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行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫成果報告
漢語佛教哲學的真理與方法
計畫類別：■個別型計畫 □整合型計畫
計畫編號：
NSC 96-2411-H-004-016-MY3執行期間： 96 年 8 月 1 日至 99 年 10 月 31 日
執行機構及系所：國立政治大學哲學系
計畫主持人： 林鎮國
共同主持人：
計畫參與人員：劉夏泱、李秋奉、鄭雅倩、王又瑩
成果報告類型(依經費核定清單規定繳交)： ■完整報告
本計畫除繳交成果報告外，另須繳交以下出國心得報告：
■赴國外出差或研習心得報告
□赴大陸地區出差或研習心得報告
■出席國際學術會議心得報告
□國際合作研究計畫國外研究報告
處理方式：
除列管計畫及下列情形者外，得立即公開查詢
□涉及專利或其他智慧財產權，□一年□二年後可
公開查詢
中 華 民 國 100 年 1 月 27 日
2 目錄 一、 中、英文摘要及關鍵詞 二、報告內容 （1）本研究計畫之背景、目的、重要性 （2）國內外有關本計畫之研究情況、重要參考文獻之評述 （3）研究方法、進行步驟及執行進度。 （4） 研究成果
1. “Phenomenology of Awakening in Zhiyi's Tientai Philosophy” 2. 〈天台止觀與智的現象學〉
3. “Disclosing the Truth in the Methods of Buddhist Meditation: A
Proposal for the Future of Philosophy and Religion”
4. 〈真理與意識---從佛性論爭到朱陸異同的二種東亞哲學類型〉
3 (一)中、英文摘要及關鍵詞 (keywords)。 本研究計畫從比較研究的角度探討漢語佛教哲學，特別是天台宗智顗的哲學、華 嚴宗法藏的哲學和禪宗神會的哲學，如何處理「真理」和「方法」的關係。在傳 統中國佛教的說法，這是有關「教」「禪」關係的問題。「真理」的問題屬於「教」 的範圍，而「方法」的問題屬於「禪」的範圍。「教」「禪」關係一直是中國佛教 史上核心的問題。究竟是「從禪出教」呢？還是「禪不離教」呢？「禪教一致」？ 還是「教外別傳」？這些中國佛教長期關心的議題。若和印度佛教比而觀之，發 現漢傳佛教的特色是不再認為真理的證成是關鍵的問題，而是認為真理的開顯才 是核心的問題。印度佛教以真理的證成為首要關切，故重視因明與量論；中國佛 教以真理的開顯為終極關懷，基本上認為真理證成的工作早已為印度論師完成， 無需重複論證性工作。對於中國佛教來說，因明與量論不是開顯真理的必要方 法，取而代之的是實相的現象學式描述與詮釋。現象學式描述與詮釋成為中國佛 教的主要方法。不同於印度唯識學的「識的現象學」，漢傳佛教的理論特色是「智 的現象學」；前者可稱為「分別的現象學」，考察「識所緣唯識所現」的經驗，而 後者可稱為「無分別的現象學」，著重於描述覺悟的經驗。以智顗的天台哲學和 法藏的華嚴哲學來說，他們都試圖揭顯實相，其中華嚴著意於佛境界（海印三昧） 的圓融無礙，而天台則關注在三諦三觀下不斷九法界的佛境界。華嚴法藏如何從 唯真心的立場開顯圓融無礙的佛境界，天台智顗如何從「一念無明法性心」的立 場開展「一念三千」的境界，皆以其不同的觀法為基礎，如何從禪出教，從方法 到真理，這是本計畫所要回答的問題。 關鍵詞：天台宗、華嚴宗、真理、方法、現象學
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English Abstract:
This research project aims to explore the intrinsic relation between truth and method in Chinese Buddhism. In contrast to Indian Buddhism, which is inclined to justify truth claims with epistemic and logical argumentation, Chinese Buddhists tend to describe the truth with the phenomenological method. In this project, I will argue that the ontological truth in the Tientai and Huayen Schools should be existentially
disclosed in the methodical context. The method in Chinese Buddhism can be characterized as “phenomenology of insight (jñāna)”, while the method in Indian Buddhism, the Yogācāra School in particular, can be characterized as
“phenomenology of consciousness (vijñāna)”. The former is similar to Heidegger’s existential phenomenology, while the latter is in parallel to Husserlian
phenomenology. The only difference is that the truth in Chinese Buddhism can be seen with the enlightened eyes only. The project is aminly focused on Tientai Zhiyi
(538-597)’s method (concentration and contemplation) and truth (threefold truth).
Keywords: Chinese Buddhism, Truth, Method, Phenomenology, Tientai, Huayen, Chan
5 (二)報告內容 （1）本研究計畫之背景、目的、重要性 本研究計畫以「漢語佛教哲學的真理與方法問題」為題，乃為本人 2004-2007 年國科會計畫「大乘瑜伽行派與中觀學派之知識論爭論及其宗教性意涵的研究」 之延續性計畫。該 2004-2007 年計畫以大乘佛教瑜伽行派和中觀學派關於知識論 （量論）的不同哲學立場與彼此之間的交涉為重點。第一年以「初期大乘瑜伽行 派的知識論與邏輯－以《解深密經‧如來成所作事品》『四種道理』為考察線索」 為題，第二年以「陳那《集量論》量論研究」為題，第三年以「月稱《淨名句論》 批判陳那量論的研究」為題。就計畫進行至今的結論而言，發現印度大乘佛教（中 觀學派與唯識學派）的教義，如中觀學「緣起性空」或唯識學「唯識無境」之真 理宣稱，必須經過不同形式的證成程序。證成的方法，各家不同。大致上，瑜伽 行唯識學派採取因明（邏輯與知識論）的方法，而中觀學派（龍樹和月稱）則持 應成辯破（辯證）的方法。不論是因明或應成，其為真理宣稱的方法論基礎並無 二致。若有差別的話，則在於瑜伽行唯識學派的邏輯論證意識十分明確，因明操 作於止觀次第中的安排亦十分清楚，可以說是「方法」先於「真理」；中觀學則 不同，可以說是「真理」先於「方法」，或說是「存有論」先於「方法論」（可類 比於海德格和嘉達美的哲學詮釋學）。因此，若欲瞭解印度大乘佛教哲學而僅論 其形上學的部分，如「緣起性空」或「唯識無境」，未能抉擇其相應的方法論， 則往往淪於獨斷的教義學論述，無法瞭解其真正的哲學底蘊。 以印度大乘佛教為參照面，吾人發現中國漢傳大乘佛教哲學在「真理」與「方 法」關係的問題上有完全不同的處理態度。本研究計畫即擬從比較研究的角度探 討漢語佛教哲學，特別是天台宗哲學，如何處理「真理」和「方法」的關係。在 傳統中國佛教的說法，這是有關「教」「禪」關係的問題。「真理」的問題屬於「教」 的範圍，而「方法」的問題屬於「禪」的範圍。在中國佛教史上，「教」「禪」關 係一直是核心的問題。究竟是「從禪出教」呢？還是「禪不離教」呢？「禪教一 致」？還是「教外別傳」？這些中國佛教長期關心的議題，若和印度佛教比而觀 之，發現其特色是不再認為真理的證成是關鍵的問題，而是認為真理的開顯才是 核心的問題。印度佛教以真理的證成為首要關切，故重視因明與量論；中國佛教 以真理的實證為終極關懷，基本上認為真理證成的工作早已為印度論師完成，不 需要再度重複去做，因此不需要延續印度佛教的論證性工作。對於中國佛教來 說，因明與量論不是開顯真理的必要方法，取而代之的是實相的現象學式描述與 詮釋。現象學式描述與詮釋成為中國佛教的主要方法。 在這裡必須說明的是，我將佛教哲學的「真理」概念區分為「命題真理」
6 諦」或《解深密經》之「七真如」，皆以命題的形式陳述，而後者則指存在實相 的「離言法性」或「真如」。事實上，關於「真如」之語義，如 袴谷憲昭所提出， 一說是來自於形容詞 tatha(正確)的抽象名詞，義為「正確」；另說是是來自副詞 tathâ (如此，這樣) 的抽象名詞，義為「如此存在」。 袴谷憲昭稱前者為「論理主 義」的解釋，而後者為「事實主義」的解釋。全體佛教，包括瑜伽行派，都傾向 於事實主義的解釋。袴谷區分「真如」的兩種用法---邏輯知識論的用法和存有論 的用法，和上述「命題真理」和「存在真理」的區分若合符節（參見袴谷憲昭， 《唯識の解釋學－『解深密經』に読む》，頁 87）。當我們在前面說印度佛教強 調「命題真理」的證成，並不等同於說印度佛教不以「存在真理」的直觀為首要 關懷。事實上，如 袴谷憲昭所指出，全體佛教，不論是印度佛教或中國佛教，緣 起論或實相論，都傾向於以「存在真理」的實證為終極目標。差別的是，在印度 佛教，不論是中觀或唯識，都視「論證」（邏輯或辯證法）為世俗諦的必要，並 認為那是現觀法性的必要階梯。反觀中國佛教，「論證」（邏輯或辯證法）作為世 俗諦中的必要階梯則完全受到忽略。早期佛教邏輯和知識論典籍的傳譯，如《方 便心論》、《迴諍論》、《如實論》等，未曾受到應有的注意，即使後來玄奘傳譯陳 那的《因明正理門論》和商羯羅的《因明入正理論》，蔚為顯學，然不及三代而 絕。從哲學史來說，中國佛教（台、賢、禪、淨）在六、七世紀以後的發展，說 明了對於「存在真理」的體證興趣完全壓倒對於「命題真理」的論證興趣。 漢傳佛教主要關注的是有關實相的現象學式描述與詮釋，其中實相是真理， 而現象學式描述與詮釋是方法，真理唯有在現象學的還原與描述中始得以開顯。 這是本計畫的要點。為此，這裡有必要就我所理解的「佛教現象學」略作說明。 依胡賽爾，現象學本身就是方法，在反思個人的經驗時，首先將一般關於外在世 界存在的自然態度「懸擱」（epoché）起來，接著描述由「能思」-「所思」的意 識結構所呈現的經驗。現象學並不關心吾人所經驗到的世界是否為外在世界，因 為該形上預設的世界存在已經被懸擱起來。現象學關心的是世界如何呈現在吾人 的經驗中。描述是此階段的工作，其目的在於消除各種理論性的預設，讓所描述 的事物如實呈現於生活世界中，而非作為科學世界中的對象。生活世界中的事物 都是意識的所思項，不離於意識的意向性。這就是「事物本身」。（Herbert Spiegelberg 曾經將現象學的方法操作列為七項，後四項為觀察現象在意識中的構 成、觀察顯現的方式、存在信念的懸擱、現象意義的詮釋）。 不過，若比觀於佛教哲學，上述的現象學方法乃屬於「識的現象學」，不同 於漢傳佛教之為「智的現象學」；前者可稱為「分別的現象學」，考察「識所緣唯 識所現」的經驗，而後者可稱為「無分別的現象學」，著重於描述覺悟的經驗。 關於「識的現象學」，學界多集中在唯識學的現象學解釋，如早期的耿寧（Iso Kern） （論唯識學四分說、唯識三世），到最近的張慶熊（胡賽爾與熊十力）、倪梁康（《八 識規矩頌》譯注）、吳汝鈞（《唯識現象學》）、司馬春英（《唯識思想 と現象學》）、
