5.1 Towards a new definition of myth
After what has been said we ought to decide between two options: either we abandon or avoid the use of the concept of myth, or we somehow try to make a new definition of myth avoiding the problems that we have pointed out.
The first option seems safer. This is the traditional position that Buddhist studies
has preferred.117 In appearance, there is not really a ‘need’ to talk about myth, especially when we remain in the field of ‘idealized’ Buddhist doctrine and Buddhist
philosophy. 118 There the concept is not necessary because myth simply should not be there, in the first place. If there appear phenomena that could be identified as myth, it is removed as not original. This is the danger of circularity that we already discussed.
Such a position is naturally limiting and restrictive; it does not give importance to narrative phenomena in the texts beyond doctrine and philosophy. In particular, it makes harder the understanding of narrative mechanisms of Buddhist literature in connection with religion and belief, etc.
117 This is the method followed by Gombrich, for example, when analyzing the Aggañña Sutta. He replaces the category of myth by joke or parody. See Gombrich, Richard “The Buddha.’s Book of Genesis?” Indo-Iranian Journal 35: 159.–78. 1992.
118 That is, a Buddhism harmonized according to Western rational modern expectations.
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The second option is more risky, but perhaps more promising for the future of the discipline. The careful development of a theory of myth for Buddhist studies (compatible with Philology) could provide many benefits, and perhaps could even help stop the proliferation of theories originating in other disciplines. However, such an enterprise must be oriented to narrative theory, because myth is narrative, and not towards history, philosophy, or doctrine.
As was said at the very beginning, it remains beyond the scope of this work to give a new full-fledged definition of myth. Our main purpose was to unveil what we believe are the main problems in the study of myth in Buddhist studies: the construction of definitions of myth based on interpretations, in a priori SDM, and in TrV.
We have shown thus the difficulties and obstacles for the success of such an enterprise. We firmly believe that once the SDM is removed as set of a-priori assumptions (beyond the consideration of myth as narrative), and at the same time the construction of new definitions remain away from any form of TrV, and as long as the question of what is myth is repositioned to the center of the discussions for theories of myth, better and more effective definitions of myth will be, indeed, possible.
But, following our original propaeudetic intention, we believe that the task we set at the beginning would appear theoretically weak if we did not to show how this
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could be done through a theoretical model. Thus, we will dedicate our efforts in this section to build an example model, and outline, so to speak, of how this could be achieved. Thus, we hope this chapter could be used as a provisory definition that can suggest a safer direction for future definitions of myth.
In a similar manner, at the end of this chapter we will return to the problem of the MSud and the question raised by Ruper Gethin, with this model, to corroborate whether anything new can be learned from it.
5.2 Myth as a narrative system
We may start by asking ourselves, against Robert Segal119 why myth cannot be studied in itself. Perhaps we should approach the problem of a definition of myth just in such a manner. That is, instead of starting from other objects or phenomena, which naturally de-mythologize myth making it a secondary issue, a definition of myth may well start from a myth in itself perspective. But how can we achieve such goal?
We have often repeated that a theory of myth should first of all be able to answer the question of what is myth. But this question seems to be often confused with other questions: what is the meaning of myth? What is the function of myth? Thus, it could be perhaps useful to explain what kind of questions a definition of myth should not
119 See Segal, p.3.
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pursue to answer.
First, it should not be intending answers of the origins of myth, whether in historical, psychological, or other terms. The question of origins inevitably takes myth away from itself, away from narrative, towards the world out of the text, and thus back into the problem of truth valuation. Also, in practical terms, the question of origins is perhaps the less grounded on evidence and the more speculative one.
Second, questions of the function, referents, or context of myth are very important for understanding myths, but secondary to what myth is. We believe that we must be extremely cautious here: taking these questions in very general, broad, and abstract terms also leads away from myth.
We are not saying that we reject such approaches. On the contrary, we understand their usefulness. But we also understand now its dangers. A pursue to answer the question of function, referents, and contexts, takes us away from myth in itself, and into history, philosophy, and the comparative method, thus making it more difficult for us to avoid traps such as the danger of circularity.
There is something more important that the external context of myth. A myth must always be understood in its proper particular narrative context. We will call this the interior textual context: a myth is encased, incarnated, in a particular textual body
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(often a text or a group of texts), forming as such a system120
Then, our questions should be of relational character, and these relational questions should involve internal phenomena and dynamics or movements, instead of external (out-of-the-text) relations. This is what we mean by myth for itself.
In a similar way it may be wise to abandon the obsession with finding definitions of myth in the form of monothetic classes.121 In other words, abandon the struggle to find a definition of myth which will, with its entire list of attributes or characteristics, fit every single form of the manifestation of myth. Instead, we should find a polythetic class of definition, strongly based on the careful observation of the phenomena we deem related with myth, in its particular and concrete manifestations.
Thus we are suggesting a start not from comparisons between different mythologies, but on the contrary, from specific historical traditions. In that sense, perhaps, we should abandon here the talk about Buddhist myth, until we have a clearer picture of the manifestation of its myths in its divergent historical and cultural traditions. Thus we should talk instead of myth in the DN, or myth in the MSud.
