置身事外的當事者: 從同理心看十九世紀英美小說 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學英國語文學系博士班博士論文. 置身事外的當事者: 從同理心看十九世紀英美小說. 治. Detached Sympathy in政 the Long Nineteenth Century: 大. 立. Frankenstein, Jane Eyre, and The Portrait of a Lady. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 指導教授：曾思旭博士、陳音頤博士. 研究生：蘇俞文撰. 中華民國 109 年 6 月. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(2) Detached Sympathy in the Long Nineteenth Century: Frankenstein, Jane Eyre, and The Portrait of a Lady. A Dissertation Submitted to Department of English, National Chengchi University. 立. 政治大. Nat. n. al. Ch. engchi. er. io. Doctor of Philosophy. sit. of the Requirements for the Degree of. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 In Partial Fulfillment. i n U. v. by Yu-wen Su June, 2020. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(3) Acknowledgement This has been a long journey. I am very thankful to the people who have helped me all the way through. First, I want to give thanks to my advisor, Justin Prystash. He has always been very gentle, kind, and honest in his guiding of my writing, and has supported me throughout my work. At times when the work seemed especially difficult, he functioned as my academic and professional knight in his shining armor of knowledge. Although sometimes his comments made me question my wisdom in pursuing a Ph.D., he always spoke the truth, which is a central reason for any merits that this document has. My appreciation for his willingness to speak the truth runs deeper than I could have imagined at the beginning of this process. The time and. 政治大. effort he put into mentoring me makes him an example of the academic I hope to be.. 立. I also want to thank Professor Eva Chen, who supported me throughout my. ‧ 國. 學. writing process. She kindly accepted me as her advisee, writing me letters of recommendation and providing invaluable help not only with my dissertation, but. ‧. also with my applications for various scholarships and grants. Professor Rae Greiner of Indiana University provided many resources and experiences during my research. y. Nat. sit. in the United States. Not only did she generously welcome me to the English. er. io. Department, but her own work became central to my argument in this dissertation. I. n. a to Dr. Helen Schicketanz. also want to give my appreciation i v Without her editing, it l C n would have taken much longer forh meeto completei this n g c h U dissertation. Serendipity brought us together, but a shared desire for me to complete my degree was the foundation of a fruitful academic relationship.. iii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(4) Table of Contents Acknowledgments......................................................................................................iii Chinese Abstract............................................................................................................v English Abstract...........................................................................................................vii Introduction……………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter One: Mapping Frankenstein’s Psychology: Passion, Sympathy, and Moral. 政治大. Regulation in Romantic Subjectivity...........................................................................26. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Chapter Two: The Natural Growth of Sympathy and Character in Jane Eyre……......................................................................................................................60. ‧. Chapter Three: James’ Formal Experimentation in Sympathy and Suffering in The. y. Nat. er. io. sit. Portrait of a Lady........................................................................................................81. n. a Conclusion..................................................................................................................111 iv l C hengchi Un. Works Cited................................................................................................................115. iv DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(5) 國立政治大學英國語文學系博士班博士論文提要. 論文名稱：置身事外的當事者. 指導教授：Justin Prystash, 陳音頤. 立. ‧ 國. ‧ er. io. sit. y. Nat. 論文提要內容：. 學. 研究生：蘇俞文. 政治大. n. 作者認為心理小說透過想像力回應了同理心在十九世紀的發展。這些心理小 a v. l. ni. Ch 說，藉由細膩描繪書中主人翁的「共感」(fellow-thinking)，從而重新定義了亞當· i U e ngch. 斯密（Adam Smith）闡述同理心中對一位「公正的觀察者」(impartial spectator)的功能。這公正的旁觀者可以被視為個人良心的人格化，以一個獨立（儘管是看不見的）人物左右主人翁的想法與判斷。在這些小說中，人物依據對這個公正的旁觀者所作的判斷，改變自己的行為。在本文討論的三本心理小說中，維克多·弗蘭肯斯坦（Victor Frankenstein）、簡·愛（Jane Eyre）和伊莎貝爾·阿切爾（Isabel Archer）試圖在遭遇的各樣衝突中與自我對話，成為一位公正的旁觀者：然而，弗蘭肯斯坦的逝去源於無法成功地與他的創造物(the Creature)，也就是他的「旁觀者」達成共識。另一方面，儘管簡·愛（Jane Eyre）與羅切斯特（Rochester）身心靈的契合呈現一個臻於完美的同理心， v DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(6) 但此同理心卻未免顯得過度理想化、不真實，因為若不是藉由文末超自然力量的協助，兩位主人翁無法再次相遇，這種完美的同理也將無法實現。與弗蘭肯斯坦和簡·愛不同，《一位女士的肖像》中的伊莎貝爾在不幸的婚姻中重新審視她的意識，也就是與她「公正的觀察者」的重新對話，從本來身為一位不切實際的夢想家轉變為一位客觀的觀察者，並在苦難中獲得自我救贖。. 關鍵字：同理心、共感、公正的觀察者、科學怪人、簡愛、一位女士的肖像. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. vi DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(7) Abstract This thesis describes sympathy’s development with fiction in the long nineteenth century. It argues that psychological novels respond to sympathy in the theatric imagination through fellow-thinking. Through discussions of psychological novels, this dissertation argues that these novels facilitate characters’ fellow-thinking in order to redefine the function of what Adam Smith sees as an “impartial spectator.” It seems that, in these novels, characters modify their actions according to their interpretations of the judgements cast by this impartial spectator, an entity which can be considered a separate (albeit unseen) character which functions as a conscience. In these three psychological novels, Victor Frankenstein, Jane Eyre, and Isabel Archer try to position themselves as this impartial spectator in the conversation or enter. 