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Dan Lusthaus (Buddhist Phenomenology)、Plamen Gradinarov 等，多是從胡賽爾現
象學的角度重新詮釋唯識哲學。倪梁康明確的宣稱：「現象學是一門現代版的唯 識學」，二者皆認為「我們無法回答意識如何超出自己之外去切中和把握外部事 物的問題」，也都認為應該將關於外在世界的「形上學問題擱置起來，放棄超越 的設定，緊緊面對我們的意識本身，停留在意識的內在之中」（《新譯八識規矩 頌》，「導讀」，4）。這些研究對於本計畫所擬推進的漢傳佛教「智的現象學」研 究很有啟發性的幫助。 關於「智的現象學」，有待進一步的考察。現象學的發展分歧為胡賽爾的超 越現象學和海德格的實存現象學，前者奠基於「超越自我」（transcendental ego）， 後者則回到「在世存有」（being-in-the world）。超越現象學的立場近於華嚴的性 起說，而實存現象學的立場近於天台的性具說。以智顗的天台哲學和法藏的華嚴 哲學來說，他們都試圖揭顯實相，其中華嚴著意於佛境界（海印三昧）的圓融無 礙，而天台則關注在三諦三觀下不斷九法界的佛境界。華嚴法藏如何從唯真心的 立場開顯圓融無礙的佛境界，天台智顗如何從「一念無明法性心」的立場開展「一 念三千」的境界，皆以其不同的觀法為基礎，如何從禪出教，從方法到真理，這 是本計畫所要回答的問題。「智的現象學」特別關注「智」的分析，不論是「一 念心」或「唯心」的分析。至於禪宗，特別是神會，本計畫將特別著重保羅呂克 所強調的存有、文本與行動的關係，試圖從神會語錄發現詮釋學的殘餘，作為未 來教禪再度合流的伏筆。 （2）國內外有關本計畫之研究情況、重要參考文獻之評述 有關天台、華嚴、禪宗的研究文獻，可謂汗牛充棟，無法也沒有必要一一列 舉說明。本研究的方法上以牟宗三先生在其《佛性與般若》（上、下冊）對法藏、 智顗、神會思想的疏解為主要參照，釐清其判釋，進而指出牟氏的存有論詮釋固 然深有洞見，也有所不見。其所不見之處，本計畫將指出，主要是將實相的展示 從觀法中抽離出來，未能正視諸家的觀法對於真理開顯的重要性。如此，若僅論 其真理，而未能將「真理」置於「方法」的實踐程序中，其所展現的存有論真理 必流於抽象；相反地，唯有將實相論重新置入觀法實踐中，才能開顯真理的實義。 本計畫以「智的現象學」概括漢傳佛教的方法，即旨在於補充牟氏存有論詮釋的 不足處。因此，談到國內外有關本計畫之研究情況與重要參考文獻，必須先提到 牟宗三的《佛性與般若》，其論法藏華嚴思想見該書上冊第二部第六章「起信論 與華嚴宗」（頁 481-572），講述華嚴經大旨、真如不變隨緣、隨緣不變，海印三 昧與法界緣起，以及判教。牟氏論天台智顗思想，主要見於該書下冊第三部「天 台宗之性具圓教」第一分之四章。事實上，牟氏對於實相與止觀的關係十分清楚： 「止觀是行者主觀修行功夫，實相是止觀功夫所證顯之境，而實相境是就『一念 無明法性心即具十法界』而證顯者。無苦可捨，無集可斷，無道可修，無滅可證，
8 即是在『三道即三德』下，在『不斷斷』中證顯實相也…存有論的色（非色之色）、 如（非如之如）、所（非所之所）是由『一念心即具十法界』之存有論的圓具而 來。存有論的心、智、能（非心之心、非智之智、非能之能）是由圓頓止觀而來。」 （頁 753-754）唯牟氏多就存有論而說，而未細說如何從止觀修行到實相開顯的 過程。關於禪宗部分，見《佛性與般若》下冊「法登論天台宗之宗眼兼判禪宗」 一章的「判攝禪宗」一節（頁 1039-1070）。論及禪宗時，牟氏試圖判釋慧能和神 會何者較為契合佛教究極的立場，也就是「圓教」的立場。這涉及禪教是否可以 合說。一般多就禪宗發展的史實而言禪教合一，宗密就華嚴而言禪教合一，就是 典型的例子；牟氏則一反舊說，順著宋法登的《圓頓宗眼》依天台宗而言禪教合 一，認為慧能禪可契合於天台圓教，而神會禪則就其為華嚴禪教而屬別教。牟宗 三認為整個禪宗，包括慧能和神會，都肯定如來藏自性清淨心，屬於真常心系， 這一點和呂澂、印順的觀點沒有不同。不同的是，牟氏進一步抉擇如來藏三義： 一、即真如理以言如來藏，此為阿賴耶系統（世親）所說的理佛性；二、如來藏 即是自性清淨心，這是一般所說的真常心系所說的如來藏自性清淨心，此心性具 有實體義，也即此實體義的心性說「直指本心，見性成佛」；三、如來藏原有的 實體性格被打散，僅就實相而詭譎地使用「如來藏」概念，那就是天台圓教的如 來藏。以這三義來看，神會禪屬於第二義，其心性有實體性格，慧能禪則近於第 三義，其心性並不宜以實體視之。同樣地，牟氏這裡的興趣仍擺在存有論上，其 與止觀實踐的關係如何，仍待進一步細論補充。由於本計畫的哲學分析以牟宗三 的觀點為主要參照，故先說明如上。 （3）研究方法、進行步驟及執行進度。 本計畫的研究方法基本上是哲學的分析與詮釋，首先設定所擬研討的哲學問 題， 也就是漢傳佛教的「真理」與「方法」關係的問題，然後就研究對象（漢傳 佛學的天台、華嚴、禪）選取相關文獻，如天台智顗的《釋禪波羅蜜次第法 門》、《修行止觀坐禪法要》、《摩訶止觀》，華嚴法藏的《華嚴發菩提心章》、《華 嚴經探玄記》、《修華嚴奧旨妄盡還源觀》，和禪宗神會的《南陽和上頓教解脫 禪門直了性壇語》、《菩提達摩南宗定是非論》、《南陽和尚問答雜徵義》，作為 文獻解讀的所本，考察個別處理「真理」與「方法」關係的問題。在實際進 行的步驟上，則在上述的研究方法之外，必須額外進行現象學的研讀，特別 是就 E. Husserl, Ideas: a General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (Trans. By W. R. Boyce Gibson, 1963)進行細讀。該書是胡賽爾的成熟之作，為瞭解他 的現象學（特別是超驗現象學）最恰當的著作。另外也必須研讀其他有關現 象學與佛教哲學的比較研究，如上所述的倪梁康、吳汝鈞、司馬春英、Dan
9 Lusthaus、Plamen Gradinarov 諸人的研究。必須聲明的是，本研究進行漢傳 佛教哲學和現象學的會通，藉以開發新議題，推進佛教哲學和當代哲學的對 話，以生發出新的哲學意義，其目的並非是有關現象學的專家研究。現象學 的專家研究不是本研究的重心，而是作為漢傳佛教的比觀對象與詮釋資源。 （4）研究成果 本計畫的研究成果共發表四篇論文，其中三篇出版中：
5. Lin Chen-kuo, 2011 (forthcoming), “Phenomenology of Awakening in Zhiyi's Tientai Philosophy,” in Morny Joy, ed., After Appropriation: Explorations in
Intercultural Philosophy and Religion. Calgary, Canada: The University of Calgary
Press.
6. 〈天台止觀與智的現象學〉，發表於「第六屆南北哲學論壇」，香港中文大學
哲學系，2010年12月20-21日。
7. “Disclosing the Truth in the Methods of Buddhist Meditation: A
Proposal for the Future of Philosophy and Religion,” presented at the First German-Chinese Conference, “Philosophy AND Religion,” Freie Universität
Berlin, Berlin, Germany, 2010/7/19-22.
8. 〈真理與意識---從佛性論爭到朱陸異同的二種東亞哲學類型〉，發表於 「華人處境中的宗教研究」研討會，香港中文大學，1 月 21-23 日，2010。
9. “Truth and Mind in the Vijñaptimātra-Tathāgatagarbha Controversy: A Comparative Approach,” presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Montreal, Nov 7-10, 2009.
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Phenomenology of Awakening in Zhiyi's Tientai Philosophy
Chen-kuo Lin (National Chengchi University, [email protected])
“Buddhism can be paralleled only with the highest formations of the philosophical and religious spirit of our European culture. From now on it will be our destiny to blend that Indian way of thinking which is completely new for us, with the one which is for us is old, but which in this
