are really social in the sense that they are indeed held by individuals or groups of people in the society. The adjudicator simply constructs these conceptions based on the case at hand and the judicial records. As a result, even in cases where competing conceptions of social moral issues are diverse in the society, and these competing conceptions are poorly or mostly not reflected in the cases facing the courts, Dworkinian judges can still reach his or her one right answer.

The problem becomes even worse when Dworkin joins the interpretive turn and builds his theory again around the idea of integrity and community of principles. First of all, Dworkin seems naïve, or insensitive at least, to the long held differences between legal sociologists and positivists regarding whether social norms are law. Legal positivists like John Austin and Hans Kelsen explicitly expel social norms from the realm of law; while legal sociologists since Eugene Ehrlich19 has taken a inclusive attitude toward social norm. Dworkin is not clear on this issue, but his communal interpretation of integrity puts him inevitably in a position to confront such debate.

Dworkin exemplifies how his communal approach resolves conflicts with justice by offering an example. In the conflict, equal concern for daughters and sons in a community requires parents to exercise a kind of dominion over one relaxed for the

seems a vindication of the moral freedom of judges -- displaced, in Dworkin's account, onto the citizens.” Michelman, id., at 69.

19

Ehrlich clearly includes a variety of social norms like customs into the definition of law. See Eugene Ehrlich, The Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (1936). Many social theoretical

approaches try to bridge these two camps. See Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (1978). Locating within the system theory of Niklas Luhmann, Guenther Teubner synthesizes three neo-evolutionary theories of law, namely, the responsive law of Nonet and Selznick, Habermasian organizational principle of society, and Luhmann’s socially adequate complexity theory, and brings forward that of reflexive law, see Guenther Teubner,, Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law, 17 Law & Society Review, 239-286 (1983). Jean Cohen recently improves the reflexive model; see Jean Cohen, Regulating intimacy: A new legal paradigm (2002).

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other20. Dworkin believes “that associative responsibilities are subject to

interpretation, and that justice will play its normal interpretive role in deciding for any person what his associative responsibilities, properly understood, really are.”21

Dworkin offers a series of test to resolve such conflict between community and justice. These criteria are:

a) whether the community is a true community22;

b) whether the bare facts of social practice of the community are indecisive; c) whether principles necessary to justify the rest of the institution condemn the

practice of dominion, in case such dominion is settled and unquestioned in the community23.

No one, answering the last test, can definitely be sure to expel all the unjust feature of an associative institution based on the interpretive attitude, especially in difficult instances where “the unjust dominion lies at the heart of some culture’s practices of family, or that indefensible discrimination is at the heart of its practices of racial or religious cohesion.”24 Dworkin further illustrates the complex structure in the difficult instances by expanding his family quarrel by asking: whether the daughter still have an obligation to abide by her father’s wishes in cultures empower parents to choose spouses for daughters but not sons?25

Dworkin believes before answering this question, we need to examine whether the bare institution of family in question met the four conditions for a true community just illustrated,26 since only genuine responsibilities derived from a true community obligate the members of the community. This examination surely involves a series of interpretations. We want to know whether the culture under examination accept that women are as important as men and see the difference of treatment as a way to protect daughter’s interests? Dworkin believes if the discriminatory practice is grounded in some more general assumption that daughters are less worthy than sons, than the association is not genuine and no associative obligation to accept this discriminatory practice could derive from the community. If, on the other hand, the discrimination against daughters is inconsistent with the rest of the institution of family, than it may be seen as a mistake and not a real requirement, thus the conflict is settled. Suppose the culture accepts the equality of sexes but in good faith thinks that equality of

20

Dworkin, supra note 2, at 202.

21

Id., 202 – 3.

22

See supra note 7 for Dworkin’s idea of a true community.

23 Id. 24 Id., at 203. 25 Id., at 204. 26

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concern requires paternalistic protection for women and this practice is consistent with the rest of the family institutions, but such institution is seriously unjust, for instance, what such protective practice is consistent with is the established practice of the family to force its family members to commit crimes in the interest of the family, then the discriminatory practice can not be justified. In the end, Dwrokin believes a real conflict occurs if the paternalistic practice of the institution is the only feature we are disposed to regard as unjust. Dworkin thinks in such case, such practice of

choosing spouse for daughters but not sons may be overridden by appeal to freedom or some other ground of rights; but still, since the difference of treatment is not a mistake, and it is also not the case where the discrimination is consistent with a more unjustifiable general responsibility of the family, the daughter responsibility to defer to parental choice in marriage is genuine and a daughter marries against her father’s will therefore owes her father an accounting or an apology, and should strive to continue her standing as a member of the community she otherwise has a duty to honor.27

This article does not dispute with Dworkin’s argument of principle demonstrated in the case just described. I only want to raise two questions that are more general. First, whether the reasoning in the case a reasoning of law or a reasoning of social norms? Second, who is the person Dworkin has in mind to conduct such reasoning, the daughter, the parents, the mediators of the community; the judge in the court adjudicates the case, or again, Hercules?

