2.1 The priority of the problem of ‘what is myth.’
While it would be perhaps exaggerated to suggest that nothing has been
advanced for the study of myth since Lévi-Strauss published “The Structural Study of Myth,”18 it has to be recognized that his complain about the chaotic situation in what he calls ‘field of mythology’19 remains true today. The study of myth is still
considered a problematic, contested, and polemic sub/inter-field,20 where, broadly speaking, consensus is hard to find.
It is interesting to note that what Lévi-Strauss describes as ‘studies in the field of mythology’ roughly correspond for him to theories of interpretations of myth. Thus,
his complain protests the fact of the multiplicity of interpretations. Nowhere does Lévi-Strauss, in his seminal article “The Structural Study of Myth,” suggests that problems in myth interpretation could be traced back to faults in definitions of myth.
Indeed, it could be argued, without a spirit of polemic, that in “The Structural
18 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. “The Structural Study of Myth.” Myth: A Symposium. Spec.
issue of The Journal of American Folklore. Vol. 68 (1955): 428-444.
19 “Of all the chapters of religious anthropology, none has tarried to the same extent as studies in the field of mythology. From a theoretical point of view the situation remains (…) chaotic. Myths are still widely interpreted in conflicting ways: as collective dreams, as the outcome of a kind of esthetic play, or as the basis of ritual.”
(Lévi-Strauss 207)
20 Often confusingly crossing over several disciplines.
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Study of Myth,” Lévi-Strauss does not give a definition of myth, and instead replaces
it with an analysis of the structure of it.
In a previous article,21 Lévi-Strauss had emphatically asserted that “myth form takes precedence over the content of the narrative.” It has been argued before,22 however, that for Lévi-Strauss ‘structure’ indeed amounts to ‘content.’23 His listing of narrative contents in columns had the obvious final purpose of establishing a new form of relational interpretation. It follows then, that in his mind, this listing of contents somehow replaces the need for a definition of myth.
But the fact that his listing is made of units of narrative contents (‘Cadmos kills the dragon,’ ‘Oedipus kills his father Laios’), contradicts his discussion of myth in terms of comparison with Saussure’s concepts of langue and parole, or with the
metaphor of music. The value of his units is given by their contents, and not by their form.
An analysis of the structure of myth already presumes the knowledge of the observed object’s limits. But according to Lévi-Strauss what are those? Or, in other
words, how or on what principles an observer should distinguish myth from that
21 Lévi-Strauss, Claude. “The Effectiveness of Symbol.” Structural Anthropology.
United States of America: Basic Books, 1963.
22 Additionally, Lévi-Strauss study of myth has been severely criticized in part due to his wrong use of the concept of structure, which in most cases merely denotes contents (see Righter, William. Myth and Literature. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1975).
23 Righter, p.19.
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which is not myth? Where did he get his basic units of form/content?
When Lévi-Strauss takes the content of certain myths for analysis he has already decided that they are myth. He does not share this method of distinction or identification with the reader.
More seriously, he is not even defining them in relation to his so called structure, or in relation to any form of interpretation24. He has not even used the idea of structure to choose myth from other narratives, and in fact, since his concept of structure can be better understood as content, his method of analysis could be applied to any type of narrative with similar results!25
In the end he has not provided an effective way to chose myth, and thus we have not received an answer for the question of what is myth. Besides the hypothetical possibility of finding a general law of the structure of myth,26 which remains open, we are left empty handed.
Lévi-Strauss also suggests that his structural analysis is, in the end, a proper method for understanding myth. However, it is our contention here, that an interpretation cannot be accepted as a definition, and neither can it occupy its place in
24 Like Mircea Eliade, as wee will show later.
25 Lévi-Strauss did not start his work from an observation and comparison of narratives. A proper structural analysis of myth, if such a thing is possible, would have required first an structural identification of myth. For example, an extensive analysis of the structure of narrative, then a selection of those narratives that, diverging similarly in structure, could be identified as myth. Only then a description would have made sense.
