國際運動總會對會員國家協會遵從策略之研究

全文

(1)國立臺灣師範大學體育學系博士班博士論文 Department of Physical Education College of Sports and Recreation. National Taiwan Normal University Doctoral Dissertation. 國際運動總會對會員國家協會遵從策略之研究 Managing the Compliance of National Federations: The Strategies of International Sports Federations. 周宛靜 CHO, WAN-CHING. 指導教授 Advisor：湯添進博士 Ph. D. 協同指導教授 Co-Advisor：鄭志富博士 Ed. D.. 中華民國 109 年 8 月 August 2020.

(2) 謝辭 Acknowledgement The completion of my dissertation says how much I am a lucky person. That I have all the luck in the world is the result of all the people who love me and who are by my side. First, I have a supervisor, Prof. Tien-Chin TAN（湯添進教授）, who is determined to guide me through my study regardless of the time difference and the five thousand miles of distance between us. He does not settle with my lame excuses of time limitations, and he does not allow me to settle either. His relentless supervision has enlightened my composing of the dissertation as well as my perspective on life in general. A big thank you to Prof TAN for everything. Second, I have five distinguished dissertation committee members, Prof. Chih-Fu Cheng（鄭志富教授）, Prof. Ping-Kun Chiu（邱炳坤教授）, Prof. Ping-Chao Lee（李炳昭教授）. Prof. Chien-Shing Lee（李建興教授）, Prof. Jinming Zheng（鄭錦明教授）, who had offered me extensive guidance on my dissertation from the first proposal to the final version. I value the extended hours of research discussion and all committee members’ generous comments. Then, I have my family, my mom and dad, sisters, and my grandparents, who sends me their best wishes. Their unconditional love has not only fuelled my pursuit of becoming a better researcher but also bolstered me during the occasional setbacks. During my nine years of study I have had a group of good friends and study mates, Yu-Hsien（郁嫻）, Liang-Yi（小亮）, Ying-Lien（瑛蓮）, Pin-Chi（品齊）, Che-Chun（哲君）, Chen-Hsuan（承璇）, Junjie, Alexandra, Ksenia, Yihuan and many more, who have always been there to help and, have never reserved their best opinions, and whose friendship I will continue to cherish. Feng-Chen（鳳禎）, Te-Yu（德郁）, Ting-Hsuan（庭瑄）and Wei（杜崴）who helped me tremendously in making everything possible. Last but not least, Freya, she challenges me intellectually, gives me confidence and helped me greatly in writing my dissertation in English. She is the parameter for everything in my life. If the Covid-19 pandemic has taught me anything, it is to love and to appreciate whenever possible.. i.

(3) 國際運動總會對會員國家協會遵從策略之研究 2020 年 8 月 4 日. 研究生：周宛靜指導教授：湯添進教授協同指導教授：鄭志富教授摘要. 國際運動總會所制定的政策對各國運動發展影響深遠，已儼然成為國際政權 (International regimes)。本研究旨在探究國際總會對國家協會的遵從策略，並驗證遵從理論在國際運動總會脈絡之適用性。本研究採質性研究透過半結構訪談蒐集資料，以立意取樣 8 個總會與 12 人受訪。研究架構是以 Tallberg 的管理-強制執法階梯遵從理論模型（management-enforcement ladder）為骨幹，Haas 的七種遵從引導面向為主要內涵，分別為：「高度覺醒」、「增能」、「上綱」、「監督」、「核實」、「橫向連結」及「組織地位提昇」。該架構強調國際政權的遵從引導是有分階段性的。從預防到監督，並在違規發生後介入，如介入未果則祭出制裁。研究結果指出，在預防階段：一、總會頻繁辦理國際活動，並透過資助會員國參加活動以及提昇參與品質以加強會員協會對政策的理解與認同（高度覺醒）。二、總會補助會員協會舉辦國內活動、提供與其資源相應的政策目標以永續發展熱情、並強化與會員國內重要關係團體的關係以創造發展之綜效（增能）。三、總會透過補助會員協會舉辦國內活動以確保各國採用總會認證的國際標準、利用國際總會法理高度使洲際總會的政策與司法框架與總會一致化（上綱）。在監督階段：一、總會透過其行政體系蒐集資訊建立國家協會評鑑制度以監督會員國遵從情況與評估發展需求，並透過既有橫向連結蒐集會員國遵從情況之必要資訊（監督）。二、發展出四種評估模式來核實國家協會對國家運動發展的真實承諾(核實)。違規發生後介入階段：一、在非正式協商階段強化國際總會的權威性。二、在正式階段利用既有橫向連結提昇總會組織地位以給違規會員國製造壓力（橫向連結、組織地位提昇）。在制裁階段：根據本研究分析，具不同行政資源、法源依據（政治意願）的國際總會對不同性質的違規案例有相應處置方式。研究結論指出，國際總會對會員國遵從策略具有階段性，在預防階段強調以增能手段取得會員對政策之理解與認同；在監督階段，著重發展評鑑制度以評估各國發展需求；並在違規發生後透過非正式與正式手段介入以給予違規者社會壓力；如正式介入未果則祭出制裁。根據研究結果，本研究建議國際運動總會的遵從系統架構可以遵從管理與違規處置兩階段呈現。關鍵字：遵從、國際政權、國際運動總會、單項協會、國際組織、國際關係. ii.

(4) Managing the Compliance of National Federations: The Strategies of International Sports Federations August 2020 Author: CHO, Wan-Ching Advisor: TAN, Tien-Chin Co-Advisor: CHENG, Chih-Fu. Abstract The influence of international sports federations (IFs) at the domestic policy-making scene reasonably places them in the position of international regimes. Applying international regime theory, specifically the theoretical concept of compliance, this research aims to explore the strategies of IFs to induce the compliance of their national federations. The theoretical framework of this research is developed based on the theoretical model of the ‘managementenforcement ladder’ (Tallberg, 2002) as well as Haas’ (1998, 2007) seven dimensions of compliance inducement, national concern, capacity building, nesting, monitoring, verification, horizontal linkages and institutional profile. Adopting a qualitative research approach, eight Olympic IFs with varying capacity were selected via purposive sampling and twelve of their staff interviewed via snowballing according to a semi-structured interview guideline that was informed by the theoretical framework. Based on the findings the IF compliance system is theorised into two stages, a compliance management system consisting of prevention and monitoring strategies, and a non-compliance responses system consisting of strategies for intervention and sanctions. Key words: International regimes, compliance, sports, federations, international institutions iii.