The first question is asking whether Dworkin takes an inclusive view of social norms and treats them as part of the law. Just like what he believes legal principle part of the law when he debates with the legal positivists. It is not clear by reading the text of “Law’s Empire” and I believe the question is one that worth pursuing. Personally, I believe the role of legal principles should be expanded for a better coordination between the laws of the state and social norms derived from the human interaction in the society. I will discuss this point further in the next section of the paper.

The second question raises the doubt that Dworkin expands his requirement of coherence of the judge to the individual citizen. Judges has next to her or him the full judicial records that contain most or all previous related facts and other judges’ legal reasoning in those cases. That’s how judges can be expected maybe to come close to Hercules to interpret and construct legal principles and make judgments of coherence. We simply cannot expect the daughter, father or mediators of a community to conduct

27

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such interpretation, especially when they are situated in the culture that shape the community and at the same time lacking the sufficient records of facts of related conflicts and reasoning of other members in the community. On the other hand, if what Dworkin has in mind is judges or Hercules doing the reasoning, then his theory of associative obligation and community of principle is incomplete. In the next section, I want to first discuss Fuller’s theory of Law as rational reflection of human interaction and then propose one way to resolve the theoretical problem of Dworkin’s communal approach.

III. Human Interaction and Legal Principle

Gerald Postema provides a useful analytical scheme for us to pinpoint where Dworkin’s theory needs improvement28. Postema intends to illustrate how the convention approach of HLA Hart and Lon Fuller’s emphasis of coordination can be integrated into a general theory of law29. Postema considers three points of

intersection of law and social life at which significant problems of coordination seem to arise. Level one coordination problem occurs out of human interaction and the law in some form is introduced to help solve the problems. Level 2 problems arise

between officials and citizens; and level 3 problems arise among law-applying officials themselves30. It should be noted that each level of the tri-level analytical scheme represents a bi-directional relationship. The level 2 problems thus involve not only how the officials apply the law to the citizens as its recipients, it also involves the reading of the laws applied from the perspective of the citizens and the process of transforming and adapting the law promulgated into level one actions toward one

28

Gerald Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 9 Journal of Legal Studies 165 – 203 (1982). Later, Postema uses a similar approach to analyze Lon Fuller’s human interactive theory of law. For a better understanding of the idea of the three levels of the coordination problems, please see the following quote:

“Fuller’s general thesis is that implicit, interactive practice is pervasive in all legal systems – not just in those heavily dependent upon “”customary law,”” but even in those apparently dominated by enacted law and formal lawmaking and law-

applying institutions. We can distinguish three broad contexts of interaction in which practices of the sort Fuller describes are in evidence. The first context is essentially “”horizontal,”” where interaction occurs between parties related as “”equal.”” In the simplest cases these relations are bilateral, as in contractual arrangements or business partnerships; but they can also be complex, multilateral relations, as in relations amongst citizens in a political community. The second context involves interaction among parties related “”vertically,”” as authorities to subordinates; for example, as officials and players, judges and litigants, and

lawgivers and subjects. In the third, interaction occurs between or among authorities or officials themselves.” Gerald Postema, Implicit Law, in Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design 255, 259 (Witteveen and Burg ed., 1999).

29

This article can be seen as an attempt to serve as the first effort of exploration to integrate the principled approach of Dworkin with Fuller’s emphasis of law as facilitator for human interaction.

30

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another. The latter of the level 2 and the whole level one problems of coordination tends to be neglected by the legal positivists, including Dworkin. We may call it the positivistic view. On the other hand, a social point of view tends to emphasize level 1 and citizen-to-official part of the level 2 problems.

Viewing from this tri-level analysis, Dworkin’s right thesis, arguments of principle, theory of interpretation and integrity discussed in the previous section contribute more to the level three and the official-to-citizen direction of the level 2 relationships. His theory of associative obligation and community of principle in “Law’s Empire” represent his theoretical extension to the level one problem.

