Myth in Buddhist Studies - Myth as Narrative: Issues Regarding the Study of Myth in Buddhist S

3.1 Myth as corruption

There is a notorious lack of works dealing specifically with Buddhist ‘myths.’

The concept, for example, seems to be avoided from most general overviews of the religion.⁵¹ Thus, from and academic perspective, it could be perhaps easily concluded that the concept of myth has no importance whatsoever in the study of the religion.⁵² However, as we will see later, this is not the case.

In scholarly literature about Buddhism, three modes of use for myth are commonly encountered. The first, involves the use of the concept of ‘myth’ in an often un-technical way (generally lacking in precision). In this use the value given to the word is, generally speaking, negative, but even then, with contradictory and confusing connotations.⁵³ This mode often involves an apologetic discourse towards

51 See for example the conspicuous absence of ‘myth’ in Gombrich, Richard. What the Buddha Taught. London: Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2009, Gethin, Rupert. The Foundations of Buddhism. Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1998, and Warder, A. K. Indian Buddhism. India: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2000. The first two

52 One could even argue that scholars avoiding the word myth altogether are perhaps working under particular ideological assumptions (see Almond) about the Theravada form of the religion.

53 King, p. 211: “(…) the term ‘myth’ would not commend itself to a Theravada (or

the religion.⁵⁴

The second mode occupies an intermediary position between non-technical and technical modes of the use of myth. In it, myth is assumed to be somehow a metaphor or symbol for doctrine. Thus, words like kamma, bodhisattva, māra, are considered elements of Buddhist mythology,⁵⁵ interpreted as representations of doctrine.

The third mode of use is highly technical. In it, the negative valuation of myth is always connected with the theoretical assumptions that Buddhist studies adopts for its method of historical stratification of scriptures (Higher Criticism). In short, the presence of myth in a scripture is most of the time a strong argument against its original purity, and thus against the possibility that the text in question represents an early stage in the history of its development and transmission. In that way, the presence or absence of myth in a scripture is often considered a good indicator for

dating texts.⁵⁶

Southern) Buddhist, for two reasons: As a fundamentalist who prides himself on the pristine purity and authenticity of his tradition and scriptures, he does not take kindly to talk about myth, symbolism, and the like. The other reason is that the distinction in Western thought between the symbolic and literal, or the mythical and historical, is largely foreign to the Buddhist and Eastern way of thinking. (…) In case the distinction is made, Buddhism tends to regard the mental and subjective realm as the more essential and real.” In a quote like this, for example, myth denotes the opposite of purity and authenticity in a tradition, and thus it has a clear negative value, while at the same time it is implicitly related with the mental and subjective realm, which, according to this author, is exactly what the Buddhist tradition considers as more essential and real!”

54 See the rest of this chapter for some examples.

55 For a classical example, see Carus, Paul. “The Mythology of Buddhism.” The Monist. Vol. 7.3 Apr (1897): 415-445.

56 For a criticism of the method see Gombrich, Richard. “Recovering the Buddha’s

Notwithstanding this, and surprisingly, Buddhist studies have not developed a theory of myth. Important authors interested in the study of texts normally identified as myth pay little attention to any theoretical implications.⁵⁷ The definition used is most of the time simply commonsensical,⁵⁸ (corresponding to what we have named before the SDM).

In any case, there seems to be a consensus in the scholarly community, both East and West, that myth is a matter of secondary importance for the core of Buddhism; it is presumed that myths (or mythical elements) are marginal, and have no relevance to the core of the religion, or that they are merely symbols of doctrine. So if myths are studied, it must always be in relation of dependence with another element. Naturally, this other element often happens to be philosophical doctrine.⁵⁹

The historical origins for this situation have been convincingly explained by modern scholars working on the self-critical dimension of the discipline. In particular, Message.” Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka (Panels of The VIIth World Sanskrit Conference VOL. II). Eds. David Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen. The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1990. 5-23. According to Gombrich, the method was developed by Frauwallner and we must “remember that most of that work was applied to philosophical texts which were undoubtedly written and read. (…) the kind of analysis which can dissect a written philosophical tradition is inappropriate for oral materials.” (Gombrich 1990. p. 8).

