自由主義外交政策的試驗──英國對柏林條約的推行，1880-1881

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(1)臺大歷史學報第35期 2005 年 6 月，頁 235~282. BIBLID1012-8514(2005)35p.235-282 2 0 0 5 . 3 . 7 收稿， 2 0 0 5 . 5 . 1 9通過刊登. From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking: The Gladstone Government and the Execution of the Berlin Treaty, 1880-1881 Wang, Shih-tsung. *. Abstract This research expounds the Liberal Party’s attitude and policy towards the Treaty of Berlin, thereby revealing the conflict and reconciliation between classical liberalism and modern imperialism. In a broad sense, this thesis deals with the Liberal Party’s criticisms of the Disraeli Government’s Eastern policy since the Berlin Congress of 1878 and the Liberals’ standpoints towards the Turkish question from the end of the Russo-Turkish War (1878) till the fulfillment of the Berlin Treaty by 1882. Specifically, it treats of the Liberal Government’s policy in executing the Treaty of Berlin from the start of Gladstone’s second ministry to the end of 1881, when the territorial arrangements of the Treaty had mostly been disposed of. The paper is divided into five sections: 1. Introduction: The Eastern Question and the Liberal Party by 1880; 2. The Proposition of a Liberal Solution to the Turkish Question: the Gladstone Government’s Policy towards the Execution of the Berlin Treaty; 3. Legality, Justice and Power: the Montenegrin and Greek Questions; 4. Moral Influence or Imperial Command: the Liberal Policy on Turkish Reforms and the Cyprus Question; 5. Conclusion: Ideas and Practices in the Liberals’ Eastern Policy. In general, they explain the way the Liberals contributed – however differently from the Conservatives – to the expansion of the British Empire, and, paradoxically, to the overthrow of classical liberalism in the meantime.. Keywords: Liberal Party, Treaty of Berlin, Gladstone, Granville, Turkey, Eastern Question.. * Professor, Department of History, National Taiwan University..

(2) 236. Wang, Shih-tsung. I. Introduction: The Eastern Question and the Liberal Party by 1880 II. The Proposition of a Liberal Solution to the Turkish Question: the Gladstone Government’s Policy towards the Execution of the Berlin Treaty III. Legality, Justice and Power: the Montenegrin and Greek Questions IV. Moral Influence or Imperial Command: the Liberal Policy on Turkish Reforms and the Cyprus Question V. Conclusion: Ideas and Practices in the Liberals’ Eastern Policy. I. Introduction: The Eastern Question and the Liberal Party by 1880 The word “imperialism” was invented by certain liberal-minded observers in England to stamp Disraeli’s foreign policy with popular 1 reprobation. But this invention turned to be a two-edged sword, and the weapon wounded the hand that wielded it. When the Liberal Party saw its way clear to winning the general election of 1880, a suspicion was engendered, which seriously injured the Liberal cause, that liberalism was in some way an antithesis to imperialism, and, therefore, prejudiced against the “Greater” Britain. It cost the Liberal leaders, particularly Lord Hartington (the Liberal leader in the House of Commons) and his associates, great pains to eradicate this popular belief, as imperial enterprises and competitions had become keenly active since the Berlin Congress in 1878. While Gladstone (opinion leader of the Liberals) proposed admirably his liberal programme on foreign affairs, Hartington pledged himself, in the name of the party he headed, “to uphold the power of the Empire, secure the safety of our own country, and maintain its. 1 The Times, 11 March 1880, “The Opposition and the General Election,” 11b..

(3) From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking. 237. 2. possessions.” Although he declared at the same time that the Liberal Party would engage in no policy of disturbance or uncalled-for annexation, but the Conservatives would also give the same assurance with as much sincerity. Indeed, there was no material difference between Hartington’s description of the future policy of the Liberal Government in foreign affairs 3 and Northcote’s vindication of Conservative policy in the past. The foreign policy of the Liberal Party around 1880 was actually that of Gladstone, at first in theory and then in practice. The Liberal Party’s foreign policy had been taking shape in their attacks on Disraelian imperialism and against the background of an intensifying scramble for the Ottoman Empire since 1876. As an opposition to conservatism, the Liberals followed Gladstonianism. In respect of foreign affairs, Lord Granville’s defence was generally not concise and direct, but it was quite as uncompromising as Gladstone’s. In the Liberal election campaign in March 1880 Granville (the Liberal leader in the House of Lords) declared assertively that the Liberal Party would in the future pursue a vigorous and firm policy in foreign affairs, and secure all the ends which the Disraeli Government had attempted to achieve overseas – by more appropriate measures and with greater practical success. W. E. Forster, one of the Liberal spokesmen, urged the same arguments in the meantime, and professed what some of his colleagues would have denounced not long ago as “imperialism.” This was the gist of nearly all the Liberal speeches of the day, which indicated that a new Liberal cabinet would be most resolute in carrying out the Berlin Treaty. It is interesting to compare them with the party discourse during 1877-1878, when non-intervention principle was 2 Ibid. Hartington said to his audience on 25 March 1880: “if the Liberal Party were in power……[they] would not stake the interests or the honour of England upon the maintenance of the integrity and independence of an unreformed Turkish government. They would not treat the condition of those people and the relations of the Turkish Government to its Christian subjects as a matter which was only of interest to Russia and to Turkey, and in which we had no call to interfere except so far as certain definite interests of our own were concerned.” Quoted in The Annual Register: A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad, 1880 (London: Longmans & Co., 1881), 53. 3 Lord Northcote was the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Disraeli Government and the Conservative leader in the House of Commons..

(4) 238. Wang, Shih-tsung. affirmed impregnably. After the Liberals’ victory in the election, much speculation arose as to who would be the new Prime Minister. On the resignation (21 April 1880) of Disraeli, Hartington and Granville were sent for by the Queen. Although Victoria wished to charge Hartington with forming a 4 government, he advised her to summon Gladstone, knowing that Gladstone would not accept any post in the government except premiership, and that no strong Liberal government could be formed without the support 5 of Gladstone. The Queen then asked, with great reluctance, Gladstone to form a government, and warned him that he would have to bear the 6 consequences of his previous sayings, to which he entirely assented. Granville, who was mostly in accordance with Gladstone on foreign affairs, became Foreign Secretary. The 1880 election, which was fought almost entirely on issues of foreign and colonial policy, proved to be a plebiscite in favour of Gladstone’s imperial thinking. The great victory of the Liberal Party made many, at home and abroad, believe a drastic change in British foreign policy would soon ensue. Germany was particularly troubled as she feared that the Berlin settlement 7 would be undone, and that, by a tolerance of Slav Propaganda in the Balkans, fresh outbreaks might be excited with Russia unfailingly making further attempts on the Straits. And the Germans’ fear was intensified 8 under the apprehension that Britain was jealous of Austria in the Balkans. The general opinion of the new British Government was that a liberal policy was being pursued in foreign affairs, not independently of the. 4 Victoria Journal, 22 April 1880, in G. E. Buckle, ed., The Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd Series, vol. III (London: John Murray, 1928), 80. 5 Granville, after a vain attempt to form a cabinet, declined the task as well. 6 British Library (BL), Add. MSS. 44764, f. 50, “Audience with the Queen,” 23 April 1880. 7 BL, Add. MSS. 44466, f. 242, Tenterden to Gladstone, 30 Oct. 1880. It was widely believed overseas, however, that Gladstone would soon resign office as a result of his stand on foreign affairs, and then scope would be given for the policy pursued at the Berlin Congress. 8 D. W. R. Bahlman, ed., The Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton 1880-1885 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972), vol. I, 15..

