Introduction - Myth as Narrative: Issues Regarding the Study of Myth in Buddhist Studies, With

1.1 Presentation of the problem

The reader holds in his hands yet another work with ‘myth’ on its title. As such,

it may be bound to provoke a certain level of rejection, especially in a type of critical

reader we are aiming it for. But this work follows a rather different path than most works on myth; we write it somehow starting from that exasperation (let’s call it academic skepticism), that the word ‘myth’ often generates, especially in the quarters

of a discipline so important for Buddhist studies as Philology. Thus, before we can get started, some essential clarifications ought to be made.

First of all, this is a work on the problem of defining myth. The need to define with precision ‘myth’ arises logically in the process of the analysis of myth. To talk about myth one has first to identify clearly ‘what is myth.’ Our guess is that if a definition of ‘myth’ presents problems, or if it is not clearly stated, the value of the

analysis remains in doubt.

The problem of the definition of myth in analysis must be clearly distinguished from the problem of interpretation of myth, with which it is often confused. A definition of myth simply permits and allows an analysis of myth (through the identification of the object named ‘myth’). An analysis is thus a first exploration into

the details, symbols and configurations of a myth, in other words a first reading into what the myth ‘says.’

Interpretations, on the other hand, are second readings that go far beyond this first reading, towards a ‘meaning’ (what the myth is ‘really’ saying ‘now’). As such interpretations of myth have to do with hermeneutics, and are perhaps away of the reach of Philology.¹

Then, our work is concerned with the definitions of myth in myth analysis, but not with the problem of interpretation of myth. From the beginning it must be

understood that this work does not intend to explain, justify, or unravel any particular myth, or its meanings, but it is solely preoccupied with the questions of ‘what is

myth,’ and thus with ‘how to identify myth.’²

But under the weight of so many works on myth, from the widest range of

disciplines, our question already appears as strange, or worst, as unnecessary. For how could it be that we want to discuss ‘what is myth’ when most scholars are already

preoccupied with other problems related to myth, like interpretations or functions? A

definition of myth is not a necessary step before any analysis and interpretation?

Exactly, this is our main contention: that the question ‘what is myth’ has been

1 See, for example, Paul Ricoeur’s comments about the hermeneutic interpretations of myth in the Introduction to The Symbolism of Evil. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970.

2 As we will explain later, however, in Chapter V we present a possible model for a definition of myth and how it could be used in analysis.

avoided. Let’s put this in different words. In current academic parlance discussions about ‘what is myth’ are generally equated with discussions about secondary phenomena related to myth, like the functions of myth.³ It is thought, for example, that one can only know what myth is when one is sure about what it does.⁴

When discourse turns to functions of myth, it already implies a previous capacity of identification of the object that it chose to call ‘myth.’ Obviously, to talk about the functions of myth it is required some kind of operable definition of myth.⁵ Similarly, in the discourse of interpretations of myth⁶ a definition must necessarily be present.

Now, we believe there is a very simple problem here that has been overlooked.

Our hypothesis is this: it seems that when one turns to the methodology of theories of myth, it is possible to notice that, in many cases, either there is no definition clearly stated or a definition is constructed from a particular method of interpretation.⁷

Following this argument, as we hope to prove in the course of our work, one can

3 See Kirk, G. S. Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures.

London: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

4 Function (purpose) and interpretation (meaning) are different categories, but are often considered as inter-dependant. Thus, it is thought that the purpose of a particular myth is determined by its meaning, and thus its interpretation. See Ricoeur and Kirk above. Psychological theories of myth like that of C. G. Jung start from similar assumptions. See Ellwood, Robert. The Politics of Myth: A Study of C. G. Jung, Mircea Eliade, and Joseph Campbell. New York: State University of New York Press.

1999.

5 That is, a definition that can recognize and distinguish myth as a unit with particular properties or characteristics.

6 Interpretation is perhaps the central topic today for any theory of myth. We evaluate this state of affairs in a negative way. One of our hypothesis is that this obsession for interpretations of myth has naturally conduced to a situation where definitions are seen as ‘secondary,’ or dependant on interpretations.

7 For our purposes, a method of interpretation involves a theoretical set of concepts.

observe how works on myth do not effectively describe how to identify or recognize myth. Instead, authors use myths as a support or proof to their particular

interpretations. The first question of what is myth (and thus how myths should be identified) is postponed as secondary, as if the answer would appear only after the particular interpretation has been confirmed. Here is where the relevance of asking again the question of ‘what is myth’ should start to become clear.

We will try to prove this while positing back the question of definition to the center of a discussion on myth.

1.2 Myth in a particular religious tradition: Buddhism

Second, if our previous hypothesis is correct then it follows that a comparative analysis of myth is, at this point, not a good idea. If we don’t know how to properly

identify myth in particular traditions, comparisons between them necessarily add to the difficulties.

While many times theories of myth are developed in a broad comparative way, this inquiry will be necessarily centered on one, and only one particular religion:

Buddhism.

However that won’t be enough. Buddhism is a multi-branched tradition. Before

talking about Buddhist myth in general, a consensus about it must be achieved first in

the entire Buddhist tradition.