(5) INDEX CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1. 1.1. RESEARCH BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................................... 1. 1.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................................................................................................................. 4. 1.3. RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVE ................................................................................................................ 4. 1.4. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION ........................................................................................................................ 4. CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................ 6. 2.1. THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES .................................................................................................... 6. 2.2. INTERNATIONAL SPORTS POLICY REGIMES .............................................................................................. 29. 2.3. ESTABLISHING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THIS RESEARCH ........................................................ 43. CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................. 56. 3.1. THE CHOICE OF RESEARCH PARADIGM FOR THE PRESENT STUDY ........................................................... 56. 3.2. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND DESIGN ..................................................................................................... 60. 3.3. RESEARCH METHOD ................................................................................................................................ 64. 3.4. RESEARCH SUBJECTS ............................................................................................................................... 71. 3.5. CODING AND ANALYSIS APPROACH ......................................................................................................... 87. 3.6. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND MITIGATION .............................................................................................. 91. CHAPTER 4. IFS’ STRATEGIES TO INDUCE THE COMPLIANCE OF THEIR NATIONAL. FEDERATIONS 94 4.1. STAGE I: PREVENTION.............................................................................................................................. 94. 4.2. STAGE II: MONITORING ......................................................................................................................... 131. 4.3. DISCUSSING IFS’ STRATEGIES IN MANAGING NFS’ COMPLIANCE.......................................................... 148. 4.4. STAGE III: INTERVENTION ...................................................................................................................... 151. 4.5. STAGE IV: SANCTION ............................................................................................................................. 171. 4.6. DISCUSSING IFS’ STRATEGIES IN RESPONDING TO NFS’ NON-COMPLIANCE.......................................... 188. CHAPTER 5 5.1. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 191. HOW DO INTERNATIONAL SPORTS FEDERATIONS INDUCE THEIR MEMBER NATIONAL FEDERATIONS’. COMPLIANCE? ................................................................................................................................................. 191 5.2. WHAT ARE THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THESE STRATEGIES UTILISED BY IFS WITH REGARD TO. THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL REGIME THEORY IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SPORTS? ...... 5.3. 198. RECOMMENDATIONS AND REFLECTION .................................................................................................. 207. REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................ 215 ANNEX A. INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM (SAMPLE) ................................................................... 237. ANNEX B. NF EVALUATION SYSTEM EXAMPLE (ITU) ............................................................... 238. iv.

(6) List of Tables TABLE 1. REGIME DEFINITION ............................................................................................................................. 8. TABLE 2. SCHOOL OF THOUGHTS IN THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES .................................................. 10. TABLE 3. LIKELIHOOD OF STATE COMPLIANCE .................................................................................................. 18. TABLE 4. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK THEORISED IN FOUR STAGES ............................................................ 55. TABLE 5. RESEARCH DESIGN - FOUR PHASES .................................................................................................... 64. TABLE 6. INTERVIEW GUIDELINE ....................................................................................................................... 69. TABLE 7. LIST OF IFS ON THE SPORTS PROGRAMME OF THE SUMMER OLYMPIC GAMES .................................... 72. TABLE 8. OLYMPIC REVENUE SHARE INDICATORS ............................................................................................. 75. TABLE 9. OLYMPIC REVENUE GROUPINGS ......................................................................................................... 76. TABLE 10 THE OLYMPIC GAMES TOKYO 2020 ATHLETES QUOTA BY SPORTS..................................................... 76 TABLE 11 OLYMPIC IF CATEGORISATION BY ASOIF ........................................................................................... 79 TABLE 12 THE BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE SAMPLED IFS........................................................................... 81 TABLE 13 IDENTIFICATION OF THE BEST CANDIDATES FOR INTERVIEWS WITHIN EACH OF THE FOUR STAGES OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................................... 83. TABLE 14 THE LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS .............................................................................................. 84 TABLE 15 AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES ORGANISED BY IFS ............................................ 96 TABLE 16 TYPES OF DOMESTIC SUPPORT PROVIDED BY IFS ............................................................................. 109 TABLE 17 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS APPLIED IN DOMESTIC SUPPORT PROGRAMMES ................................. 127 TABLE 18 OVERVIEW OF THE COMPLIANCE INDUCEMENT STRATEGIES IN STAGE I .......................................... 130 TABLE 19 OVERVIEW OF THE COMPLIANCE INDUCEMENT STRATEGIES IN STAGE II ......................................... 146 TABLE 20 THE ROLES OF HORIZONTAL LINKAGES AND INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE IN IFS’ COMPLIANCE INDUCEMENT.............................................................................................................................................. 170 TABLE 21 THE TYPES OF NON-COMPLIANCE BASED ON HAAS’ CAPACITY-WILLINGNESS MODEL................... 172 TABLE 22 THE LIKELIHOOD OF IFS’ INTERVENTION AND SANCTIONS ............................................................... 190 TABLE 23 OVERVIEW OF IFS’ STRATEGIES OF NF COMPLIANCE INDUCEMENT ................................................. 194. v.

(7) List of Figures FIGURE 1. STAGES AND ACTORS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION STAGE ................................................................. 13. FIGURE 2. THE SPORT GOVERNANCE VERTICAL NETWORK ............................................................................ 33. FIGURE 3. THE TOTAL OLYMPIC SYSTEM........................................................................................................ 36. FIGURE 4. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK................................................................................................................ 62. FIGURE 5. THE EXAMPLE OF CODING FOR STAGE I ......................................................................................... 90. FIGURE 6. THE EXAMPLE OF CODING FOR STAGE II ....................................................................................... 90. FIGURE 7. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM OF IFS ......................................... 201. vi.

(8) Abbreviations Abbreviations. Meaning. IOC. International Olympic Committee. LOC. Local Organising Committee. IF. International Federations. CC. Continental Confederations. NF. National Federations. ASOIF. Association of Summer Olympic International Federations. FIFA. Fédération Internationale de Football Association. IAAF. International Association of Athletics Federations.. FINA. Federation Internationale de Natation. BWF. Badminton World Federation. UCI. Union Cycliste Internationale. ITU. International Triathlon Union. UWW. United World Wrestling. WA. World Archery. FIBA. International Basketball Federation. FIVB. Fédération Internationale de Volleyball. FISA. The World Rowing Federation. CAS. Court of Arbitration of Sports. Note: IAAF changed its name into ‘World Athletics’ in 2019.. vii.

(9) Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Research Background The initial fundamental roles of international sports federations (IFs) have been mainly regulatory and restricted to the matter of the international competitions at a global level. The modern functions of IFs, however, are expanding dramatically (ASOIF, 2019, p. 16). In fact, while IFs are substantively constituted through self-governing private norms (Casini, 2015), their institutional actions have an impact beyond the international competitions they organise. For example, the Olympic Charter or the World Anti-Doping Code are traditionally referenced in sports related national laws, which demonstrates a interpenetration of private norms and public authority from the regulatory, institutional and procedural perspectives (Casini, 2015). The examination of elite sports policy is no longer confined within national boundaries, rather it should take the “international influence” more into account (Houlihan & Green, 2005, p. 9). Against this background, the international sports federations (IFs) can reasonably be regarded as regimes of international sports policy (Houlihan, 2009). Houlihan (2009) observed some unique regime features that are generally shared by these IFs: they demonstrate stable stakeholder relations and have processes in place enabling stakeholders’ voices to be heard (or ignored); they have the institutional capacity to set agendas, monitor policies, and review, verify, or enforce compliance; they also vigorously promote or police their own values. Moreover, their actions constitute at large the international influence observed at the domestic scene of. 1.