政治大. into conflict with the other characters, nature, and consciousness: Frankenstein is unable. 立. to successfully negotiate his position vis-a-vis a theatric “impartial observer,” his. ‧ 國. 學. creature, and, as a result, dies. Although Jane Eyre’s sympathy with Rochester is perfect, this idealized sympathy is nonetheless shadowed by the supernatural voice. Without the. ‧. help (rather than the hindrance) of this force, this perfect sympathy is impossible. Different from Frankenstein and Jane, Isabel in The Portrait is transformed from an. y. Nat. sit. absorbed thinker to a more objective observer through her relationship with Osmond. By. n. a her suffering. accomplishment redeems her from. er. io. successfully negotiating her relationship with her conscience, “impartial observer,” her. iv l C n hengchi U. Key words: Sympathy, fellow-thinking, Frankenstein, Jane Eyre, The Portrait of a Lady. vii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(8) Introduction. This thesis describes the formal engagement with the development of detached sympathy 1 in three important novels of the long nineteenth century. Although Adam Smith’s philosophical theories are not my focus in this thesis, his concept of detachment, of an “impartial spectator,” serves as a lead into my argument about detached sympathy in three important novels of the long nineteenth century. In Smithian theory, psychological novels respond to sympathy in the theatric imagination through fellow-thinking or thinking along with others, which allows a character to enter into the others’ thought processes. Through discussions of psychological novels, I argue that these novels facilitate characters’ fellow-thinking in order to redefine the function of what Smith sees as an “impartial. 政治大. spectator.” I suggest that, in these novels, characters modify their actions according to their. 立. interpretations of the judgements cast by this impartial spectator, “the great judge and. ‧ 國. 學. arbiter of their conduct” (Smith 115), an entity which can be considered a separate (albeit unseen) character which functions as a conscience. The process of unconsciously (or. ‧. unwittingly) trying to be as objective as the spectator results in the characters’ cognitive decisions. Thus, sympathy in long nineteenth-century fiction is a cognitive act derived from. y. Nat. sit. an understanding of meaning, an active transcendence of the self which is most often set. er. io. in motion by difficulties. The characters’ personal suffering is the fertile ground on which. n. a This fellow-thinking allows this sort of fellow-thinking grows. i v them to imagine different l C U nnot accommodate the potential scenarios which could result from theirhbehavior, e n g cbuth iti does. for “wrong” scenarios like Isabel’s misinterpretation of Osmond’s motivations in The Portrait of a Lady. Of the many novels of the long nineteenth century, the three novels on which my thesis focuses stand out to me because I sense a sort of “oddity” that they have in common. In my early readings of these novels, I was deeply moved by the characters of Frankenstein’s creature, Jane Eyre, and Isabel Archer, by the afflictions they encountered Detached sympathy takes place when the sympathizer is looking from a distance, an observer rather than a participant—for example, the sympathy which a reader feels for the characters in a novel. It can also occur among characters and between authors and their characters. Detached sympathy can be built on the base of conventional sympathy. Emotional reactions spur “conventional” sympathizers to act. In contrast, rather than immersing themselves in the suffering that they see, detached sympathizers’ actions are motivated by rational analysis. 1. 1 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(9) in the novels, and I was compelled to sympathize with them. But later, as I reread these novels that had once touched me so viscerally, I felt as if my ability to sympathize with the characters had been blocked. In thinking about this feeling more deeply, I found that it seems that there was another voice, an impartial observer, making judgements that were in conflict with my ability to immerse myself in my reading, to simply feel and think with the characters. This experience of what seems to be a sort of split self has propelled me to stop and observe how my sympathy is both elicited and, later, frustrated during my reading. I find that my sympathy with the characters grows stronger when I feel that their thoughts and emotions are clearly revealed to me in the reading process. Conversely, my sympathy is frustrated when I observe that there is another side of the character that is a sort of “dark side,” a part of the character’s personality which is not as admirable as the. 政治大. character as a whole, and is, initially at least, kept hidden from view. This dark side of the. 立. character’s personality, then, would seem to maintain the contrast with what excites our. ‧ 國. 