(5) From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking. 239. 9. English public, however. Before long, there was some confusion about whether this was really a new start for Britain in European politics. Writing to Granville in September 1878, Gladstone said, “Diplomacy is essentially irresponsible and I hold it to be the worst possible training for 10 responsible, and a fortiori for despotic government.” However, he tried to show that the moral duty of promoting “justice, humanity and freedom” was not incompatible with national interests in dealing with the Turkish 11 question. In less than two years, Gladstone returned to power to redress Disraeli’s jingoism in the East. While Gladstone’s second ministry was marked by a series of reversals of the Conservatives’ foreign policy, the execution of the unfulfilled provisions of the Berlin Treaty by means of the Concert of Europe was recognized by some historians as his only 12 achievement in diplomacy. However, sensible of the expediency of maintaining the continuity of foreign policy, the Liberals were quick to seek for a ground of action common to both of the British political parties in dealing with the Berlin Treaty. As such, the Liberal Party had built up a reputation for itself in the power politics of Europe, but by so doing it tragically debased itself as an effective critic of imperialism.. 9 Stephen Gwynn and G. M. Tuckwell, eds., The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke (London: John Murray, 1917), vol. I, 320. 10 Public Record Office (PRO), PRO30/29/29A, Gladstone to Granville, 17 Sept. 1878. 11 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 3rd Series, vol. 237, “The Supplementary Estimate,” 4 Feb. 1878, Gladstone, 959. More than three years later, Gladstone still held to this ideal solution to the Eastern Question. He told his Midlothian constituents: “Beyond sea, in Europe, Asia and Africa, we have carefully and constantly striven to fulfil the expectations I may have led you to entertain. And although all the clouds have not yet disappeared, I am thankful to say that the horizon has been greatly cleared and a progress made in the sense of liberty, justice and humanity, at least as great as in a time so limited it would have been reasonable to expect.” Gladstone to J. Cowan, 30 May 1881 (read to the annual general meeting of the Midlothian Liberal Association), in H. C. G. Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, vol. X (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1990), 73. 12 Harold Temperley and L. M. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902) (London: Frank Cass, 1966), 390..

(6) 240. Wang, Shih-tsung. II. The Proposition of a Liberal Solution to the Turkish Question: the Gladstone Government’s Policy towards the Execution of the Berlin Treaty The Liberals generally approved the spirit of the Berlin Treaty when it was being under consideration, while at the same time they understood that it would be difficult for anyone in power to carry out an agreement that would transform the policy of maintaining the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Particularly, the indecisive and purposeless 13 Anglo-Turkish Convention, a by-product of the Berlin Treaty, was condemned by the Opposition to be nothing more than an embarrassment to the future ministry. But overall, the Liberal Party had no doubt that Britain was bound to observe and promote the Berlin Treaty at the sacrifice of the Paris Treaty of 1856. Although the Liberal leaders – with the exception of Hartington – vehemently denounced the Berlin Treaty as impracticable when they were in opposition, the impression was not correct that the Liberals would not insist upon the performance of its stipulations if they came into power. As a matter of fact, the problem of the Berlin Treaty was the first region in which the new government gave evidence of a distinctive 14 policy. The nomination itself of Granville as Foreign Secretary was rightly seen by experienced English diplomats as a guarantee for the order 15 of things established by the Berlin Treaty. And before long, Granville wrote to assure Victoria and the Powers that the Gladstone government, instead of destroying the Berlin Treaty, was determined to do their best to 16 carry its provisions. Gladstone agreed with Granville in treating it as an 13 The Anglo-Turkish convention was signed on 4 June 1878. By this treaty Britain engaged for the future to defend the Asiatic dominion of the Ottoman Empire “by force of arms,” in return for a promise by the Sultan to introduce all necessary reforms in Turkey, and for the assignment of Cyprus to be occupied by Britain. 14 The Annual Register: A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad, 1880, 62. 15 See Layard to White, 27 April 1880, quoted in H. S. Edwards, Sir William White, For Six Years Ambassador at Constantinople: His Life and Correspondence (London: John Murray, 1902), 199-200. 16 See Granville to the Queen, 1 May 1880, in G. E. Buckle, ed., The Letters of Queen Victoria,.

(7) From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking. 241. 17. instrument of international law. In reference to things that were not contemplated by the Berlin Treaty–such as the proposal for the joint occupation of Eastern Roumelia– the Liberals, certainly, felt free to form their own opinion and to canvass 18 and dispute the propriety of such a course of proceeding. And they meant to keep the freedom of diplomacy when they announced just before they came to power that they would not stake the interests or the honor of Britain upon the maintenance of the independence and integrity of an “unreformed” Turkish government. In fact, the Liberals claimed the right of interference in “the relations of the Turkish government to its Christian 19 subjects.” Obviously, the Eastern Question would soon of necessity be reopened and the Liberal Party would try for a solution following the 1880 election, which they were about to win. However, soon after the Liberal government was formed, the Liberals found themselves trapped in political practicalities. Hartington, now the Secretary for India, spoke much of the difficulty and embarrassment confronting the British Government in Europe, Asia and Africa. Leading Liberals started to warn the electors not to expect too much from the new government. Joseph Chamberlain, the President of the Board of Trade, for instance, cautioned his Radical followers against expecting that a government representing all shades of liberalism would move as far as the most advanced section desired. It was curious, as contemporary commentators observed, that the first duty of the Gladstone government 2nd Series, vol. III, 93; PRO, PRO30/29/37, Granville to the Queen, 19 Sept. 1880; and FO424/97/364, Granville to Layard, 30 April 1880 (an identic circular to all the Powers concerned). Also cf. PRO30/29/22A/7, Granville’s Draft Speech Urging the Fulfilment of the Treaty of Berlin, March 1880 (?). 17 Gladstone to Granville, 19 Sept. 1880, quoted in Agatha Ramm, William Ewart Gladstone (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1989), 82. Also cf. Hansard, 3rd Series, vol. 252, “Address in Answer to Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech,” 20 May 1880, Gladstone, 137. 18 See Hansard, 3rd Series, vol. 243, “Business of Parliament – Ministerial Statement,” 13 Feb. 1879, Hartington, 1109. 19 Hartington’s speech on 25 March 1880, quoted in The Annual Register: A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad, 1880, 53..

(8) 242. Wang, Shih-tsung. should be to allay the immense excitement and enthusiasm that the Liberals had raised to bring them into power. The prudent determination of the new government did not surprise the country, though it disappointed many enthusiastic supporters of the Liberal cause who believed a new impulse would suddenly be given to the course of affairs. In respect of the Berlin Treaty, the Liberal government allowed itself to drift for a while as it realized that what the Conservative government had left behind were the portions most difficult of execution or in principle more open to question. Hesitant to reopen the Eastern Question, the Foreign Secretary warned Lord Odo Russell, the British Ambassador to Berlin, in early May 1880 that Turkey, if pushed too hard by the Powers, “might crumble in our 20 hands.” The idea of a liberal policy on foreign affairs was still in doubt. Until 1882 foreign affairs drew little attention of the country, and the Liberals had reason to congratulate themselves on being able to carry out almost unchecked the programme they had laid down for themselves. The discussion on foreign affairs occupied a very small portion of time in Parliament during the first sessions after the Liberals’ assumption of office, though the development of Gladstone’s policy in the East was closely watched. Parliamentary challenges to the ministers were sporadic and unauthoritative. Seeing that in the effort to fulfil the Berlin Treaty the government should enlist a universal support of the British public, the Opposition leaders on the whole adopted a becoming attitude in this respect. In reviewing the government’s position in early 1881, Disraeli touched but lightly on its foreign policy, contenting himself with the observation that the Berlin Treaty, however unsettled, secured the peace of Europe. Even Queen Victoria and the press spoke in defence of the government in the 21 undetermined state of affairs. Thanks to ordinary patriotic feeling the 20 Edmond Fitzmaurice, The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower, Second Earl Granville (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1905), vol. II, 199. 21 In the Queen’s Speech to the Houses in 1880 she said: “Unfortunate delays had taken place in the settlement of the Eastern Question, but for the attainment of the objects in view the government continued to place reliance on the fact that the Concert of Europe had been steadily maintained in regard to the Eastern Question.” Quoted in The Annual Register: A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad, 1880, 105. The Times on 12 May 1880 also.