(10) public policymaking (Houlihan, 2009). Given this observed influence exerted by international sports federations, it is particularly relevant to examine systematically, and in more detail, in what ways IFs exert their influence over the national actors. While there is a divergence of opinions in the academic discussion of international regimes regarding the extent to which institutionalism matters (Hasenclever et al., 1997), this research assumes an institutionalist point of view that acknowledges the significant role IFs play in setting the norms of their international sports community through their institutional actions. Effectively, while modern IGBs interact with various stakeholders across private and public sectors (Chappelet, 2016; Henry & Lee, 2004), the majority of their policies and rules are affecting their national federations, and subsequently the individuals (coaches, athletes, competition officials, etc) and organisations (clubs, regional federations, schools) affiliated with the national federations. The researcher further argues that most national federations are inclined to comply, and the majority of non-compliance cases arises from a lack of resources. As a result, it is particularly intriguing to examine the ways in which the international sports policy regimes manage to exert their influence on the presumably autonomous jurisdiction of their national federations. In general, scholarly investigations into the roles of international sports federations as a collective community are scarce, both in the field of International Relations (IR) and Sports Policy studies (Budd & Levermore, 2004; Keys, 2009), and too often the focus is placed on. 2.

(11) unicorn organisations, such as the International Football Federation (FIFA) or the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (Clausen, 2018; Forster & Pope, 2004). Furthermore, it is perhaps not only the lack of academic attention that causes this field being under-researched. Haas (1998) commented that the extent to which national actors comply with an international regime is particularly difficult to measure, and the causality between an international regime’s institutional actions or international rules and national compliant behaviours is also difficult to prove. However, one notable exception to the past lack of academic attention on international sports regimes is the increasing amount of research on the regime effectiveness of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in the last decade (Fincoeur et al., 2015; Gray, 2019; Hanstad & Houlihan, 2015; Houlihan, 1999, 2004, 2014; Tan et al., 2018; Ulrich et al., 2018; Westmattelmann et al., 2018). These studies about the international anti-doping policy regime offer a great starting point and inform the complexity and scope of international regime theory for this research. While the studies about the international anti-doping policy regime (Gray, 2019; Houlihan, 1999, 2014; Tan et al., 2018) may have a different focus from this research, their theoretical groundwork can certainly be extended to this research, particularly concerning the challenges of ensuring the effectiveness of and the compliance within a sports policy regime, as well as national actors’ responses to an international sport regime’s compliance requirements.. 3.

(12) 1.2 Research Questions Two specific research questions are outlined as followed: a. How do international sports federations induce their member national federations’ compliance? b. What are the theoretical implications of these strategies utilised by IFs with regard to the applicability of international regime theory in the context of international sports?. 1.3 Research Aim and Objective This research aims to examine the operation of IFs interfacing with their national federations in order to deepen the understanding of IFs’ role as the sports policy regimes and the ways in which they exert their influence over their national federations. The objective of this research is to explore the strategies of international sports federations to induce compliance by their member federations, through the application of international regime theory, specifically the theoretical concept of compliance. Thereby, this research attempts to theorise the distinctive features of regime influence in the context of international sports.. 1.4 Research Contribution This research sheds light on an under-explored field of international relations and international sports. Using the perspective of international regime theory, it enhances the understanding of international sports federations’ operation specifically concerning the ways in 4.

(13) which they interface with their national federations. Empirical evidence into the day-to-day operations of IFs is gathered to inform the theorising of IFs’ role as sports policy regimes, and in the global development of sports worldwide. Thereby, this research will also map out the distinctive features of regime influence in the context of international sports. These findings not only lay the groundwork for future research into international sports policy regimes, but also contribute to two practically dimensions for policy actors. First, from the perspective of international sports federations, the enhancement of knowledge towards compliance inducement may contribute to a more robust overall programme of regime governing, specifically with regard to the interactions with their memberships, and subsequently to more effective policy regimes. Second, national actors may also benefit from an enhanced understanding of interfacing with the international sports policy regimes. In the case of Taiwan, for example, these insights may inform the critical reflection on the effectiveness of its current international policy of sport aiming to “take immense stride to the world” (Sports Administration of Taiwan, 2017, p. 46), assist in formulating a national strategy, and help position sports at the heart of the state government’s pursuit of a meaningful national presence in the international community.. 5.

(14) Chapter 2 Literature Review Placing international sports federations in the position of international regimes is the key premise of this research. As a result, it is relevant to first review the theoretical concept of international regime and present the context in which the Olympic International Federations reside that provides the foundation of their regime characteristics. Next, to answer the research questions, it is important to visit the theoretical concept of compliance in the context of international regimes and discuss how theoretical perspectives of compliance are applicable to international sports federations and to their interaction with their member national federations. Finally, based on this theoretical background, the researcher establishes an analytical framework for this research.. 2.1 Theories of International Regimes A consensus definition of international regime by Steven Krasner conceptualises regimes as: “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 1982, p. 185). Critics of Krasner’s definition are mainly concerned with the components of the conceptualisation are rather indistinguishable operationally (Hasenclever et al., 1997). As it does not provide enough guidance or clarity when being applied in empirical studies of international institutions. Peterson (2012) explained that this 1982 definition indicates three principle elements: 1) an interrelated array of principles, norms, rules and decision-making 6.

(15) procedures, 2) a group of actors using that array to guide their expectations regarding their own and others’ behaviour, and 3) an issue-area where that array and those expectations will be engaged. Levy, Meyer and Rittberg (1995, p. 272) refined the definition of international regimes based on the extent of the formality of rules as well as the extent to which the expectations of actors converge. Asserting that an institution cannot be a regime without a minimal degree of formality of rules and convergence of expectation, they define an international regime “as an social institution consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas” (Levy et al., 1995, p. 274). Based on these two dimensions, Levy, Young and Zurn (1995, p. 272) classified different regime types (s. Table 1, p 8). According to their conceptualisation a ‘Classic Regime’ exists when rules are explicit and regularly referred to, and rule-consistent behaviour is widespread (Levy et al., 1995). A ‘Tacit Regime’ refers to when norms and informal rules are being observed, yet not necessarily formalised, and a good level of expectation by members is maintained (Levy et al., 1995). Instead, a Dead-Letter Regime has explicit written rules, both procedural and non-procedural, yet the rules are generally not respected by the members (Levy et al., 1995).. 7.

(16) Table 1 Regime Definition. Formality. Low High. Convergence of Expectations Low No Regimes. High Tacit Regimes. Dead-Letter Regimes. Classic Regimes. From “The Study of International Regimes,” by M. A. Levy, O. R. Young, & M. Zurn, 1995, European Journal of International Relations, 1(3), p. 272.. In The Study of International Regimes, Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (1997) have identified three main schools of thought within the realm of international regime studies as having fundamental differences in their respective approach, namely, the power-based realists, the interest-based neoliberals, and the knowledge-based cognitivists (s. Table 2, p 10). Both neoliberal and realist approaches assume that the behaviour of state actors in the international society is based on their rational calculations, while the former emphasises a maximization of interests, and the later stresses relative gain of power (Hasenclever et al., 1997, p. 2). These rationalistic views (state actors maximizing or advancing their power or interests) have been the dominant theoretical perspective on compliance. In their view, compliance occurs either as a “coincidence” that is orchestrated by the most powerful nations (Hathaway, 2002, p. 1944), or simply as “by-products of domestic politics” which are considered to almost singularly shape a state’s action (Hathaway, 2002, p. 1952). The sociological (cognitivist) view, on the other hand, argues that socialisation always comes before what may be perceived as rationalised decision-making (Hasenclever et al., 1997). The importance of norm is emphasised in the socialist argument that “states are best understood 8.