學. sympathy: clear revelation, not just “goodness.” For example, Frankenstein’s creature is originally presented as good-natured with rich emotions, but he is transformed into a. ‧. cunning and malicious serial killer after he feels that he has been wronged. In Jane Eyre, Jane is willing to sacrifice even her beloved Rochester to abide by her moral standards.. y. Nat. sit. Because her passionate willingness to sacrifice extends even to herself and her own. er. io. happiness, she almost marries St. John in spite of her realization that she could never be. n. a happy with him. Isabel is an intelligent woman, but she is easily i v absorbed in her. l C n U intellectual theory, a self-inflicted deception, results in her entering a marital prison h e n that i h gc. in The Portrait of a Lady. I wondered how these characters could be so inconsistent. It is as if they are condemned by parts of themselves which exist hidden alongside their more public selves. I will argue that the characters who succeed in transcending their dilemmas are those who adapt themselves to the objective role of this Smithian impartial observer. This other, antithetical personality is often propelled by strong passion in its search for the darker side of a character’s psyche, inhibiting the character from seeing the truth. In these three psychological novels, Frankenstein’s Creature, Jane Eyre, and Isabel Archer try to position themselves as this impartial spectator through conversation or by entering into conflict with the other characters, nature, and their own consciousness: The Creature is 2 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(10) unable to successfully negotiate his position vis-a-vis Smith’s impartial observer and, as a result, hunts down both his creator and ultimately, himself. Although Jane Eyre’s sympathy with Rochester is perfect, this idealized sympathy is nonetheless shadowed by the supernatural voice. Without the help (rather than the hindrance) of this force, this perfect sympathy is impossible. Different from Frankenstein and Jane, Isabel in The Portrait is transformed from an absorbed thinker to a more objective observer through her relationship with Osmond. By successfully negotiating her relationship with her conscience (Smith’s “impartial observer”), her accomplishment redeems her from her suffering. Sympathy is less a merging of the self with another than it is the ability to visualize someone else’s actions through imagination and, in doing so, forge a connection with that. 政治大. person. In turn, sympathy enables readers to imagine the incidents that take place, do not. 立. take place, or could take place in the novels along with the protagonists. By doing so, the. ‧ 國. 學. readers’ aggressive powers can be regulated. This regulation occurs because these novels illustrate the potentially damaging implications of these incidents. Consequently,. ‧. sympathy is a way to educate, to regulate impulsive actions by imagining how others make their decisions in certain situations, a voluntary action derived from an. y. Nat. er. io. suffering and sacrifice.. sit. understanding of meaning, an active transcendence which is most often set in motion by. n. a three relationships: author-character, Sympathy takes place within characteriv. l C Un character, and reader-character. In the h author-character authors sympathize e n g c h i relationship, with their characters in various degrees. In contrast to Shelley’s Brontë’s personal. involvement with their characters, Henry James approaches sympathy from a more detached position. In all the novels, when sympathy is shared between characters, these characters are aspiring to share their feelings, whether they are in pain or in ecstasy.. While the Creature, in despair, fails to achieve shared feelings with Frankenstein, Jane and Rochester are united in harmonious sympathy. An etymological analysis of “sympathy” shows us that “sym” means “same and common,” while “path” means “suffering, feeling, pain, emotion, and experience.” Thus, the shared feeling, suffering, and experience of pain deepens mutual identification as well as intensifies attachment. In contrast, Frankenstein’s resistance to sharing his feelings and identifying with the 3 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(11) Creature results in hatred and detachment, both emotionally and physically. As for Isabel, one reason that she suffers is that she does not achieve this shared feeling with Osmond, at least, but the readers do achieve it (with her). Thus, this readerly sympathy towards characters is part and parcel of literature’s enduring influence on its readers. By exploring the process that contributes to sympathy in the novels, the function of sympathy, and the ways that readers and characters receive sympathies, I will examine how events in these novels shed light on the minds, personalities, and destinies of their characters. Sometimes, these novels warn of unwanted consequences which can result from not exercising sympathies with their readers. Looking into sympathy as both content and as a structure that requires its readers’ engagement, I will ask how sympathy demonstrates the literary changes from the late eighteenth to late nineteenth centuries.. 政治大. How is sympathy plotted, articulated, and aroused in the novel? How do narrations. 立. present what goes on inside characters’ minds, how they experience and think about the. ‧ 國. times of hardships?. 