Now, we could put our questions in the following manner: First, and in this particular context, what kind of narrative is a myth? Second, how does a myth operate,
120 See our comments on canon in our previous chapter.
121 See Southwold, Martin. “Buddhism and the Definition of Religion.” Man, New Series, Vol. 13.3 Sep (1978): 362-379.
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what does a myth has to do to be a myth in a text.122
The first question could perhaps be answered by bringing forward the relationship between myth and religion: a myth is always related to narrative(s) pertaining or connected to a religion. It follows that the first qualifying element or property of myth as a narrative could be in this relationship. As a type of narrative, a myth is nothing more and nothing less than a form of religious narrative. As such it is perhaps a part or sub-group of phenomena included in the broader category of religious narrative.
The second question has to do with the precise link between myth and narrative or in other words, whether a myth corresponds in limits to narratives: is a myth the same as a narrative or it is something else? We will answer this question later.
Before we can continue we need to answer what is a religion. Here, we will have to use the help of the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who developed a theory of
religion that is broad enough to be used beyond the constraints of that particular discipline. According to Clifford Geertz a religion is first of all a “cultural system.”
(Geertz 1969 6) Geertz describes religion with 5 interrelated points. For him, religion is:
122 This is not a question of origins.
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(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. (Geertz 1969 4)
We don’t need to go into the details of this theory here. We don’t intend to
define religion but merely want to find some properties or characteristic of it that could tell us something of narratives in religion.
Now, if we accept Geertz’s definition of religion as a system, then we should conclude first that religious narratives should be part of a ‘narrative’ sub-system of religion.
However, in the systemic theory of religion of Geertz we believe we find a similar problem to the one we found before in Ricoeur’s definition of symbols (see
our chapter 2). Indeed, Geertz, like Ricoeur, overemphasizes the importance and autonomy of symbols. But when we read again the points 2, 3, and 4, of his 5-point definition we feel as if Geertz was actually talking about narratives, and maybe even myths, instead of symbols, for symbols define in these terms, as we explained before,
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require myths.
His definition of symbols also appears too abstract when he affirms for example that “meanings can only be ‘stored’ in symbols” (Geertz 1973 127) or when he
explains that religion as a cultural system is made of “a cluster of religious symbols, woven into some sort of ordered whole” (Geertz 1973 129) How can symbols store meaning? What is the logic and coherence of a cluster of religious symbols? Perhaps that ordered whole could somehow correspond to narrative and myth?
The question is, like with Ricoeur, if symbols can establish themselves autonomously, and if it is possible for them to spread, by themselves, ‘meaning without’ the context of myths; if they can actually spread meaning without the de-codifying system of myths. It is our opinion that this view is wrong because symbols depend on, hang on so to speak, from a system of narratives and thus myths.
In any case, the clue to the relation between religion and narrative (which at this point corresponds to myth) is given by Geertz’s theory in point 2, 3, 4, and 5. It is, indeed, a theory of religious operation. Religion formulates, establishes, clothes, etc.
In other words, it is a functional theory of religion, but one that remains grounded on the narrative aspects of religion.
In any case, we should remain away from points 4 and 5, because of their subjectivity and their tendencies of valuation (‘clothing,’ ‘factuality,’ ‘seem realistic’).
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Point 2 is too strong, and is reductionistic, so we will remain away from it too. We do this because we have to avoid TrV; we already know that any kind of inclination towards function leads towards TrV.
Point 1 should also be changed, following our criticism of Ricoeur’s theory of symbols, to ‘a system of narrative(s).’ Thus, point number 2 is answering the question for the relationship between religion and narrative(s).
(1) a system of religious narratives or myths (one or more) which123
(2) formulate conceptions of a general order of existence.
By “formulate conceptions of general order of existence” we will understand
‘direction’ towards certain kind of actions, preferences, and inclinations in relation to
a way of life or certain forms of perspectives in the manner of understanding the world and men position in it. In other words religion, in relation to narrative, is a system that describes or explain the world and at the same time re-positions men in it.
Then to the question of “how religion formulates conceptions of a general order
of existence” the answer could come naturally: by a narrative system. Without
123 Here we are just assuming that religious narratives and myths are equivalent, or the same thing, but we will return to this point.
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religious narratives, religion would not be able to formulate conceptions of a general order of existence. Then, a religious system needs for its survival the sub-system of religious narrative(s).
What are the mechanisms by which religious narrative formulates these conceptions? We suspect that this has to do with myth properly. The relation between myth and the world of ideology have often been pointed out by scholars of myth, although in rather cryptic and un-precise words.124
Now, before we can continue to answer this question, it is pertinent to define further the boundaries of myth. We have to return to our second question of whether a religious narrative corresponds exactly to myth. Is any religious narrative a myth?
Here is time to go to the narrative phenomena itself.