(17) as the product of a socialised environment”, that the socialisation or internalisation of social norms itself determines the interests of a perceived rational decision (Raustiala, 2000, p. 405). Hence, the cognitivist point of view takes into consideration both principled beliefs, i.e. normative ideas that specify measures separating right from wrong, just from unjust, and causal beliefs, i.e. cause-and-effect scientific arguments that guide people to achieve their own objectives (Hasenclever et al., 1997, p. 143). The power of idealism, referring to humanitarian sentiments and moral conscience can be explained as “what starts as strategic incentive-based cooperation within international institutions often leads at later points to preference shifts” (Checkel, 2005, p. 814). In this view, compliance is socially influenced and subject to the norm of the international community. The major discrepancy separating these schools of thought is the extent to which they believe in “institutionalism”, i.e. that international institutions matter (Hasenclever et al., 1997, p. 2). The cognitivist school asserts that institutionalism does make a difference in international resolutions, while the realist and neoliberal schools put more emphasis on the states as the primary driving force for their interactions with international regimes. While there is a divergence of opinions in the academic discussion of international regimes regarding the extent to which institutionalism matters (Hasenclever et al., 1997), this research assumes an institutionalist point of view that acknowledges the significant role IFs play in setting the norms of their international sports community through their institutional. 9.

(18) actions. Effectively, while modern IGBs interact with various stakeholders across private and public sectors (Chappelet, 2016; Henry & Lee, 2004), the majority of their policies and rules are affecting their national federations, and subsequently the individuals (coaches, athletes, competition officials, etc) and organisations (clubs, regional federations, schools) affiliated with the national federations. However, we do not intend to denounce the interplay of states’ power pursuit or maximisation of national interests in the political and decision-making process within international sport federations. Rather, in this research the state actors’ role is seen as part of the regime compliance inducement scheme.. Table 2 School of Thoughts in the Study of International Regimes Realism. Neoliberalism. Cognitivism (especially “strong cognitivism”). Central Variable. power. interests. knowledge. Institutionalism Meta-theoretical orientation Behavioural model. weak rationalistic. medium rationalistic. strong sociological. concerned with relative gains. absolute gain maximiser. role-player. Note. Adapted from Theories of International Regimes (P. 6), by A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger, 1997, UK, Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.. 2.1.1. Theoretical Perspectives on Compliance. In establishing a scheme of international collaboration, the question of the effectiveness of international institutions, which can be merely a set of rules with or without a formal organisational capacity, is often at the centre of a broader debate in international relations 10.

(19) theories (Bernauer, 1995; Haas et al., 1993; Keohane et al., 1993; Krasner, 1983). Much attention has been paid to the conditions under which states are able to establish collaborations, i.e. the process and conditions of forming an international institution (Bernauer, 1995; Stein, 1990; Young, 1989). Yet, it has become more relevant to investigate the role of international institutions and the ways their existence contributes to effective international collaborations (Bernauer, 1995; Gallarotti, 1991; Haas et al., 1993). While compliance is often regarded as the focal contributing force to institutional effectiveness (Raustiala, 2000; Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002); it would be beneficial to clarify the conceptualisation of compliance in the context of international regimes as Houlihan (2014) noted for WADA’s daily operations, it is not uncommon for the concepts of implementation and compliance being used interchangeably. Young (2013, p. 104) defined compliance as the “degree to which state behaviour conforms to what an agreement prescribes or proscribes”, suggesting that compliance or noncompliance is not necessarily a binary choice, there is possibility of a partial compliance. Compliance is considered not uniquely applicable to legal rules and can be defined as “a state of conformity or identity between an actor's behaviour and a specified rule” (Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002, p. 539). Houlihan (2014), Hanstad and Houlihan (2015) and Gray (2019) all emphasised that there should be a differentiation between adherence (ratification or acceptance) and implementation,. 11.

(20) which take place prior to compliance. Adherence refers to an international legal rule being adopted and enacted as one that is valid at the national level (Houlihan, 2014). Implementation indicates a level of commitment of resources (Gray, 2019). Compliance hereby is referred to as “the intensity of commitment to achieve the aim of drug-free sport.”(Hanstad & Houlihan, 2015, p. 588). Falkner et al.’s (2008) suggested that compliance can be observed through the domestic implementation phase of the international rules, i.e. EU directives, from transposition, enforcement and application (s. Figure 1, p 13). Transposition refers the stage where state actors adopts officially an international rule at the national level through a process of ratification, usually in the national parliament. Enforcement refers to the stage where the adopted law is actually enforced by the administration i.e. in the government’s administrative procedures or police operations, and by the courts, i.e. rule according to the adopted law. Application refers to an internalisation process in which the adopted law, a behavioural prescription, is perceived normal. From the perspective of the institutions, Haas (1998) also points out that it is quite challenging for the international institutions to keep track of the implementation of an international law, except for observing changes in bureaucratic budgets and investment patterns; or as a less ideal indicator the number of rule enforcement.. 12.

(21) Figure 1 Stages and Actors of The Implementation Stage EU. Member States Implementation. Administration Court. Application. Norm Addresses (Administration; entrepreneurs, etc). Enforcement. Administration Government Parliament Interests Groups. Text of Directive. Decision-making Process. Transposition. Monitoring and Enforcement by Commission Note. Adapted from “Introduction: The Challenge of Implementation Research in the New Member States” by G. Falkner, O. Treib & E. Holzeithner, 2008, in G. Falkner, O. Treib & E. Holzeithner (Eds.), in Compliance in the Enlarged European Union: Living Rights or Dead Letters? (p. 8.), Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing.. 2.1.2. The debate between enforcement and management approaches.. In general, the scholarly debate on compliance inducement is between the enforcement approach and the management approach (A. Chayes et al., 1998; A. H. Chayes et al., 1995; Downs et al., 1996; Tallberg, 2002). According to Raustiala and Victor (1998, p. 681), “the two schools of thought reflect different visions of how the international system works, the possibilities for governance with international law, and the policy tools that are available and should be used to handle implementation problems.” The enforcement approach is derived from the rationalist point of view and asserts that. 13.

(22) only a sanction costly enough could deter a carefully calculated non-compliance decision by a state (Haas, 2007). States choose not to comply when the benefits of shirking exceed the costs of being exposed; as a result, “compliance problems are best remedied by increasing the likelihood and costs of detection through monitoring and the threat of sanctions” (Tallberg, 2002, p. 611). Dorn and Fulton’s research (1997, p. 17) offers a typical enforcement oriented approach claiming that to whip an unwilling state there are two ways available, the “the carrots and sticks” or incentives and punishments. To enforcement theorists, compliance entails states committing resources that could be otherwise used somewhere else. As there is a considerable distinction between the signature to an agreement and compliance, as states sometimes commit to an international agreement for the sake of participation, not for valuing the contents of the rules (Haas, 1998; Tallberg, 2002), enforcement is a must to ensure profound behaviour change. Tallberg (2002) backs the hypothesis that the larger the difference between the pre-existing national behaviours and the international standard for compliance is the less likely the member states make required adjustments to be compliant with empirical evidence from the EU. This depth-of-cooperation hypothesis also implies that the more extensive the required behavioural changes are by international rules, the greater are the incentives to shirk, in other words the greater punishment is required to support it (Downs et al., 1996; Tallberg, 2002). Monitoring and sanctioning are considered as central elements to the enforcement. 14.

