Myth as Narrative: Issues Regarding the Study of Myth in Buddhist Studies, With Particular Interest in the Mahāsudassana Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya

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(1)南. 華. 大. 學. 宗教學研究所碩士論文. Myth as Narrative: Issues Regarding the Study of Myth in Buddhist Studies, With Particular Interest in the Mahāsudassana Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya. 研究生：溫德斯指導教授：何建興博士. 中華民國. 103 年. 01. 月. 21. 日.

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(3) Abstract The problem of the definition of myth in analysis must be clearly distinguished from the problem of interpretation of myth, with which it is often confused. A definition of myth simply permits and allows an analysis of myth (through the identification of the object named ‘myth’). However, for many years, works on myth do not effectively describe how to identify or recognize myth. Instead, authors use myths as a support or proof to their particular interpretations. The first question of what is myth (and thus how myths should be identified) is postponed as secondary, as if the answer would appear only after the particular interpretation has been confirmed. Here is where the relevance of asking again the question of ‘what is myth’ should start to become clear. Then, our work is concerned with the definitions of myth in myth analysis, but not with the problem of interpretation of myth. From the beginning it must be understood that this work does not intend to explain, justify, or unravel any particular myth, or its meanings, but it is solely preoccupied with the questions of ‘what is myth,’ and thus with ‘how to identify myth. The following content will focus on presenting the problem of the definition of myth, and thus gives an example as evidence. In other words, this work will try to prove the problem of the definition of myth while positing back the question of definition to the center of a discussion on myth.. Key words: problem of myth, myth, the definition of myth. i.

(4) Index Abstract…………………………………………………………………..i Index…………………………………………………………………….ii Chapter I: Introduction……………….....................................................1 Chapter II: The Problem of a definition of myth………………………15 Chapter III: Myth in Buddhist Studies…………………………………44 Chapter IV: ‘What is myth doing here?’ The problem of myth in the Mahāsudassana Sutta………………………………………………62 Chapter V: Outline for a new definition of myth……………………….91 Chapter VI: Conclusions………………………………………………134 Abbreviations………………………………………………………….138 Bibliography…………………………………………………………...139. ii.

(5) Chapter I: Introduction. 1.1 Presentation of the problem The reader holds in his hands yet another work with ‘myth’ on its title. As such, it may be bound to provoke a certain level of rejection, especially in a type of critical reader we are aiming it for. But this work follows a rather different path than most works on myth; we write it somehow starting from that exasperation (let’s call it academic skepticism), that the word ‘myth’ often generates, especially in the quarters of a discipline so important for Buddhist studies as Philology. Thus, before we can get started, some essential clarifications ought to be made. First of all, this is a work on the problem of defining myth. The need to define with precision ‘myth’ arises logically in the process of the analysis of myth. To talk about myth one has first to identify clearly ‘what is myth.’ Our guess is that if a definition of ‘myth’ presents problems, or if it is not clearly stated, the value of the analysis remains in doubt. The problem of the definition of myth in analysis must be clearly distinguished from the problem of interpretation of myth, with which it is often confused. A definition of myth simply permits and allows an analysis of myth (through the identification of the object named ‘myth’). An analysis is thus a first exploration into 1.

(6) the details, symbols and configurations of a myth, in other words a first reading into what the myth ‘says.’ Interpretations, on the other hand, are second readings that go far beyond this first reading, towards a ‘meaning’ (what the myth is ‘really’ saying ‘now’). As such interpretations of myth have to do with hermeneutics, and are perhaps away of the reach of Philology.1 Then, our work is concerned with the definitions of myth in myth analysis, but not with the problem of interpretation of myth. From the beginning it must be understood that this work does not intend to explain, justify, or unravel any particular myth, or its meanings, but it is solely preoccupied with the questions of ‘what is myth,’ and thus with ‘how to identify myth.’2 But under the weight of so many works on myth, from the widest range of disciplines, our question already appears as strange, or worst, as unnecessary. For how could it be that we want to discuss ‘what is myth’ when most scholars are already preoccupied with other problems related to myth, like interpretations or functions? A definition of myth is not a necessary step before any analysis and interpretation? Exactly, this is our main contention: that the question ‘what is myth’ has been. 1. See, for example, Paul Ricoeur’s comments about the hermeneutic interpretations of myth in the Introduction to The Symbolism of Evil. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970. 2 As we will explain later, however, in Chapter V we present a possible model for a definition of myth and how it could be used in analysis. 2.

(7) avoided. Let’s put this in different words. In current academic parlance discussions about ‘what is myth’ are generally equated with discussions about secondary phenomena related to myth, like the functions of myth.3 It is thought, for example, that one can only know what myth is when one is sure about what it does.4 When discourse turns to functions of myth, it already implies a previous capacity of identification of the object that it chose to call ‘myth.’ Obviously, to talk about the functions of myth it is required some kind of operable definition of myth. 5 Similarly, in the discourse of interpretations of myth6 a definition must necessarily be present. Now, we believe there is a very simple problem here that has been overlooked. Our hypothesis is this: it seems that when one turns to the methodology of theories of myth, it is possible to notice that, in many cases, either there is no definition clearly stated or a definition is constructed from a particular method of interpretation.7 Following this argument, as we hope to prove in the course of our work, one can 3. See Kirk, G. S. Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures. London: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 4 Function (purpose) and interpretation (meaning) are different categories, but are often considered as inter-dependant. Thus, it is thought that the purpose of a particular myth is determined by its meaning, and thus its interpretation. See Ricoeur and Kirk above. Psychological theories of myth like that of C. G. Jung start from similar assumptions. See Ellwood, Robert. The Politics of Myth: A Study of C. G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, and Joseph Campbell. New York: State University of New York Press. 1999. 5 That is, a definition that can recognize and distinguish myth as a unit with particular properties or characteristics. 6 Interpretation is perhaps the central topic today for any theory of myth. We evaluate this state of affairs in a negative way. One of our hypothesis is that this obsession for interpretations of myth has naturally conduced to a situation where definitions are seen as ‘secondary,’ or dependant on interpretations. 7 For our purposes, a method of interpretation involves a theoretical set of concepts. 3.

(8) observe how works on myth do not effectively describe how to identify or recognize myth. Instead, authors use myths as a support or proof to their particular interpretations. The first question of what is myth (and thus how myths should be identified) is postponed as secondary, as if the answer would appear only after the particular interpretation has been confirmed. Here is where the relevance of asking again the question of ‘what is myth’ should start to become clear. We will try to prove this while positing back the question of definition to the center of a discussion on myth.. 1.2 Myth in a particular religious tradition: Buddhism Second, if our previous hypothesis is correct then it follows that a comparative analysis of myth is, at this point, not a good idea. If we don’t know how to properly identify myth in particular traditions, comparisons between them necessarily add to the difficulties. While many times theories of myth are developed in a broad comparative way, this inquiry will be necessarily centered on one, and only one particular religion: Buddhism. However that won’t be enough. Buddhism is a multi-branched tradition. Before talking about Buddhist myth in general, a consensus about it must be achieved first in 4.