However, what Dworkin needs to makeup in his theory is still the social point of view. The critique of Dworkin’s Hercules as loner who conducts monologue is

essentially challenging Dworkin’s theory for its insufficiency of the citizen-to-official part of the level 2 coordination, since what are really the competing conceptions of social morality in the society have been consistently overlooked by Dworkin’s judges. What is more, although Dworkin extends his theory to include level one problem of coordination by introducing the concept of associative obligation and community of principle, but the way he extends his theory, as criticized in the previous section, has been a simple expansion of his accomplishment in solving level 3 and the

official-to-citizen part of the level 2 problem to all levels of the coordination. In short, Dworkin did not quite catch the social point of view.

Lon Fuller is one of the few legal philosophers devote to a social theory of law based on human interaction31. Human interaction has always been in the core of

31

For a general account of Fuller’s academic development and theories of law, see Robert Summer, Lon L. Fuller (1984). The sociological approach to law, especially as a legal theory, has not been well received by the legal academic community. As Philip Selznick observed that Fuller’s contribution to the legal philosophy has not been recognized by the academic community as he should be:

“At some point in the future, when we become more open to the moral relevance of social inquiry, more empirical in our study of philosophical issues, more capable of uniting moral and social theory, Lon Fuller’s work will stand as a landmark⋯”. See the preface Philip wrote for the book Rediscovering Fuller, supra note 28, at 11. Lacking of adequate understanding of Fuller’s sociological approach also contributes to poor communication in the 1960’s, when Fuller debated with Dworkin. As Fuller pointed out:

“One of the embarrassments about a debate like this is that it becomes apparent at an early point that many of the differences derive from tacit assumptions that are made

on both sides”.

See Lon Fuller, A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin, 10 Vill. L .Rev. 655 (1965)。Dworkin’s comments can be found in Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Law-Observations Prompted by Professor Fuller’s Novel Claim, 113 U.Pa. L. Rev. 668 (1965) and the Elusive Morality of Law, 10 Vill. L. Rev. 631 (1965). Hart has also been critical to Fuller’s idea of morality of law. See HLA Hart, Book Review: The Morality of Law by Lon Fuller, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1965); Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1958) and the Concept of Law, 195-8, 202 (1961).

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Fuller’s idea of law32; norms derived from human interaction always exist and ought to be the basis and primary concern of the law. Legislative and judicial law making should not be simply a one way projection of the law to the people, legislators and judges ought to be sensitive to the existing human interactions involved and try their best to direct these social interactions back into sound patterns33 and not lay down substantive requirement whenever possible since sound social interaction is a better basis to achieve good social order and substantive norm laid down by the law of the state may obstruct further interactions of the people due to its insensitive to the context of the social facts or its been misinterpreted by different roles in the society involved34. Fuller’s theory of law can thus be considered one that best emphasizes the level 1 and the citizen-to-official relationship of the level 2 coordination35.

The interplay between formally enacted law and the social context to which that law is applied is what Dworkin’s legal theory lacks and it remains so even when Dworkin switches to the communal approach as discussed above. Fuller defines social context as the “interactional patterns and reciprocal expectations that have come into being without the direct guidance of state-made law.36” Such interplay exists, only differs in degree, in all application of the law. Here Fuller agrees with Dworkin that it

However, Hart did not fully realize that Fuller was focusing on the legitimacy of the law based on what’s the process involved in the legal decisions making. The eight ways that the law may fail represent Fuller’s procedural normative threshold for evaluation after we interpret how the legal actors of a legal system interact with each other and produce law. They are not substantive normative threshold or principles of good craftsmanship, as Hart claims, for one to apply. See David Dyzenhaus, the Legitimacy of Legality, 46 University of Toronto Law Journal 129, 130, 140 (1996); James Ketchen, Revisiting Fuller's Critique of Hart-Managerial Control and the Pathology of Legal Systems: the

Hart-Weber Nexus, 53 Univ. of Toronto L. J. 1, 8-9 (2003).

32

Postema thinks Fuller has always been inspirational, though he did not develop a full theory of law. See Postema, Implicit Law, supra note 28, 258. In fact, the three levels of coordination developed by Postema represent his attempt to integrate Fuller’s human interactive point of view of the law with Hart’s conventionalism. See Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, supra note 28.

33

Whenever Fuller uses the word social order, he means good social order. The scholarship of good social order has occupied Fuller’s mind and he calls it ‘Eunomics’. See Lon Fuller, Means and Ends, in the Principles of Social Order 61-2 (Kenneth Winston, Ed., 2001). In fuller’s theory, a sound pattern of social interaction is one that meet the requirement of the morality of duty, which is characterized by reciprocity that are achieved through mutual consent, exchanges with comparable value or reversible roles. See Lon Fuller, the Morality of Law, 13 – 27 (1964).