confrontation becomes alive and strengthened.”1 —Edmund Husserl
I. Introduction
In this article I will explore the Buddhist phenomenology of awakening as exemplified in the philosophical writings of Zhiyi (538-597), the founder of the Tientai School of Buddhism. The phrase “phenomenology of awakening”was deliberately coined in contrast to “phenomenology of mundane experience.” In the Buddhist context, the former may be referred to as “phenomenology of insight” whereas the latter is classifiable as "phenomenology of consciousness.” In both forms of phenomenology, method is required for the disclosure of truth. However, there are different articulations of truth through different methods employed in different religious and philosophical systems. This article will be mainly concerned with how the truth of awakened experience is disclosed through the meditative method in the Buddhist phenomenology of Zhiyi.
Before delving into the discussion proper, I would first like to highlight several preliminary methodological notes. In complying with the formative ideas of this volume, which attempts to investigate the ways in which Western philosophy and religion can be rethought through non-Western categories, I would like to raise two questions. First, in what sense can Zhiyi’s Tientai philosophy be characterized as a form of phenomenology? Second, in what way can Husserlian phenomenology be further developed into a phenomenology of awakening as envisioned in the Buddhist tradition? For the first question, I would argue that Buddhist philosophy in general
1 Cited in Karl Schuhmann, “Husserl and Indian Thought,” in D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Lester Embree,
Jitendranath Mohanty, eds., Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), 26.
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can be characterized as phenomenological, and that Zhiyi’s philosophy is no exception. Viewing Buddhist philosophy in terms of phenomenology has been the trend in recent decades, and the compatibility of the Buddhist and Western ways of philosophizing has been brilliantly explored by several leading scholars, such as J. Mohanty, Iso Kern, Dan Lusthaus, Plamen Gradinarov, and Ni Liangkang. Most of them are interested in teasing out from Yogācāra Buddhism its phenomenological elements, such as the intentional structure of cognition. They insist that the mode of philosophizing needs to shift from metaphysics to epistemology, and then from epistemology to phenomenology. According to the phenomenological approach, both the object of cognition and the act of cognition are seen as two poles in the same structure of consciousness for the reason that consciousness is always conscious of both itself and something else. For both Husserl and Yogācāra, the structure of consciousness consists of three parts: in addition to the object and act of cognition, there also exists the self-awareness of consciousness. It is in the domain of
consciousness that all experience occurs, including the experience of “things themselves” in both the Buddhist and Husserlian senses. Things themselves should not be regarded as something separate from our conscious experience. Hence, all we need concern ourselves with is how things appear in our experience of consciousness, and what we should not concern ourselves with is metaphysical speculation. This is the phenomenological attitude shared by Zhiyi and Husserl.
And as we begin to appreciate the similar phenomenological trends in non-Western philosophies, including especially Buddhist philosophy, we should, however, be cautious not to fall into one-sided readings. To gloss over substantive differences in doing comparative philosophy will inevitably result in
miscategorizations, such as for example, picturing Mencius as Kant, or Zhuangzi as Heidegger. Taking hermeneutical directives from Ricoeur and Gadamer, I prefer to adopt the method of dialogical reading, hoping that the “other” can be brought into critical conversation. For this essay, therefore, I would like to see in Zhiyi’s
philosophy the possibility of a contribution to the mainstream of phenomenology. And here arises the second question: Is it possible for phenomenologists to learn anything new from Zhiyi’s Buddhist philosophy? What exactly can be added to the diversity of the phenomenological legacy from the canons of Buddhist philosophy?