(9) the entire Buddhist tradition. Thus, merely talking about Buddhist myth won’t be specific enough. Again, we are aiming for identification of myth, and thus we have to concentrate on a particular historical and textual form of the religion. Thus, we will be mainly concentrating on what is called Theravada Buddhism. This could be seen as shorthanded but we deem it as necessary. We also chose to concentrate on Theravada Buddhism because this tradition is often singled-out as the closest to an early form of Buddhism, and as such as the most non-mythical form of traditional Buddhism. It should be easier then, on principle, to isolate myth in it. We also hope that ideological prejudices against myth can present themselves more clearly in it.. 1.3 Self-criticism of our discipline This work, then, should be understood in the context of a relatively recent self-critical tendency in Buddhist studies. As such, it is rooted on some of the conclusions drawn by the previous work of authors such as Philip C. Almond8 and Gregory Schopen.9 8. Philip C Almond, The British Discovery of Buddhism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 9 Schopen, Gregory. Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: Collected papers on the Archeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India. United States of America: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997. 5.

(10) Almond, in his book The British Discovery of Buddhism, traces the development and inclinations of the discipline of Buddhist studies to the context of Colonialism and to a particular set of beliefs and ideas corresponding to it, which he identifies as ‘Protestant.’ This ideology can best be described as “a particular European interpretation of the Buddhist tradition, shaped by the rationalistic and anti-ritualistic ethos.”10 In other words, it posses an inherent inclination to exclude from its inquiry, the irrational, and more specifically, phenomena related to myth and ritual practice. This Protestant ideology naturally influenced the nascent discipline of Buddhist studies in its research methods, which as a consequence became almost exclusively textual-oriented. (Almond 37) Following the tradition of protestant reformers ‘the locus of true religion’11 was to be found in scripture alone. This was naturally followed by an idealization through text, that created an ‘image of decay, decadence, and degeneration’ for contemporary Eastern Buddhism, at the same time that it created and constructed an ideal Buddhism of the past. (Almond 40) From the work of Almond we can presume that one of the key concepts operating for this idealization was indeed myth. It is probably through the control of. 10. See Trainor, Kevin. Relics, ritual, and representation in Buddhism: Rematerializing the Sri Lankan Theravada tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) p. 11. 11 Schopen, p. 13. 6.

(11) the concept of myth, or rather, through the negative valuation of myth, that a pure and idealized Buddhism could be created and maintained in time. It is through a decidedly anti-mythical reading of texts that its idealization could be defended. And it is also through the criticism of myth that a factual Eastern Buddhism could be deprecated. That was the picture of the 19th Century drawn by Almond (mainly on Theravada Buddhism). How much of this historical picture remains an issue in the 21st Century? Is the concept of myth still today somehow under the influence of that Protestant ideology? While Almond’s study does not go beyond the 19th century, Schopen, in his anthology of articles Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks,12 suggests, convincingly in my opinion, how much this Protestant ideology, in the form of textual centrism, is still present today in the history-making of the discipline of Buddhist studies. But Schopen is only concerned with the centrality of texts (against archeology) in relation to a historical inquiry. He is not concerned with myth. It is interesting to note here, nevertheless, that myth could perhaps have something to do with the fact of textual centrism described by him. One of Schopen repeated complains is how the finds of archeology have been often softened, silenced, or ignored by scholars of Buddhist studies, especially when. 12. Specially in his articles “Archeology and Protestant Presuppositions in the Study of Indian Buddhism” and “Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman/Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of the Transference of Merit.” 7.

(12) the data contradict the texts.13 Considering that a great part of his articles in the anthology Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks centers on the phenomena of the stupa cult, and as such it is connected to beliefs about death and the cult of the dead, it sounds reasonable to assume that the negative valuation of myth could have something to do with this.14 We should regard then the concept of myth as important, since it is often closely related to many elements that have largely remained marginal and peripheral in Buddhist studies. In addition, a proper understanding of myth may help us understand better a non-idealized historical Buddhist tradition.. 1.4 Main difficulties Our intention is, then, to carefully and tentatively explore some issues regarding the study of myth in Buddhist studies, with particular attention of the Theravada tradition. However, we must recognize, from the very start, some serious difficulties inherent in such an enterprise. Theories of myth are highly problematic and polemic, even in the older and broader field of Religious studies: the theoretical material is enormous, and many. 13. Schopen, p. 2. Consider for example the implicit importance of myth in Schopen’s article “Burial Ad Sanctos and the Physical Presence of the Buddha in Early Indian Buddhism,” also from the same collection. 14. 8.

(13) times confusing and even contradictory. Probably the two most important difficulties that we will be facing are: first, the fact that there is no theory of myth developed from Buddhist studies; that is, no theory of myth has been specially made for the study of Buddhism. And second, the fact that there are few works dealing with Buddhist myth properly. Thus, our project necessarily cannot aspire to be more than propaedeutic. With that in mind, we will concentrate on how the problem of a definition of myth appears in Buddhist studies of the Theravada tradition. Now, considering the possibility of the so called Protestant ideology in the discipline, we will be paying special attention to the negative valuation of myth, as a result of it. Our hypothesis will be that, whenever a definition of myth manifests a negative valuation of myth (whenever it is affected ideologically in this way); the definition in question will have theoretical problems, especially in relation to its ability to distinguish myth-narratives from non-myth narratives (the object of study). At the same time we will try to show how this problem is connected to general limitations of the methods of Buddhist studies, due to Philology’s natural reticence towards theory.15 Thus, of all the disciplines dealing with religion, Buddhist studies seems to have remained farthest isolated from the problem of the concept of myth,. 15. Pollock, Sheldon. Future Philology? The Fate of a Soft Science in a Hard World. Critical Inquiry 35 (Summer 2009) p. 931-961. 9.

(14) thanks also to its perceived non-theism.16 Yet, because of this, it has maintained itself dependant of other disciplines for the study of myth, and also not up to date with advancements in its study. Thus, we are also interested in assessing how much, due to its importance in Buddhist studies, the traditional and conservative position of Philology against theory in general can conflict or harmonize with the necessity of a theory of myth. We start from the assumption that myth is narrative, and thus as an object of study it is perhaps more compatible to Literary theory than to Philology. Likewise, we expect to observe a natural tension between the limits of Philology and the theoretical requirements of Buddhist studies for understanding myth. Our work is not, however, a direct criticism of Philology. However, it obviously stands in the hope that a criticism of its use of the concept of myth can help open Philology to other theories, for its own benefit.. 1.5 Structure of the work Our work will be divided into four main parts. As we said before, Buddhist. 16. For the theoretical problems of considering Buddhism as a religion see the comments of Melford E. Spiro, in “Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation.” Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion. Ed. Michael Banton. London: Tavistock Publications Limited, 1969. 85-126. For a thorough description of the non-theistic aspects of Buddhism, see Helmuth v. Glasenapp in Buddhism –A Non-Theistic Religion. Trans. Irmgard Schloegl. London: Geoge Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970. 10.