34

Lon Fuller, Law as an Iustrument of Social Control and Law as a Facilitation of Human Interaction, 1975:1 BYU L. Rev. 89 (1975) and Lon Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, in the Principles of Social Order, id., 231. The latter article was further expanded and supplemented by Lon Fuller, Some Presuppositions Shaping the Concept of “Socialization” in Law, Justice and the Individual in Society 33 (Tapp & Levine ed., 1977).

35

Another inspirational approach can be found in Jean Cohen’s new legal paradigm. She improves the reflexive model of Teubner and emphasizes Habermasian co-originality and legal principle in addition to reflexivity. See Jean Cohen, Regulating Intimacy – the New Legal Paradigm (2002). Chishing Chen, the New Legal Paradigm of Jean Cohen and Its Implication for Public Online Resolution, 37:4

EurAmerica 513 (2007).

36

Lon Fuller, the Justification of Legal Decisions, 6 World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 77 (1972).

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is in vein to seek legislative intention in hard legal interpretation; only that Dwrokin looks for remedy in arguments of principle, but Fuller emphasizes that the social context involved should never be overlooked37. Fuller believes the difficulty lies in the achievement of congruence between the demand of the state-made law and the ‘extra legal-qualities of the human relationship’ to which the law is applied38.

I believe it is hard to imagine one can tackle the difficulty without emphasizing dialog and reflection. Dialog between disputing parties with adequate participation by other parties of interests both inside and outside the community can improve mutual understanding and reflection. Such process of communication should be accessible and the primary target of state-made law39. In such scheme, both the interplay and reflection of state-made law and its social context are enhanced and mutually re-enforcing.

Dworkin has made headway to address all three levels of social coordination Postema points out when he turns to associative and communal approach in “Law’s Empire”, but his task is unfinished40. I believe Dworkinian theory can be complete if one incorporates considerations of social context in Dworkin’s legal principle.

Specifically speaking, in case we are conducting arguments of principle in a hard case, we don’t simply always go to a more general principle to try to achieve coherence; instead, we judge41 whether it is more appropriate to enable dialog among disputing parties and the public, and we direct such dialogic and reflective process through legal principle handed down to the disputing parties and the public, all three levels of

37

Id., 77 – 83. The social context of our society tends to become more rich and polycentric; the legal thought has also shifted from a command and control mode toward a bottom-up and dialogical mode. See Orly Lobel, the Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn, L. Rev. 342 (2004). This trend is increasing in the area of information law, and it is predicted that state-made law becomes more impotent in the internet age. See Ethan Katsh, the First Amendment and Technological Change: The New Media Has a Message, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1459 (1989). The social context of law is indeed a subject worth focusing now and in the future.

38

Fuller, id., 80.

39

See Chen, supra note 35.

40

Commenting Dworkin’s idea of liberal community, Selznick also believes Dworkin’s task in

unfinished. See Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 479 (1989) and Philip Selznick, Law, Community, and Moral Reasoning – Dworkin’s Unfinished Task, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 505 (1989). In terms of emphasizing the interplay between state-made law and its social context, Selznick is similar to Fuller; he calls it responsiveness of the law and holds it as the key to the jurisprudence of

Communitarian Liberalism, See Philip Selznick, the Jurisprudence of Communitarian Liberalism, in Communitarianism in Law and Society 19 (Paul van Seters ed., 2006).

41

One guidance for such judgments can be found in the idea of discursive coherence provided by Robert Alexy and Aleksander Peczenik. See Alexy & Peczenik, the Concept of Coherence and Its Significance for Discursive Rationality, 3 Ratio Juris 130-47 (1990). The discursive coherence of the social context can provide a good threshold to determine whether coherence requires legal decision makers ought to looking for a more abstract principle or empowering further dialog and reflection. See Chishing Chen, Toward a Discursive Basis of Public Reason in the Internet World, to be published.

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coordination can be well attended42.

IV. Conclusion

Courts everywhere are under great pressure due to congested case load. At the same time, the number of trials in courts is also reducing with an alarming speed43. Whether such trend is worth pursuing is in doubt44, even if Dworkin’s theory can still fit the description of the practice. Dworkin has made a great step to incorporate all communities in his legal theory, but he needs to do more. This paper is an effort to suggest a first step for such further improvement. On the other hand, the courts has undertaken its catalyst roles in the emerging era of governance45, such transformation should be more and not less evident in the future. However, we are still in need of a general legal theory to guide such transforming efforts. Fuller’s human interaction perspective is what we really need to bring back to our attention. This article is a first attempt to show how the perspective of Fuller might be incorporated into Dworkin’s legal philosophy. Hopefully it can raise some attention, which is in great need in a time of change.