In order to clearly address these questions, this study has been divided two sections. The first section will attempt to lay out the Buddhist distinction between mundane experience and awakened experience. The two forms of knowledge, mundane knowledge (vijñāna) and trans-mundane insight (prajñā) will be closely
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examined. For convenience, I use “knowledge” to mean “mundane knowledge” and “insight” to mean “trans-mundane knowledge.”2 In the second part, I will focus on Zhiyi’s soteriological phenomenology with special attention to the problems of truth, meditation, and insight.
II. Knowledge and Insight
A possible contribution to Husserlian phenomenology might be best found by way of exploring the Buddhist distinctions of enlightened experience and
non-enlightened experience. The former arises from the realization of
non-discriminative knowledge (nirvikalpa-jñāna), whereas the latter, mundane
experience, results from discriminative knowledge (vijñāna). Through this distinction, we see the inseparability of experience and knowledge.
But before fully fleshing out the distinctions in Buddhist theory, let us look into Husserl first, who was not completely ignorant of Buddhism as religion and
philosophy. In a book review written in 1925 for Karl Eugen Neumann’s German translation of the Suttapitaka, Husserl praised Buddhism as “a religiosity which looks purely inward in vision and deed—which, I should say, is not ‘transcendent’, but ‘transcendental’—enters the horizon of our religious and ethical as well as of our philosophical consciousness.”3 Although Husserl’s remark is very brief, it
nonetheless demonstrates that he did view Buddhist philosophy from the perspective of transcendental phenomenology. Here the term “transcendental” is used by Husserl to mean the attitude that is “directed itself to the life of consciousness—in which the ‘world’ is for us precisely that, the world which is present to us—we find ourselves in a new cognitive attitude [or situation],” whereas in the natural attitude “the world is for us the self-evidently existing universe of realities which are continuously before us in unquestioned givenness.”4
2 Since the term vijñāna has different usages depending upon context, it will not be translated
consistently throughout the article. I felt the best way to avoid confusion was to add the Sanskrit term after the translation, though it may appear somewhat awkward.
Husserl seemed quite excited to learn that this “transcendental” insight has long been seen as the guiding principle of Buddhist meditation, that is, the constitution of the world is taken as the object of consciousness
3 Karl Schuhmann, ibid., 25.
4 Edmund Husserl, “Phenomenology,” in Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston, eds., Husserl:
Shorter Works (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 27. Regarding the term
“transcendental” in Husserl’s usage, scholars have varying interpretations. Dan Zahavi insists that “the specific and unique transcendental-phenomenological question is: What are the conditions of
possibility for appearance as such?” See Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 54. According to D. W. Smith’s interpretation, the term applies to “pure consciousness in abstraction from its connection with natural or cultural objects or activities.” See D. W. Smith, Husserl (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 447.
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in meditative contemplation. Unlike the natural attitude in which the existence of the external world is uncritically assumed, in Buddhist meditation a practitioner is trained to withdraw from all metaphysical assumptions about the world and reside in solitude for sober contemplation. The practitioner believes that unless metaphysical
assumptions about the existence of world have been methodically “bracketed,” she will be unable to clearly discern the way that objects appear in consciousness. This mode of thinking may be properly regarded as a shift from “natural attitude” to “phenomenological attitude.”5
As mentioned above, the distinction between the enlightened experience and the non-enlightened experience is central to Buddhist philosophy. This distinction can be understood either in terms of ontology or of epistemology. As an ontological
distinction, it involves the notion of two realms of existence. In view of epistemology, however, the distinction is rather seen as two ways of knowing, i.e., enlightenment and ignorance. According to the Buddhist theory of two truths, these two aspects are inseparable. Methodologically speaking, we should proceed from epistemological analysis to ontological exposition, asking: How does our knowledge of the world become discriminated and concealed? Conversely, what are the conditions for the possibility of unconcealed or non-discriminated knowledge? The Buddhist answer can be found in the various analyses of cognition. Briefly, ignorance (concealment)
appears as the result of discriminated knowledge, whereas enlightenment (non-concealed knowledge) is realized by non-discriminated insight. Unless
fundamental transformation from the cognitive state of discriminated knowledge to the cognitive state of non-discriminated insight has been accomplished, salvific liberation remains impossible.
In the Abhidharmaśabhāsya of Vasubandhu, vijñāna and jñāna are taken as synonymous with cognition/knowledge. Vijñāna is defined as cognition relative to each object (viṣayaṃprativijñapti).6 It is also understood as upalabdhi (apprehension), which is etymologically derived from the root √labh, meaning “to seize, get
possession of, acquire, receive, obtain, or find.”7
5 In spite of the above “insight,” Husserl’s “oversight” can be seen in his characterization of Buddhism
as “transcendental [subjectivity],” a notion which would seem to contradict the Buddhist doctrinal position of no-self. Historically, the Husserlian notion of “transcendental subjectivity” has been more or less compatible with the Mahayana Buddhist doctrine of mind-only (citta-mātra) or
consciousness-only (vijñapti-mātra), though not of course with Early Buddhism.
In the usage of epistemology,
vijñāna (consciousness) refers to cognition which seizes something as its object
6 Abhidharmakośabhāsya of Vasubandhu, Chapter I: Dhātunirdeśa, ed., Yasunori Ejima (Tokyo: The
Sankibo Press, 1989), 17; Bhikkhu K L Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (Hong Kong: Center of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong, 2007), 293.
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(viṣaya) and makes it known to the one who cognizes. Accordingly, cognition never exists in itself; it must be the cognition of something. For instance,
visual-consciousness never exists without form as the visual object. By the same token, visual-consciousness also needs the visual faculty as the condition for its arising. However, knowledge cannot be explained by the function of sensory vijñāna only. It requires prajñā (understanding) in conjunction with sensory perception for the conditions of knowledge to obtain. In this respect, prajñā is defined as the
discernment/examination of objects.8 In contrast to the longstanding misconception of prajñā as “mystical wisdom,” interpreting it rather as the “source of true
knowledge” better coheres with the actual usage of the term in the literature. Instead of alluding to something mysterious, most Buddhist philosophers employ the notion of prajñā in the epistemological sense. Keeping this in mind, we should resist the tendency to mystify the notion of “insight” in Zhiyi’s philosophy.
Historically, the distinction between “insight/correct knowledge” (samyagjñāna) and “discriminated knowledge” (vijñāna) as two forms of knowledge seems to make its first appearance in Yogācārin literature. In the Yogācārabhūmi, “insight/correct knowledge” is defined as “intuitive knowledge of things themselves (tathatā)” in contrast to “discriminated knowledge” which is embedded in conceptualization and verbalization. Three kinds of insight are listed: (1) trans-mundane insight, (2) mundane insight, and (3) trans-in-mundane insight. The first refers to intuitive knowledge of the nonexistence of external objects. The second refers to abstract knowledge of things in themselves which is acquired through conceptual thinking (vikalpa). The third one refers to the trans-mundane knowledge which is realized within the context of the mundane.9 In the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, we find another account of three forms of insight (correct knowledge) similar to those
elaborated in Yogācārin literature. They are (1) insight of all phenomena (sarvajñatā), (2) insight of paths (margajñatā) and (3) insight of all modes of phenomena
(sarvākārajñatā).10
8
Cf., Bhikkhu Dhammajoti, Abhidharma Doctrine and Controversy on Perception (Sri Lanka: Center for Buddhist Studies, 2004), 18-19.
As we shall see below, this theory of threefold insight plays an
9 Yogācārabhūmi, T.30.696.a 10
In contrast to Abhidharma epistemology, prajñā and vijñāna are rather placed in opposition to each other in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. True knowledge (prajñā) is attainable only when one comes to realize that no knowledge is attainable. According to Prajñāpāramitā thought, just like magic, emptiness can be known through non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). In this regard, prajñā obtained through anupalabdhi (= nirvikalpa) is opposed to vijñāna, which is obtained through upalabdhi (=vikalpa). In other words, Prajñāpāramitā thinkers stand for “negative epistemology” instead of “positive epistemology.” The problem of “non-apprehension” or “negative cognition” was taken up again via the positive understanding by the later Buddhist philosophers such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The historical development of negative epistemology does not concern us at this stage. For anupalabdhi in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, see Edward Conze, “The Development of
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important role in Zhiyi’s philosophy.