(15) works on myth are few, and there are no works on theories of myth specifically from Buddhist studies. Thus, we have been forced to advance from the general to the particular. In Chapter II we will offer a brief review of the general landscape regarding theories of myth, with special attention to the issues of definition and negative valuation of myth. There we will explore with detail the problem in definitions of myths. We will concentrate on the definitions of myth in the theories of Lévi-Strauss, Eliade, and Ricoeur, as examples. We will try to show through a brief analysis of them an important deficiency in relation to their definitions of myth. In Chapter III we will be reviewing some works relevant for understanding the position of myth in Buddhist studies, giving some remarks regarding the use and value normally given to myth in the discipline. We will be paying special attention to connecting the Protestant ideology working behind Buddhist studies with what we observed in the first part in relation to the problems of definitions of myth. In Chapter IV we will give attention to one of the most interesting works on myth in Buddhist studies in recent years, the article “Mythology as Meditation: From the Mahāsudassana Sutta to the Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra,” by Rupert Gethin. We will be presenting a criticism of the methods used in the article, again mainly 11.

(16) based on its definition of the concept of myth and its application. As expected, we will be also paying special attention to the problem of the valuation of myth in it, as well as to other matters relevant for our topic. The purpose there will be to observe how, in a concrete case, a definition of myth operates in the analysis of Buddhist scriptures. To enrich our commentary, we will be contrasting Gethin’s arguments with Richard Gombrich’s ideas. Gombrich is another important author working on myth-narratives, but with a different answer to the problem of myth. Yet, the fact that both authors are perhaps part of a more conservative side of Philology should be particularly interesting for what we noted above. We expect to show how, contrary to what is often affirmed, even Philology uses theoretical concepts taken from other disciplines, and thus require a harder critical stance towards theoretical concepts and tools, which today it does not have. Up to Chapter IV, then, our intention is to show the coherence and extension of the problem of a definition of myth, between its general study and that found specifically in Buddhist studies of the Theravada tradition. We believe that a criticism of the concept of myth is a necessary step before the discipline of Buddhist studies can theoretically provide a definition based on its own observations of the problem in Buddhist scriptures. 12.

(17) In Chapter V we will use what we have learned in the previous chapters to try to construct an outline for a definition of myth. Our intention is not to give a fully operable ‘new’ definition of myth, but merely to show a theoretical model of a definition, with which the avoidance of problems described in our work is possible. Thus we will be using theoretical tools from anthropology (Clifford Geertz) and from literary analysis (Northrop Frye), to provide a theoretical example of how to build a simple model for defining myth that can help and complement the philological tools of Buddhist studies. We will be modifying Frye’s model for narrative analysis of literary fiction for the identification of myth narratives. Lastly, we will use this model of a definition of myth to analyze the Mahāsudassana Sutta one more time, in a bid to confirm whether the ideas behind its construction are practical. We hope we will get some interesting results by doing so. All in all, the fifth chapter could perhaps appear as the most unsatisfactory, due to its extravagant and eclectic nature, but we feel the need to show in a practicable way how a definition of myth could actually be constructed following our criticism, and at the same time how theoretical tools for narrative analysis coming from outside of Philology can be incorporated to the study of Buddhist scriptures, without serious difficulties.. 13.

(18) We agree with some scholars17 of Buddhist studies who have began to question the limits imposed by overemphasizing Philology as unique way of approaching Buddhist texts, and in that sense, our work is oriented towards a more open future discipline, where narrative will have the central place it deserves.. 17. See Gomez, Luis O. “On Reading Literature Literally: Concrete Imagery before Doctrine.” Published in Special International Symposium on Pure Land Buddhism. 5-30, and McClintock, Sara L. “Compassionate Trickster: The Buddha as a Literary Character in the Narratives of Early Indian Buddhism.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion. Vol. 79.1 (2011): 90-112. 14.

(19) Chapter II: The problem of a definition of myth. 2.1 The priority of the problem of ‘what is myth.’ While it would be perhaps exaggerated to suggest that nothing has been advanced for the study of myth since Lévi-Strauss published “The Structural Study of Myth,”18 it has to be recognized that his complain about the chaotic situation in what he calls ‘field of mythology’ 19 remains true today. The study of myth is still considered a problematic, contested, and polemic sub/inter-field,20 where, broadly speaking, consensus is hard to find. It is interesting to note that what Lévi-Strauss describes as ‘studies in the field of mythology’ roughly correspond for him to theories of interpretations of myth. Thus, his complain protests the fact of the multiplicity of interpretations. Nowhere does Lévi-Strauss, in his seminal article “The Structural Study of Myth,” suggests that problems in myth interpretation could be traced back to faults in definitions of myth. Indeed, it could be argued, without a spirit of polemic, that in “The Structural 18. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. “The Structural Study of Myth.” Myth: A Symposium. Spec. issue of The Journal of American Folklore. Vol. 68 (1955): 428-444. 19 “Of all the chapters of religious anthropology, none has tarried to the same extent as studies in the field of mythology. From a theoretical point of view the situation remains (…) chaotic. Myths are still widely interpreted in conflicting ways: as collective dreams, as the outcome of a kind of esthetic play, or as the basis of ritual.” (Lévi-Strauss 207) 20 Often confusingly crossing over several disciplines. 15.

(20) Study of Myth,” Lévi-Strauss does not give a definition of myth, and instead replaces it with an analysis of the structure of it. In a previous article,21 Lévi-Strauss had emphatically asserted that “myth form takes precedence over the content of the narrative.” It has been argued before,22 however, that for Lévi-Strauss ‘structure’ indeed amounts to ‘content.’23 His listing of narrative contents in columns had the obvious final purpose of establishing a new form of relational interpretation. It follows then, that in his mind, this listing of contents somehow replaces the need for a definition of myth. But the fact that his listing is made of units of narrative contents (‘Cadmos kills the dragon,’ ‘Oedipus kills his father Laios’), contradicts his discussion of myth in terms of comparison with Saussure’s concepts of langue and parole, or with the metaphor of music. The value of his units is given by their contents, and not by their form. An analysis of the structure of myth already presumes the knowledge of the observed object’s limits. But according to Lévi-Strauss what are those? Or, in other words, how or on what principles an observer should distinguish myth from that. 21. Lévi-Strauss, Claude. “The Effectiveness of Symbol.” Structural Anthropology. United States of America: Basic Books, 1963. 22 Additionally, Lévi-Strauss study of myth has been severely criticized in part due to his wrong use of the concept of structure, which in most cases merely denotes contents (see Righter, William. Myth and Literature. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1975). 23 Righter, p.19. 16.

(21) which is not myth? Where did he get his basic units of form/content? When Lévi-Strauss takes the content of certain myths for analysis he has already decided that they are myth. He does not share this method of distinction or identification with the reader. More seriously, he is not even defining them in relation to his so called structure, or in relation to any form of interpretation24. He has not even used the idea of structure to choose myth from other narratives, and in fact, since his concept of structure can be better understood as content, his method of analysis could be applied to any type of narrative with similar results!25 In the end he has not provided an effective way to chose myth, and thus we have not received an answer for the question of what is myth. Besides the hypothetical possibility of finding a general law of the structure of myth, 26 which remains open, we are left empty handed. Lévi-Strauss also suggests that his structural analysis is, in the end, a proper method for understanding myth. However, it is our contention here, that an interpretation cannot be accepted as a definition, and neither can it occupy its place in 24. Like Mircea Eliade, as wee will show later. Lévi-Strauss did not start his work from an observation and comparison of narratives. A proper structural analysis of myth, if such a thing is possible, would have required first an structural identification of myth. For example, an extensive analysis of the structure of narrative, then a selection of those narratives that, diverging similarly in structure, could be identified as myth. Only then a description would have made sense. 26 Expressed in his idiosyncratic formula [Fx(a): Fy(b) 〜 Fx(b):Fa-1(y)]. 25. 17.