(9) From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking. 243. Liberal government was free from fierce challenges in the subject, but in practice it could not take actions individually or independently since the main point of its methodology in regard of the Eastern Question was the maintenance of the concerted action of Europe. After the Berlin Congress of 1878 some progress had been made by international arrangements on the execution of its resolutions (esp. those affecting Austria and Russia), but many of the most important of the agreements still remained unfulfilled. During the two years after the signature of the Berlin Treaty nearly all the points had been settled which did not materially rely on Turkish co-operation for their fulfilment; but where the settlement of affairs depended chiefly on the action of the Porte 22 only a few things had been done. The rectification of the frontiers of Turkey, Montenegro and Roumelia had to a great extent been accomplished, but hardly any progress in the settlement of the relations between Turkey and Greece had been achieved. After Granville’s accession to office the questions of Greek territory (Art. 24) and Armenian reforms (Art. 61) – their solution had already been strongly urged on the Porte by the former 23 Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury – were taken up with increased vigour. The Liberals were without doubt desirous of realizing the Berlin resolutions, but the difficulties facing them accumulated with time. Protests from British holders of Turkish bonds affected by the execution of certain stipulations of the treaty were a testament to their dedication and the 24 difficulties. showed much consideration for the government’s position: “We were only just beginning in earnest the most difficult and complicated of all the problems for which the Berlin Treaty provided a temporary solution. The task will need great patience, and too much must not be expected at the outset from our own Government.” (p. 11c) 22 For the articles (23 in number) which remained to be executed in whole or in part at the time when the Gladstone government came into office, see PRO, FO881/4126, Lord Tenterden’s Memorandum on the Present State of the Questions Arising under the Treaty of Berlin, 28 April 1880. 23 In Armenia, which Britain by the Anglo-Turkish convention had taken under her protection, anarchy and famine produced a condition of chronic revolt, causing much concern among the Radicals. 24 See British Parliamentary Papers 1880, vol. LXXXII, Turkey no. 20 (1880), [C.2709], Mr..

(10) 244. Wang, Shih-tsung. Like many treaties, the Berlin Treaty and the Anglo-Turkish Convention were couched in terms so vague that differences arose on the interpretation of the clauses. In this case the complication was even more delicate because the articles were understood differently by the several European Powers and Turkey, and because no statement had been made herein that the Treaty of San Stefano between Russia and Turkey, which the Berlin Treaty was supposed to replace, was abrogated. Failure to execute the Berlin Treaty would possibly induce Russia to revive the 25 previous pact – hence a danger to Europe and especially to Turkey. Thus, as Granville pointed out, as regarded Russia and Turkey there was “no 26 advantage in prematurely declaring it to have failed.” Soon after the Liberals took office an announcement was made that caused quite a stir in London. It was stated that Sir Austen Henry Layard, the British Ambassador to Turkey, had received leave of absence from his post at Constantinople – not recalled – and that his place was to be taken by Mr. George Joachim Goschen (First Viscount Goschen, 1831-1907) as 27 Special Ambassador. The meaning of this change was widely discussed, because it was not usual to remove an ambassador on the change of the home government, and because the difference between a “special 28 ambassador” and an ordinary one was subtle. The Powers had already. 25. 26 27. 28. Guedalla to Granville, 15 July 1880, Inclosure: “Memorial from Turkish Bondholders,” 306-308. Indeed, it was believed that another definitive treaty between Russia and Turkey on the basis of that of San Stefano had since been proposed by Russia, which would confirm some of the previous provisions most objectionable to Britain. See “England in the Levant,” The Edinburgh Review, vol. 148, no.304 (Oct. 1878), 591. Granville to Dufferin, 5 May 1880 (private), quoted in Harold Temperley and L. M. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902), 397. In fact, the first candidate considered was Lord Carlingford. See BL, Add. MSS. 44172, f.29, Granville to Gladstone, 29 April 1880; and PRO, PRO30/29/29A, Gladstone to Granville, 2 May 1880. Gladstone told the House of Commons, which was very restive as to the “two ambassadors,” that “a special ambassador carries with him no powers other than those which attach to an ordinary ambassador.” But he was mindful of the distinction between them when he reminded his Foreign Secretary that the “extraordinary” might finally carry the ordinary in.

(11) From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking. 245. been startled by the change of English administration, and the recall of Layard seemed to confirm their fear that the Gladstone government would not be faithful to the international engagements entered into by its 29 predecessor. More so because Goschen, a financial specialist, was understood to fully share the views of the Liberal Party on foreign affairs, although he differed from them on domestic matters. Anyway, the appointment was gratifying evidence that the Liberal government intended to deal energetically with Turkish affairs: it was, as a matter of fact, decreed “in order to mark the sense which Her Majesty’s Government [entertained] of the gravity of the situation,” indicating that the time for 30 mere warnings had passed. Indeed, Layard was replaced because his influence at Constantinople, after a train of unsuccessful remonstrations, had already worn out. On the other hand, Layard was recalled because the Liberals saw that he, and Disraeli, had made the Concert of Europe more 31 difficult. Controversy and suspicion over the change of ambassadorship was partly allayed by an announcement in the Daily News of 7 May 1880 that Granville was about to issue a circular note to the Powers inviting their co-operation in securing the execution of the unfulfilled conditions of the Berlin Treaty. The first action the Liberal government took to enforce the Berlin. its train without leaving any liberty of choice. See Hansard, 3rd Series, vol. 252, “Address in Answer to Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech,” 20 May 1880, Gladstone, 138; and PRO, PRO30/29/29A, Gladstone to Granville, 2 May 1880. Goschen’s expenses at Constantinople came to a very large sum within a few months (almost twice as much as usual), causing great concern. See BL, Add. MSS. 44149, f.14, Dilke to Gladstone, 20 Sept. 1880. 29 Such was Victoria’s worry. She said to Granville: “It would be most unwise to change Sir Austen Layard immediately. It should be postponed, at any rate, till Europe is reassured that the new government does not intend to upset the foreign policy of the late government, and to act in accordance with Russia’s views.” Queen Victoria to Granville, 1 May 1880, in G. E. Buckle, ed., The Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd Series, vol. III, 94. 30 PRO, FO78/3074, Granville to Goschen, 18 May 1880; and PRO30/29/143, Opinions of the Cabinet on the Last Paragraph of Instructions to Mr. Goschen, 14 May 1880. 31 Forster to Dr. Washburn, 1 May 1880, in T. W. Reid, Life of the Right Honourable William Edward Forster (London: Chapman & Hall, 1888), vol. II, 232..

(12) 246. Wang, Shih-tsung. Treaty was to invite the other Powers to concert measures for obtaining its fulfilment. It was, however, doubted whether this action was in agreement with the Liberal pre-election pledges. Some considered it to be a new departure; some worried about the consequences of reopening the Eastern Question in this way. The Liberals were criticized by the Opposition for inconsistencies in their argument over the Berlin Treaty and their haste to press for its execution. But the Opposition attacks were neither vigorous nor damaging, and the government was able to methodically proceed with its leaders’ programme as planned. On 14 May Gladstone informed Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in London, of his position on Turkish affairs. He repudiated the view that the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire was a British interest and the basis of British policy in the East: the suzerainty of the Sultan was to be supported as long as it was useful and conducive to the peace of Europe. Also repudiated was the idea that Britain, after the take-over of Cyprus, coveted another territorial acquisition in Asia Minor or beyond. What the British government wished to see, Gladstone emphasized, were the reestablishment of a Turkish parliament, autonomous constitutions for the provinces, and financial 32 reforms of the Porte. In general, the Concert of Europe was the Liberal approach and solution to the Eastern Question. It was the keynote of Gladstone’s Midlothian campaign speeches concerning foreign affairs, and of his accusation of impotence against the Conservatives in dealing with the Ottoman Empire. Gladstone introduced the idea of a moral coercion of Turkey by the European Concert in his Edinburgh speech on 25 November 33 1879, and his constant contention in active opposition during the Disraeli ministry was that this unanimous diplomatic action was to be secured by 32 BL, Add. MSS. 56445, f.95, Gladstone to Granville, 13 May 1880; and ibid., Gladstone’s memorandum, 14 May 1880. Granville concurred with the Prime Minister in this matter, but he doubted whether the Turkish Ambassador would report it. See Add. MSS. 44172, f.57, Granville to Gladstone, 13 May 1880. 33 See Gladstone’s Edinburgh speech on 25 Nov. 1879, in A. T. Bassett, ed., Gladstone’s Speeches (London: Methuen, 1916), 577; and W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe (London: The Athlone Press, 1956), 29, 35..