26 Expressed in his idiosyncratic formula [Fx(a): Fy(b) 〜 Fx(b):Fa-1(y)].
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a theory of myth. To detail the structure of an object somehow already identified as myth is not the same as defining myth by its structure. This is an important point.
But necessarily, each time an interpretation is tried, a definition must be assumed.
Furthermore, it is pertinent to ask whether it is even possible to provide interpretations without knowing ‘what exactly is a myth.’ When we see the structural method of
Lévi-Strauss, we don’t see this definition. Logically there must be one that has made him choose between some units and not others, between some narrative texts and not
others. It is as if Lévi-Strauss was working under such strong convictions of knowing
‘what is myth’ that he simply did not need to define his object of study. This is our
first important clue.
The initial problem in the theory of myths should be first not how to interpret myth, but how to define and how to identify myth, that is, how to distinguish the object
or material that we chose to call myth. In the center of any theory of myth should be the definition of myth. That is what we understood by what is myth; a definition that clearly casts the observed object in a set or paradigm of theoretical delimitations.
2.2 The failure of theories of myth
In the encounter of theories of ‘myth,’ one gets the impression of the absolute elusive nature of the concept; ‘myth’ appears to be that kind of word that, despite its
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extensive use, it always manages to escape from clear theoretical boundaries.
Besides the share number of different theories of myth available there may be several other reasons for this problem. For example, we have the dispersion of its study across disciplines, each discipline in its turn harboring multiple, sometimes conflicting theories of myth.27 It is then not surprising that the concept is confusing, difficult to track, and not precise.
Naturally, theories of myth are closely dependant on the context and purpose that
motivated its conceptual origin. Thus, “theories of myth are theories of some much larger domain, with myth a mere subset.” (Segal 2) As such, “there are no theories of
myth itself, for there is no discipline of myth in itself. There is no study of myth as myth.” (Segal 2)
In other words, the study of myth has never configured a study in itself. This fact is important, and should be considered more thoroughly. We could put this in the following way: myth is not the main object of any discipline. This means, naturally, that myth is always studied in relation to something else (be it society, literature, culture, mind, art, religion, etc.), constituting a secondary object. In other words, to be qualified and quantified it is always dependent of something different from itself.
Thus, myth is like a shadow that only becomes visible when something else is
27 See Robert A. Segal in Myth: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
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illuminated. This fact, paradoxically, could be yet another of the causes of the concept’s theoretical obscurity and a reason for the multiplicity of its definitions.
Now, the considerable amount of interpretations in addition to the lack of specialized theories for the study of myth in-itself, almost inevitably raises the following suspicion: does myth really exist? Does myth really correspond to a concrete object or phenomenon? Or is it whatever we want it to be? Is it, finally, a useful category? As one famous scholar of myth puts it, “it is essential to have a clear idea of what myths are and what myths are not, and, so far as possible, of the ways in which they are likely to operate.”28
A detailed review of the definitions of myth is beyond the scope of this short-sized work. But we can do without it thanks to the fact that there are already an important number of book-length discussions dealing with the most influential ones.29 Most of these works start with an entire chapter dedicated at listing the varieties of theories of myths.30
28 Kirk: Introduction, pg 2.
29 For some, see in our bibliography Ken Dowden in The Uses of Greek Mythology, William Righter in Myth and Literature, Milton Scarbough in Myth and Modernity:
Postcritical Reflections, and Robert A. Segal in Myth: A Very Short Introduction. For examples of definitions see G. S. Kirk in Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures, or for the strange lack of it see Claude Lévi-Strauss in “The Structural Study of Myth.” in The Journal of American Folklore. Vol. 68: 428-444.
For an extensive anthology of theories, definitions, and methods of interpretation, see the anthology Sacred Narratives: Readings in The Theory of Myth, by Alan Dundes.
This last one in particular is an excellent example of the multiplicity in the study of myth in the discipline of Religious studies, with several short articles discussing old definitions and presenting new ones.