The distinction between knowledge and insight was also further elaborated in the Yogācārin theory of the eightfold consciousness and fourfold insight. Briefly speaking, in Yogācāra’s transformative phenomenology, the eightfold consciousness (five
sensory consciousnesses, apperceptive-consciousness, ego-consciousness, and storehouse-consciousness) must be transformed into fourfold insight
(all-accomplishing insight, intellectual discerning insight, equality insight, and mirror insight).11 That is, the five sensory consciousnesses are transformed into
all-accomplishing insight, apperceptive-consciousness to intellectual discerning insight, self-consciousness to equality insight, and storehouse-consciousness to mirror insight. A brief outline of the theory of fourfold insight found in Xuanzang’s
Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi is provided below (T.31.56.a):12
(1) Mirror Insight (ādarśajñāna): “The mind associated with this insight is
dissociated from conceptual constructions (vikalpa). Its objects of cognition and their characteristics are too subtle and difficult to be discerned… It is pure and free of impurity… Like a great mirror, it reflects the images of all physical objects.”
(2) Equality Insight (samatājñāna): “The mind associated with this insight sees the nondiscrimination of all existents, including self and other sentient beings. It is always associated with great compassion…It is also the special support for intellectual discerning insight.”
(3) Intellectual Discerning Insight (pratyavekṣāṇājñāna): “The mind associated with this insight perfectly sees the particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the universal
(sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of existence. It functions without any hindrance.”
(4) All-accomplishing Insight (kṛtyānuṣthānajñāna): “The mind associated with this insight is capable of performing actions of body, speech, and thought for the benefits of all sentient beings.”
The above theory of insight in Yogācārin philosophy can be summarized as
2000), p. 127.
11 Louis de La Vallee Poussin, translated and annotated, Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: La Siddhi de
Hiuan-tsang ( Paris: Librarie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928), 685f; also cf., Maitreyanatha/
Aryāsaṇga, The Universal Vehicle Discourse Literature (Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra) (New York, NY: American Institute of Buddhist Studies, 2004), 98-101. For analysis of nirvikalpajñāna, see Leslie S Kawamura, “Nirvikalpa-jñāna: Awareness Freed from Discrimination,” in Koichi Shinohara and Gregory Schopen, eds., From Benares to Beijing: Essays on Buddhism and Chinese Religion (Oakville, Canada: Mosaic Press, 1991).
12 For Xuanzang’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, also see Wei Tat’s English translation: Hsuan Tsang, Ch’eng
Wei-Shih Lun: The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness, trans. by Wei Tat (Hong Kong: The Ch’eng
16
follows: Insight is freed from conceptual construction. Following the Abhidharma usage, the Yogācārin notion of insight refers to the cognitive function of
understanding (prajñā), which is always associated with various forms of cognition (vijñāna). The key factor responsible for the distinction between insight and
knowledge is conceptual construction (vikalpa) in association with cognition. Insight is freed from conceptual construction, whereas ordinary knowledge is embedded in conceptual construction. In most Buddhist texts, vijñāna and vikalpa are often taken as synonyms, with the latter being more appropriately understood as the “constitution of meaning” in the structure of noesis and noema. In addition to epistemic meaning,
vikalpa also connotes a sense of psychological attachment. For Buddhism, knowing
something is not merely a cognitive act. It is always associated with, or even
dominated by, various non-cognitive or ideological factors. This is the reason why the fundamental form of insight is referred to as “insight freed from
conceptual/ideological construction.” With insight one is capable of correctly cognizing the aspects of object: the particular and the universal. As Dignāga argues, these two aspects of the object are known by perception and inference respectively. Aside from this, there is nothing else one can know. According to Abhidharma, however, a yoga-practitioner is capable of directly perceiving the universal character of object.13 With insight one also cognizes the equality of all existents, i.e., the truth that all existents are equally empty of permanent essence.
There is another crucial issue left for further investigation. Is insight, which is said
to be freed from the act of conceptual construction, intentional? If the answer is
affirmative, what then is the intentional structure of insight? Can we find the same threefold intentional structure (noesis, noema, self-awareness) in insight? If insight has the same intentional structure of consciousness, then the difference between two forms of knowledge requires an explanation. Historically, this issue was debated in the Chinese Yogācāra School. Three theories were given in response to this issue in Xuanzang’s Siddhi (T.31.49.c-50.a): (1) Insight is void of the structure of noesis (the part of seeing) and noema (the part of the seen); (2) Insight is structured in noesis and noema; and (3) In insight noesis exists only, but not noema. The last theory, held by Dharmapāla and Xuanzang, was considered the orthodox view.14
13 See Bhikkhu K L Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (Hong Kong: Center of Buddhist Studies,
The University of Hong Kong, 2007), 358-360.
In regards to the debate, however, it should be noted that fundamental insight is generally characterized as being devoid of subject as the grasper (grāhaka) and object as the grasped (grāhya). The duality of subject as the grasper and object as the grasped is merely a mental
14
Shunkyo Katsumata, Bukkyo in okeru Shinshiki-setsu no Kenkyū (Tokyo, Sankibo, 1961), 172-184, 278-280.
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construction, which can be eliminated due to its being void of permanent essence. However, the noesis-noema structure in insight remains without change even if the duality of subject-object is eliminated.
In sum, the difference between mundane knowledge and insight rather lies in the function of objectivating act, i.e., cognitive construction (vikalpa).15 In mundane knowledge, noesis (the seeing) is objectivated as the subject-as-grasper and noema (the seen) is objectivated as the object-as-grasped. In contrast, the act of objectivation ceases to function in the enlightened experience while the structure of noesis and noema remains intact in regards to insight. This interpretation can be justified by the Yogācārin theory of the three natures (trisvabhāva), although it differs somewhat from the orthodox position held by Dharmapāla and Xuanzang. According to the theory of three natures, the duality of grasper and grasped belongs to discursive constructions (parikalpita) whereas the structure of consciousness is seen as the ground of
phenomena in dependent-arising (paratantra). This theory holds that it is discursive construction, instead of phenomena itself, that should be eliminated.
III. Zhiyi’s Phenomenology of Awakening
Let us now turn to Zhiyi. What is the enlightened experience disclosed in Zhiyi’s philosophy? What is Zhiyi’s conception of mind/consciousness? And what is Zhiyi’s response to Yogācāra and Mādhyamika? Before addressing these questions in detail, I would like to first point out that Zhiyi was more eager than his contemporaries to take on a phenomenological approach for disclosing the experience of “things themselves (Ch. shixiang, real phenomena).” However, he was discontented with Yogācāra’s epistemological approach and also rejected the metaphysical idealism prevalent in certain Chinese Yogācāra sects. As to the Mādhyamika approach, Zhiyi was largely sympathetic. Unlike Indian Mādhyamika thinkers, however, he was not interested in doing logical and epistemological justification for the “thesis” of emptiness. For Zhiyi, the most important issue was the direct realization of “things themselves” through meditation (cessation and contemplation). Zhiyi maintained that without the direct realization of “things themselves” in meditation, truth would remain abstract and
15 Iso Kern renders “dharsanabhāga” (the act of seeing) by “objectivating act” and “nimittabhāga” by
“objective phenomenon”. For Yogācāra, there are two levels of objectivation, one on the mental (paratantra) level, the other on the discursive (parikalpita) level. The latter is grounded in the former. Husserl himself takes “objectivation,” which is defined as “outward experience form” as the condition of objectivity of science. See Eugen Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1995), 104. For Kern’s interpretation, see Iso Kern, “The Structure of Consciousness According to Xuanzang,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 19, No. 3, Oct. 1988, 282-295.
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speculative, and thus completely useless for realizing enlightenment. As a devoted Buddhist practitioner, Zhiyi held meditation to be the only genuine path to awakening.