(13) From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking. 247. any English government that determined to engage in the task. As he knew well, mutual trust was lacking among the Powers, but he was confident that a “common accord” could (only) be “achieved under the guidance and 34 fostering care of England.” The task was thus boldly undertaken by Gladstone after he won the 1880 election. In his eyes it was the working of the European Concert for the purpose of justice, peace and liberty that was the greatest matter at issue. “That has always been the ideal of my life in 35 foreign policy,” he said. In effect, the promotion of concerted pressure on the Turks was probably the best way of performing Britain’s duty in the Eastern Question (esp. in Asia Minor) without involving herself in 36 dangerous and costly complications. While on the other hand, the European Powers also seemed inclined “to put on a show of concert” in order to strengthen their representations to Turkey. That, however, did not necessarily make it easier for the Liberal government to make a stand for its principles. “The question is,” as Granville pointed out, “if their representations fail, what is to be the next step. We do not shrink from doing what may be judicious, with the other Powers, but we are not 37 inclined for isolated and dual action.” Although Granville was not much more optimistic than his predecessor Lord Salisbury about the establishment and maintenance of the Concert of Europe, he held to it in order that all attempts at Turkish reforms should not prove abortive. The European Concert in this way served well the Liberal cause. 34 BL, Add. MSS. 44667, f.18, Gladstone’s note on the Concert of Europe, undated (March 1880?). 35 Gladstone to his wife, 10 Oct. 1880, in A. T. Bassett, ed., Gladstone to His Wife (London: Methuen, 1936), 232-233. 36 It was actually in order to resist more effectively Russia’s claim to the right of interference between the Sultan and his Christian subjects that Britain first sought, since the Crimean War, to organize the Concert of Europe on the basis of the necessity for a collective intervention of all the Powers. And so Granville took the European Concert to be the only instrument that well saved Turkey. See Valentine Chirol, “The Attitude of the Powers,” in Luigi Villari, ed., The Balkan Question: The Present Condition of the Balkans and of the European Responsibilities (London: John Murray, 1905), 233. 37 Granville to Dufferin, 5 May 1880, quoted in Harold Temperley and L. M. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy from Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902), 397..

(14) 248. Wang, Shih-tsung. 38. In his circular of 4 May 1880 to the British ambassadors in Europe, Granville invited the co-operation of the Powers for preventing any further delay in the execution of the Berlin Treaty, and he proposed that an identic and simultaneous note should be addressed by their representatives at Constantinople to ask the Porte to fulfil “forthwith” its obligations particularly in regard to Greece, Montenegro and Armenia. In order to secure cordiality of action among the Powers, Gladstone tendered a public apology for the language he had used about Austria in the course of his 39 election campaign; and by so doing he provoked a great deal of bitter comment. Gladstone’s letter to Count Karolyi, the Austrian ambassador in 40 London, was published on 10 May, but the diplomatic circumstances that led to this apology were not made known. It was very probable that Gladstone repeatedly denounced Austria on public occasions in the hope that without an Austrian ally Britain would not make war on Russia freely. Yet, the majority of the Liberal leaders did not have sympathy with that 41 point of view. It appeared from Granville’s subsequent explanation in Parliament that Gladstone, seeing that his hostile observations were still resented in Austria, had expressed himself anxious to withdraw them so as 38 See PRO, FO65/1076; also cf. Cab37/1/15, Draft of Despatch from Lord Granville to Her Majesty’s Representatives at Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome and St. Petersburg, 4 May 1880. 39 See “Speech in the Waverley Market, Edinburgh,” 29 Nov. 1879, in W. E. Gladstone, Midlothian Speeches, 1879 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1971, originally published 1879), 162; for Gladstone’s denunciation of Austria at Edinburgh on 17 March 1880, see The Times, 18 March 1880, 11b; and The Times, 13 April 1880, 9f, Gladstone’s answer to the special correspondent of the Vienna Allgemeine Zeitung. 40 See H. C. G. Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries, vol. IX, 514-515. For exchange of notes between Gladstone and Karolyi, see BL, Add. MSS. 44544, f.2; and G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1899-1914, vol. IX: The Balkan Wars (London: HMSO, 1933), 773-774. 41 See Richard Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question, 1875-1878 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1979), 392. Also cf. Cranbrook’s diary on 9 Feb. 1878, in A. E. Gathorne-Hardy, ed., Gathorne Hardy, First Earl of Cranbrook: A Memoir (London: Longman, Green & Co., 1910), vol. II, 51. Granville, for example, complained to Hartington: “Gladstone was quite wrong in his attacks upon Austria; it was in opposition to what we agreed ought to be our line with respect to Austria.” See Granville to Hartington, 5 April 1880, quoted in Edmond Fitzmaurice, The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower, Second Earl Granville, 203..

(15) 249. From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking 42. to clear the way for co-operations on Turkish affairs. Thereupon, much to Gladstone’s relief, the Austrian ambassador assured him that the policy of Austria was not to go beyond the Berlin Treaty. In the explicit public assurances from Austria on her policy in the Balkans, Gladstone had 43 received in advance an equivalent for his apology. It now appeared that Austria could no longer rely on British support to resist Russia, and that, with Anglo-Russian tension eased, the construction of a European Concert 44 became promising for the first time since 1856. In the Queen’s speech read to Parliament on 20 May, the fulfilment of the Berlin Treaty was spoken of as a national object to be attained in concert with the other Powers. In the debate on the Queen’s address the Liberal government optimistically expressed their Turkish policy in the light of the European Concert. It was recognized to be a new start in the Eastern Question and the only chance of preserving the position of Turkey, 45 which, both parties agreed, was convenient for the time being. The Liberal government announced after the declaration of the Goschen mission that Britain had so profound and vital an interest of her own – separate from the other Powers – in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire that it might always rely in the last resort on her support. On 1 June Granville informed Goschen that the Powers had accepted the British proposal of an identic and simultaneous note, and that a conference was to be held at Berlin to consider and determine by a majority on the proper line of frontier to be adopted between Turkey and Greece. The identic note of 11 June stated that the union of the signatory Powers’ efforts would be the. 42 Hansard, 3rd Series, vol. 252, “Austria – Mr. Gladstone’s Speech – The Correspondence,” 171-172. Some believed that this was actually an instance of Granville’s steering Victoria away from rejecting Gladstone as government conductor. See Andrew Lang, Life, Letters, and Diaries of Sir Stafford Northcote First Earl of Iddesleigh (London: William Blackwood, 1891), 249. 43 The Annual Register: A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad, 1880, 64. 44 For the change in Anglo-Russian relations after Gladstone’s accession to power and its impact upon the Dreikaiserbund, see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (London: Macmillan, 1966), 219. 45 BL, Add. MSS. 43570, f.25, Northbrook to Ripon, 21 May 1880..