42

Susan Sturm gave a good example. Sturm points out that the second generation of employment discrimination is a byproduct of ongoing interactions shaped by the structures of day-to-day

decision-making and workplace relationships”. Sturm applauds the Supreme Court’s handling of sexual harassment cases by refusing to give specific substantive content that constitutes sexual harassment; and instead, the Court provides the defendant employers with affirmative defenses if they exercise due care to avoid harassment and resolve the conflict if it does occurs. By doing so, dialog and reflective thinking are empowered and guided by the court. See Susan Sturm, Second generation employment discrimination: A structural approach, 101 Columbia Law Review 458, 469 (2001).

43

See Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication, 86 Boston U. L. Rev. 1101 (2006).

44

Courts decisions can serve its expressive function if general reciprocity is highly experienced in the society. If, on the contrary, the social trust is low, courts messages cannot be expected to get across the society and even be treated with cynicism. See Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's Expressive Function, 49 Syracuse L. Rev. 1039 (1999).

45

See Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13:3 Columbia J. European L. (2007).

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由富勒人際交往的法理學論

MGM v. Grokster 案

陳起行∗ 目次 壹、個案事實一、本案美國聯邦地方法院及上訴法院的判決二、聯邦最高法院的見解三、台灣相關判決四、小結貳、富勒人際交往的法律理論一、人際交往的法律觀 1.調解 2.裁判理論 3.立法 4.自由 5.道德二、富勒與德沃金及哈特的辯論三、富勒法律理論在法制上的啟發參、由富勒重人際互動的法律觀論數位著作保護的法律形成肆、結語 ∗ 政大法律系教授，美國加州柏克萊大學法學博士，美國北德州大學電腦碩士。

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摘要富勒是繼龐德之後出任哈佛法學院法理學教席的美國法理學家。不過，由於富勒的法理學以人際交往的社會理念作為基礎，雖然發展出眾多發人深省的法律理論，卻始終未能成為法理學研究的重點，甚至逐漸遠離法理學論述的焦點。這個現象在近幾年有了改變，深入探討富勒法理學的論著有增加的趨勢。本文認為，資訊科技所引發的法律典範移轉，似乎也正朝向富勒重視人際交往的法理學轉向。本文以涉及運用點對點傳輸技術侵害數位著作的 Grokster 案為中心，探討此一問題對法律所構成的挑戰，以及為何我們應當更加正視富勒的法理學，才能尋找到回應新興資訊科技法律問題之道。 關鍵詞：富勒人際交往數位著作權點對點傳輸隱藏性法律調解 Abstract

After Roscoe Pound, Lon Fuller held the jurisprudence professorship at Harvard Law School. Fuller’s sociological approach emphasizing human interaction is, however, not so welcomed in the jurisprudential world. It is believed that such trend may need a change. This paper discusses the Grosker case first, one that involves digital copyright infringement through the P2P model, and then advocates the need to take Fuller seriously in order to response to the legal challenges brought forward by the information technologies.

Key Words: Lon Fuller, Human Interaction, Digital Copyright, P2P, Implicit Law, Mediation

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壹、個案事實

點對點傳輸是一項網路上資源分享的模式。其特點在於去中心化，也就是無須單一來源的資源提供者。例如被認定侵害著作權的 Napster 網站，存放大量音樂、歌曲供人下載，音樂著作使用人均必須透過連絡 Napster 網站，才能搜尋、下載音樂著作。在點對點傳輸的模式下，雖然個別運作上有差異，但基本上資料的傳輸，是直接由數位資料的提供者傳輸給數位資料的使用者。資料提供者往往也是經由網路上其他資料提供者直接取得該項資料，並將該資料持續保存在分享資料夾中，供網路上有意下載的使用者下載。

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., et al. v. Grokster, Ltd., et al. (545 U.S. 913,