30 Righter, p. 9: “Most definitions [of myth] exist at a very high level of generality,
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According to him, the functionalist theories of myth “describe myth in terms of its operation within a social structure, often in connection with a ritual which marks a stage in the development or progress of the individual through his life cycle.” (Righter 15) Bronisław Malinowski is given as an example of this category.
Psychological theories of myth trace its origins to the hidden constitution of the
mind, thus establishing a causative link between the mind and myth. Righter lists under this category Sigmund Freud and Carl G. Jung, and surprisingly the work of
and an admission of the multiple nature of the subject is built into them. (…) ‘Myth is narrative, irrational… and comes to mean any anonymously composed story telling of origins and destinies, the explanation a society offers its young of why the world is and why we do as we do, its pedagogic images of the nature and destiny of man’
(Warren and Wellek). Or, ‘Myth is to be defined as a complex of stories – some no doubt fact, and some fantasy – which, for various reasons, human beings regard as demonstrations of the inner meaning of the universe of human life’ (Alan Watts).
Others assign such a multiplicity of causes as to be almost completely meaningless:
‘Myth is a universal cultural phenomenon originating in a plurality of motives and involving all mental faculties’ (David Bidney). Still others wish to establish the character of myth as an imaginative language in its own right: ‘An autonomous form of the human spirit, with its own structure, function, expression … with unity of feeling’ (Cassirer). Or, ‘A myth … is a schema of the imagination which, (…) is capable of effectively organizing our way of viewing portions of the external world in accord with its distinctions’ (Joseph Margolis).”
31 Righter, William. Myth and Literature. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1975.
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Claude Lévi-Strauss.
For Righter, of all the groups, religious theories of myth are the most ambiguous as well as the less objective. In them, myth is presented as having syncretistic and vague metaphysical or religious foundations. Here he places authors like Joseph Campbell, Mircea Eliade, and Heinrich Zimmer.
Finally, theories of symbolic form describe myth as a ‘self contained and self referential symbolic language.’ As a form of symbolic language myth is expression of feelings (experience), thus it is understood in a much broader sense, almost as a fiction. Cassirer is the example here.
The building of broad categories for the multiplicity of myth is an ingenious way of trying to make order of an academic zone that has none. But then again, Righter is only one of several authors struggling to give some order by following a similar pattern. Segal, for example, affirms that each modern theory of myth starts from at least one of three different questions, which can be described as questions of origin,
function, and subject matter.
By origin, Segal means ‘why and how a myth arises.’ By function, ‘why and how myth persists,’ by subject matter, the referent of myth. Segal affirms that the answer to
the first two questions is often a need, which myth fulfills. The condition for myth existence in time is this fulfillment, thus myth lasts as long as it fulfills this need.
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What this need is, according to Segal, varies from theory to theory. (Segal 2)
Notice first, however, how none of these broad categories as explained by Righter or Segal actually deal with myth in-itself. Second, all these groups or categories of inquiry clearly correspond to different disciplinary interests and thus methods of approaching issues related with ‘myth,’ like history, psychology –origin, sociology, anthropology –function, or religious studies and structuralism –subject matter (Righter’s religious and symbolic form), etc. Indeed, it could be argued that
theories of myth naturally ought to diverge because they simply start from different phenomena related to myth, but never from myth itself: they simply don’t share the object of study.
At the same time, it should be evident how definitions of myth are always tied by necessity to particular disciplinary interpretations of myth, since each discipline has
already its own object(s) of study. Then, these theories want to say something about what myth means in relation to that other object. A hypothesis could follow from this:
definitions of myth are backwardly constructed to accommodate prior assumptions of
what myths must mean (interpretation).