(16) 250. Wang, Shih-tsung. best means of securing the objects of the Berlin Treaty. This message produced great consternation in Constantinople and its immediate consequence was a change of Turkish ministry. But the plausibility or effect of the European Concert was seriously doubted by all the non-Gladstonians. The Opposition press continuously denounced the Concert of Europe as a “hollow sham, and derided the attempt to fully execute the Berlin Treaty by such an instrument as a ‘pretentious farce.’” Disraeli had in reality made concert more difficult by the Anglo-Turkish Convention; and Lord Salisbury, the former Foreign Secretary, insisted on the uselessness of the Concert of Europe for diplomatic pressure. Indeed, the Berlin Treaty, unlike the Paris Treaty of 1856, did not ask for the joint action of the Powers in dealing with the Porte: every one of the Powers had a right to act separately upon the Treaty 46 of Berlin. Lord Argyll, the Privy Seal and one of the leading Liberals, admitted that the European Concert in Turkey was useless for its professed 47 purpose since what was every body’s business was nobody’s business. And Joseph Chamberlain, the President of the Board of Trade, was frankly opposed to the idea of concert. They and Selborne (Lord Chancellor), Kimberley (Colonial Secretary), Northbrook (First Lord of the Admiralty), Hartington (Secretary for India), and John Bright (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster) were all worried by the shaky state of the Concert of 48 Europe. Even the Prime Minister’s confidence was not unhesitating. He said to Granville in June 1880: “Four years ago, before the example of sham concert had been set at Constantinople, I think Turkey would have yielded in every case to a united voice. Now that it has imbibed the idea 49 that union is not real, I do not feel so confident.” Gladstone obviously 46 Russia proposed in July 1879 that a clause should be added to the Berlin Treaty binding the Powers to see to its fulfilment. That proposition in a modified form was finally supported by Germany and Austria, but it was opposed by the British government, who deprecated and doubted the possibility of united action. 47 Duchess of Argyll, ed., The Duke of Argyll: Autobiography and Memoirs (London: John Murray, 1906), vol. II, 329. 48 BL, Add. MSS. 44172, f.114, Granville to Gladstone, 19 Aug. 1880. 49 PRO, PRO30/29/123, Gladstone to Granville, 29 June 1880. A month later Gladstone wrote:.

(17) From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking. 251. preferred a concert of coercive action to that of moral persuasion, while Granville was well prepared to attend to British special interests in case the concert broke up. Together, they were careful to avoid individual arguments and action so long as the concert continued, and they defined the 50 Concert of Europe as a “joint yet not collective” movement. Since there was much fear of precipitating the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, it was hoped that the Powers would continue to act together. The Concert of Europe on the Montenegrin question was fine, but it actually broke down on the Greek frontier question. In October Gladstone and Granville began to differ on the policy in the East. The Prime Minister wanted to go on as the mandatory of Europe, while his Foreign Secretary wanted to take “the logical and defensible course of 51 washing our hands of the whole thing.” At that time Gladstone and Granville’s speech on the concert became lukewarm, but they denied that the European Concert had broken up and they continued to urge its use in 52 the complete execution of the Berlin Treaty. Considered as a principle of 53 “orderly succession,” the Concert of Europe remained the first precept of Gladstonianism on foreign affairs. As Sir Charles W. Dilke, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, saw it, the European Concert was the first real attempt in modern times to arrive at an understanding among the Powers as “a basis for political disarmament and for the adoption of a policy which would cease to ruin nations in time 54 of peace by perpetual preparations for war.” Nevertheless, the principle of the European Concert was not necessarily incompatible with use of force.. 50 51 52 53 54. “I am not one of those who build with strong confidence on the surrender of the Turk.” PRO, PRO30/29/123, Gladstone to Granville, 29 July 1880. PRO, PRO30/29/123, Gladstone to Granville, 26 July 1880. Granville to his Wife, 9 Oct. 1880, quoted in Edmond Fitzmaurice, The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower, Second Earl Granville, 223. See PRO, Cab37/4/88, Granville to Sir H. Elliot, 23 Nov. 1880; and FO45/401, Granville to Paget, 11 Nov. 1880. Hansard, 3rd Series, vol. 262, “The Anglo-Turkish Convention,” 24 June 1881, Gladstone, 1321. Winifred Taffs, Lord Odo Russell (London: Frederick Muller, 1938), 278..

(18) 252. Wang, Shih-tsung. When Parliament reopened in May 1880 the movers of the Queen’s Address in both Houses seemed to use words of coercion freely in respect of the Turkish question; and the government pointedly expressed its willingness to take “active measures” for the fulfilment of the Berlin Treaty. Even the pacifist-minded Gladstone did not declare that the government would in no circumstances have resort to force. Before the election Gladstone apparently did not contemplate using force: he was of the 55 opinion that a threat of force would be sufficient. But now he was prepared to pledge the honour of the country to military menaces – with every intention to carry them into execution. Among the Liberals, Goschen 56 in particular was keen to use pressure and force against Turkey, making himself very unwelcome at Constantinople. The government’s intention of using force to solve the Eastern Question was doubtless fueled by the Liberals’ anti-Turkish sentiments. Granville’s despatch to Goschen of 10 June 1880 was skillfully omitted in the second Blue Book issued by the Gladstone government on Asiatic reforms (Turkey no. 23 (1880) [C.2712]) after its words of bitter hostility to the Porte had caused much disturbance 57 to the Queen. During the Montenegrin confrontation Gladstone was ready to use force. And in as early as August the government was considering the possibility of occupying a base on the Turkish coast in preparation for 58 subduing Turkish revolts. Although the Liberals did not desire to create war, they manifestly wanted to force Turkey to accept their conditions while keeping the Concert of Europe in view.. 55 See Gladstone’s speech at Edinburgh on 25 Nov. 1879, in A. T. Bassett, ed., Gladstone’s Speeches, 575-577. 56 A. D. Elliot, The Life of George Joachim Goschen, First Viscount Goschen 1831-1907 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911), vol. I, 198. 57 See PRO, FO78/3074, Granville to Goschen, 10 June 1880; and Victoria to Granville, 10 June 1880, in G. E. Buckle, ed., The Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd Series, vol. III, 112-113. The former document was important in that it expressed the Gladstone government’s attitude to the Cyprus Convention and Britain’s new policy on Armenian reforms. For further discussion, see Harold Temperley and L. M. Penson, A Century of Diplomatic Blue Books, 1814-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 294-295. 58 PRO, PRO30/29/123, Gladstone to Granville, 20 Aug. 1880..

(19) From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking. 253. III. Legality, Justice and Power: the Montenegrin and Greek Questions The most urgent questions that the Liberal government found unsettled under the Berlin Treaty were the disputes on Montenegrin and Greek territories. These were the first things Gladstone tackled according to his premeditation on the Eastern Question. Gladstone had strong sympathy for Montenegro. “Myself a man of peace, I know of no wars which have been more truly glorious than the 59 wars of Montenegro,” Gladstone once said. In 1877, when the Balkan issue burned again, Gladstone published an article entitled “Montenegro,” in which he told the history of Montenegro and argued for its 60 nation-building. During the Congress of Berlin he fervently supported 61 the territorial claim of Montenegro. After Gladstone came to power his government acted together with Austria on the Montenegrin question “in 62 the most cordial and straightforward manner.” At the end of June 1880 Britain and the Powers proposed to Turkey to draw the AlbanianMontenegrin frontier so as to give Montenegro the port of Dulcigno. After the Porte rejected it, an interview took place between Gladstone, Granville, Northbrook, and H. C. E. Childers (Secretary for War) at the Foreign Office as to the means of coercing Turkey. The Prime Minister insisted that the Montenegrin question should be dealt with in advance of the Greek question. Hence the naval demonstration at Dulcigno on the Albanian 63 coast. 59 BL, Add. MSS. 44544, f.101, Gladstone to Spicidion Gopcevic, 29, Nov. 1880. In 1879 Gladstone made arrangements for one of his sons (i.e. Herbert) to visit Montenegro in 1880. The journey had never been undertaken. But, “in any case, I have a desire to send to Montenegro some small memorial of the real interest I have felt in its welfare,” he said. BL, Add. MSS. 44544, f.101, Gladstone to Spicidion Gopcevic, 19 April 1881. 60 The Nineteenth Century, vol. I, no. 3, W. E. Gladstone, “Montenegro: A Sketch,” May 1877, 360-379. 61 The Nineteenth Century, vol. III, no. 14, W. E. Gladstone, “Liberty in the East and West,” June 1878, 1174. 62 PRO, FO7/986, Granville to Elliot, 27 Sept. 1880. 63 BL, Add. MSS. 43924, f.13, Dilke’s diary on 30 June 1880. In the meeting the War Office.