57 See for example the case of Gethin and Gombrich, discussed in our fourth chapter.

58 See Waldschmidt, E. Die Überlieferung vom Lebensende des Buddha: eine vergleichende Analyse des Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra und seiner Textentsprechungen.

Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1944–48.

59 A similar situation is that of Buddhist cosmology. However, works on Buddhist cosmology are more common, probably due to the fact that cosmology can be easily related to doctrine, and thus justified as metaphor or symbolical expression of philosophical doctrine. At the same time it can be discarded as an understandable pre-modern mistake.

the work of Philip C. Almond⁶⁰ in regard to the encounter and ‘discovery’ of Buddhism by the British Empire during the 19^th century (and as a consequence the origins of the discipline of Buddhist studies), as well as several articles of Gregory Schopen⁶¹ dealing with the opposition of archeological history against a textual history. Both scholars have made a call of attention towards what they call a Protestant ideology that has been operating behind the discipline of Buddhist studies.

For Almond, many of the foundational theoretical assumptions of the discipline, among which we found those related with myth, have been carried over from the

Victorian period where Buddhism as a religion was created for the West, when for the first time it “becomes an object” (Almond 12). Chief among these is the

predominance of a constructed image of Buddhism based on text⁶² (pure and idealized (not mythical).

This text centrism is best understood as a continuation of the Protestant Christian ideology of the era, which had previously constructed an image of what ‘true religion’

should be. As such it opposed texts to tradition, history to myth, original message to

60 Almond, Philip C. The British Discovery of Buddhism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

61 See Schopen, Gregory. Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: Collected papers on the Archeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India. United States of America: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997.

62 See Franklin, J. Jeffrey. The Lotus and The Lion: Buddhism and The British Empire. New York: Cornell University Press, 2008.

corruption.⁶³

Almond distinguishes between two phases in the process of the Victorian creation of Buddhism. In the first phase, Buddhism remained located far away, exotic.

It is only in the second phase that an appropriation really started.⁶⁴

The successful cultural appropriation of Buddhism required a possession through texts.⁶⁵ At the same time this possession warranted the dominance and control over

63 The SDM (also accepted in Buddhist studies) probably has its origins here.

64 Almond, p. 13: “Originally existing 'out there' in the Oriental present, Buddhism came to be determined as an object the primary location of which was the West, through the progressive collection, translation, and publication of its textual past.

Buddhism, by 1860, had come to exist, not in the Orient, but in the Oriental libraries and institutes of the West, in its texts and manuscripts, at the desks of the Western savants who interpreted it. It had become a textual object, defined, classified, and interpreted through its own textuality. By the middle of the century, the Buddhism that existed 'out there' was beginning to be judged by a West that alone knew what Buddhism was, is, and ought to be. The essence of Buddhism came to be seen as expressed not 'out there' in the Orient, but in the West through the West's control of Buddhism's own textual past.”

65 Franklin, p. 5: “European scholars asserted the precedence of their textualized Buddhism over the indigenous practices of actual Buddhists in Asia. This represented a form of imperial appropriation of the religious other, a form of discursive violence that supplemented the physical violence of conquest and occupation. At its farthest remove from the violence that defines it, “discovery” must be understood as

“construction”: the process by which nineteenth-century British culture assimilated or failed to assimilate elements of Buddhism.”

66 Almond p. 66-67: “(…) for there is a very real sense in which, especially as

reconstruction of the historical Buddha, his original teachings, and an earlier, more pure form of the religion: an idealized version of Buddhism was born.

The problem was myth. After all, the Buddha was 500 years older than Jesus (at the very limits of any possible Indian history), with more than enough time for the development and expansion of all kinds of non-historical material (myth), which now was covering the earliest, purest strata.