學. things that happen to them, and how do these inner experiences change them as people in. ‧. For purposes of this study, my first consideration will be the relation between sympathy and the rise of the novel as a genre. The eighteenth-century moral philosophers. y. Nat. sit. David Hume and Adam Smith bring forward the idea of sympathy; however, until the. er. io. late eighteenth century, there was no specific genre in which to qualify the phenomenon.. n. The novel is, in John Brewer’s a words, an art form that expresses i v sympathy which then. l C n U contributes to the formation of a “culture in the eighteenth century (23). h eofnsensibility” i h gc 2. Brewer maintains that, since sensibility can be defined as “the capacity to feel and exert. Sensibility is also related to taste, feeling things in a physical way, and to the intensity and degree of sensibility. Edmund Burke, along with David Hume and Adam Smith, was an influential eighteenth-century philosopher. Burke is skeptical of Rousseau’s belief in sensibility as a guide to moral action, instead arguing that reliable natural feelings can only derive from the cultivation of institutions (9). Natural taste, therefore, can only come from the “most highly developed individuals” (9). Mere sentiment cannot direct people to goodness. Burke points out that, similar to a “sensory response”—taste on the tongue, for example—navigating us through our moral decisions, we have a natural response to aesthetic judgements. Burke thinks that, in Marjorie Garson’s words, “natural feelings, to be reliable, must have the aid of institutions and cultivations” (9). These aesthetic judgements are based on a sort of pleasure-pain derived from natural objects, “the love of pleasure and the fear of pain” (9). Our morals derive, then, from our sensations and sentiments. Hume shares this idea. Similar to our decisions about taste, we make our moral decisions depending on whether we approve or disapprove of a subject (162). We approve things that are virtuous and beautiful, whereas we feel disgusted by things of which we disapprove. Taste and truth are aligned, as Keats points out: “Beauty is truth, truth, beauty.” 2. 4 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(12) sympathy,” sympathy helps sentiments to be communicated. Both psychological and emotive communication are fundamental to the social fiber which allows the society to work smoothly (Brewer 22). Thus, in the eighteenth century, sympathy functioned as a standard for personal judgement. The rise of the middle class also contributed to the novel’s new focus on the domestic and on ordinary people for whom sympathy is a major subject. The middle class became a major population after the Napoleonic Wars and provided a fertile ground for the novelists’ experiment. In the introduction to The Nineteenth-Century Novel 1820-1880, John Kucich and Jenny Bourne Taylor write that “[t]he cultural ascendency of the middle-class family also reinforced the popularity of domestic life as the privileged context within which to explore the emotions” (xxiv). With the “growth of benevolent and humanitarian reform movements” (23), sympathy. 政治大. helps to bring people together, simultaneously recognizing each other as group members,. 立. which works to the advantage of politics. This belief is tied up with the realm of. ‧ 國. the people.. 學. aesthetics—good artists as well as politicians are those who speak deeply to the hearts of. ‧. Thus, sympathy emphasized a moral discourse, so much so that people believed that a good person is one who feels deeply in response to others’ misfortunes.. y. Nat. sit. Emphasizing compassion for the weak and concern for the poor, the novel flourished as a. er. io. genre that touches upon subjects that were considered inappropriate in the past—for. n. a and women. Concurrentiwith example, the lower classes, slavery, v this recognition that l C n and sympathy, the novel U every individual, regardless of social class, respect h e ndeserves i h gc. finally became the most important literary genre in the late eighteenth century. Sympathy, Brewer maintains, is an idea first conceptualized by Hume, and later expanded and consolidated by Adam Smith (21). Hume believes that sympathy is distinct from other emotions because it enables us to communicate with people who are so different from ourselves: No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own. (206). 5 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(13) Hume points out that imagination enables sympathy. Because we rely solely on our own feelings, sympathy comes most naturally to us through our imagination that shapes our opinions of others. Our ideas about others’ situations come to us in the form of a two-part impression: first, a cognitive understanding of the other situation, after which the inner self-communication concretizes the idea into an impression3. Hume believes that it is our ability to sympathize with others which allows us, as Rachel Ablow puts it, to “feel like members of a larger social [group]” while at the same time, to maintain our own individuality through recognizing the sentiments felt by others (2). In the same vein, Smith further elaborates that sympathy is a moral construct by which people regulate their behaviors in their interactions with other people. Nevertheless, in expanding Hume’s theory, Adam Smith turns to sympathy’s. 政治大. limitations. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith points out that, although sympathy. 立. can unite people who share similar identities and interests, sympathy towards strangers. ‧ 國. 學. does not come automatically. In other words, people’s sympathy is often withheld from those who are different. People prefer to direct their sympathy towards those who are like. ‧. them. Furthermore, people usually sympathize more easily with others’ misfortunes than with their happiness. This attraction to misfortune may exist because people realize they. y. Nat. sit. are not immune to similar afflictions. This transference seems to result in a type of. er. io. imagination which is essential for fellow-feeling. To tackle these limitations, Smith thus. n. emphasizes that the importanceaof fellow-feeling is its abilityi vto enable people imagining. l C U n to overcoming differences. themselves in another’s situation. Consequently, h e n g cithisicrucial. Hume divides thoughts into impression and idea: whereas perception is any awareness which comes into our minds, impression—forced upon us—imprints those