(20) 254. Wang, Shih-tsung. The Gladstone government believed that a military demonstration would dash the Turks’ hope that they could rely upon Europe abstaining from using force to carry out the treaty demands, and that it would greatly 64 assist the negotiations for a peaceful solution of the Greek difficulty. With the resources of diplomacy exhausted, the settlement of the Montenegrin question was now considered by the Liberals to be the best stepping-stone to enforcing the decisions of the Berlin Congress. At the invitation of Britain the Powers began to enter upon a policy of “moral coercion.” On 3 July Granville proposed to Austria to send ships and marines to enable Montenegro to seize Dulcigno, currently occupied by the Albanians. The proposal was accepted by Austria and was then communicated to and supported by the other Powers. Therefore, a collective note drawn up by the ambassadors at Constantinople in the sense of Granville’s communication to Karolyi was presented to the Porte on 3 65 August. Arrangements were soon after made for organizing a joint naval demonstration off the Albanian coast – each Power represented by some ironclads from its fleet – on the understanding that no troops were to be landed. It was so because technically Britain was strongly opposed to any operations on shore unless she had to take the Dardanelles. In order still further to guard against the danger of drifting into war, a protocol was signed by each of the Powers at the instance of Britain, in which everyone pledged itself not to seek any territorial acquisitions, exclusive influence or commercial advantages for its subjects as a consequence of the. proposed to place an army corps in Greece, and Dilke suggested the cheaper plan of a naval occupation of Smyrna and the control of customs and dues. The latter’s ideas were taken up by Gladstone, only to be put into practice after the cession of territory to Montenegro. 64 PRO, FO27/2422, Granville to Lyons, 12 July 1880. 65 See Kenneth Bourne and D. C. Watt, eds., British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part I, Series B, vol. V: The Ottoman Empire in the Aftermath of the Berlin Settlement, 1878-1883 (Maryland: University Publications of America, 1984), 52, “Collective Note respecting the Montenegrin Frontier,” 3 Aug. 1880; and PRO, FO421/36/290, Inclosure: “Collective Note addressed to the Porte,” 3 Aug. 1880..

(21) From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking. 255. 66. demonstration. The fleet finally assembled at Gravosa in mid-September under the command of the English Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour. It was now revealed that the naval demonstration aimed not only to effect the surrender of Dulcigno, but also to settle the questions of the Greek borders, Armenian reforms, the interests of the Turkish bondholders, and the Russian indemnity. The Liberals had some difficulty in defending their action of sending in arms. One of the objects of the naval demonstration was to show the union of the Powers, another was undoubtedly coercion of the Porte. The movements of the Mediterranean fleet had been so deliberately arranged by the War Office as well as Foreign Office as to avoid giving an impression 67 that Britain intended to act alone. But, just how far coercion was to be carried was an important question the government could not answer precisely. The failure of the naval demonstration to extort any concession from Turkey, as had been expected, soon became apparent, and public curiosity was excited to discover what would be the next act on the part of the Powers. The Concert of Europe became what Gladstone called a farce, as Germany, Austria and France showed that they would not resort to violence. This defection only made the Gladstone government more determined to overcome the obduracy of the Turks by force. It was carefully considered in what way coercion could be applied effectually with the smallest risk to peace, and for a week nothing was known for certain. Rumour had it that the British government was proposing to the other Powers to make another demonstration before Constantinople itself. 66 See PRO, FO78/3103, Draft of Self-Denying Protocol, 11 Sept. 1880; and Edward Hertslet, ed., The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. IV: 1875-1891 (London: HMSO, 1891), 2994, “Self-Denying Protocol respecting the Montenegrin and Greek Boundary Questions,” signed 21 Sept. 1880. Granville himself did not believe in the self-denying agreement, but he supported it as an expression to the right-mindedness of his government. See PRO, FO7/986, Granville’s note, 29 July 1880. 67 See PRO, PRO30/29/137, Northbrook to Granville, 8 July 1880, Inclosure: “Memorandum on the Naval Demonstration.” Northbrook’s letter expressed surprise at Lord Tenterdan’s (Under Secretary at FO) memorandum of 7 July contemplating a separate action. See also PRO, Cab37/3/53, Draft of Instructions to the Admiral in Command of the Mediterranean Sea, 8 Sept. 1880..

(22) 256. Wang, Shih-tsung. Indeed, the idea of staging a demonstration at Turkey’s capital appealed much to the Cabinet as the most efficacious means, who relinquished it for 68 fear of the likely “grave consequences.” The answer that finally came out was a threat to occupy Smyrna. The Liberals satisfied themselves that the occupation of Smyrna – a port that received regularly a great amount of customs duty for the Porte – was “entirely and even easily practicable and 69 no new provisions of force were required.” Gladstone was very stern about Montenegro: he showed remarkable firmness in the pursuit of this policy. During the half year before the end of 1880 Gladstone was the motivating force in foreign policy, and “it fell to 70 Granville to restrain the impetuosity of the Prime Minister at some point.” At the end of September 1880 Gladstone actually gave orders for using force to bring down the Turks. He wrote to Granville on 27 September: “The Montenegrins are the mandatories of Europe. Should not the Porte be told that we so regard them and warn it in grave terms demanding an immediate reply. Unless the reply be favourable the two Turkish ships of war ought to be sunk or seized… As the concert abroad takes so much time 71 the home concert should take as little as possible.” In another letter of the same day Gladstone said to Granville: “If a Turkish soldier [crosses] the Montenegrin frontier, it is a casus belli.” In Granville’s view, only when Turkey effectively opposed the execution of the Berlin Treaty by force 72 could Britain claim it a casus belli. To subjugate the Turks, the Prime Minister was prepared to summon all British subjects to quit the service of the Porte, to offer Albania its independence, to reinforce the Mediterranean fleet, to occupy the Dulcigno district, and to hold regiments at Malta in. 68 PRO, FO424/103/26, Granville to Russell, 1 Oct. 1880; and BL, Add. MSS. 44104, f.213, Argyll to Gladstone, 3 Oct. 1880. 69 See BL, Add. MSS. 44776, f.145, Gladstone’s memorandum of proceedings in 1880 with relation to the unfulfilled covenants of the Treaty of Berlin, 8 April 1895. Also cf. John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone (London: Macmillan, 1903), vol. III, 8-9. 70 W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe, 138. 71 PRO, PRO30/29/123, Gladstone to Granville, 27 Sept. 1880. 72 PRO, FO424/103/26, Granville to Russell, 1 Oct. 1880..

(23) 257. From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking 73. readiness for the same purpose. While holding back these measures, Gladstone tried to impose the whole responsibility on the Sultan, as distinct from the Porte, to “bring him to reason.” This method worked. On 28 September Goschen reported to Granville an offer from the Sultan of an unconditional settlement of the Montenegrin question by 3 74 October. After accepting that, Gladstone proposed to his cabinet that “material means” should be applied to obtain from Turkey the immediate settlement of the question of the Montenegrin frontier, if moral means fell short. In order to prevent reopening the Eastern Question generally, Gladstone contemplated a local action at Dulcigno for it would not inflict a sweeping shock on the Ottoman Empire. Yet, without the concurrence of Austria a successful operation on the Albanian coast was not possible. The cabinet was not disposed to go beyond the European Concert and strongly 75 repudiated the idea of the sole action of England; it then decided instead to collect the fleet at Malta for the seizure of Smyrna. Although there was still no sign of practical divergence in the government, Gladstone at this point was apparently not in agreement with his colleagues on the concert principle. He said: “If we can arrange for an active concert of at least three of the Powers, together with the approval or acquiescence of the rest, we ought to prepare for proceeding, either locally or otherwise, with the limited object at present of fulfilling the Treaty of Berlin on the 76 Montenegrin frontier.” The idea of power politics was here indicated, 73 BL, Add. MSS. 44764, f.103, Gladstone’s memorandum, 27 Sept. 1880. 74 PRO, FO78/3095, Goschen to Granville, 28 Sept. 1880; also cf. Cab41/14/24, Gladstone to Victoria, 30 Sept. 1880. 75 The cabinet did not think that Britain should undertake action in concert with Russia or with any single power in the case of the Montenegrin frontier the Liberals desired especially the cooperation of Austria. See PRO, Cab41/14/24, Gladstone to Victoria, 30 Sept. 1880; Hamilton diary on 30 Sept. 1880, in D. W. R. Bahlman, ed., The Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton 1880-1885, vol. I, 60; and John Bright, The Diaries of John Bright (London: Cassell, 1930), 449. 76 PRO, PRO30/29/123, Gladstone’s memorandum (after cabinet meeting), 30 Sept. 1880. The Prime Minister continued, “Should there be further contumacy it might be right to consider how far the settlement of the Greek frontier should be combined in the same arrangement.” During the Montenegrin “crisis” Gladstone received little assistance from the front bench;.