(22) a theory of myth. To detail the structure of an object somehow already identified as myth is not the same as defining myth by its structure. This is an important point. But necessarily, each time an interpretation is tried, a definition must be assumed. Furthermore, it is pertinent to ask whether it is even possible to provide interpretations without knowing ‘what exactly is a myth.’ When we see the structural method of Lévi-Strauss, we don’t see this definition. Logically there must be one that has made him choose between some units and not others, between some narrative texts and not others. It is as if Lévi-Strauss was working under such strong convictions of knowing ‘what is myth’ that he simply did not need to define his object of study. This is our first important clue. The initial problem in the theory of myths should be first not how to interpret myth, but how to define and how to identify myth, that is, how to distinguish the object or material that we chose to call myth. In the center of any theory of myth should be the definition of myth. That is what we understood by what is myth; a definition that clearly casts the observed object in a set or paradigm of theoretical delimitations.. 2.2 The failure of theories of myth In the encounter of theories of ‘myth,’ one gets the impression of the absolute elusive nature of the concept; ‘myth’ appears to be that kind of word that, despite its 18.

(23) extensive use, it always manages to escape from clear theoretical boundaries. Besides the share number of different theories of myth available there may be several other reasons for this problem. For example, we have the dispersion of its study across disciplines, each discipline in its turn harboring multiple, sometimes conflicting theories of myth.27 It is then not surprising that the concept is confusing, difficult to track, and not precise. Naturally, theories of myth are closely dependant on the context and purpose that motivated its conceptual origin. Thus, “theories of myth are theories of some much larger domain, with myth a mere subset.” (Segal 2) As such, “there are no theories of myth itself, for there is no discipline of myth in itself. There is no study of myth as myth.” (Segal 2) In other words, the study of myth has never configured a study in itself. This fact is important, and should be considered more thoroughly. We could put this in the following way: myth is not the main object of any discipline. This means, naturally, that myth is always studied in relation to something else (be it society, literature, culture, mind, art, religion, etc.), constituting a secondary object. In other words, to be qualified and quantified it is always dependent of something different from itself. Thus, myth is like a shadow that only becomes visible when something else is. 27. See Robert A. Segal in Myth: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 19.

(24) illuminated. This fact, paradoxically, could be yet another of the causes of the concept’s theoretical obscurity and a reason for the multiplicity of its definitions. Now, the considerable amount of interpretations in addition to the lack of specialized theories for the study of myth in-itself, almost inevitably raises the following suspicion: does myth really exist? Does myth really correspond to a concrete object or phenomenon? Or is it whatever we want it to be? Is it, finally, a useful category? As one famous scholar of myth puts it, “it is essential to have a clear idea of what myths are and what myths are not, and, so far as possible, of the ways in which they are likely to operate.”28 A detailed review of the definitions of myth is beyond the scope of this short-sized work. But we can do without it thanks to the fact that there are already an important number of book-length discussions dealing with the most influential ones.29 Most of these works start with an entire chapter dedicated at listing the varieties of theories of myths.30 28. Kirk: Introduction, pg 2. For some, see in our bibliography Ken Dowden in The Uses of Greek Mythology, William Righter in Myth and Literature, Milton Scarbough in Myth and Modernity: Postcritical Reflections, and Robert A. Segal in Myth: A Very Short Introduction. For examples of definitions see G. S. Kirk in Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures, or for the strange lack of it see Claude Lévi-Strauss in “The Structural Study of Myth.” in The Journal of American Folklore. Vol. 68: 428-444. For an extensive anthology of theories, definitions, and methods of interpretation, see the anthology Sacred Narratives: Readings in The Theory of Myth, by Alan Dundes. This last one in particular is an excellent example of the multiplicity in the study of myth in the discipline of Religious studies, with several short articles discussing old definitions and presenting new ones. 30 Righter, p. 9: “Most definitions [of myth] exist at a very high level of generality, 29. 20.

(25) Due to the sheer size of the material, authors on myth commonly complement their surveys of theories of myth with some kind of categorizing schema. William Righter31, for example, complements his general account with some of the more influential modern theories of myth, which he groups in four broad categories: functionalist, psychological, religious, and those of symbolic form. According to him, the functionalist theories of myth “describe myth in terms of its operation within a social structure, often in connection with a ritual which marks a stage in the development or progress of the individual through his life cycle.” (Righter 15) Bronisław Malinowski is given as an example of this category. Psychological theories of myth trace its origins to the hidden constitution of the mind, thus establishing a causative link between the mind and myth. Righter lists under this category Sigmund Freud and Carl G. Jung, and surprisingly the work of. and an admission of the multiple nature of the subject is built into them. (…) ‘Myth is narrative, irrational… and comes to mean any anonymously composed story telling of origins and destinies, the explanation a society offers its young of why the world is and why we do as we do, its pedagogic images of the nature and destiny of man’ (Warren and Wellek). Or, ‘Myth is to be defined as a complex of stories – some no doubt fact, and some fantasy – which, for various reasons, human beings regard as demonstrations of the inner meaning of the universe of human life’ (Alan Watts). Others assign such a multiplicity of causes as to be almost completely meaningless: ‘Myth is a universal cultural phenomenon originating in a plurality of motives and involving all mental faculties’ (David Bidney). Still others wish to establish the character of myth as an imaginative language in its own right: ‘An autonomous form of the human spirit, with its own structure, function, expression … with unity of feeling’ (Cassirer). Or, ‘A myth … is a schema of the imagination which, (…) is capable of effectively organizing our way of viewing portions of the external world in accord with its distinctions’ (Joseph Margolis).” 31 Righter, William. Myth and Literature. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1975. 21.

(26) Claude Lévi-Strauss. For Righter, of all the groups, religious theories of myth are the most ambiguous as well as the less objective. In them, myth is presented as having syncretistic and vague metaphysical or religious foundations. Here he places authors like Joseph Campbell, Mircea Eliade, and Heinrich Zimmer. Finally, theories of symbolic form describe myth as a ‘self contained and self referential symbolic language.’ As a form of symbolic language myth is expression of feelings (experience), thus it is understood in a much broader sense, almost as a fiction. Cassirer is the example here. The building of broad categories for the multiplicity of myth is an ingenious way of trying to make order of an academic zone that has none. But then again, Righter is only one of several authors struggling to give some order by following a similar pattern. Segal, for example, affirms that each modern theory of myth starts from at least one of three different questions, which can be described as questions of origin, function, and subject matter. By origin, Segal means ‘why and how a myth arises.’ By function, ‘why and how myth persists,’ by subject matter, the referent of myth. Segal affirms that the answer to the first two questions is often a need, which myth fulfills. The condition for myth existence in time is this fulfillment, thus myth lasts as long as it fulfills this need. 22.