Mind and Worlds
Let us now examine Zhiyi’s theory of mind/consciousness, which he holds to be the first object of meditative contemplation. In contrast to Abhidharma and Yogācāra’s dualistic conceptions of mind in two aspects (deluded mind and enlightened mind), Zhiyi urges us to return to the experience of mind before the metaphysical
categorizations of mind as deluded and pure. For Zhiyi, the practical implication of the dualistic conception of mind is that a certain period of time is required for accomplishing the soteriological task of transformation from the deluded state of mind to the pure state of mind. Zhiyi clearly rejects metaphysical speculation about time, which, as he believes, will in the end take us nowhere. On the contrary, Zhiyi contends that the problem of time should be treated within the context of meditative practice. That is, time is pragmatically conceivable only in terms of the evolving process of consciousness in meditation. For both Zhiyi and Husserl, one should methodically bracket metaphysical assumptions about the existence of mind and world in order to make the experience of worlds-in-mind fully manifested. Just like Husserl, Zhiyi asks us to turn to “contemplation of mind (guanxin)” in which all worlds are manifested. Let us see how Zhiyi presented his phenomenological description of mind in the famous passage on “three thousand worlds in one-instant mind”16:
A single thought exists along with the ten realms. A single realm exists along
with the [other] ten realms, so there are one hundred realms. One realm exists
along with thirty types of worlds [i.e., each of the ten realms are included in each of the three types of worlds: the world of sentient beings, the worlds of the five skandhas, and the worlds of lands]; multiplied by one hundred realms. This results in the existence with three thousand types of worlds. These three thousand [worlds] exist along with a single momentary thought. If there is no mind, that is the end of the matter. If there is even an ephemeral mind, it exists with three thousand [realms]. [emphasis added]
In Paul Swanson’s translation, “one mind” is rendered as a “single thought” in order to “avoid the implication of a reified ‘mind’ as separate from mental functioning and
16
Zhiyi, Mohezhiguan, T.46.54.a. I adapt Paul Swanson’s English translation with some modifications. Swanson’s translation is available on-line at http://www.nanzan-u.ac.jp/~pswanson/index.html.
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‘objects’ that are experienced.”17 This clarification is quite helpful. However, I did take issue with his translation of ju as “include.” Instead, I render it as “exist along with,” indicating the simultaneous correlativity of mind (as intentional act) and worlds (as intentional objects). That is, whenever a single thought/mind arises, there
simultaneously arises the realm of objects to which it correlates. This description ties in with the classic insight of phenomenology which holds that mind is always
conscious of something as its intentional object. Hence, if we follow Swanson in translating the first sentence as “A single thought includes the ten dharma realms,” the interpretative results will be in opposition to Zhiyi’s own phenomenological intent.
How should we then interpret Zhiyi’s famous statement, “Three thousand worlds exist with a single momentary thought”? It would be pretty easy to understand this statement if Zhiyi had claimed that a single thought arises with a single world.
However, the theory of one-to-one correspondence between mind and world is subject to Zhiyi’s criticism because it contradicts the Buddhist teaching of emptiness. For there is nothing called “one single thought,” neither is there anything called “one single world.” Everything, including mind and world, exist inter-relatively and inter-penetratively without self-nature. Instead of being taken as an empirical description, Zhiyi’s fundamental maxim should be read as a description of “real phenomena” which have been realized through phenomenological reduction. In other words, this statement should be understood in view of insight, instead of in view of empirical knowledge. As a result of this phenomenological reduction, all phenomena are themselves shown as the objects inter-relatively constituted in the
non-objectivating consciousness.
Zhiyi continues to clarify what is and what is not the proper understanding of the relation between mind and worlds. It is important to note that for Zhiyi the
phenomenon of being-with cannot be explained by any form of metaphysics. Among various forms of metaphysics, Zhiyi rejects metaphysical idealism in particular, which includes the idealisms of both pure and deluded mind. In Zhiyi’s own words,
If all phenomena arise from a single moment of mind, this is a vertical
[relationship]; if a mind in one moment encompasses all phenomena, this is a horizontal [relationship]. But these are neither [merely] vertical nor [merely] horizontal. It is just that mind is all phenomena, and all phenomena are mind. Therefore [the relationship of mind and phenomena] is neither vertical nor horizontal; they are neither the same nor different. This is mysterious and subtle,
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profound in the extreme; it cannot be grasped conceptually, and cannot be verbalized. This is what is called [contemplating] “realms of experience as inconceivable.” [emphasis added]
Zhiyi concludes that the only alternative way for disclosing the meaning of being-with is the method of meditation, but not through any metaphysical speculation. For Zhiyi clearly rejects two forms of metaphysics, namely transcendental idealism (of pure mind) and empirical idealism (of deluded mind). The former is characterized by Zhiyi as the “vertical” way of thinking by which phenomena is explained as being
transcendentally grounded in the absolute (pure) mind, and the latter as the “horizontal” way of thinking which explains phenomena through epistemological analysis. Zhiyi argues that since both forms of metaphysics are rooted in
representational thinking, which is also called “conceivable thinking;” they are incapable of making real phenomena (things themselves) fully manifest. In this respect, we find that Zhiyi, Husserl, and Heidegger exploit similar lines of reasoning in formulating their rejection of metaphysics. For Zhiyi in particular, the truth of “real phenomena” is concealed within the conceivability of metaphysics.
Truth and Method
The motif of Zhiyi’s philosophy is the disclosure of the truth of real phenomena through meditation. Ontologically speaking, truth exists prior to method. Practically, truth needs to be disclosed through method. Thus, in the Buddhist tradition, truth can be realized only through the method of meditation. Though quite complicated, Zhiyi’s system of meditation can be divided into two paths: the gradual and the sudden. The sudden path of meditation is often considered the key to producing the experience of perfect and sudden awakening, while the gradual path is regarded as the preparatory step to the final goal of meditation, i.e., the aforementioned perfect and sudden awakening. However, some contend that the difference between the two paths is merely pedagogical, even if the end of Zhiyi’s own of philosophy conceived as the culmination of sudden awakening. Regarding this issue, I rather see in Zhiyi’s system of meditation the gradual path as the necessary training for the superior practice of perfect and sudden awakening.
In Zhiyi’s system, a practitioner aims to disclose the experience of awakening by taking threefold truth as the object of threefold contemplation. The fruit of practice is called “threefold insight.” Therefore, in regards to the architectonics of meditation, Zhiyi’s system consists of the structure of threefold truth, threefold contemplation,
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and threefold insight:18
(1) Threefold Truth: Truth can be viewed from three aspects, consisting of (i) the truth of emptiness, stated as “all phenomena are empty,” (ii) conventional truth, i.e., truth of discourse, and (iii) truth as the middle way, i.e., truth as the full disclosure through double negation of the two truths. In contrast to Mādhyamikan theory of truth, Zhiyi develops a dialectical hermeneutic to make phenomena fully disclosed in each aspect. That is, the enlightened experience will not disclose itself in the truth of emptiness and the conventional truth respectively; it must also be disclosed in the truth of the middle way. No aspect of truth should be separated from the other two aspects, because truth can never be exhausted from a single perspective. Truth shows itself only through the holistic and dialectical contemplation. According to this pattern of threefold truth, part and whole are dialectically interrelated and holistically
integrated, wherein the whole can be manifested only through the dynamic dialectics of the parts.19
(2) Threefold Meditation: For Zhiyi, the meditation of cessation and
contemplation is instrumental for the realization of truth. This is witnessed in Zhiyi’s magnum opus, Mohezhiguan (Great Calming and Contemplation). The method of meditation is further divided into threefold cessation and threefold contemplation with correspondence to threefold truth and threefold insight. However, it must be noted that this system of meditation does not function mechanically. That is, the first contemplation does not merely take the truth of emptiness as the object. By the same token, the second contemplation does not merely take the discursive truth as the object and the third contemplation does not take the middle way as the object. For Zhiyi, one should practice contemplation dialectically and dynamically. The first step is to enter into emptiness from the conventional, which will lead to an insight that reveals the conventionality of all phenomena, i.e., the emptiness. This methodic move is similar to Husserl’s shifting from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude. The second move is then a return to the conventional from emptiness through a reverse dialectic. Driven by salvific compassion, a practitioner takes this move to return to the mundane world (conventional world) from the state of emptiness, which results in skillful command of the knowledge of the mundane world. In comparison, the second move in Tientai dialectical meditation is rather similar to the call for
18 “Threefold truth refers to the object which is illuminated by the one instant mind. Threefold
contemplation refers to the act which is initiated by the one instant mind. Threefold insight refers to that which is accomplished by [threefold] contemplation.” See Mohezhiguan, T.46.55.c.