2005, 以下簡稱本案) 被上訴人Grokster1便是免費提供網路上點對點傳輸電腦軟體的系統業者。Grokster所提供的點對點傳輸軟體會指定某些電腦作為超級連結點（supernode），或稱為索引電腦（indexing computer），網路資源需求者透過這些索引電腦所提供的索引，可以進一步連結到存放所需資源的電腦，直接由存放該資源的電腦透過網際網路將該項資源傳輸至需求者的主機2_。點對點傳輸普遍受到歡迎的原因主要是Napster模式被判定侵害著作權之後，Grokster所採用的點對點傳輸模式並未儲存侵害著作權的數位資料於Grokster 網站，資料直接由使用者的電腦傳給另一位使用者的電腦，Grokster點對點的傳輸模式與Napster並不相同，有可能因而排除其侵害著作權的責任。不過，一般相信，絕大多數點對點傳輸被用於傳輸音樂等受著作權保護的著作。本案原告 MGM提出專業的統計數字，指出 90%透過Grokster點對點傳輸模式提供下載的檔案是受著作權保護的著作3_{。Grokster質疑此數字，並指出免費下載受著作權保護} 的檔案中，有些可能受有著作權人的授權。Grokster也辯稱未侵害著作權的點對點傳輸雖然在數量上較少，但在著作種類上看來，有其重要性。例如一些音樂演出者透過點對點傳輸方式免費提供下載他們的音樂，因而增加聽眾；未受著作權保護的數位內容提供者也利用點對點傳輸的方式散佈其數位內容檔案。 Grokster承認其知悉有人利用其點對點傳輸軟體傳輸侵害著作權的數位內容，即使確定的下載時間與內容無法掌握。更有甚者，Grokster有時也會回應使用者的詢問，對於如何播放下載的電影，提供指引。証明Grokster直接知悉其使 1

本案另一位主要被上訴人Streamcast Networks, Inc.雖在個別行為上與Grokster稍有不同，但是由於其差異並不影響本文之立論以及分析，因此本文不加以討論。 2 Streamcast使用的技術則不需要索引電腦作為仲介，直接搜尋提供所需資源的電腦並下載資料， 545 U.S. 922。 3 545 U.S. 922-3。

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用者侵害著作權的事實4_{。此外，本案事實也顯示，Grokster也主動試圖接收Napster} 的客戶，繼續透過Grokster的模式，下載音樂。任何使用者搜索“Napster＂或“免費分享＂等關鍵詞，都會被導引到Grokster的網站。Grokster使用群的人數因此維繫於免費取得受著作權保護的著作。由於Grokster經營的商業模式並非靠使用者支付使用其軟體的費用，而是靠出賣廣告的空間，將廣告傳給每一位使用Grokster 軟體的使用者，Grokster的主要目的難以脫離下載免費著作。即使Grokster在收到著作權人威脅信函時，會傳送電子郵件，警告其使用者勿傳遞侵害著作權的內容，Grokster並未阻斷這些使用者繼續使用Grokster的軟體分享受著作權保護的數位內容5_。 一、本案美國聯邦地方法院及上訴法院的判決 本案於聯邦地方法院審理時，法官認定Grokster的使用者直接侵害了著作權，但以簡易判決的方式認為Grokster提供現在版本的點對點傳輸軟體並不構成著作權的侵害，因為Grokster並不知悉其使用者侵害著作權的特定行為（specific acts）6。聯邦上訴法院維持地院的判決。上訴法院引用Sony案7認為散佈具備相

當程度非侵權使用（substantial noninfringing uses）商用產品的一方無須為該產品

負共同侵權責任（contributory liability），除非散佈者確實的悉特定的侵害個案而

未採取行動。由於點對點傳輸模式的分散性質，著作是直接由點對點傳輸軟體之使用者之間傳遞，Grokster並無實際侵權上的認知。上訴法院也不認定Grokster

需付輔助侵權（vicarious infringement）的責任8_{，因為Grokster並未監控或控制}

（monitor or control）其軟體的使用；並未由協議而取得權利或有能力監督（supervise）其軟體的使用；也沒有獨立的義務警戒（police）侵權的軟體使用

行為9_。

二、聯邦最高法院的見解

美國聯邦最高法院一致地（unanimously）推翻了上訴法院的判決，並由蘇特大法官（David H. Souter）執筆，撰寫法院見解。金斯柏格大法官（Ruth Bader Ginsburg）撰寫了協同意見，瑞恩奎斯特（William H. Rehnquist）以及甘迺迪大法官（Anthony Kennedy）加入其意見；布萊爾大法官（Stephen G. Breyer）也提出協同意見，由史蒂芬斯（John Panl Stevens）及奧康諾大法官（Sandra Day O’Connor）加入。 4 Id. 5 545 U.S. 923-7。 6 545 U.S. 927。 7