(27) What this need is, according to Segal, varies from theory to theory. (Segal 2) Notice first, however, how none of these broad categories as explained by Righter or Segal actually deal with myth in-itself. Second, all these groups or categories of inquiry clearly correspond to different disciplinary interests and thus methods of approaching issues related with ‘myth,’ like history, psychology –origin, sociology, anthropology –function, or religious studies and structuralism –subject matter (Righter’s religious and symbolic form), etc. Indeed, it could be argued that theories of myth naturally ought to diverge because they simply start from different phenomena related to myth, but never from myth itself: they simply don’t share the object of study. At the same time, it should be evident how definitions of myth are always tied by necessity to particular disciplinary interpretations of myth, since each discipline has already its own object(s) of study. Then, these theories want to say something about what myth means in relation to that other object. A hypothesis could follow from this: definitions of myth are backwardly constructed to accommodate prior assumptions of what myths must mean (interpretation).. 2.3 The construction of definitions of myth from interpretations This is perhaps even more evident in theories inclined to phenomenology, like 23.

(28) Mircea Eliade’s. 32 In Eliade’s definition, for example, myth narrates a sacred history,33 which likewise is defined by the terms of its content: it is a narrative ‘telling’ or ‘description’ of a creation-event of a reality in a special time (a time out of history), by supernatural beings. This he describes as an irruption of the sacred into the world of man. Eliade’s definition of myth is subsumed to a universalistic view of religion,34 and to a way of understanding religion through a dichotomous relation (sacred/profane, supernatural/natural, primordial time/historic time, etc.). Now, there is nothing wrong here with the definition itself. Contrary to Lévi-Strauss, Eliade does provide a definition which, at least in theory, intends to define myth. The problem, however, is that Eliade’s definition is reductionist: it forces a distinction of myth only in terms of the concepts of his interpretation. Thus, it seems that his theory has started not from the observation of narratives, but from a previous selection, based on his own interpretation. It naturally leaves then an immense group 32. Eliade, Mircea. Myth and Reality. Trans. Willard R. Trask. Illinois: Waveland Press Inc., 1998. 33 Eliade 1998, p. 7: “(…) myth narrates a sacred history; it relates an event that took place in primordial Time, the fabled time of the ‘beginnings. In other words myth tells how, through the deeds of Supernatural Beings, a reality came into existence, be it the whole of reality, the Cosmos, or only a fragment of reality—an island, a species of plant, a particular kind of human behavior, an institution. Myth then is always an account of a ‘creation’; it relates how something was produced, began to be. Myth tells only of that which really happened, which manifested itself completely. (…) In short, myths describe the various and sometimes dramatic breakthroughs of the sacred (or the ‘supernatural’) into the World.” 34 Ellwood, Robert. The Politics of Myth: A Study of C. G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, and Joseph Campbell. New York: State University of New York Press. 1999. 24.

(29) of narratives arbitrarily out of the concept of myth. This definition of myth not only depends of Eliade’s particular concepts of the sacred, the profane, and of time, but it also restricts myth rather subjectively to those narratives that pertain to creation or origin, themselves concepts broad and rather ambiguous. Then, irrespective of the evaluation of such a definition, we are forced to exclude a great number of narratives by a mere personal inclination posing as a real qualitative method of distinction. In this way, the definition of myth is reduced to an interpretative theory. The ‘theory’ does not show us clearly how to recognize what is myth from what is not without an interpretation operating, forcing us also to accept the interpretation in question. Let’s put this in different terms. If we were to ask ‘where are we to find myth’ or ‘how are we to identify it,’ the following answer would be forced on us -only in those texts that presumably support the interpretation. It might be argued, of course, that any concept inevitably has its origin in a similar accident: definitions are up to a certain extent always arbitrary and subjective, and depend on other concepts. But here the problem seems to be that a definition seems to have been backwardly constructed to accommodate, validate, and justify a particular method of interpretation, a particular understanding of what myth ought to 25.

(30) mean. In other words, the interpretation’s concepts are responsible for determining, what is myth.35 It follows that the center of such an interpretation lays on the concepts which at the same time are used to delimit the object ‘myth’ (see 3 on Table 1). Out of this interpretative context, away from its concepts, that which has been identified as myth (see 4 on table 1) disappears completely. Thus the capacity of explanation of such a definition is problematic, since it depends on the acceptance of a very specific type of interpretation. And is not applicable to phenomena not corresponding to the interpretation, and cannot say anything of myth in general. This method of constructing definitions from interpretations is not unique of Mircea Eliade. We have already mentioned how Lévi-Strauss replaces a definition by an analysis of ‘structure’ (his method of interpretation), falling in a similar kind of pitfall. But our intention here is not to reject the validity of any interpretation, but to call into question the process of constructing definitions from interpretations. Myth, in this way, is not an observed 36 but rather a constructed object, built from the requirements of a previously designed interpretation.. 35. We provide 2 diagrams. In Table 1 we have tried to visually describe the process of the construction of a theory of myth from a previous definition, while in Table 2 we describe how the process should be, ideally. 36 Of course every observation implies a construction, but here the important thing is whether this construction is based on phenomena observed, or merely on an interpretative theory. 26.

(31) The fact that interpretations have priority over definitions seems to be a particular problem of myth theories. However any interpretation requires a previous definition. An interpretation, if not on a precise definition, must at least rest on a-priori assumptions about what that object is, otherwise the object interpreted would be non-identifiable. Thus, if we assume that definitions of myth like Eliade’s and Lévi-Strauss’ were backwardly constructed, their interpretations must have started from a previous definition or at the very least from assumptions working as such, based on some form of common sense understanding of what is myth (1 in Table 1).37 This previous definition actually gives the interpretation (2 in Table 1) a provisory description of what should be myth (4 in Table 1), which is developed only after the concepts of interpretation (3 in Table 1). Thus the new definition of myth (5 in Table 1) is the last stage in this process, and as a consequence it lacks almost any relevance for the theory itself, since it has no ability to really distinguish what is myth: myth is a preselected object that does not depend of the new definition. In such a process of construction what we consider to be the normal procedures are overridden. Normally, phenomena are observed (in this case narratives), (see 1 in Table 2) and from these observations comes a hypothesis which results in a definition. 37. This would justify perhaps Lévi-Strauss’ implicit impression that a definition of myth was somehow unnecessary in his work on myth analysis. 27.

(32) (2 in Table 2). This definition selects, delimits, and categorizes the phenomena. Thus, at the same time that this definition is raised, the object appears (also 2 in Table 2). Only then an interpretation and its concepts are produced, based in the observation of the object, to explain what the definition has proposed.. Table 1: Diagram of the Construction of a Theory of Myth from a Previous Definition (SDM). The proof of this is logical. It lays on the fact that any interpretation needs first to 28.

(33) identify its object. But the problem is how to identify an object without a definition. Thus it follows that, since the final definitions rest on a particular interpretation, a previous definition or assumptions of what is myth must have already been in place before the origin of the interpretation.. Table 2: Diagram of the Ideal Construction of a Theory of Myth. How can this be proved? Thanks to the fact that we know myths are found in narratives (or at least are embedded in texts), we can answer for now with a counter 29.