perceptions with the five senses and emotions. Hume believes that our sentimental emotions are cognitive thinking: “Thus all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. It is not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy. When I am convinced of any principle, it is only an idea, which strikes more strongly upon me. When I give the preference to one set of arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority of their influence” (69). In fact, reason will find a way to achieve the passion’s goal: “[R]eason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (169). Rachel Cohon rightly explains that “reason alone cannot move us to action; the impulse to act itself must come from passion.” However, sometimes emotions appear to be so calm that they are mistaken for pure reasoning. Johnathan Haidt further clarifies that moral judgement involves gut feelings as moral intuitions (885-886). Expanding on Hume’s theory, Immanuel Kant sees this moral intuition, or natural human instinct, as an universal moral principle. Kant explains, as Entrican Wilson and Lara Denis describe, that this “supreme moral principle” is inherent in us and is “revealed through the operations of reason” (30). This universal principle is a law that each of us should follow. 3. 6 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(14) Smith’s viewpoint is an important departure from Hume and other eighteenthcentury philosophers in that he considers sympathy to be less an emotion than a thought, a thought which, taking place in the imagination, functions especially as a means of knowing others’ feelings through imagining others’ emotions as one’s own: “[I]t is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what...his sensations [are]. Neither can that faculty [of imagination] help us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we are in his case” (8). Smith emphasizes that sympathy cannot be “selfish” because it must happen between persons, that is, sympathy must take place in a relationship with others: “[Sympathy arises] from an imaginary change of situations with the person chiefly concerned, yet this imaginary change is not supposed to happen to me in my own person and character, but in that of the person with whom I. 政治大. sympathize” (8). According to Smith, when we sympathize with others, we change. 立. “persons and characters.” However, at the same time that we are engaged in the process. ‧ 國. 學. of sympathy, we are detached from it, watching it. It is because of this self-awareness that we can use the position of the detached observer to modify our thoughts. The “voice” that. ‧. we hear—the judgement of our conscience—seems to belong to another person dwelling simultaneously in our minds. Not only do we take the other person as ourselves, but we. y. Nat. sit. have a dual perspective. Jonathan Lamb explains that in Smith’s theater of sympathy:. er. io. [His] observer and performer [both] have parts to play in the construction of an. n. a that will foster genuine isympathy. equilibrium of sentiments Further, this sort v l C n of equilibrium can be achieved h eonly i U learns to govern his n gifctheh performer. passions and render them congenial to the spectator, who stands by silently to signal his approval when this stage has been reached (65). Both the spectator and the sympathizer must participate actively in order to produce genuine sympathy. The “performer” is the self, initiating the action while the spectator functions as a conscience. In addition, it is necessary to learn to govern our passions in order to earn the spectator’s approval. Only when this approval has been achieved can a genuine sympathy take place. In this way, sympathy is the action by which one communicates, understands, and so tries to regulate one’s negative impulses. Because each person is unique, each person filters this emotional information differently. Thus, sympathy serves as a virtual theater in 7 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(15) one’s imagination, and the purpose of this theater is to allow someone to play out both wanted and unwanted outcomes so that the sympathizer can decide which behavior to act out. This theatric imagination often presents itself in times of suffering because the desire to avoid pain forces people to take action. But often, there is a gap between what the characters play out in their imaginations and what actually happens. Thus, characters trap themselves in trouble when they mistake what is in their imagination for what actually happens. To avoid this scenario is to be an observer, rather than immersing themselves in their thoughts. With regard to recent studies on sympathy, and its crucial component of fellowfeeling, whereas Rae Greiner examines how the form of Victorian novels elicits sympathy through the imaginations of the characters, Rachel Ablow provides a close. 政治大. reading of sympathy in the Victorian marriage plot. In alignment with Greiner and. 立. Ablow, Audrey Jaffe analyzes how sympathy shapes Victorian identities. As for readers’. ‧ 國. 