Thus a method was developed to separate the original elements from the later corruptions or accretions. The principle involved the exclusion of the miraculous and the supernatural from what was considered historical accurate. (Almond 65)

The discussion between an idealized reconstructed Buddhism affected the way Mahāyāna Buddhism was initially perceived. Contrasting the ideal textual purity of an

artificial Buddhism was the reality of the then contemporary degenerated Mahāyāna, and “a discourse of 'pure' versus 'corrupt' Buddhism was developed on the foundation

of the historical priority of Pali Buddhism and the posteriority of Mahāyāna Buddhism.” (Almond 95)

In relation to this, the Pāli Canon of the Theravada tradition gained a position as primus inter pares; it was conceived as historically closer to the supposed original

doctrine of the Buddha, not only due to its presumed antiquity. It was also considered regards its methodology, British research into the life of the Buddha paralleled that of European research into Jesus [and thus it would] not be unreasonable to surmise that, indirectly at least, there may have been some influence.”

more reliable due to the apparent fewer presence of myth in it.⁶⁷

From this apparently low proportional quantity of myth, it was possible to push for an even more original construction, leading to what was to be called Early Buddhism, and then to what was the original doctrine of the Buddha.⁶⁸

As Schopen has shown, this text-centric method and its idealized object continue to have a position of predominance in Buddhist studies even today. Although more critical voices like Schopen have started to be felt. Trainor,⁶⁹ for example, talks about

a consensus among modern Western scholars that agrees that the texts of the various Buddhist traditions “cannot provide much historically reliable information about the details of the Buddha’s life.” (Trainor 4)

Yet some scholars still “want to assume that accounts of miraculous occurrences

and passages depicting a devotional attitude toward the person of the Buddha (…)

67 Reat, p. 49: “Then as now, the vast majority of Indians lived under the loft canopy of a highly sophisticated spirituality, but contented themselves with a simple religion focused upon a variety of supernatural beings believed to exert influence upon their day-to-day lives. (…) Nikaya Buddhism, by contrast, was not in a position to participate in this devotional trend. Its doctrines clearly condemn rituals and portray the various popular deities as being deluded or as being followers of the Buddha.”

68 Almond, p. 66: “Already back then there where critical voices not so optimistic.

Rhys Davids himself was not immune from such criticism. Edgar Ware in The Fortnightly Review criticized his rationalistic approach. 'The modern system', he wrote, of rejecting whatever is supernatural, and accepting the residue as historical, gives a very charming and not improbable romance, as may be seen in Mr Rhys David's [sic] graceful article in the present edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

But this account is not a whit more trustworthy than early Roman history as constructed on the principle of Niebuhr or a German or French life of Jesus of Nazareth.’”

69 Trainor, Kevin. Relics, ritual, and representation in Buddhism: Rematerializing the Sri Lankan Theravada tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

represent later strata in the developing Buddha legend.” (Trainor 5)

So at the center of the problem of reconstructing the original teachings of the Buddha is the question of the historical stratification of the Pāli suttas, and myth

works as another criterion of authenticity in determining this. Likewise, the valuation of the Pāli Canon is somehow directly connected with the problem of the modern

understanding of myth and its opposition to truth, in the form of a negative relationship: less myth equals more historical truth.

But then, how is it possible that considering the technical importance given to myth there is no real theory developed for Buddhist studies?

For scholars of Buddhism, the problem of myth is demanding. Myth or mythical elements in the Pāli Canon appear contradictory to the sanitized and idealized western construct of a ‘hypothetical original core’ of the Buddhist doctrine. If myth is present in the Pāli Canon, the question is whether it is traceable to the Buddha himself or it is

a posterior development (a corruption). In the context of a teacher that apparently⁷⁰ discouraged his followers from useless speculations not conducing to salvation, what are we to make of the presence of myth in the earliest scriptures?

Thus, myth becomes useful tool when it can be trimmed. This has been the most common way of dealing with the problem of myth in Buddhism scholarship, apart

70 As in some, and only some texts.

from ignoring it completely. Myths cannot be traced back in time to the Buddha. Myth doesn’t make sense, unless in a negative way: less myth means more truth. More myth

means more development, more corruption.

Thus, myth is an almost automatic disqualifying criterion for authenticity, and when you remove it from the text (as a part or mythical elements) or we you remove an entire sutta (as a text or narrative) the rest can be restored to their original pristine form.

3.2 Hidden or disguised myth

Now we turn to TrV in Buddhist studies. Myth has such a strong negative value behind, that when it is described as an essential component of any religion there are those scholars who would want to affirm then, that, since Buddhism lacks myth, it should not be considered a religion.