Thus, merely talking about Buddhist myth won’t be specific enough. Again, we are aiming for identification of myth, and thus we have to concentrate on a particular historical and textual form of the religion. Thus, we will be mainly concentrating on

what is called Theravada Buddhism. This could be seen as shorthanded but we deem it as necessary.

We also chose to concentrate on Theravada Buddhism because this tradition is often singled-out as the closest to an early form of Buddhism, and as such as the most non-mythical form of traditional Buddhism. It should be easier then, on principle, to isolate myth in it. We also hope that ideological prejudices against myth can present themselves more clearly in it.

1.3 Self-criticism of our discipline

This work, then, should be understood in the context of a relatively recent self-critical tendency in Buddhist studies. As such, it is rooted on some of the conclusions drawn by the previous work of authors such as Philip C. Almond⁸ and Gregory Schopen.⁹

8 Philip C Almond, The British Discovery of Buddhism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

9 Schopen, Gregory. Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks: Collected papers on the Archeology, Epigraphy, and Texts of Monastic Buddhism in India. United States of America: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997.

Almond, in his book The British Discovery of Buddhism, traces the development and inclinations of the discipline of Buddhist studies to the context of Colonialism

and to a particular set of beliefs and ideas corresponding to it, which he identifies as

‘Protestant.’ This ideology can best be described as “a particular European

interpretation of the Buddhist tradition, shaped by the rationalistic and anti-ritualistic ethos.”¹⁰ In other words, it posses an inherent inclination to exclude from its inquiry,

the irrational, and more specifically, phenomena related to myth and ritual practice.

This Protestant ideology naturally influenced the nascent discipline of Buddhist studies in its research methods, which as a consequence became almost exclusively

textual-oriented. (Almond 37) Following the tradition of protestant reformers ‘the locus of true religion’¹¹ was to be found in scripture alone.

This was naturally followed by an idealization through text, that created an

‘image of decay, decadence, and degeneration’ for contemporary Eastern Buddhism,

at the same time that it created and constructed an ideal Buddhism of the past.

(Almond 40)

From the work of Almond we can presume that one of the key concepts operating for this idealization was indeed myth. It is probably through the control of

10 See Trainor, Kevin. Relics, ritual, and representation in Buddhism:

Rematerializing the Sri Lankan Theravada tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) p. 11.

11 Schopen, p. 13.

the concept of myth, or rather, through the negative valuation of myth, that a pure and idealized Buddhism could be created and maintained in time. It is through a decidedly anti-mythical reading of texts that its idealization could be defended. And it is also through the criticism of myth that a factual Eastern Buddhism could be deprecated.

That was the picture of the 19^th Century drawn by Almond (mainly on Theravada Buddhism). How much of this historical picture remains an issue in the 21^st Century?

Is the concept of myth still today somehow under the influence of that Protestant ideology? While Almond’s study does not go beyond the 19^th century, Schopen, in his

anthology of articles Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks,¹² suggests, convincingly in my opinion, how much this Protestant ideology, in the form of textual centrism, is still present today in the history-making of the discipline of Buddhist studies.

But Schopen is only concerned with the centrality of texts (against archeology) in relation to a historical inquiry. He is not concerned with myth. It is interesting to note here, nevertheless, that myth could perhaps have something to do with the fact of textual centrism described by him.

One of Schopen repeated complains is how the finds of archeology have been often softened, silenced, or ignored by scholars of Buddhist studies, especially when

12 Specially in his articles “Archeology and Protestant Presuppositions in the Study of Indian Buddhism” and “Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman/Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of the Transference of Merit.”

the data contradict the texts.¹³ Considering that a great part of his articles in the anthology Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks centers on the phenomena of the stupa cult, and as such it is connected to beliefs about death and the cult of the dead, it sounds reasonable to assume that the negative valuation of myth could have something to do with this.¹⁴

We should regard then the concept of myth as important, since it is often closely related to many elements that have largely remained marginal and peripheral in Buddhist studies. In addition, a proper understanding of myth may help us understand better a non-idealized historical Buddhist tradition.

1.4 Main difficulties

Our intention is, then, to carefully and tentatively explore some issues regarding the study of myth in Buddhist studies, with particular attention of the Theravada tradition. However, we must recognize, from the very start, some serious difficulties inherent in such an enterprise.

Theories of myth are highly problematic and polemic, even in the older and broader field of Religious studies: the theoretical material is enormous, and many

13 Schopen, p. 2.

14 Consider for example the implicit importance of myth in Schopen’s article “Burial Ad Sanctos and the Physical Presence of the Buddha in Early Indian Buddhism,” also from the same collection.

times confusing and even contradictory.

Probably the two most important difficulties that we will be facing are: first, the fact that there is no theory of myth developed from Buddhist studies; that is, no theory of myth has been specially made for the study of Buddhism. And second, the fact that there are few works dealing with Buddhist myth properly.

Thus, our project necessarily cannot aspire to be more than propaedeutic. With that in mind, we will concentrate on how the problem of a definition of myth appears in Buddhist studies of the Theravada tradition. Now, considering the possibility of the

so called Protestant ideology in the discipline, we will be paying special attention to the negative valuation of myth, as a result of it.