學. response, Suzanne Keen’s important work on Empathy and the Novel looks into how the novel shapes its own readers. Focusing on elements of the novel’s form that elicit the. ‧. characters’ sympathetic response, Greiner uses Adam Smith’s definition of sympathy as a starting point for her analysis. In this analysis she argues that sympathy is less an emotion. y. Nat. sit. than it is a “protraction” which arouses emotion. In her view, it is this conception of. er. io. sympathy that is central to nineteenth-century realist novels. For Greiner, sympathy is. n. a action that elicits emotionsi vrather than an emotion in more an action than a thought, an l C n and of itself. Sympathy qualifies and substantiates h e n g c hrealism i U in the form of imaginative speech. Sympathy is an active creative process (8) which results in fellow-feeling,. ultimately contributing to a fictional narrative that is the result of this shared feeling. Looking into the ways that the novel elicits the response of the characters in their fellowthinking, the sympathetic imaginations, Greiner believes it is plausible to “pry apart [the] thinking and feeling” of sympathy (3): “‘Sympathy’ is a mechanism of feelingproduction, an activity with the capacity to generate feelings (‘moral’ or otherwise) but not a feeling in its own right and incapable of certifying which feelings result” (293). Along the same lines, Ablow shares the notion that sympathy is a marriage between minds. Rather than being simply an emotion—a “sense” of sympathy—sympathy is a cognitive action of thinking. Thus, sympathy is no longer a moral standard through 8 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(16) which, if people fulfil certain criteria, they are considered to be virtuous, or sympathetic. Through the abstracted shared feelings which are represented in narrative forms, we produce a reality that is affirmed by the novel’s “sympathetic realism.” In a similar vein, Jeanne Britton interprets sympathy as a structural feature of the novels; rather than, as Greiner suggests, “eliciting” sympathy from the reader, Britton examines how novels illustrate sympathy as a structural feature, and, as such, sympathy is uniquely positioned to mitigate human difference in the novel (1). In contrast to Hume’s view that emotions easily flow from one person to another, making sympathy, in Britton’s words, “inevitable,” Smith implies that sympathy is, in fact, a shifting in perspective (2) and that, therefore, sympathy is a cognitive process rather than an instinctive emotional shift between people. Britton explains that, for Smith, sympathy is. 政治大. experienced through an intellectual conception of suffering (i.e., through the. 立. imagination). Sympathy thus transforms itself from a philosophical model to an element. ‧ 國. 學. of narrative through the suffering that the characters experience. But Smith’s version of sympathy does not allow novels to satisfactorily address the various viewpoints inherent. ‧. in “acts of narrative transmission.” Thus, Britton proposes secondhand narratives, a process in which characters take other characters’ emotions as their own. Her term for. y. Nat. sit. this process is “vicarious narratives” (3). Building on both Greiner’s argument that. er. io. sympathy is cognitive thinking rather than an emotion, and on Britton’s “sympathetic. n. vicariousness”, I argue that the afunction of sympathy is, in fact, i v founded in rational. l C n it is possible for sympathy U thinking. Through the imaginative process of fellow-thinking, hen i h gc to control the characters’ ardently wished-for, yet potentially damaging, desires, which I will return to when I discuss the Gothic tradition later in this chapter. The importance of sympathy is magnified as the eighteenth century gives way to the nineteenth. Stephen Arata suggests that, in fact, sympathy is the novel’s central theme in the nineteenth century. Considering sympathy as a moral guide, the Victorians believed that an emotional reaction reflected a person’s morality. Linking novelists together with physicians (a group becoming increasingly more respected in Victorian Britain), Sally Shuttleworth points out that both groups attempt “to diagnose the moral and social ills of the society” (14). Sympathy is seen as a virtue, a means to arouse the readers’ concern for social education, since sympathy allows a person to see others’ 9 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(17) perspectives, to understand their feelings, and to engage in merciful action. For example, Jane Eyre resists the temporary pleasures of adultery, upholding her moral principles as she understands her potential to harm both her and Mr. Rochester’s lives. In addition, Brontë attributes the supernatural voice that brings Jane and Mr. Rochester together to the power of nature’s sympathy in Jane Eyre. By exploring interior feelings, authors are able to elicit their readers’ sympathy. In the introduction to The Nineteenth-Century Novel 1820-1880, John Kucich and Jenny Bourne Taylor point out that the novelists fulfill their social responsibility by engaging with social problems through their novels (xix). These novels function as moral compasses which raise social awareness. Influenced by the scientific ethos, novelists are encouraged to adapt “a taste for [a] dispassionate, objective narratorial voice,” (xxiv) “a. 政治大. collective self-examination” through which they hold themselves accountable to their. 立. readers (xviii). As the novel evolves into a more complicated narrative form, “the. ‧ 國. 