19 Zhiyi, Fahua Xuanyi, T.33.705.c; also cf., Paul Swanson, Foundations of T’ien-t’ai Philosophy: The
Flowering of the Two Truths Theory in Chinese Buddhism (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press,
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returning to the life-world in Husserl’s later writings. The third move is thus to realize that the previous two moves are merely provisional for the final realization of things themselves. When one arrives at this final stage, there will be attachment to neither the first truth nor the second. The practitioner will rather be illuminated by the three truths simultaneously. This final move is called the “contemplation of the middle way,” which manifests the highest form of insight, namely, the insight of all modes of phenomena.20
(3) Threefold Insight: According to the Prajñāpāramitāśāstra, the text from which Zhiyi’s theory of threefold insight is borrowed, (i) “insight of paths”
(margajñatā) refers to all kinds of mundane knowledge which are required for the fulfillment of religious goals, and (ii) “insight of all phenomena” (sarvajñatā), or “omniscience,” refers to the abstract truth of all phenomena gained by the elimination of ignorance, and (iii) “insight of all modes of phenomena” (sarvākārajñatā) refers to the concrete truth that is realized in all aspects of phenomena.21 The sequence of practice is stated as follows: Insofar as one has obtained the knowledge of the paths beforehand, one can be said to know the abstract truth of all phenomena. Next, one progresses to the concrete knowledge of all aspects of phenomena and then proceeds to cut off all habitual defilements in the final enlightenment.22
Thus, in view of the gradual path, the three forms of insight are taken as independent of one another. On the other hand, threefold insight can be attained within a single instant of mind via the sudden path. It is in a single instant mind that threefold truth arises simultaneously with threefold insight and threefold
contemplation. Now, how could all of these occur simultaneously? The answer to this conundrum is found in Zhiyi’s conception of mind. In addition to the intentionality of mind as being-with, a notion which we have already explained above, everyday mind is also characterized as both deluded and pure. Put it in Buddhist parlance, everyday mind has been in ignorance (avidyā) from the very beginning, which is equivalent to saying that mind is the function of mental construction (vikalpa). According to the Buddhist theory of emptiness, however, everything, including even ignorance, is empty in itself. Since ignorance is empty of itself, it follows that mind as ignorance is also empty of itself. Hence, mind should be conceived as both ignorance and
emptiness. As a consequence, if mind as ignorance is taken as the phenomenological ground of phenomena, mind as emptiness, i.e., prajñā, must also be taken as the
20 Zhiyi, Mohezhiguan, T.46.24.b.
21 Cf., Fa Qing, The Development of Prajñā in Buddhism: From Early Buddhism to the
Prajñāpāramitā System, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Calgary, 2001, 92-95.
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groundless ground of phenomena. Thus, in view of ignorance, mind functions in the act of objectivation, whereas in view of emptiness, mind is able to function as non-objectivating insight. Finally, in view of the middle way, mind is characterized
neither as ignorance nor as emptiness. It is characterized as “inconceivable” in the
sense that any form of metaphysics will fail to account for the dialectical paradox of mind. As the correlates of mind, all phenomena (the three thousand worlds) also manifest themselves as the inconceivable infinity of mutual penetration. This is the reason why Zhiyi always summarizes his system as “threefold truth within an instant mind,” “threefold contemplation within an instant mind,” and “threefold insight within an instant mind.”23
IV. Concluding Remarks
Summing up the above exegetical analysis in response to the questions raised at the beginning: (i) In what sense can Zhiyi’s Tientai philosophy be characterized as phenomenology of awakening? (ii) What can be added to the diversity of the phenomenological legacy when we bring Zhiyi into philosophical dialogue with Husserl? To begin with, Zhiyi and Husserl belong to different traditions. Zhiyi is religion-oriented, and all of his philosophizing is directed toward a soteriological goal. Husserl’s philosophical enterprise, on the other hand, is science-oriented, a fact
attested by his dream of establishing phenomenology as the most rigorous science. Although in his later years Husserl became more devoted to ethics and religion, he never considered his philosophical task as a path to spiritual liberation. In spite of the historical differences, however, we do see similarities in the two philosophical
systems. On the one hand, Husserl contends that truth consists in two aspects: truth as proposition and truth as evidence. The truth as proposition is based upon truth as evidence “where objects and states of affairs are given intuitively as they themselves are or as given in person.”24 On the other side, Zhiyi placed the theory of threefold truth within the methodical context of meditation. Truth manifests itself only in the mental experience of contemplation. Hence, Zhiyi’s famous dictum, “threefold truth in an instant mind,” might now be better understood in light of Husserl’s theory of “evidence as the experience of truth, i.e., as an intentional act in which the intended object is presented intuitively, though in different degrees of fulfillment.”25
In view of Zhiyi’s “classification of teachings,” on the other hand, Husserl’s
23 Zhiyi, Weimojing Xuanshu, T.38.524.c-529.b.
24 Dieter Lohmar, “Truth”, in Lester Embree, et al., Encyclopedia of Phenomenology (Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 708.
24
phenomenology belongs to the gradual path, whereas Zhiyi considered his own system as the perfect and sudden path which leads to a final realization of the truth of inter-relativity and inter-penetration of phenomena, i.e., the three thousand worlds in one single thought. At the final moment of awakening, one realizes that the world of the rich, the world of the poor, the world of humanity, the world of animals, the world of plants, the world of gods, and the world of ghosts are all interrelated to one other. And as far as any one world is manifested in the mind, all other worlds are also simultaneously manifested. As a result, the experience of awakening is never exclusionary. True awakening, which manifests the enlightened world, must be experienced along with all other worlds that have yet to be enlightened. True liberation must be experienced along with all other worlds that are still in suffering. This is the core spirit of Zhiyi’s phenomenology of awakening.