(23) approach. Monitoring generally increases transparency and exposes potential violators. Sanctions raise the costs of shirking and make non-compliance a less attractive option. They are thus capable of deterring defections and compelling compliance (Axelrod & Keohane, 1986; Dorn & Fulton, 1997; Downs et al., 1996; Olson, 1965; Tallberg, 2002; Underdal, 1998). The notion of the enforcement approach, especially in the context of modern international relations, relies fundamentally on legal rules. Nonetheless, the growing complexity of the international society has given rise to the increasing difficulty that the traditional approach of international law-making is facing in resolving problems (Shelton, 2007). As a matter of fact, the “proposed solutions to problems are not always in the form of law” in the international society of states (Shelton, 2007, p. 7). Responding to the need arising from this international reality, international law and international relations scholars’ attention is increasingly focused on different forms (Bilder, 2007; D’Amato, 2008; Guzman & Meyer, 2010; Haas, 2007; Shelton, 2007; Trubek et al., 2005) and content (normative or promotional) of international laws, and correspondingly on the extent to which different characteristics of laws induce compliance (Shelton, 2007, p. 4) or desired changes in state behaviour (Raustiala, 2000). The management approach arises from the sociological view, claiming that it is the “transformative power of normative discourse” (Hathaway, 2002, p. 1957) and the frequency of interactions between international and national actors rather than the calculation of benefits that is responsible for the continuous effectiveness of international regimes (Hathaway, 2002,. 15.

(24) p. 1957). The management approach argues that coercive actions, such as economic sanctions or threat of war, are both economically and politically costly and proven to be staggering procedural and operational progress; therefore, they should not be the primary mechanism to achieve compliance (A. H. Chayes et al., 1995; Hathaway, 2002). Consequently, it is best that non-compliance is addressed through a problem-solving strategy of capacity building, rule interpretation, and transparency (Tallberg, 2002). The management approach’s main argument lies on the assumption that states are inclined to comply (A. H. Chayes et al., 1995; Downs et al., 1996; Haas, 2007; Tallberg, 2002). Non-compliance occurs mainly due to a lack of capacity rather than wilful disobedience (A. H. Chayes et al., 1995). To reiterate, the difference between the management and enforcement approaches is rather a divergence regarding the reasons or causes for states’ compliance and non-compliance. To the managerial theorists the incidences of apparent non-compliance are seen as a problem to be resolved; to enforcement theorists those are violations that have to be punished (Downs et al., 1996). Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996) explain that sanctioning rarely happens in the international scene and that states appear inclined to comply because the international agreements tend to codify existing behaviour, rather than imposing extensive adjustment requirements (Downs et al., 1996; Tallberg, 2002). Though the mechanisms of how transparency contributes to regime effectiveness are rather under-explored, it is generally acknowledged that transparency, the demand and supply. 16.

(25) of information, is crucial to regime effectiveness (Mitchell, 1998). Moreover, Tallberg (2002) argues that both the managerial and enforcement theorists consider monitoring an integral part of the cures to non-compliance; however, the management approach emphasises monitoring for the benefits of exercising transparency whereas the enforcement approach stresses the importance of the coercive pairing of monitoring and punitive actions. By the same token, Tallberg (2002, p. 614) argues that to the managerial theorists “dispute settlement is primarily viewed as clarifying common norms through interpretation and adjudication, rather than providing enforcement. ” Haas (2007) argues that states’ willingness and capacity are the two parameters that could affect their choice to comply (s. Table 3, p18). The technical capacity of a state refers to a developed administrative system, competence or financial resources, etc. A state’s willingness refers to the political factors at play that signal the commitment to an important area of national concern, or reinforce a favourable political agenda with which the domestic leadership wishes to be associated. Additionally, the anticipated domestic resistance on the subject matter could be too grave and hence too costly to realise the commitment. Echoing the managerial view that implies that states are inclined to comply unless they are constraint by a lack of capacity, Haas (2007) argues that those states that are incapable yet willing may try to comply and expect to fail so that international institutions would likely step in to help build its technical capacity.. 17.

(26) Table 3 Likelihood of State Compliance Costly Compliance State is capable & willing State is capable but unwilling State is incapable & willing. Possible Unlikely State may try to comply and expect to fail in order to attract resources from international institution to improve capacity State is incapable & unwilling Highly unlikely. Compliance Not Costly Most likely Unlikely State may try to comply. Unlikely. Note. Adapted from “Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from international relations and Comparative Politics” by P. Haas, 2007, in D. Shelton (Ed.), Commitment and Compliance the Role of Non-Binding Norms in International Legal System, (p.47) 2007. NY: Oxford University Press. In addition, Haas (1998) notes that the extent to which the same sovereign state complies or not varies depending on the subject matter. For example, the International Boxing Association (AIBA) opened the door for professional boxers to compete in the Olympic Games Rio 2016. Such a rule change should be simple for strong nations such as the United States (USA) and Canada who normally were able and willing to comply with almost any rule changes in the past. However, this particular rule is in conflict with their domestic regulations that stipulate a strict separation of amateur and professional ranks. These two nations are not able to adopt this portion of the international rules until to date. In line with the implications of the management approach, Haas (1998, 2007) argues that there are seven dimensions of institutional inducement that could exert influence over a state’s choice to comply, namely, monitoring, verification, horizontal linkage, nesting, capacity 18.

(27) building, national concerns, institutional profile: 1.. Monitoring: monitoring is the mean to obtain valuable information about rules implementation at the national level and to inform the international institutions’ decisionmaking (Haas, 2007). Monitoring provisions are often incorporated in an international treaty and can be done through member states’ self-reporting through filling out a standardised questionnaire when the secretariat lacks resources. Self-reporting may lure member states’ wilful misrepresentation (Haas, 2007). In these situations, a third party may be required to aid the monitoring for it to be impartial.. 2.. Verification: verification provides instant, accurate and credible information, which allows an early warning of a violation and increases the likelihood of detection (Haas, 1998). It also allows the institutions to publish monitoring results to create peer pressure among the member states by making other nations’ actions transparent. Verification can be done by the regime itself or by NGOs serving as watchdogs. Surprise visits by independent inspectors are also utilised by some institutions.. 3.. Horizontal linkage: frequent interaction or some form of alliance among institutions, such as states, international institutions and international NGOs, creates a dense network that amplifies institutional legitimacy or discursive capacity (Haas, 1998). Horizontal linkage can entail reciprocal benefits from other areas of importance, or create an ambiance of solidarity to encourage conformity to an international norm, hence, compliance. For. 19.