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios,Inc. 464 U.S.417（1984）。

8

共同侵權係指共同侵權行為人有意圖（intention）引誘或鼓勵直接侵權；輔助侵權行為則係指因他人直接侵權而獲利，又未行使權利阻止或限制侵權的產生。

9

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法院上基本認為本案的關鍵問題是：對於提供可以合法使用也可以非法使用的商品的一造而言，什麼時候要為第三人使用其產品而侵害他人著作權負責。法院認為若侵害者的目的是鼓勵侵害著作權，經由明確的表白（clear expression）或其他肯定的步驟（affirmative steps）以促進侵害，則必須為第三人的侵權行為負責10_{。易言之，法院認定有事實證明Grokster意圖鼓勵其點對點傳輸軟體的使} 用者侵害他人著作權，因此要為其使用者侵害著作權負責。由於 Sony 案是上訴法院所引用的判例，蘇特大法官由該案開始分析。Sony 美國公司所製造的錄影機，也因為使用者用來複製電影，遭到環球影城等原告控告侵害著作權。美國聯邦最高法院認為 Sony 錄影機具有大量非侵權性使用（substantial noninfringing uses），並且使用者將電視上所播放原告電影錄製後觀賞，屬於轉移時間（time-shifted）的著作合理使用，因而判定 Sony 勝訴。本案是否也以 Grokster 的軟體具備大量非侵權性使用為關鍵的考量因素，受到蘇特大法官的質疑。蘇特大法官認為，Sony案並未排除法官就意圖上的認定。如果在產品同具備侵權性與非侵權性使用之外，顯示有言詞或行為指向鼓勵侵害，則產品提供者應負侵害著作權之責。Sony提供的錄影機確實具備侵害性與非侵害性使用，但由於 Sony並無任何鼓勵購買其產品的使用者侵害著作權，因此單純因產品具備第三人侵權性使用不能構成Sony負責的要件11_{。本案與Sony案有別，在於Grokster除提} 供點對點傳輸軟體之外，確實有言語及行為鼓勵其使用者侵權，因此應當負侵害著作權之責。如前所述，有事實證明 Grokster 於其使用者以電子郵件詢運如何播放下載的電影時，提供引導；Grokster 也主動試圖接收 Napster 的客戶；其經常發出的電子新聞稿強調 Grokster 的點對點傳輸軟體下載流行音樂的能力。Sony 案提供商品提供者享有著作權安全港保護的同時，也包括了引誘的規則（inducement rule），作為其受保護的前提，亦即商品提供者有言語或行為引誘使用者侵害著作權時，即不再受著作權安全港的保護，而應負責。因此 Grokster 應當為其使用者侵害著作權之行為負責。蘇特大法官最後整理出三點證明Grokster有引誘其使用者侵害著作權之意圖。第一，Grokster顯示出其滿足一個眾所周知的侵害著作權的意圖，這個市場是由過去Napster的客戶所構成；第二，Grokster並未嘗試發展軟體或其他技術以 10 545 U.S. 918。 11 單純知悉侵害的潛力或實際的侵權性使用，不足以構成產品提供者負責的條件（mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability）, 545 U.S. 937。

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降低使用者運用其軟體侵害他人的著作權；第三，Grokster由販賣廣告空間獲利，越大的使用者群越能提高Grokster廣告上的獲利，Grokster商業上的敏感度會驅使其尋求大量的使用者，即便這些使用者有侵權性使用的事實。此點單獨來看難以認定Grokster不法的意圖，但由整個紀錄的意義脈絡看來，其不法的意圖則很明顯12_。認定事實證明Grokster有引誘侵害著作權的意圖，應當是美國聯邦最高法院大法官們一致的見解，但是本案究竟對於網際網路及點對點傳輸等新興科技在散佈數位著作的公共利益與數位著作權權利人保障間的利益平衡採取什麼立場？雖然主筆大法官在撰寫法律意見一開始便提及此點13_{，但並未深入探討。由於此} 課題涉及本案日後的解讀，尤其是本案是否改變Sony案的見解，十分重要。也因此金斯柏格大法官撰寫了協同意見，而布萊爾大法官擔心金斯柏格大法官的協同意見會造成誤解，以為本案已經改變或限縮Sony案的判決，所以另外撰寫了協同意見予以闡明。基本上，金斯柏格大法官認為Grokster的軟體已經被使用一段期間，並且絕大多數（overwhelmingly）被用來侵害著作權；而其侵害也是Grokster產品主要的獲利來源。而證據也不足以顯示一定程度或具商業意義非侵害性的使用經過一段時間以後會發展出來。依此，聯邦地院武斷地給予Grokster簡易勝訴判決並不妥當。布萊爾大法官則強調上訴法院對於Sony的解讀以及事實的認定，並無不當。 Grokster案涉及 10%的非侵權性使用與Sony案相當。布萊爾大法官並且舉出相當多的具體案例，例如分享軟體以及將古代典籍數位化的古騰堡（Gutenberg）計畫等日益增多的數位公共領域。布萊爾大法官的用意是要指出Grokster個案並不影響點對點傳輸等分享數位內容模式的發展。Grokster不應解讀成限縮或變更 Sony案平衡公共利益與私人財產權利益的標準而損害網路上數位內容的分享。在協同意見最後，布萊爾大法官重申他認為本案並沒有顯示Sony判決應當被變更，使得對於Sony的解讀更加限縮。事實上，若再考慮變更Sony判決可能帶來限制科技發展的不良影響，布來爾大法官認為應維持Sony判決，以他解讀Sony案的方式來解讀本案，也因此希望第九上訴巡迴法院再次審理Grokster案時，能確認有關Sony案的解讀問題14_。三、台灣相關判決在美國最高法院作出MGM v. Grokster一案的判決後不久，台灣的地方法院也先後做出兩項判決：其一被告為全球數碼科技股份有限公司（EZPeer，以下簡 12 545 U.S. 939-40。 13 545 U.S. 928-9。 14 545 U.S. 948-660。