(34) question: how and when where the narrative/texts in any particular theory of myth chosen? If there is no answer as to the how, we have a possible partial proof. If they where selected exclusively based on principles related to the interpretation we have again possible partial proof. In the case of Mircea Eliade, for example, both are true: there is no answer as to how these and not other narratives were chosen, and at the same time the contents of the myths that Eliade describe are exclusively connected to his concepts of interpretation.. 2.4 True and false narratives We should try now to reconstruct such a hypothetical previous definition by following elements that are shared by most ‘interpretative definitions’ of myth. There is, as we have seen, at least one consensual element in theories of myth: myth is narrative.38 But, while modern definitions universally recognize myth as narrative, they seldom explain the significance of this. Neither is the actual relation between myth and narrative explored. Thus, in relation to definitions of myth, narrative merely refers to the actual place where myths are supposedly located: texts. In this work, by narrative it will be understood any text (or discourse) that presents a sequence of related events, actions, characters, images, concepts, symbols,. 38. See Righter, pg.10. 30.

(35) or ideas, be it oral or written.39 It is due to the relation between these elements that a narrative can be considered a system.40 The narrative aspect of myth seem to drift in definitions from the simple and commonsensical ‘narrative of gods,’ to the broader ‘narrative of beginnings,’ to the almost abstract ‘foundational narrative.’ If myth is to be something, it must be some form of narrative. But with the concept of narrative comes a fragile illusion of simplicity, for we still don’t know ‘what is myth’. If myth is a narrative, what type of narrative it is? Or, in other words, a myth is narrative of what? Evidently the problem is to determine exactly what form of narrative corresponds to myth. Even if by narrative we understand straightforwardly a story, and thus we take myth as a story of gods, the fancy of simplicity disappears quite rapidly. In a sense, we just keep postponing an answer. If, following commonsense, we reply with confidence ‘a narrative of gods,’ we now have to answer what does our category of ‘god’ entails to. For example, a god is only that which is called a god or is also that which acts as a god or seems ‘to us’ like a god?. 39. We are purposely avoiding here a definition of narrative as a mere story. Thus we include explanations or even lists of concepts and ideas as forms of narrative. 40 We follow here the concept of system developed by Clifford Geertz. We will return to this point in our 5th chapter. See Geertz, Clifford, “Religion as a Cultural System.” Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion. Ed. Michael Banton. London: Tavistock Publications Limited, 1969. 1-46. And in The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973. 31.

(36) Furthermore, what are we to do with narratives of semi-divine beings? And what should we do of the narratives directly relevant for understanding doctrines or laws, but where the main character of the religion (be him god, semi-divine human, founder figure, etc.) is not even a protagonist, or worst, he simply does not bother to appear? And what are we to do of all the other narratives relating to no god, that we still intuitively and following commonsense consider myths? The concept of narrative by itself, then, is not enough for constituting an assumed previous definition of myth. A second element, that should specify what type of narrative is myth, is required for an operable definition. And, considering the fact that the concept of narrative is consensual, this second element must also be generally accepted. Bruce Lincoln41, in the preface to his work Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship give us an important clue when, referring to the problem of the concept of myth, affirms that:. (…) whenever someone calls something a ‘myth,’ powerful-and highly consequential-assertions are being made about its relative level of validity and authority. 41. Lincoln, Bruce. Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999. 32.

(37) vis-a-vis other sorts of discourse. Such assertions, moreover, can be strongly positive (e.g., myth = "primordial truth" or "sacred story"), strongly negative (myth = "lie'' or "obsolete worldview"), or something in between (as in the mildly indulgent view that myth = "pleasant diversion," "poetic fancy," or "story for children"). (Lincoln ix). According to Lincoln, a narrative is thus positioned in relation to other forms of narratives by its value of trueness or falseness, in other words, by the value of truth (or lie) that it seems to posses. Is this idea of truth in myth that we now want to follow.. 2.5 ‘Truth Valuation’ in a Standard Definition of Myth (SDM) “In the language current during the nineteenth century,” says Mircea Eliade in Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries, “a ‘myth’ meant anything that was opposed to ‘reality.’” This, he concluded, was yet another “cliché of Christian origin and structure” (Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries 23). But scholars of the twentieth century, he affirms, instead of treating myth as ‘fable,’ ‘invention,’ or ‘fiction,’ “have accepted 33.

(38) it as it was understood in the archaic societies, where, on the contrary, ‘myth’ means a ‘true story’ and, beyond that, a story that is a most precious possession because it is sacred, exemplary, significant.” (Myth and Reality 1). Of course, the intention of Eliade here is to re-contextualize myth in its place in a determined culture, and by doing so rescue its importance, and the seriousness which its consideration required. However, it seems rather difficult to accept the idea that myth was indeed ever understood by that generation of scholars (including Eliade himself) as ‘true story,’ in the sense he seems to affirm. On the contrary, it rather seems to be the case that the problem of truth was, for all purposes, bracketed below a phenomenological apparatus, “on the grounds of selective and apparently ‘essentialist’ categories.”42 When we accept myth is a truth for others (in the past), we just relativize the value of truth only partially43, implying that it is not so in reality (our times). This is why Eliade’s theory has to hang strongly on essentialist concepts like the sacred, or time. Thus myth is ‘true’ (for ‘them,’ in the context of sacredness and other-temporality), but still ‘wrong’ (for us, in our context). So whether we want it or not, we are still affirming that myth is, finally, not truth. To affirm that in archaic or primitive societies myth is “thought to express the 42. Ellwood, p.107. By partial relativization we mean just that. An incomplete relativization of truth, only in intent. 43. 34.

(39) absolute truth, because it narrates a sacred history” (Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries 23) is ambiguous: ‘thought to express’ is not the same as affirming that ‘it is.’ Thus it is only a partial relativization of truth, where truth is still placed ‘near us,’ and not ‘close to them.’ Essentialist concepts like ‘sacred history’ or ‘expression of absolute truth’ also show this partial relativism. In any case, we believe Mircea Eliade pointed correctly to the importance of the question of the value of truth in definitions of myth; he identified correctly a problem in conceptualizing myth as a narrative opposed to reality (or truth). However, he failed in observing how much he himself and his generation where still working under those same presumptions. The problem of truth in myth is still an unresolved issue. Myth, is affirmed, cannot be true, it is false, it is a lie. But by doing so, we apparently take away from myth all possibility of value.44 What are we to do of all this? Following the shift from phenomenology to hermeneutics, the bracketing of truth was followed by other procedures, like the idea of re-valorizing myth. In the The Symbolism of Evil, for example, Paul Ricoeur initially defines myth in a way that closely echoes Eliade’s; he explains myth as “not a false explanation by means of images and fables, but a traditional narration which relates to events that happened at. 44. Thus what is understood as demythologization. See Ricoeur. 35.