When we observe Buddhist narratives in the DN we realize that a myth cannot be equivalent to a narrative. An example will be enough: the framing of the MSud.125 It is clear that the MSud is a narrative inside a narrative. In that case, it is impossible to defend that, if the tale of the king Sudasanna is a myth, then the framing is also part of
124 Slochower, for example, describes myth as a ‘pictorial hypothesis’ about the nature of man, and affirms that “myth addresses itself to the problem of identity, asking ‘who am I?’ (…), ‘Where do I come from?’, ‘Where am I bound?’, and ‘What must I do now to get there?’ (Slochower 15). But we have to move very carefully here, for TrV easily appears when taking about functions of myth. For a clear example, King 211: “Myth represents an actionable orientation to truth and reality; i.e., the mythical approach invites its user to participate in active personal relationships with the mythically grasped truth or value. When pertaining to one's own faith, it contains intrinsic emotional involvement and volitional potential. It is then no longer mere myth.”
125 We will return to this framing later.
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that myth. The entire MSud then cannot be a myth. But then, is the entire
sub-narrative of the MSud (the tale of the king’s death) a myth properly speaking?
‘What is myth’? At this point we need further theoretical help.
5.3 Secular literature and myth
In The Secular Scripture: A Study of The Structure of Romance.126 Northrop Frye expands on the problem of the relationship and distinction of romance and myth, and thus between secular and religious literature.
The thesis of this work is that in every human society there is a double literary tradition. One of these traditions holds the prominent place because it deals with those things that predominantly concern that society, while the other one mainly entertains
(romance). The important narratives “help explain certain features in that society’s religion, law, social structure, environment, history, or cosmology.” He identifies this
tradition with myths.
According to Frye, the more important stories are imaginative, but that is not their main characteristic. They convey something like ‘special knowledge,’ what in religion is often called revelation. Hence they are normally not thought of as
imaginative or even of human origin. (Frye 1976 6)
126 Frye, Northrop. The Secular Scripture: A Study of the Structure of Romance. USA:
Harvard University Press, 1976.
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Frye also mentions that myths stick together to form a mythology127 impelled by this special knowledge they transmit. (Frye 1976 12) Thus mythologies are structures of belief or social concern. And according to Frye, it is the structure of myths that makes the process possible. “A mythological universe is a vision of reality in terms of human concerns and hopes and anxieties.” (Frye 1976 14)
There are some important insights here. First, Frye seems to understand myths as synonymous to religious narratives. But, because of what we said before of the MSud it would be better to consider them as not corresponding to the same kind of phenomena. What give myths their distinction in contrast to other narratives would be that they are narratives units of ‘special knowledge.’ But then we would have to
accept that there are different types of religious narratives, only some communicating
‘special knowledge,’ only some then would be myths.
127 A good example of how the content of a narrative should not be equated with myth is in the narrative of Barlaam and Josaphat. The narrative was originally about Buddha, yet it was transformed to suit the needs of the Christian myth. The core of the narrative (defense of asceticism) is still the same. But the myth is completely different.
Frye 1976, 10: “The fact that myths stick together to form a mythology is clearly shown in an explicitly Christian story, such as the Barlaam and Josaphat romance, which comes from about the eighth century. This is said to be a Christianized version of the story of the Buddha, though there is hardly enough story for many specific parallels to emerge. Prince Josaphat is kept in seclusion by his father, who hates Christianity: the hermit Barlaam gets through to see him on the pretext that he has a precious jewel to show him. The jewel turns out to be an interminable sermon in which Barlaam sets forth the entire structure of Christian mythology from creation to last judgment, with appendices on the ascetic life, the use of images in ritual, the necessity of baptism, and the doctrine of the two natures of Christ. What makes so long a harangue possible-its plausibility is another matter-is simply the interconnection of the individual myths in the total Christian mythology: every concept or doctrine involves all others (…).”
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What we want to suggest is this: myths are encased in narratives, but are not
equivalents to religious narratives themselves. They would be the mechanism by which religious narrative ‘formulates.’
But what are they then? Following the conception of units of ‘special knowledge’
we could speculate that they are more like special narrative units that carry, and only carry this ‘special knowledge.’ Consequently, they would be smaller than normal
narratives because they have to be simple and precise to carry this ‘special knowledge’ (perhaps with less narrative details). But, at the same time, because this
‘special knowledge’ is more important than the ‘normal knowledge’ of other religious
narratives they could gather together, across different narratives, to form bigger units pertaining to that ‘special knowledge.’
To prove this we need to find a way to identify them.
5.4 Frye’s Theory of Myths
We can find help again in Frye’s insights, this time in his most influential and important work: the Anatomy of Criticism (AoC).128 In it, the author presents four
different methods to approach the analysis of literature. One of these methods is called ‘Theory of Myths,’ which provides a model that we can modify and use to
128 Frye, Northrop. Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957.
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identify myth.
In AoC Frye pursues the idea that the structure of myths provides the basis of a
In AoC Frye pursues the idea that the structure of myths provides the basis of a