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稱全球數碼）15_{，另一案被告包括飛行網股份有限公司（Kuro，以下簡稱飛行網）} 16_{。不同之處在於美國Grokster案是民事判決，而台灣兩項相關案件則均屬刑事} 判決。全球數碼經營模式與Grokster相類似，提供會員軟體，使會員彼此可以分享檔案。不同的是，全球數碼向會員收費，以點數回饋，會員每下載一個檔案，扣若干點數。若會員提供檔案供其他會員下載，全球數碼也會提供點數以資獎勵。法官基本上認為民事責任與刑事責任無法等同，而著作權法益，尤其在數位環境下，仍未確立，理應由主導財富分配的市場運作釐清，或由私法平衡損益。若要以刑法保護此一不成熟的法益，適用上便必須嚴謹。法官認定全球數碼提供會員的點對點傳輸軟體，是由會員自主地上傳或下載檔案，無論全球數碼有無維護集中的檔案索引資料，其負責人並無法 24 小時間監控會員間資料的傳輸。而點對點傳輸模式，是可以分享公共領域或不侵害著作權的內容。依此，法院判定被告無罪17_。全球數碼判決後的數個月後，臺北地方法院對飛行網案做出判決。本案的關鍵事實是被告為提供大量的檔案供下載，大量購入市售的音樂光碟，轉換格式之後，在數個月之內上傳約三萬多首錄音著作到被告電腦內，侵害著作權罪證確鑿。而飛行網除提供會員點對點傳輸軟體之外，在會員下載非法音樂檔案的全程，多有介入，因此與會員侵害著作權的行為具備因果關係。民國九十六年六月十四日，立法院修訂著作權法，正式將Grosker的見解納入著作權法。該法第八十七條第一項第七款18_{規定在未經著作財產權人同意或授} 權的情形下，任何人意圖供公眾透過網路公開傳輸或重製他人著作，侵害著作財產權，而受有利益者，視為侵害著作權。而對於意圖的認定，同條第二項19_也將 Grokster 案所涉及的各項鼓勵侵害數位著作權的行為整理納入。四、小結全球數碼與飛行網的兩個個案，時間上與 Grokster 的判決時間先後距離不到 15 台灣士林地方法院，92 年度訴字第 728 號，民國 94 年 6 月 30 日判決。 16 台灣台北地方法院，92 年度訴字第 2146 號，民國 94 年 9 月 9 日判決。 17 本案法官明智地指出，以刑罰處理著作權侵害，必須謹慎。不過，本案是否有如接下來介紹的Kuro案被告一般，以另外的網址提供下載音樂等檔案，似應進一步查明。尤其鑑定人確實曾經找到此網址，並指出該網站係全球數碼所有。 18 “有下列情形之一者，除本法另有規定外，視為侵害著作權或製版權： … 七、未經著作財產權人同意或授權，意圖供公眾透過網路公開傳輸或重製他人著作，侵害著作財產權，對公眾提供可公開傳輸或重製著作之電腦程式或其他技術，而受有利益者。” 19 “前項第七款之行為人，採取廣告或其他積極措施，教唆、誘使、煽惑、說服公眾利用電腦程式或其他技術侵害著作財產權者，為具備該款之意圖。”