(40) the beginning of time and which has a purpose.” (Ricoeur 5) But he has in mind something very different to the partial relativization of myth’s truth. He later goes in the opposite direction, negating any possibility of recovering through interpretation myth’s original value of truth.45 Ricoeur’s intention is to somehow rescue myth from its devaluation for modern man. Now, this devaluation, according to him, is precisely forced by myth’s etiological nature (myth as an explanation of reality). Thus, for Ricoeur, to rescue myth it is necessary first to destroy its etiological intention. This is what he calls demythologization. But notice here how this project is also starting from a definition of myth as false narrative: he is clearly stating that myth is first and foremost not true (wrong etiology is its primary essence). So where Eliade suggested that the truth value of a myth could still be accepted in the context of sacred time, Ricoeur is affirming that the essence of myth itself cannot be redeemed and must be abandoned. The rest follows naturally from this premise: modern man can no longer believe in myth. Myth has to be transformed into something else to be re-valued.46. 45. Ricoeur, p. 5: “For us, moderns, a myth is only a myth because we can no longer connect that time with the time of history as we write it, employing the critical method, nor can we connect mythical places with our geographical space. This is why the myth can no longer be an explanation; to exclude its etiological intention is the theme of all necessary demythologization.” 46 Ricoeur, p. 164: “If (…) the myth is to survive this double distinction of history and myth as well as of explanation and myth, the myth must not be either history, 36.

(41) There is a contradiction here. Ricoeur presented himself before as following the definition of History of Religions, described as no longer finding in myth ‘a false explanation by means of images and fables, but a traditional narration.’ And yet later he is insisting that myth is in essence a false explanation. This again is indicating the conflict between a new definition proposed following and interpretation and a traditional understanding of what is myth. Ricoeur constructs a layered hierarchy where he places symbol, myth, and pseudo-scientific myth or gnosis. In the opposite extremes of this hierarchy are experience and speculation. Initially, man faces the experience of feelings. He then expresses this experience through symbol(s). Myth is a development and speculation of this original experience-to-expression movement. Pseudo-knowledge or ‘gnosis’ is one more step removed from experience, as a further speculative development from myth. Thus myth is in the middle position between symbol and irrational speculation. Symbols are also, like myths, expressions of experience, but since they are closer to experience they are more spontaneous (pure, not contaminated by speculation). It follows that Ricoeur only values myths as a way of recovering symbol for re-constructing experience, through the analytical dismantling of myth. Once we get happening in a definite time and place, or explanation. (…) For a critical understanding of myth it is first necessary that the myth be entirely divorced from the “etiological” function with which it appears to be identified.” 37.

(42) rid of the etiological function (demythologization), myth can become “a vessel of meaning” (Ricoeur 349) through symbol.47 Here we can observe the main theoretical problem of his theory of myth. Ricoeur supposes that symbols are previous to myth, and closer to experience. But when we observe his examples of symbols (defilement, sin, guilt, and water as threat/renewal in flood/baptism) it appears problematic whether they can have any value independent of myths. In other words, symbols appear as secondary expressions originated on the context of a myth. Thus, their quality of spontaneity in comparison to myths’ speculative nature is put to doubt. Symbols depend on the narrative of myth for their meaning. The work of Ricoeur is important for us because it shows in a crystal-clear way the dual stage process of construction of definitions of myth in relation to the requirements of interpretation.. Previous Definition (or Assumptions). . Interpretation . New Definition. Ricoeur wants to rescue myth from its devaluation, building a new definition (as 47. Ricoeur, p. 18: “(…) I shall always understand by symbol (…) analogical meanings which are spontaneously formed and immediately significant (…) I shall regard myths as a species of symbols, as symbols developed in the form of narrations and articulated in a time and space that cannot be co-ordinated with the space and time of history and geography according to the critical method.” 38.

(43) vessel for symbols of experience). But for that he needs to destroy completely the etiological function (the value of truth) of the previous definition. Notice how his new definition is born necessarily of the requirements of his interpretation of symbol, experience, and speculation. What is myth then? The ability to identify or distinguish myth-narratives from non myth-narratives remains as elusive as before, even though in the second part of his work Ricoeur will profusely discuss, give interpretations, and evaluate narratives that he considers myths. We have then, yet another proof that definitions of myth are constructed backwards, from methods or theories of interpretation. By this we mean that they start from previous assumptions about what myth should and should not be. In that sense, they start from a previous definition (a pseudo or proto definition), which we will call from now a ‘standard definition of myth’ (SDM). But it also seems clear now that definitions of myth that are constructed in this way, based on the requirements of interpretations, present serious problems when it comes to answer the question of what is myth. We have affirmed that this SDM is consensual, in other words, it seems to be universally accepted. It consists of two elements (or affirmations): myth is narrative, and is false narrative (truth valuation). 39.

(44) By ‘truth valuation’ (TrV) we simply mean a negative evaluation of myth, in relation to truth. That is, a myth is a false narrative, a lie. When myth is opposed to truth, it is also opposed to reason and to history. Thus, all these oppositions form the TrV of myth. Let’s repeat here one more time what this SDM involves: myth is a type of narrative that is not true, but false. As such, myth is a narrative that can be distinguished from history.. 2.6 The Western ideology behind Truth Valuation (TrV) Against what we have said before it could be protested that the TrV implicated in a SMD might have its natural origins in the etymology of the word ‘myth’ itself; in other words, that the definition of myth as false narrative is merely a fact that has always been included in the value of the word. Thus, any different definition of myth would be problematic, and would be going against the traditional and true meaning of myth. At the same time, the opposition between myth and logos and myth and history is traditionally traced back by scholars to Greece, and Greek philosophy, since the word myth itself comes from ancient Greece. It would be useful, then, to revise briefly the etymology of myth, and thus answer in advance that complain. 40.

(45) Gregory Nagy48 derives the word myth (muthos) from the Greek verb muo, “which means ‘I have my mouth closed’ or ‘I have my eyes closed’ from the standpoint of everyday situations, but ‘I say in special way’ or ‘I see in a special way’ from the standpoint of marked situations in ritual.” (Nagy 3) In that sense myth would seem to mean ‘special speech,’ as opposed to everyday speech. Similarly, Bruce Lincoln49 explains that in its earliest attestations in the Greek epic, logos and mythos represented two different and opposed forms of speech. Logos connoted not a rational argumentation but rather ‘shady speech acts’ (like seduction, beguilement, and deception), which inferiors used to outwit those who held power over them, while mythos was the speech of the ‘preeminent’ (poets and kings), those with authority, having the capacity to advance powerful truth claims,50 and backed by physical force. (Lincoln x) It never means ‘false story,’ ‘symbolic story,’ ‘sacred story.’ (Lincoln 7) In Hesiod, for example, mythos represents a discourse of power and authority that has to be believed and obeyed, while in the Illiad, it appears as a speech of power, performed in public, by one with authority. Likewise, it forces consent from those 48. Nagy, Gregory. Greek Mythology and Poetics. New York: Cornell University Press (1992). 49 Lincoln, Bruce. Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999. Print. 50 In the context described by Lincoln, it does not seem to me that ‘truth claims’ here necessarily imply TrV. Mythos would be a speech of power, a speech that becomes truth, not because of its content, but merely because it is backed by a figure of authority. 41.