(24) 258. Wang, Shih-tsung. though not meant. It was really the first sign of the failure of classical liberalism in international affairs. At this juncture Granville was with Gladstone in his fight to secure Turkey’s surrender. On 1 October Granville proposed to Austria that, if the 77 naval demonstration failed, the Powers should go beyond local action. At the same time, the ironclads of the Mediterranean fleet, other than those in the naval demonstration, were ordered to Malta. The British force was now capable of forcing the Dardanelles and reaching Constantinople within a few days. But the fear of precipitating the dissolution of the Turkish Empire was so great that the Powers still tried to act together. The Concert of Europe for the time being became an obstacle to the Gladstonians’ mission. On 4 October a note from the Porte was presented to the European Powers embodying the final resolutions of Turkey on the unfulfilled conditions of the Berlin Treaty. It produced a strong sense of revulsion at the Porte’s continued procrastination. Thoroughly dissatisfied, the Gladstone government instantly despatched a circular telegramme to the Powers proposing use of force and the occupation of Smyrna. Although Britain resolved to coerce in concert with the other Powers, full concert was now out of the question. At this moment, the Liberal leaders decided that England should discharge herself of the responsibility and take 78 independent action if the Powers declined her proposal. “And so we may bid good-bye to the Turk if not with glory at least without dishonour,” said even Granville was a little startled at his proceedings, requesting him to leave out his “bag and baggage” theory. See BL, Add. MSS. 44790, f.111, Gladstone’s memorandum entitled “1879-94,” 11 July 1894. 77 PRO, FO7/987, Granville to Elliot, 1 Oct. 1880. On the same day, Granville became very gloomy because he thought Gladstone was inclined to give in to Turkey rather than resort to coercion. See Dilke’s memoir on 1 Oct. 1880, in Stephen Gwynn and G. M. Tuckwell, eds., The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, vol. I, 339. A week later, Granville wrote to the Prime Minister: “Bismarck asks why we do not go to Constantinople and settle the matter at once…… I am rather inclined to the rash or timid extreme.” See BL, Add. MSS. 44172, f.203, Granville to Gladstone, 9 Oct. 1880. 78 PRO, PRO30/29/130, Harcourt to Granville, 5 Oct. 1880; and ibid., Granville to Harcourt, 6 Oct. 1880..

(25) 259. From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking 79. William Harcourt, the Home Secretary. The Turkish note of 6 October declared that Turkey would not yield to any of European demands unless the naval operation was abandoned. Rumours then grew that the European Powers were inclined to accede to the British suggestions, including a partial blockade of the Turkish coast in the Aegean. And The Standard (wrongly) reported on 8 October that all the Powers had agreed to the 80 British proposal to seize the Aegean ports. It now became well known that the Liberal government held a very strong position in regard to the Eastern Question. Actually, it was prepared to ask the Austrian government to acknowledge that those Powers who were willing to execute the Berlin Treaty should be the mandatory of Europe, hoping that in this way the 81 The Gladstone government moral concert would be maintained. obviously did not see its way to back down. While it was doubted whether a Turkish war was imminent, the Porte suddenly gave signs of yielding. The change of Turkey’s position was due not to a threat of coercion from Europe, but to the knowledge that Britain had asked Europe to coerce. Apparently the Porte had heard of Britain’s proposal to the Powers, but not of their refusals. The Porte’s note of 11 October promised that the Sultan would issue immediate orders for the cession of Dulcigno, giving an immense relief to the tension of the public 82 mind concerning Eastern affairs. On 26 November 1880 a Turco79 Quoted in A. G. Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harcourt (London: Constable, 1923), vol. I, 378. 80 The Standard, 8 Oct. 1880, 5c; also cf. Agatha Ramm, ed., The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1876-1886 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962), vol. I, 195n. 81 BL, Add. MSS. 44544, f.71, Gladstone to Argyll, 9 Oct. 1880. The question for the cabinet to decide was whether under the circumstances England should act in conjunction with Russia (and Italy) as mandatories of Europe, or whether all action should be dropped. See Edward W. Hamilton’s diary on 11 Oct. 1880, in D. W. R. Bahlman, ed., The Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton 1880-1885, vol. I, 64. 82 On the next day, Turkey issued another note to the Powers stating that in order to give a new proof of its loyalty and good will, and with the object of averting the naval demonstration, it would at once give directions to the local authorities for the cession of the Dulcigno district to Montenegro “by pacific means.”.

(26) Wang, Shih-tsung. 260. 83. Montenegrin convention was signed, and the European fleet which had been assembled in the Adriatic dispersed on 5 December. Another phase of the Turkish difficulty was at an end, and the great crisis postponed. The stipulations of the Berlin Treaty were positive in the case of Montenegro; as to Greece the conditions were less definite, but still they 84 implied more or less a cession of territory by Turkey. Although the cession of Dulcigno was not actually contained in the Berlin Treaty, it evolved directly from that instrument. The demands on the Porte made by the Powers in behalf of Greece, however, were rather imperfectly recorded 85 in the treaty. These demands formed the basis of Salisbury’s correspondence in dealing with the Greek question, but his arguments and representations were not very effective. On the Greek question England alone was detached from any influence that would militate against her position in the East. Gladstone wrote in June 1879: “The entire nation is free to regard, and does regard, the Hellenic factor in the Eastern Question altogether apart from the idea that it can either derange the ‘balance of 86 power,’ or menace the Empire of the Queen.” On this issue the Gladstone government looked for moderation on the part of Greece as well as for a corresponding spirit of concession on the part of Turkey. While urging the completion of this rectification of frontier upon the Sultan “in the interests both of Turkey and Greece,” the British government did not desire that there should be any forcible annexation to Greece of so large a Muslim. 83 See “Convention between the Porte and Montenegro, relative to the Cession of Dulcigno,” 25 Nov. 1880, in Edward Hertslet, ed., The Map of Europe by Treaty, vol. IV: 1875-1891, 3010-3014. 84 The 24th Article of the Berlin Treaty states that if Turkey and Greece should fail to agree on the rectification of frontier indicated in the 13th Protocol, the signatory Powers reserve it to themselves to offer their mediation to the two parties, in order to facilitate the negotiations. 85 Northbrook once said: “If I am a Turkish statesman I should take my chance – I should give way upon the rubbishy Montenegrin frontier in which the Porte is clearly in the wrong, and resist the cessions to Greece upon which there is something to be said on the side of the Turk.” See BL, Add. MSS. 43570, f.113, Northbrook to Ripon, 27 Aug. 1880. 86 The Nineteenth Century, vol. V, no. 28, W. E. Gladstone, “Greece and the Treaty of Berlin,” June 1879, 1124..