學. emotional expression of a new social order” (xxv) appears. In Rachel Cohon’s words, we should look into ideas and beliefs, as well as into their related feelings, emotions, and. ‧. motivations: “[I]deological analysis—in narrative or elsewhere—is inseparable from a treatment of emotion” (23). This ideology leads to the argument that early nineteenth. y. Nat. er. io. observed in society.. sit. century novelists often wrote to raise moral awareness of the difficulties that they. n. a century novels, we musti vtake these novelists’ values To understand these nineteenth. l C nFor example, these novelists U into account, as these values often motivated writing. h e n their i h gc. encourage self-discipline by showing the defects inherent in a lack of self-control, on the one hand, and the virtue and merits of reason on the other. Kucich and Bourne Taylor explain that those novelists have “a strong social conscience [motivating them]…to examine the underside of social life, and a deep interest in sensibility and sentimentalism” (xxvi). Sympathy is important for the Victorian novelists, for they use sympathy to shape their readers’ morality. Matthew Arnold’s introduction to the poetry of Wordsworth embodies this idea. Arnold “commend[s Wordsworth] as a moral poet while warning that Wordsworthians were “apt to praise him for the wrong things,” as Reed explains, further stating that what distinguishes the Romantics from the Victorians is that “[the Romantics] founded their 10 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(18) beliefs in philosophy and the [Victorians’] values rested in morality” (336). John Reed points out that, although poets such as Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, and Shelley are fundamentally Romantic, they are to some extent responsible for building the foundation for the eventual shift towards Victorianism. Sympathy is seen in Romantic poetry which prioritizes emotion, imagination, and spontaneity. The emotion, imagination, and spontaneity which characterize Romantic poetry are also important aspects of sympathy. In the “Preface to the Lyrical Ballads”, William Wordsworth famously writes that “Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: it takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquility.” As Reed writes imagination is what “the Romantics responded by placing fundamental authority in man himself and suggested that this power extended itself outward to the world at large” (338). Imagination, then, is central to the Romantic. 政治大. view of sympathy, serving as a bridge to the Victorian view of sympathy. While the. 立. Romantics use sympathy to create philosophical debate, the Victorians are looking for a. ‧ 國. 學. moral answer.. Consequently, realism becomes the dominant perspective in nineteenth-century. ‧. novels by which novelists write to raise moral awareness. Brewer rightly maintains that these novels’ realism is a way to engage readers in them (31). The similarities between. y. Nat. sit. the mundane, ordinary lives depicted in domestic novels and their readers’ lives ensure. er. io. that readers are more likely to sympathize with the characters in these novels. Realism, as. n. a life, domestic concerns. Providing Ian Watt argues, is about everyday a frame for the iv l C n represent a fundamental U narration to arouse individual emotionshand novels i e nfeelings, h gc order of the domestic sphere. With “minute particulars and large social issues” that “become the foundation of the broad array of forms taken by ‘Victorian Realism’” (Kucich and Bourne Taylor xxvii), Jane Austen and Sir Walter Scott look into the psychological depths. Austen contributes to the inspiration of “a new self-consciousness about the integrity of narrative form and an unprecedented attention to psychological depth and complexity” (Kucich and Bourne Taylor xxvii). This psychological depth and complexity form a sub-genre in realist novels—psychological novels. Traditionally known as stories of the “problem novel,” psychological novels try to analyze humans and their relations, in addition to seeking to uncover the problem between the self and others (Smith 108). Athena Vettos states that as a flexible term, the 11 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(19) origin of “psychological novels” remains obscure. It could derive from the historical romance, the sentimental novel, the epistolary novel, or the spiritual autobiography (637). Despite the different versions that more modernist psychological writers4 framed from their nineteenth-century counterparts, Vettos suggests that both periods shared a “wideranging and complex engagement with contemporary psychological issues” (637). She continues by pointing out that recent critical approaches to the psychological novel range from rigorous narratological analyses of the literary presentation of consciousness (Cohn, qtd. in Vettos) to historical and theoretical studies of the close relationships among fiction, psychology, and neurology in different eras (637). This latter approach, in particular, has generated a range of critical analyses of the relationship between fiction and psychology, especially as those relationships played themselves out during the nineteenth century (637).. 立. 政治大. Psychological novels of this time period show that, in spite of this conception of. ‧ 國. 學. sympathy as a moral guide, nineteenth-century realist novels nonetheless retain darker elements of the Gothic. Although for the Victorians, sympathy is related to morality, I. ‧. suggest that, rather than simply reflecting morality without action, sympathy is a process by which we can actively understand humanity’s dark side. Sympathy allows characters. y. Nat. sit. to control their dark sides through suffering and restraining negative impulses. The. er. io. Gothic inheritance of these novels ensures that a false sympathy can be manifested.. n. The Gothic’s emphasis ona the imagination also provides i v novelists with a means to. l C n U limit this sort of “artificial” sympathy.h This can be seen when characters use i e nlimitation h gc. their imaginations as a means to assimilate and therefore repudiate any sympathy which is not based in truth. The three novels I study all have supernatural elements— Frankenstein’s creature, the supernatural voice in Jane’s head, and the ghost in Gardencourt in The Portrait—which manifest the unconscious emotions buried deep in various characters’ psyches. Thus, to understand the remnant of the Gothic tradition in the psychological novels, it is imperative to look into the development of the Gothic genre itself. In a broader definition, psychological novels are associated with nineteenth-century literary movements such as psychological realism and with twentieth-century literary modernism. It is also connected to stream-of-consciousness novels and with narrative techniques such as free indirect discourse and the interior monologue. 