(46) inferior to the speaker, and only those equal in status are allowed to oppose it. (Lincoln 7) Gregory Nagy alternatively traces the origins of the dichotomy between muthos ‘myth’ and aletheia ‘truth’ in the context of the development of the Archaic Greek city-state and the tendency of pan-Hellenism. The ‘singers’ are socially mobile, and thus what they sing is conditioned by their mobility, forcing them to detach myths from ritual, since myths must be carried to different locations. What is accepted as sacred tradition in one community will be considered pseudos (a fallacy or lie) in another. Thus, in this tradition what is ‘convergent is highlighted while that divergent shaded over.’ Muthos becomes related with the divergences, while aletheia with the convergences, and ‘truth’. (Nagy 30) Be as it may, these authors agree that before Plato the word mythos had a higher position than the word logos. As a result of Plato's polemic, mythos was finally displaced in importance by logos. Under Plato, “mythoi were not only revised but also radically revalorized. What others had taken to be primordial revelations or undeniable truths now were treated as state propaganda, best suited for children and those incapable of adopting the discourse and practice of the ruling elite, within an emergent regime of truth that called (and calls) itself ‘philosophy.’” (Lincoln 42) But even then myth was not necessarily understood as false narrative, inferior to logos, 42.

(47) “false on the whole but still having some truth in it." (Lincoln 43) This is important for us, because it proves that the opposition between truth and myth that today is part of a Western ideology can be traced a long way back in time, to after Plato, but not to its origins and as a consequence needs not be so. At the same time, this can be taken as a relevant warning: the discipline of Buddhist Studies may be, in relation to myth, working under ideological assumptions that may be totally foreign to their object of study.. 43.

(48) Chapter III: Myth in Buddhist Studies. 3.1 Myth as corruption There is a notorious lack of works dealing specifically with Buddhist ‘myths.’ The concept, for example, seems to be avoided from most general overviews of the religion.51 Thus, from and academic perspective, it could be perhaps easily concluded that the concept of myth has no importance whatsoever in the study of the religion. 52 However, as we will see later, this is not the case. In scholarly literature about Buddhism, three modes of use for myth are commonly encountered. The first, involves the use of the concept of ‘myth’ in an often un-technical way (generally lacking in precision). In this use the value given to the word is, generally speaking, negative, but even then, with contradictory and confusing connotations.53 This mode often involves an apologetic discourse towards 51. See for example the conspicuous absence of ‘myth’ in Gombrich, Richard. What the Buddha Taught. London: Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2009, Gethin, Rupert. The Foundations of Buddhism. Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1998, and Warder, A. K. Indian Buddhism. India: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2000. The first two authors are important for the analysis of Buddhist mythical scriptures, yet none of them has used the concept in their ‘introductory’ works. Gombrich has totally replaced its use, in practical terms, for metaphor, allegory, and satire. See the third chapter of his book How Buddhism Began: The conditioned genesis of the early teachings. 2nd ed. USA: Routledge, 2005. 52 One could even argue that scholars avoiding the word myth altogether are perhaps working under particular ideological assumptions (see Almond) about the Theravada form of the religion. 53 King, p. 211: “(…) the term ‘myth’ would not commend itself to a Theravada (or 44.

(49) the religion.54 The second mode occupies an intermediary position between non-technical and technical modes of the use of myth. In it, myth is assumed to be somehow a metaphor or symbol for doctrine. Thus, words like kamma, bodhisattva, māra, are considered elements of Buddhist mythology,55 interpreted as representations of doctrine. The third mode of use is highly technical. In it, the negative valuation of myth is always connected with the theoretical assumptions that Buddhist studies adopts for its method of historical stratification of scriptures (Higher Criticism). In short, the presence of myth in a scripture is most of the time a strong argument against its original purity, and thus against the possibility that the text in question represents an early stage in the history of its development and transmission. In that way, the presence or absence of myth in a scripture is often considered a good indicator for dating texts.56. Southern) Buddhist, for two reasons: As a fundamentalist who prides himself on the pristine purity and authenticity of his tradition and scriptures, he does not take kindly to talk about myth, symbolism, and the like. The other reason is that the distinction in Western thought between the symbolic and literal, or the mythical and historical, is largely foreign to the Buddhist and Eastern way of thinking. (…) In case the distinction is made, Buddhism tends to regard the mental and subjective realm as the more essential and real.” In a quote like this, for example, myth denotes the opposite of purity and authenticity in a tradition, and thus it has a clear negative value, while at the same time it is implicitly related with the mental and subjective realm, which, according to this author, is exactly what the Buddhist tradition considers as more essential and real!” 54 See the rest of this chapter for some examples. 55 For a classical example, see Carus, Paul. “The Mythology of Buddhism.” The Monist. Vol. 7.3 Apr (1897): 415-445. 56 For a criticism of the method see Gombrich, Richard. “Recovering the Buddha’s 45.

(50) Notwithstanding this, and surprisingly, Buddhist studies have not developed a theory of myth. Important authors interested in the study of texts normally identified as myth pay little attention to any theoretical implications.57 The definition used is most of the time simply commonsensical,58 (corresponding to what we have named before the SDM). In any case, there seems to be a consensus in the scholarly community, both East and West, that myth is a matter of secondary importance for the core of Buddhism; it is presumed that myths (or mythical elements) are marginal, and have no relevance to the core of the religion, or that they are merely symbols of doctrine. So if myths are studied, it must always be in relation of dependence with another element. Naturally, this other element often happens to be philosophical doctrine.59 The historical origins for this situation have been convincingly explained by modern scholars working on the self-critical dimension of the discipline. In particular, Message.” Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka (Panels of The VIIth World Sanskrit Conference VOL. II). Eds. David Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen. The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1990. 5-23. According to Gombrich, the method was developed by Frauwallner and we must “remember that most of that work was applied to philosophical texts which were undoubtedly written and read. (…) the kind of analysis which can dissect a written philosophical tradition is inappropriate for oral materials.” (Gombrich 1990. p. 8). 57 See for example the case of Gethin and Gombrich, discussed in our fourth chapter. 58 See Waldschmidt, E. Die Überlieferung vom Lebensende des Buddha: eine vergleichende Analyse des Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra und seiner Textentsprechungen. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1944–48. 59 A similar situation is that of Buddhist cosmology. However, works on Buddhist cosmology are more common, probably due to the fact that cosmology can be easily related to doctrine, and thus justified as metaphor or symbolical expression of philosophical doctrine. At the same time it can be discarded as an understandable pre-modern mistake. 46.

(51) the work of Philip C. Almond 60 in regard to the encounter and ‘discovery’ of Buddhism by the British Empire during the 19th century (and as a consequence the origins of the discipline of Buddhist studies), as well as several articles of Gregory Schopen 61 dealing with the opposition of archeological history against a textual history. Both scholars have made a call of attention towards what they call a Protestant ideology that has been operating behind the discipline of Buddhist studies. For Almond, many of the foundational theoretical assumptions of the discipline, among which we found those related with myth, have been carried over from the Victorian period where Buddhism as a religion was created for the West, when for the first time it “becomes an object” (Almond 12). Chief among these is the predominance of a constructed image of Buddhism based on text 62 (pure and idealized (not mythical). This text centrism is best understood as a continuation of the Protestant Christian ideology of the era, which had previously constructed an image of what ‘true religion’ should be. As such it opposed texts to tradition, history to myth, original message to. 60. Almond, Philip C. The British Discovery of Buddhism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 61 See Schopen, Gregory. Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: Collected papers on the Archeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India. United States of America: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997. 62 See Franklin, J. Jeffrey. The Lotus and The Lion: Buddhism and The British Empire. New York: Cornell University Press, 2008. 47.