(27) 261. From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking 87. population as to be a source of danger and conflict. Thus, in the dispute over Thessaly, even Gladstone “felt that justice required us to take the 88 Turkish side.” Obviously, in the case of the Greek frontier the Liberal government was not disposed to employ material pressure on the Porte. On 8 June 1880 the German government issued invitations for a conference on the Greek frontier question, to be held at Berlin on 16 June. The so-called second conference of Berlin, which in Disraeli’s belief was instigated by the Gladstone government with the object of modifying the resolutions of the original congress, assembled duly, with all the Powers 89 (Turkey and Greece excluded) represented. Granville clarified in the House of Lords that the conference was a proposal by France, not a device 90 of the British government; but he meanwhile admitted of a departure from the policy of the Berlin Congress. The Liberal government had actually suggested that an alternative proposal with regard to the Greek frontier should be presented to the Porte in an identic note, and that, if by the end of June no satisfactory reply came from Turkey, a conference should be assembled, either in Paris or in Berlin, to decide by a majority on the proper line of rectification. Clearly, Britain did not desire to take charge of the Greek question as a whole; she held that the initiative in this question should remain with the French government. A revised Greco-Turkish frontier that had been agreed upon by Britain and France was submitted in June for agreement to the conference of Berlin. The line of frontier proposed by the two Powers was more favourable to Greece than that suggested by the Congress of Berlin, and more in accordance with 87 PRO, FO78/3074, Granville to Goschen, 18 May 1880. 88 BL, Add. MSS. 44776, f.145, Gladstone’s memorandum of proceedings in 1880 with relation to the unfulfilled covenants of the Treaty of Berlin, 8 April 1895. 89 Lord Odo Russell, the British Ambassador at Berlin, was appointed as Britain’s representative. Russell’s instructions were in line with Goschen’s. See PRO, FO421/35/3, Granville to Russell, 9 June 1880. Russell stated British views in the first meeting of the conference. See FO78/3183, Russell to Granville, 16 June 1880. 90 In fact, the British government only suggested that Paris or Berlin would be a suitable place of meeting, and that there should be in the first instance a conference of the representatives of the mediating Powers. See PRO, FO27/2421, Granville to Lyons, 11 May 1880; and FO45/400, Granville to Paget (and all ambassadors), 11 May 1880..

(28) 262. Wang, Shih-tsung. the natural frontier of Greece, too. It was supported by Russia because “if the Berlin arrangements were disregarded in this instance it would become 91 more easy to relax or alter the other stipulations made by the Congress.” The conference terminated on 1 July after the Anglo-French proposition 92 was adopted. And the offer soon after the conference of the Porte for an exclusive Anglo-Turkish negotiation on the Greek frontier was turned down by the British government. On 15 July the collective note was 93 communicated to Turkey. The Greek question was really far more difficult than the Montenegrin question. Since the frontier decided upon at the Berlin conference was no part of the Berlin Treaty itself, the demand for it should be pressed on grounds that certainly went beyond that treaty. The Porte had legitimately announced, in advance, its rejection of the proposals of the Berlin conference on the Greek frontier. In consideration of the necessity of maintaining the Ottoman Empire as a security against disorder in the East, Britain could not choose to proceed with Greece infinitely. Immediately after the first meeting of the Berlin conference took place, Gladstone reminded Granville to “[introduce] at the proper time the question of a liberal price to be paid to Turkey” if the interpretation of the Berlin Treaty 94 should be in favour of Greece in material terms. That price, however, was never precisely asked or set. Of all the Powers Britain was the most 95 loyal to the decision of the Berlin conference. Granville was inclined to 91 PRO, FO424/99/403, Granville to Dufferin, 19 June 1880. 92 The result of the Berlin conference was to award to Greece a much larger proportion of territory than had been originally proposed by Lord Salisbury. See PRO, FO78/3183, Map Showing the New Frontier Proposed for Greece and Turkey, June 1880. For details of the negotiation, see FO88/4271, Memorandum by Mr. Currie on the Greek Frontier Question, 4 Aug. 1880. 93 For the seven protocols of the Berlin Conference for the rectification of the Greek frontier, see British Parliamentary Papers 1880, vol. LXXVIII, Greece no. 3 (1880), [C. 2633], 540-551, 568-571, 586-598. 94 PRO, PRO30/29/123, Memorandum by Gladstone for Granville, 18 June 1880. 95 Goschen said: “It proved impossible to secure for Greece all that she desired, but the struggle to uphold the decision of the Berlin Conference as far as possible in face of the more than lukewarmness of the remaining powers, was in the main to be conducted by the.

(29) From Party Spirit to Imperial Thinking. 263. resort to force to bring Turkey to reason, but the Prime Minister was not so sure. To dissipate the doubt entertained by most of the politicians who compared Thessaly with Dulcigno that a naval demonstration would never be made in support of the Greek claims, Granville and Dilke suggested that the concert might reasonably be expected to be called together for this purpose as well. Indeed, it was proposed, by Northbrook (the First Lord of the Admiralty) in particular, that the demonstration off the Albanian coast should be revived and extended to a campaign in regard of the Greek 96 frontier question. But, as Granville realized it, it was dangerous to announce a further demonstration till Dulcigno was actually handed over. After all, with all the other Powers just lukewarm, this idea was never realized. After the Montenegrin question was solved in mid-October 1880, the Greek question became more grave. For Britain, to take sole action now was Quixotic, and would require a new start. But it seemed to be the only option left. Indecisive, the Liberal government concealed from all the Powers and Turkey what policy Britain was to adopt, expecting that fear 97 would soon make the Turks succumb. It was so because Britain’s moral grounds as to the Greek question were not so strong as in the case of the Montenegrin frontier. “Is the Berlin interpretation of the Treaty line so indisputably just that we are to aim or to feel free to aim at pressing it as 98 we pressed the case of Montenegro?” Gladstone wrote. Granville made no definite proposal about Greece: he shared the Prime Minister’s doubt, in a different way though. “I was quite prepared to join others in advising. British government, and I was to be its instrument.” Quoted in A. D. Elliot, The Life of George Joachim Goschen, First Viscount Goschen 1831-1907, vol. I, 207-208. 96 PRO, FO65/1077, Draft of Letter to the Admiral in Command of the Mediterranean Station, 12 Aug. 1880; BL, Add. MSS. 44642, f.54, Gladstone’s Cabinet Note, 17 July 1880; and Add. MSS. 44172, f.114, Granville to Gladstone, 19 Aug. 1880. 97 Granville continued to tell the European governments that Britain desired to maintain the Concert of Europe because it was still so strongly the interest of all. Yet, the Powers’ view was that Britain had used up the European Concert for the Montenegrin matter. See BL, Add. MSS. 43878, f.176, Dilke to Granville, 17 Oct. 1880. 98 PRO, PRO30/29/123, Gladstone to Granville, 13 Oct. 1880..

(30) 264. Wang, Shih-tsung. prudence and moderation [to Greece],” the Foreign Secretary said, “but then I desired to know on what basis that advice was to be given. Was it that Europe abandoned, or maintained, the decisions of Berlin? If the latter, what grounds of encouragement could I with truth offer that, by remaining 99 quiet, Greece would obtain her object?” To some Liberals who wanted their government to take up a more neutral non-intervening position, the 100 Sultan’s obstinacy afforded Britain a not discreditable means of escape. Anyway, the Liberal government now had the least idea of acting in Greece as the mandatory of Europe. And Goschen became very anxious to return home after he had noticed a decided change of tone in Granville’s attitude, which allowed no further application of material pressure on the Porte. The Greek question became a burning issue towards the end of 1880. In early December a large meeting, presided over by the Scottish Liberal leader Lord Rosebery, was held to urge upon the government the duty of supporting the Greek claims. Meanwhile Goschen wrote at length his views on the Greek situation, arguing that, from a European point of view, the union of Greece and Albania would be greatly advantageous as a counterbalance to pan-Slavism. The Prime Minister was so impressed that he considered whether, by way of solving the Greek question, Crete and even Cyprus might not be handed over to Greece in lieu of Thessaly. But, since he and his cabinet did not wish to violate the Berlin settlement and go to war with Greece against Turkey, the British government still asserted in moderate language its liberty of action so as to “retain power of doing 101 good.” When the French government proposed on 18 December that the mediation of the Powers should be converted into arbitration, Gladstone immediately approved. Granville consented later. He said to Gladstone: “I am glad that the French should have made this move about arbitration. We. 99 PRO, Cab37/4/88, Granville to Sir H. Elliot, 23 Nov. 1880. Cf. the draft by Granville in FO7/987. 100 See Hamilton diary on 11 Oct. 1880, in D. W. R. Bahlman, ed., The Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton 1880-1885, vol. I, 65; and BL, Add. MSS. 43570, f.192, Northbrook to Ripon, 13 Nov. 1880. 101 PRO, PRO30/29/37, Granville to Victoria, 9 Dec. 1880..