(28) example, the United Kingdom (UK) had been proven willing to compromise in the EU Large Scale Power Plant Directive because the UK had the need to avoid the reputation of being the 'dirty man of Europe'; a reputation that had hindered the UK’s diplomatic efforts in other domains (Haas, 1998). Horizontal linkage is especially evident within the international anti-doping movement. Huang and Tan (2015) point out that the intervention of several Western states helped create a global discourse of solidarity concerning the fight against doping. This global atmosphere of solidarity brought pressure to other states to conform and to become a signatory of the WADA Code. In the international federations’ community, it is likely that horizontal linkage is built around geographical proximity and the line of funding within the notion of “systemic governance” (Henry & Lee, 2004, p. 27), or the “total Olympic system” structure in the Olympic Movement (Chappelet, 2016, p. 747). 4.. Nesting: nesting refers to “the array of hierarchical influences” (Haas, 2007, p. 57) which can be either conceptual or legal. Conceptual nesting refers to specific issue-related contexts that are causally connected to a broader concept of higher societal importance. For example, the question of having a joint women’s Ice Hockey team by North Korea and South Korea in the Olympic Games Pyeongchang 2018 is a sporting issue, yet nested under the broader discussion of the resolution of two conflicted nations and a peace-making effort. 20.

(29) by the IOC. Bearing the banner of world peace, the supposedly sporting issues, namely, the sacrifice of athletes’ rights (reduced quota), the disturbance caused to team chemistry and the training schedule of both the North Korean and South Korean teams, had been put aside in the public discussion. On the other hand, the hierarchical influences can be legally framed, as complying with one international law may mean an automatic legal obligation to another due to the hierarchy of the legal system. For example, the Olympic Charter serves not only as the statutes of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). It is also the “basic instrument of a constitutional nature” (Olympic Charter, 2018, p. 9) defining the main reciprocal rights and obligations of the three main constituents of the Olympic Movement, namely the IOC, the IFs, and the National Olympic Committees (NOCs), as well as the Organising Committees for the Olympic Games (OCOGs). Although the main constituents of the Olympic Movement do not include the national federations (NFs), article 29 of the Olympic Charter states that “to be recognised by an NOC and accepted as a member of such NOC, a national federation must…be affiliated to an IF recognised by the IOC and be governed by and comply in all aspects with both the Olympic Charter and the rules of its IF.” By signing up to become a member of an IF on the Olympic program, a national federation is legally obliged to comply with this Olympic Charter in all aspects.. 21.

(30) 5.. Capacity building: the provision of capacity building resources upon compliance or the withholding of such resources due to non-compliance is a mean to encourage states to comply and remain compliant (Haas, 1998, 2007). The aid conditionality linked to the conceptualisation of capacity building can be interpreted as supporting either managerial or enforcement theory (Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002; Raustiala & Victor, 1998). The existence of providing assistance is an action embraced by the managerial theorist while the link between compliance and funding, which in practice has been critical to the success, is consistent with enforcement theory (Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002). Capacity building resources include training, technology, monetary subsidies, etc. The majority of the EU’s compliance inducement falls under a broader concept of capacity building. Examples are the filling of a knowledge void within and among national authorities or the issuing of interpretive guidelines targeting policy areas that lack certainty (Tallberg, 2002). One capacity building technique that is rather common in the international sports community is revenue redistribution, as is done, for example, by the World Athletics’ Foundation or the IOC’s Solidarity Fund (Houlihan & Green, 2005, p. 10). Capacity building may genuinely resolve non-compliance cases resulting from a lack of capacity, if done properly. Storm and Solberg (2018) provide evidence from FIFA’s redistribution of. 22.

(31) revenue, arguing that the NFs whose administration is under-developed tend not to be able to benefit fully from the fund without sufficient monitoring and verification. 6.. National concerns: national concern refers to the initiatives to reinforce the concerns of the mass public or social elites that already exist to pressure the state government to comply to its international commitment. An effective raise of national concerns is a type of norm creating initiative and internalisation process, in which members are educated in a way that they would be inclined to support a certain idea proposed by the international regime (Haas, 2007). A certain norm that has been existing for a long time, that people in the community take for granted or feel ashamed of when not being able to conform could be a sign of successful norm-setting. Institutional may publicise events and engage in public education to catalyse opinion about issues in a short term. In a long term, institutions may run information campaign to promote certain findings of epistemic community. For example, the International Boxing Association (AIBA) had run an extensive ‘HeadsUp’ campaign to promote the findings of Dr Charles Butler to defend its decision in removing headgears for elite men’s category(AIBA, 2015; Wang, 2013). The key messages of the campaign were the health, education and careers of its boxers, are undoubtedly a long-lasting concern of the community. It is belived that the HeadsUp campaign had successfully led to the IOC to accept AIBA’s recommendation to also remove headgear in the Olympic Games Rio 2016 (Nutley, 2016).. 23.

(32) 7.. Institutional profile: Institutional profile refers to the technique that the international institutions raise their own profile so that the participating state leaders could gain political approval at the domestic level or the stakes of failing to meet international commitment are higher. The strategic partnerships between the IOC and the United Nations (UN) on the subjects of promoting peace, solidarity and respect (Jiwani, 2019) certainly help raising the institutional profile and the political importance of the IOC and consequently increase the Olympic Movement’s relevance in the global discourse of peace-building and humanitarian efforts.. It is worth noting that these techniques arising from the dimensions above are not always implemented individually. Oftentimes, it is a combination of several techniques within a given administrative capacity. A prime example is the practice of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). WADA launched the ISO Code Compliance Monitoring Programme in 2017 that includes the Code Compliance Questionnaire (CCQ) to be filled out by WADA Signatories. Furthermore, WADA expanded the program in 2018 to include an in-person audit, a Continuous Monitoring Program based on the WADA results management database (ADAMs), and technical assistance services by WADA staff to signatories. As can be seen, this Code compliance scheme includes the dimensions of monitoring, verification, and a certain level of capacity building.. 24.

(33) In reality, especially monitoring and verification are often employed in a hand-in-hand fashion. For example, the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations’ (ASOIF) governance assessment questionnaire requires the summer Olympic IFs to provide policy documents as well as evidence of implementation (self-reporting). Based on the evidence reported, an independent third party will then verify and assess their governance practice. This is a typical example of combining monitoring and verification. The management-enforcement ladder Examining the literature from both the management and enforcement approaches and analysing the empirical evidence from the European institutions’ practices in inducing compliance of EU member states, Tallberg (2002) proposes a Management-Enforcement Ladder model to illustrate the compliance system of the EU. This model suggests that both mechanisms of enforcement and management, widely considered as two competing conceptions, are actually complementary and “most effective when combined” (Tallberg, 2002, p. 610). Tallberg (2002) further argues that the compliance system of the EU challenges the antithetical positioning of enforcement and management strategies and that the coercive (enforcement) and problem-solving (management) strategies are mutually reinforcing each other. In addition, Tallberg (2002, p. 609) demonstrates that the day-to-day operation of the compliance system of the EU broadly involves the stage of informal consultation, negotiation,. 25.

(34) or even adjudication before a case is brought forward to the stage of litigation in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which he terms a ‘path to compliance’. Tallberg’s view of a path to compliance echoes at large with Young’s (2013) view that compliance is not a binary choice between clean-cut compliance and clean-cut violation. While the EU’s compliance system guides its member states to a path to compliance, a ladder of enforcement and management measures is formed, consisting of “preventive capacity building and rule interpretation, systems of monitoring, legal proceedings against violators, informal channels of bargaining, and the final option of sanctions” (Tallberg, 2002, p. 615). The Management-Enforcement Ladder Tallberg (2002) proposes has four stages: Stage I Violation Prevention: Several preventive measures such as capacity building, elasticity of rule implementation, i.e. granting longer grace periods of rule implementation for nations facing stronger national resistance, knowledge sharing among members to fill knowledge gaps, i.e. organising workshops among relevant national authorities, and rule clarification, i.e. issuing rule interpretation guidelines, are being utilised in stage I. Stage II Monitoring: Tallberg (2002, p. 616) observed a two-track approach of monitoring. On the one hand, there is a systematic and active collection and assessment of information through in-house monitoring by the European Commission; on the other hand, there is a decentralised approach to monitor compliance through recording and examining complaints lodged by nonstate organizations or individuals.. 26.