25 天台止觀與智的現象學 林鎮國 只有佛教能與歐洲文化中的哲學與宗教精神的最高形式 相比擬。從現在起，我們注定要融合全新的印度思考模 式，在這樣的交會下，我們舊的思維將更顯生氣蓬勃。26 —埃德蒙德．胡塞爾 導言 本文以天台智顗（538-597）的圓頓止觀為例探討佛教「智的現象學」的可 能內涵。「智的現象學」一詞乃用來區別以世俗經驗為考察對象的「識的現象學」。 在這兩種現象學中，真理需要藉由方法開顯，不同 的宗教與哲學系統也會以不同 的方法對真理提出不同的解讀。本文的目的即在於闡釋智顗如何在其天台現象學 中以獨特的禪修方法揭顯有關真理的覺悟經驗。 在進入正式的討論前，我想先提出一些初步的方法論說明。本文試圖藉由非 西方的範疇重新思考西方哲學與宗教的議題，提出兩個問題，第一、在何種情況 下智顗的天台哲學可以被視為智的現象學？第二、胡塞爾的現象學可以何種方式 進一步發展為在佛教哲學傳統所見的「智的現象學」？關於第一個問題，我將說 明一般佛教哲學皆可具有現象學性格，智顗的哲學也不例外。 從現象學的角度檢視佛教哲學在這幾年已成為趨勢，彼此的契合性也已經由
許多學者精闢地探討過，例如 J. Mohanty、Iso Kern、Dan Lusthaus、Plamen
Gradinarov、陳榮灼、吳汝鈞、倪梁康、司馬春英等人。他們大部分著眼於佛教 瑜伽行唯識哲學，爬梳其現象學的元素，特別是意識的意向性結構，指出認知的 對象與認知的行為是同一意識結構的兩端，因為意識總是同時覺知其自己與他 物。對於胡塞爾與瑜伽行者而言，意識的構成包含三個部份，除了認知對象（相 分）與認識行為（見分）外，還包含意識的自我覺知（自證分）。所有的經驗皆 在意識的活動中產生，包含佛教與胡塞爾所瞭解的「事物自身」的經驗；「事物 自身」不應被視為與我們的意識經驗分離之物，因此我們只須要關注事物如何在 我們的意識經驗中呈現，而非關注有關事物存在的形上學思辨，這樣的現象學態
26 引述自 Karl Schuhmann, “Husserl and Indian Thought,” in D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Lester
Embree, Jitendranath Mohanty, eds., Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), 26。本文原以英文 “Phenomenology of Awakening in Zhiyi's Tientai Philosophy” 發表於 2008 年在芝加哥舉行的美國宗教學會年會，由林恕安中 譯，再經本人潤飾而成。
26 度顯然為佛教與胡塞爾所共享。 然而，當我們開始在非西方的哲學傳統，特別是佛教哲學，看到類似的現象 學面向時，我們更應謹慎地不要落入片面的比附。在做比較哲學時，若掩蓋了實 質的不同，將不可避免地導致表面上的類比。本文不擬進行二種哲學系統的比 較，而希望以呂格爾與高達美的詮釋學進路，採取對話閱讀的方式，將他者帶入 批判性的對談中。因此本文想了解的是，智顗哲學對現象學主流的可能貢獻為 何？衍生的第二個問題則是，現象學家能否從智顗的佛教哲學中學習到新的事 物？佛教哲學到底有什麼可以增添現象學的多樣性？ 為了清楚地說明這些問題，此研究將分為兩部份，第一部分將試圖釐清在佛 教中世俗經驗與覺悟經驗的區別，檢視兩種意識的型態—識（vijñāna）與智 （jñāna/prajñā）。為了方便起見，我以「識」表示日常經驗的意識，並以「智」 表示覺悟經驗的意識。27在第二部份，我將著重闡釋智顗的解脫現象學 （soteriological phenomenology），尤其是在真理、禪修與智的問題上。 識與智 佛教哲學對胡塞爾現象學的可能貢獻也許可以在探索覺悟經驗與非覺悟經 驗之區別中找到。前者由無分別智（nirvikalpa-jñāna）的證得而產生，而後者， 也就是世俗經驗，則由分別識（vijñāna）所生；在這樣的區別中，我們必須了解 經驗與意識的不可分離。 在完整說明佛教理論中的區別前，讓我們先看看胡塞爾的理論。胡塞爾並非 完全不熟悉佛教的宗教哲學。他在1925 年曾對卡爾．尤金．紐曼（Karl Eugen Neumann）對《經藏》（Suttapitaka）的德譯寫過書評，讚揚佛教是：「一種如此 純粹內在視域與行為的宗教性，我應該說，它不是超絕的（transcendent），而是 超越的（transcendental），進入我們宗教、倫理與哲學意識的視野中。」28 雖然 胡塞爾的評論相當簡短，卻說明了他視佛教哲學為一種超越的現象學的看法。此 處，胡塞爾所使用的「超越的」一詞表示「引導吾人至意識生命的態度，於此意 識中『世界』如此地呈現於我們面前，我們發現自己處在一個新的認知態度或情 境」，而在自然態度中，「世界對我們而言則是自明的現實，持續地在我們面前毫 無質疑的既有存在。」29 27 既然 vijñāna 這個語詞依於不同的文脈而有所不同，此語詞在此文中將沒有一致性的翻譯； 雖然看起來有點奇怪，但我認為最好避免困擾的方式是在翻譯後加上梵文。 對於像胡賽爾這樣對佛學僅具初步認識的西方哲學家
28 Karl Schuhmann, ibid., 25. 同註一，第 25 頁。參見劉國英，〈胡賽爾論佛教〉，《現象學與
人文科學》，第3 輯（現象學與佛家哲學專輯）（香港：香港中文大學現象學與人文科學研 究中心，2006）。
29 Edmund Husserl, “Phenomenology,” in Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston, eds., Husserl:
Shorter Works (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 27. 在胡塞爾的用
27 來說，能夠一針見血地以「超絕的」和「超越的」來分辨佛教哲學的性格，確是 令人驚異。對胡賽爾來說，「超絕的」指的是對超出意識之外的關於世界存在的 形上學預設，正是必須予以懸擱的東西；「超越的」則是反觀主體，在純粹主體 性上探問客觀認識的可能性條件的態度，也就是胡賽爾所稱的現象學態度30 胡塞爾顯然認識到長久以來佛教視為禪修指導原則的超越論洞見，在於將世 界的構成視為在禪修中的意識對境，完全不同於自然態度對於外在世界的存在不 加批判的設定。在佛教禪修中，行者必須懸置所有關於世界的形上學假設，安住 於靜觀。修行者相信在方法上除非將世界的形上學假設置入括弧中，他將無法清 楚地察覺對境顯現在意識中的狀態；這種 思考模式可以稱為從自然態度轉換為現 象學態度。 。我 們將指出，佛教的止觀實踐正是這種現象學態度的表現。 31 如同上述，覺悟經驗與非覺悟經驗的區別是佛教哲學的核心，這樣的區別可 以透過存有論或知識論來解釋；就存有論的區別而言，它指涉二種存在領域，而 從知識論的角度而言，則此區別被視為兩種不同的認識方式---覺悟與無明。根據 佛教對二諦的見解，此二者（存有論和知識論）是無法分開而談的。就方法來說， 我們則應該從知識論的分析進至存有論的說明，探問：我們對世界的知識如何遭 到分別與遮蔽？相反地，不被遮蔽與不被分別的知識在何種條件下如何可能？佛 教對此問題的答案可以在不同的認知分析下找到。簡言之，無明（遮蔽）為分別 智的結果，而覺悟（非遮蔽）則由非分別智所證。除非從分別智的認知狀態根本 地轉變為非分別智的認知狀態，解脫救渡將不可能發生。 以世親的《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośabhāsya）為例 ，「識」（vijñāna）與「智」 （jñāna）都是認知的同義詞，「識」被定義為對向於所知境的認識
（viṣayaṃprativijñapti）32，同時它也被理解為「了知」（upalabdhi )，此字的字
源由表示「把握、得到、具有、獲得及尋得」的字根√labh所衍生33
越現象學問題問：甚麼是現象的可能性的條件？參見Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 54。Zahavi 顯然認為胡賽爾接受了康德的「超 越的」概念，而根據D. W. Smith’s 的解釋，「超越的」概念用來指涉從自然或文化的情境 或活動中抽離出的純粹意識。見D. W. Smith, Husserl (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 447。 。在認識論 30 現象學中關於「超絕的」和「超越的」的概念區分，還可以參考倪梁康，《胡賽爾現象學概 念通釋》（北京：三聯書店，1999 ），頁 455-460。 31 雖說對於上述的「智」，胡塞爾的洞見可以在他視佛教為超越的[主體性]這樣一個似乎與佛 教教義無我的立場相違的概念。從歷史的角度來說，胡塞爾之超越的[主體性]的概念雖不見 於早期佛教，但已多少與大乘佛教唯識 (citta-mātra 或 vijñapti-mātra ) 教義兼容。.
32 Abhidharmakośabhāsya of Vasubandhu, Chapter I: Dhātunirdeśa, ed., Yasunori Ejima (Tokyo:
The Sankibo Press, 1989), 17; Bhikkhu K L Dhammajoti, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma (Hong Kong: Center of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong, 2007), 293.