2.3 The construction of definitions of myth from interpretations
This is perhaps even more evident in theories inclined to phenomenology, like
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Mircea Eliade’s.32 In Eliade’s definition, for example, myth narrates a sacred
history,33 which likewise is defined by the terms of its content: it is a narrative
‘telling’ or ‘description’ of a creation-event of a reality in a special time (a time out of
history), by supernatural beings. This he describes as an irruption of the sacred into define myth. The problem, however, is that Eliade’s definition is reductionist: it forces a distinction of myth only in terms of the concepts of his interpretation. Thus, it seems that his theory has started not from the observation of narratives, but from a previous selection, based on his own interpretation. It naturally leaves then an immense group
32 Eliade, Mircea. Myth and Reality. Trans. Willard R. Trask. Illinois: Waveland Press Inc., 1998.
33 Eliade 1998, p. 7: “(…) myth narrates a sacred history; it relates an event that took place in primordial Time, the fabled time of the ‘beginnings. In other words myth tells how, through the deeds of Supernatural Beings, a reality came into existence, be it the whole of reality, the Cosmos, or only a fragment of reality—an island, a species of plant, a particular kind of human behavior, an institution. Myth then is always an account of a ‘creation’; it relates how something was produced, began to be. Myth tells only of that which really happened, which manifested itself completely. (…) In short, myths describe the various and sometimes dramatic breakthroughs of the sacred (or the ‘supernatural’) into the World.”
34 Ellwood, Robert. The Politics of Myth: A Study of C. G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, and Joseph Campbell. New York: State University of New York Press. 1999.
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of narratives arbitrarily out of the concept of myth.
This definition of myth not only depends of Eliade’s particular concepts of the sacred, the profane, and of time, but it also restricts myth rather subjectively to those
narratives that pertain to creation or origin, themselves concepts broad and rather ambiguous. Then, irrespective of the evaluation of such a definition, we are forced to exclude a great number of narratives by a mere personal inclination posing as a real qualitative method of distinction.
In this way, the definition of myth is reduced to an interpretative theory. The
‘theory’ does not show us clearly how to recognize what is myth from what is not
without an interpretation operating, forcing us also to accept the interpretation in question.
Let’s put this in different terms. If we were to ask ‘where are we to find myth’ or
‘how are we to identify it,’ the following answer would be forced on us -only in those
texts that presumably support the interpretation.
It might be argued, of course, that any concept inevitably has its origin in a similar accident: definitions are up to a certain extent always arbitrary and subjective, and depend on other concepts. But here the problem seems to be that a definition seems to have been backwardly constructed to accommodate, validate, and justify a particular method of interpretation, a particular understanding of what myth ought to
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mean. In other words, the interpretation’s concepts are responsible for determining, what is myth.35
It follows that the center of such an interpretation lays on the concepts which at the same time are used to delimit the object ‘myth’ (see 3 on Table 1). Out of this interpretative context, away from its concepts, that which has been identified as myth (see 4 on table 1) disappears completely. Thus the capacity of explanation of such a definition is problematic, since it depends on the acceptance of a very specific type of interpretation. And is not applicable to phenomena not corresponding to the interpretation, and cannot say anything of myth in general.
This method of constructing definitions from interpretations is not unique of
Mircea Eliade. We have already mentioned how Lévi-Strauss replaces a definition by an analysis of ‘structure’ (his method of interpretation), falling in a similar kind of
pitfall. But our intention here is not to reject the validity of any interpretation, but to call into question the process of constructing definitions from interpretations. Myth, in this way, is not an observed36 but rather a constructed object, built from the requirements of a previously designed interpretation.
35 We provide 2 diagrams. In Table 1 we have tried to visually describe the process of the construction of a theory of myth from a previous definition, while in Table 2 we describe how the process should be, ideally.
36 Of course every observation implies a construction, but here the important thing is whether this construction is based on phenomena observed, or merely on an interpretative theory.
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The fact that interpretations have priority over definitions seems to be a particular problem of myth theories. However any interpretation requires a previous
The fact that interpretations have priority over definitions seems to be a particular problem of myth theories. However any interpretation requires a previous