(35) Stage III A Legal System Permitting Cases Against Non-Compliant States That Further Clarifies Existing Rules: This legal system refers to formal infringement proceedings allowing the EU Commission to first conduct an informal consultation process aiming to “weed out cases that may have arisen due to legal uncertainty and misunderstandings” (Tallberg, 2002, p. 617). This bargaining process, though informal, is institutionalised insofar as to which cases are reviewed in direct negotiation with state representatives. Then, once violations have occurred within the proceedings, the Commission would function as prosecutor and the ECJ as judge (Tallberg, 2002). In this phase, “enforcement and management processes serve to turn up the pressure, making compliance an increasingly attractive option for member states” (Tallberg, 2002, p. 617) by raising the cost of a violation or lowering its profit. For example, the Commission could declare its readiness to eventually use economic sanctions. Social costs might be imposed through an explicit Commission strategy to name and shame, most concretely, by issuing convicting press releases and scoreboards on non-compliance states. Tallberg (2002) notes that the sanctioning capacity of the EU makes being declared as non-compliant extremely costly, especially in a reputational sense. The likelihood of imposing these sanctions serves as deterrence and aids the implementation of various other compliance inducements (Tallberg, 2002). It is both the threat of resource-consuming litigation as well as the ramping up of social pressure that, according to Tallberg (2002, p. 617), “provide for an environment highly hospitable to bargaining….” As a result, negotiated solutions are not an alternative to. 27.

(36) adjudication, but have become the main form of dispute settlement in the working philosophy and the daily practice of the Commission (Tallberg, 2002). Stage IV Deterrent Sanctions as A Final Measure if States Refuse to Accept the Rulings of the Legal System. In Tallberg’s (2002) empirical findings, a vast majority of the noncompliance cases are settled before they are referred to the ECJ as a result of the introduction of EU’s new sanctioning power, economic penalties. As the sanctioning power serves as a pronounced deterrence mechanism, integrating the threat of it into the formal infringement procedure together with other preventive measures reinforces the compliance-inducing capacity overall.. 28.

(37) 2.2 International Sports Policy Regimes International sports studies applying the concept of international regimes focus predominantly on the anti-doping policy regime, the heart of which is the World AntiDoping Agency (WADA) (Fincoeur et al., 2015; Gray, 2019; Hanstad & Houlihan, 2015; Houlihan, 1999, 2004, 2014; Houlihan et al., 2019; Huang & Tan, 2015; Westmattelmann et al., 2018). According to Houlihan et al. (2019), the majority of the studies of anti-doping policy focus either on the complex global network of organisations that form the policy regime, or on particular aspects of the policy implementation, i.e. the whereabouts system, CAS rulings, athletes’ rights and the use of Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUEs). From the perspectives of regime research paradigms (Hasenclever et al., 1997; Levy et al., 1995), the academic discussions about the anti-doping policy regime revolve around the paradigms of ‘regime effectiveness’ (Hasenclever et al., 1997, p. 2) and ‘regime consequence’ (Levy et al., 1995, p. 291). Regime effectiveness refers to the extent to which an organisation acts consistently with its stated aims and mission (Levy et al., 1995). For example, Waddington and Møller (2019) view WADA’s performance as poor because the anti-doping policies it has instigated have failed to capture the true prevalence of doping in elite sports. Their view displays a singular point of assessment against WADA’s stated aims and mission. On the other hand, regime 29.

(38) consequence refers to the extent to which an organisation has influences on the actors involved (Levy et al., 1995). Furthermore, Houlihan et al. (2019) also point out that a lack of normative change over time in doping culture in the global sports community can be seen as a sign of WADA’s negligence. In the next subchapter, we will discuss the characteristics of International Federations that form the basis of conceptualising them as international sports policy regimes.. 2.2.1 Conceptualising international sports federations as international regimes The notion of placing International Federations as international regimes appeared in Houlihan’s article (2009) in which he discussed the non-domestic influence on domestic elite-sports policy processes. He identified the policy harmonising effort of the international sports policy regimes as being one of the key influences external to domestic policy processes. However, general scholarly investigations into international sports federations as a whole are scarce and often focus exclusively on a handful of prominent organisations, such as FIFA (Clausen, 2018; Croci & Forster, 2004). Noticeably, increasing academic attention is being paid to the development of better governance practices and structure, and the professionalization of international sports federations (Chappelet, 2016, 2017; 30.

(39) Chappelet et al., 2020; Clausen, 2018; Clausen et al., 2017; Clausen & Bayle, 2017; Geeraert et al., 2015). Clausen and Bayle (2018) examined UCI’s evolution of governance practice during the tenure of Hein Verbruggen’s presidency and his successors. Chappelet, et al. (2020) also examined governance structures comparing four IFs of varying sizes, namely FIFA, UCI, FISA, and FIH. The focus of these studies is on IFs’ structural variations, instead of their interaction and interfacing with other stakeholders, specifically their national federations. While the notion is there, no one has formally conceptualised IFs as international regimes. However, there are many characteristics of IFs that can be argued to form the basis of IFs as international sports policy regimes. According to Levy et al. (1995), an international institution has to have a minimal degree of formality of rules and convergence of expectations to be seen as an international regime. With regard to the formality of rules, there is a pyramidal structure based upon which IFs exert influence over the NFs (ASOIF, 2019; Croci & Forster, 2004; Henry & Lee, 2004), as well as a policy network of organisations within which IFs and their NFs operate interdependently (Chappelet, 2016; Henry & Lee, 2004). With regard to the convergence of expectations, the purpose of the establishment of the international sports federation has been to organise international competitions and govern the sports worldwide, though their organisational roles and mission as a collective community are. 31.

(40) expanding rapidly (ASOIF, 2019). In addition, IFs are facing common public expectations external to their existing structures which is considered to have a significant impact on IFs’ late pursue of good governance principles. These features inform the characteristics of IFs as international sports policy regimes and are shared across all international sports federations. The pyramidal structure of governance. With regard to the governing structure of international federations, a pyramidal governing structure is set up within which the international sports federations stand at the apex of a vertical hierarchy of governing bodies, while their national federations are the single point of contact at the national level interfacing with that of the continental or international body (ASOIF, 2019; Croci & Forster, 2004). Croci and Forster (2004) argue that recognising the IFs as the supreme governing body within this pyramid is crucial to uphold the ongoing existence and stability of the structure and the individual organisations in it. The blue arrows in Figure 2 demonstrate that the national associations (NFs) voluntarily uphold the rules and norms dictated by the IFs, the pyramidal structure is reinforced through a mutual legitimation scheme (Croci & Forster, 2004). The NFs recognise the IF as the one and only representative governing body of the sport internationally, and the IF recognises one NF per nation as the governing body at the national level (Croci & Forster, 2004).. 32.