Even a reputed scholar like Walpola Rahula, in his now classic introduction to Buddhism,⁷¹ felt compelled to suggest that the religion may well deserve to be

considered as something else instead. He even affirmed that whether Buddhism was part of the category ‘religion’ or not was irrelevant.⁷²

71 Rahula, Walpola. What the Buddha Taught. USA: Gordon Fraser, 1959.

72 Rahula, p. 1: “Among the founders of religions the Buddha (if we are permitted to call him the founder of a religion in the popular sense of the term) was only a teacher who did not claim to be other than a human being, pure and simple.” Also, Rahula p.

5: “(…) the question has often been asked: Is Buddhism a religion or a philosophy? It

The labels may well be irrelevant for a believer involved in apologetics, but doubtfully so for a scholar. The important thing is that the suggestion that ‘Buddhism is not a religion’ converges and is inter-dependent with the idea that there is no myth in it. For establishing the link between no-myth and no-religion, another idea closely related is brought forward: there is no place for faith in Buddhism.

For scholars fond of thinking of myth as a false narrative, and religion understood as an institution which demands belief in myths (unproven or simply false stories), Buddhism should not be considered a religion, because, as the argument goes, it doesn’t demand belief or faith⁷³

However, the Buddhism defended and proclaimed in such arguments is not a real, historical Buddhism; it is rather an idealized textual version invented by the West (Almond) in the age of Colonialism, under the influence of the Protestant ideology;

indeed, a Buddhism without any real foundation beyond philology. As a proof, this idealized version of Buddhism contradicts a great number of real observed phenomena that has a direct connection with myth, belief, and faith in the East, whether modern or past.

And even when considering Theravada Buddhism the problem of myth is not as does not matter what you call it. Buddhism remains what it is whatever label you may put on it. The label is immaterial.”[!].

73 Rahula, p. 8: “Almost all religions are built on faith-rather ‘blind’ faith it would seem. But in Buddhism emphasis is laid on ‘seeing’, knowing, understanding, and not on faith, or belief.”

simple as it is made to appear by some scholars. Winston L King⁷⁴ has cleverly manifested the inherent theoretical problems and contradictions of considering any

Buddhism, including Theravada Buddhism (and even Zen), as pure of myth. For King, even a ‘pure’ and ‘absolute’ experience (that is, devoid of ‘cosmic and historical relativities’) is “conditioned and formed in the matrix of Buddhist ideas about the nature of the self, its innate capacities, and its relation to the universe about it.” (King

218)

According to King it is simply impossible to escape the formative power of this

‘matrix.’ And he suggests that perhaps this ‘pure experience’ may be indeed a form of

“new super-symbolism in which psychological attitudes, their genesis, development,

and significance have become a new cosmology, a metaphysic of action if not of concept.” (King 218) And thus, we may add, a new form of myth. King calls this a

mythos in-reverse.⁷⁵

But returning to our practical concerns, after it is affirmed that there cannot be myth in Buddhism, what happens with all those things that under the dominance of a SDM should be considered myth or mythical?

74 King, Winston L. “Myth in Buddhism: Essential or Peripheral?” Journal of Bible and Religion. Vol. 29.3 Jul (1961): 211-218.

75 King, p. 218: “It becomes a mythos-in-reverse, which, instead of reworking historical and natural realities in terms of human value apprehensions in the usual religious manner, takes man's inner mental states and calls them ultimate realities.

Whether a system of mythically reworked history and nature, or one of cosmologized mind-states, is the more dependent upon myth, it is impossible to decide.”

Three options are commonly followed to deal with them by scholars: a. they are simply ignored, b. they are disguised as something else, or c. they are considered extraneous and posterior to the original text or doctrine in question.⁷⁶

For the first option, which happens to be the easiest one, a scholar just needs to follow the artificial idealized Western construction of Buddhism, which we mentioned before. It is also common in the studies of Buddhism, that when cautious authors want to avoid the use of myth as a general category, they satisfy themselves with changing noun for adjective: thus, instead of a clear definition of myth we get mythical

在文檔中 Myth as Narrative: Issues Regarding the Study of Myth in Buddhist Studies, With Particular Interest in the Mahāsudassana Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya (頁 48-66)