Our hypothesis will be that, whenever a definition of myth manifests a negative valuation of myth (whenever it is affected ideologically in this way); the definition in question will have theoretical problems, especially in relation to its ability to distinguish myth-narratives from non-myth narratives (the object of study).

At the same time we will try to show how this problem is connected to general limitations of the methods of Buddhist studies, due to Philology’s natural reticence

towards theory.¹⁵ Thus, of all the disciplines dealing with religion, Buddhist studies

seems to have remained farthest isolated from the problem of the concept of myth,

15 Pollock, Sheldon. Future Philology? The Fate of a Soft Science in a Hard World.

Critical Inquiry 35 (Summer 2009) p. 931-961.

thanks also to its perceived non-theism.¹⁶ Yet, because of this, it has maintained itself dependant of other disciplines for the study of myth, and also not up to date with advancements in its study.

Thus, we are also interested in assessing how much, due to its importance in Buddhist studies, the traditional and conservative position of Philology against theory in general can conflict or harmonize with the necessity of a theory of myth. We start from the assumption that myth is narrative, and thus as an object of study it is perhaps more compatible to Literary theory than to Philology. Likewise, we expect to observe a natural tension between the limits of Philology and the theoretical requirements of Buddhist studies for understanding myth.

Our work is not, however, a direct criticism of Philology. However, it obviously stands in the hope that a criticism of its use of the concept of myth can help open Philology to other theories, for its own benefit.

1.5 Structure of the work

Our work will be divided into four main parts. As we said before, Buddhist

16 For the theoretical problems of considering Buddhism as a religion see the comments of Melford E. Spiro, in “Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation.” Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion. Ed. Michael Banton. London: Tavistock Publications Limited, 1969. 85-126. For a thorough description of the non-theistic aspects of Buddhism, see Helmuth v. Glasenapp in Buddhism –A Non-Theistic Religion. Trans. Irmgard Schloegl. London: Geoge Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970.

works on myth are few, and there are no works on theories of myth specifically from Buddhist studies. Thus, we have been forced to advance from the general to the particular.

In Chapter II we will offer a brief review of the general landscape regarding theories of myth, with special attention to the issues of definition and negative valuation of myth. There we will explore with detail the problem in definitions of myths.

We will concentrate on the definitions of myth in the theories of Lévi-Strauss, Eliade, and Ricoeur, as examples. We will try to show through a brief analysis of them an important deficiency in relation to their definitions of myth.

In Chapter III we will be reviewing some works relevant for understanding the position of myth in Buddhist studies, giving some remarks regarding the use and value normally given to myth in the discipline. We will be paying special attention to connecting the Protestant ideology working behind Buddhist studies with what we observed in the first part in relation to the problems of definitions of myth.

In Chapter IV we will give attention to one of the most interesting works on

myth in Buddhist studies in recent years, the article “Mythology as Meditation: From the Mahāsudassana Sutta to the Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra,” by Rupert Gethin.

We will be presenting a criticism of the methods used in the article, again mainly

based on its definition of the concept of myth and its application. As expected, we will be also paying special attention to the problem of the valuation of myth in it, as well as to other matters relevant for our topic.

The purpose there will be to observe how, in a concrete case, a definition of myth

operates in the analysis of Buddhist scriptures. To enrich our commentary, we will be contrasting Gethin’s arguments with Richard Gombrich’s ideas. Gombrich is another

important author working on myth-narratives, but with a different answer to the problem of myth.

Yet, the fact that both authors are perhaps part of a more conservative side of Philology should be particularly interesting for what we noted above. We expect to show how, contrary to what is often affirmed, even Philology uses theoretical concepts taken from other disciplines, and thus require a harder critical stance towards theoretical concepts and tools, which today it does not have.

Up to Chapter IV, then, our intention is to show the coherence and extension of the problem of a definition of myth, between its general study and that found specifically in Buddhist studies of the Theravada tradition.

We believe that a criticism of the concept of myth is a necessary step before the discipline of Buddhist studies can theoretically provide a definition based on its own observations of the problem in Buddhist scriptures.

In Chapter V we will use what we have learned in the previous chapters to try to construct an outline for a definition of myth. Our intention is not to give a fully operable ‘new’ definition of myth, but merely to show a theoretical model of a definition, with which the avoidance of problems described in our work is possible.

Thus we will be using theoretical tools from anthropology (Clifford Geertz) and from literary analysis (Northrop Frye), to provide a theoretical example of how to build a simple model for defining myth that can help and complement the philological tools of Buddhist studies. We will be modifying Frye’s model for narrative analysis of literary fiction for the identification of myth narratives.

Lastly, we will use this model of a definition of myth to analyze the Mahāsudassana Sutta one more time, in a bid to confirm whether the ideas behind its

construction are practical. We hope we will get some interesting results by doing so.

All in all, the fifth chapter could perhaps appear as the most unsatisfactory, due to its extravagant and eclectic nature, but we feel the need to show in a practicable way how a definition of myth could actually be constructed following our criticism,

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