(41) Figure 2 The Sport Governance Vertical Network. Note. Adapted from “Webs of Authority: Hierarchies, Networks, Legitimacy, and Economic Power in Global Sports Organisations” by O. Croci, and J. Forster, 2004, in G. T. Papanikos (Eds.), The Economics and Management of Mega Athletic Events: Olympic Games, Professional Sports, and Other Essays, (p.5.), Athens: Athens Institute for Education and Research.. Taylor (1988) argues that the way IFs organise themselves, i.e. democratically electing a board to represent memberships via the general assembly in accordance with the statutes to gain legitimacy and being chaired by politically and commercially connected figures, indicates that they are substantially the central government of a sport. Taylor’s view largely echoes the concept of ‘political governance’ (Henry & Lee, 2004, p. 38), which refers to a government steering and directing through regulation and 33.

(42) inducement rather than conducting a command of change to achieve its objectives (Henry, 2013, p. 8). Henry (2013) also points out that in addition to the measures in place to issue sporting provision, prescription and proscription, a sport government also imposes a mixture of moral and fiscal incentives to advance its policy objectives. On the other hand, the democratic system of international sports federations described by Taylor (1988) implies is that their national federations are also voters to IFs’ leaderships; IFs’ role to their national federations can be both governing and providing constituent services. The role of continental confederations (CCs) in this vertical network is not extensively elaborated in the literature. From the European point of view, Chappelet et al. (2020) cited three existing models. First, there is the mega legal autonomous model, i.e. UEFA, FIFA’s powerful European Confederation. The second model does not have a confederation in the institutional structure, which indicates a generally very weak and ineffective continental entity in the implementation of IF development policies (e.g., FISA). Last, in the third model continental offices are set under the direct control of IF headquarters (e.g., FIBA). Highlighted as an underestimated factor of IF governance and in line with the aim of this research, Chappelet et al (2020) point out that the quality of collaboration between the levels of intervention in the governance of this pyramid (Figure 2, p 33) is. 34.

(43) important to create the optimal conditions for the IFs’ implementation of their development policies. The policy network of organisations. Henry and Lee (2004) argue that this traditional hierarchy of the government of sport (s. Figure 2, p 33) is shifting to a “web of interaction between stakeholders” or “systemic governance” (2004, p. 28). In Chappelet et al.’s (2020) view, this shift marks the transition from regulating and coordinating actions that are rather centralised, hierarchical and vertical (government) to a horizontal network based on consensus, in some circumstances compromise, and a shared power with multiple actors. One important implication of this shift of governance models is that the sporting governing bodies no longer directly or fully dictate the outcomes to a group of passive recipients, they rather govern through negotiating preferable outcomes by virtue of their capacity (Henry & Lee, 2004, p. 29). Chappelet (2016, p. 747) proposes “the total Olympic system” concept that is specific to the Olympic Movement. It gives an overview of the policy network of organisations surrounding IFs and their interaction with the NFs (Figure 3, p 36). Chappelet (2016) argues that the linkages among these actors in the system are essentially capital, suggesting that IFs’ governing influence may be subject to their power to mobilise these resources.. 35.

(44) Figure 3 The Total Olympic System Adapted from “From Olympic Administration to Olympic Governance” by Jean-Loup Chappelet, 2016, in Sport in Society, 19(6), p 747.. The notion of systemic governance, to a large extent, sheds light on the policy network of actors in which the IFs and their member national federations operate interdependently. Henry (2013) elaborated that to understand systemic governance, one has to understand the relationships between these stakeholders and the process of their interaction. The process of interaction between IFs and their NFs is still predominantly based upon the pyramidal structure as set out in Figure 2. Nonetheless, understanding the actors within the policy environment is not insignificant in the interaction between IFs 36.

(45) and their NFs. IFs’ expanding roles and mission. According to the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF)’s publication ‘Future of Global Sports’, which outlines the evolution of the roles and responsibilities of IFs from their initial stage to the modern days, the initial fundamental responsibilities of IFs encompass: the definition and enforcement of sporting rules and regulations, the coordination of the international competition calendar in the interests of their members, the organisation of junior/grass-roots level competitions to underpin professional elite events, the organisation of world championships, and last but not least, the use their revenue to establish a solidarity mechanism and further develop the sport worldwide (ASOIF, 2019, p. 16). These initial fundamental roles and responsibilities reflect the ‘traditional roles’ of ruling/governing, organising/administering competitions, development/solidarity (ASOIF, 2019, p. 17). ASOIF further outlines integrity, governance, medical/science, commercial delivery, technology, media/communication as the ‘recent roles’ of the Olympic IFs. Furthermore, Clausen (2018) refers to the political governance of IFs as having a board elected by and supposedly representing the interests of members as the social mission of the IFs for sports development. However, Clausen (2018, p. 21) also points out that there is ensuing organisational risks of having “mission drift” and “goal vagueness”. 37.

(46) which she attributes to the interplay of IFs’ traditional social mission vis a vis their members and the more recent revenue-generating drive. Drawn particularly from the European Union example, Tallberg (2002) points out that access to dispute-settlement bodies is considered the central element of institutional design that affects the effectiveness of institutional efforts. In the international sports movement, a majority of IFs incorporate a constitutional provision referring to the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) as its ultimate dispute-resolving body, a provision that is accessible to the national federations and individuals, such as athletes. The public expectations. What is perhaps most relevant to mention is that the Governance Task Force (GTF) by ASOIF had been established upon the request of the IOC in 2015 (Chappelet et al., 2020). Apparently, there has been growing concern in the international sports community and in public opinion about the need to adopt good governance principles (Alm, 2013; Börzel et al., 2008; De Dycker, 2019). The principles of good governance are effectively “normative ethical principles on how organisations should operate” (Henry & Lee, 2004, p. 30). GTF has been created to monitor and assess the governance practice of the Olympic IFs through providing a standardised scoring system on IFs’ governance practice. The growing concern of good governance is also evidenced in the European Commission’s official communication (European Commission, 2011) stating in its acknowledgement of the social role of. 38.

(47) sports that the autonomy of the sports organisation is only granted and earned on the basis of a set of good governance principles being upheld. An overview of the development of the internal legal framework can be observed from the results of the ASOIF-run IF Governance Assessment (ASOIF, 2018b). Indicator 6.7 from the Assessment, “(non-sporting) decisions made can be challenged through internal appeal mechanisms on the basis of clear rules”, has an average score of 2.7 across ASOIF’s 28 full members. The score of 1 indicates ‘some opportunity for internal appeals’, 2 indicates ‘internal appeals policy in place’, 3 indicates ‘internal appeals policy in place, evidence of implementation’, and a score of 4 indicates ‘state of the art appeals policy, evidence of implementation, full decisions published’ (ASOIF, 2018b, p. 22). Although full details about the distribution of scores per IF is not published, it would be fair to say that on average the IFs have an internal appeals policy in place, but do not show significant evidence of implementation. Chappelet (2017) argues that to the value and integrity preserving efforts of the IFs within the movement of pursuing good governance reinforcing the wider international legal framework is particularly important. At the particular period of time of this research it is expected that a good amount of empirical evidence regarding the dissemination of good governance principles to the NFs’ domestic practices as part of IFs’ own efforts of pursuing better governance. 39.