4. 12 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(20) In contrast to nineteenth-century psychological novels, which are more ambiguous about both villainous characters and supernatural elements, eighteenth century Gothic novels focus on tangible monsters or other frightening creatures—“the supernatural, innocent maidens in distress, and devilish villains” (Smith 43). In these three novels, the Gothic elements are not presented as completely treacherous, but they are presented as things that the psyche either leaves out or has been oblivious to. The Gothic elements manifest themselves when people fail to regulate the darker sides of themselves. As a result, then, this long-suppressed and ignored energy will transform into a potentially disastrous power. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, rapid changes in industrialization, the increasing extent of scientific knowledge, numerous wars, and a decline in religious. 政治大. beliefs resulted in a much more anxious society. Concomitantly, the novel’s growing. 立. number of sub-genres shows that the novel was beginning to solidify as a genre. Those. ‧ 國. 學. sub-genres—including the sensational, the Gothic, and realist novels—are novelistic experiments to test out the potential and limitations of literary expression. Gothic novels. ‧. appear to function as a means of expressing these cultural anxieties. The extreme sensationalism of the Gothic derives from an overflow of sentiment that attempts to. y. Nat. sit. revolt against eighteenth century neoclassicism—a coldness due to an over-emphasis on. er. io. scientific reasoning—but which ends in a nihilistic excess of emotion. Considering that. n. the Gothic novel seems to haveabeen born of a suppressed anxiety, i v it is not surprising that. l C U n is the supernatural. The the Gothic element which most often appears h e n gin cthese h i novels supernatural is a manifestation of this emotional unease since anxiety, like other emotions, is difficult to define, at least in any sort of universal sense. The readers of early Gothic novels were attracted to such fiction as a means of rebelling against the emphasis on rationality and order that dominated much of the eighteenth century. These novels often exploited the irrational and inexplicable.. Considering the way that the novel evolves into the nineteenth century, Melissa Pennell points out that “the term ‘gothic’ was applied to any fiction that inspires terror or horror, even those not set during the Middle Ages. Such narratives continued to incorporate the supernatural, the irrational, suspense, a sense of foreboding, and an atmosphere of gloom” (50). E. J. Clery claims that in the Gothic “the meaning of the text is inseparable 13 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(21) from its affect, its impact on the reader, the feelings of fear, suspense, curiosity and sympathy which it attempts to arouse,” a meaning that works in the “machinery of the supernatural” (70). Supernatural elements in Gothic novels help characters to escape from undesirable situations and thus, provide readers a break from mundane, everyday life, a life in which, as Robert Hume writes, “[because] realism is not the desired object—and it is not in the Gothic novel—supernaturalism seems a valid enough device for removing the narrative from the realm of the everyday” (284). These novels’ integration of the Gothic elements as a way to retain the inexplicable depicts a more precise picture of the human psyche. Gothic elements in the realist/psychological novel represent the “dark side” that must be tamed by Smith’s spectator. When readers of these novels I consider enact a. 政治大. conversation with the unknown—their darker sides—they assimilate a potentially. 立. undesirable outcome, a warning of what might happen were they to submit themselves to. ‧ 國. 學. their wishes. Since they are able to satisfy their inappropriate desires in their imaginations, these desires do not infringe upon their “real” lives. Sympathy, then, serves. ‧. a means of both controlling and eliminating desires, while the novel is a vehicle through which they can play out their potentially destructive desires. This high regard for rational. y. Nat. sit. thought is clearly displayed in Victorian realist novels, which attempt to corral the dark. er. io. impulses of the Gothic. Sympathy thus shows its great importance in that, rather than. n. being a moral guide, it is a toolathat enables a conversation with i v the unknown.. l C n Even though sympathy can potentially usediasU a form of moral guidance, h e n be h gc. characters are reluctant to align themselves with the negative. It follows, then, that they fail to regulate the disastrous emotions. Those darker sides become more powerful because of the characters’ ignorance and reluctance to face them. The nineteenth-century novelists in this study express that it is better to acknowledge these elements which are beyond one’s recognition than to eliminate them. Often, the representative of the treacherous or of the dark side is not entirely evil. That is not to say that they are less harmful, but the harm that they cause is due to the hero(ine)’s ignorance, his/her inability to take care of the matter, a circumstance which allows the bad to become worse. This extreme sensitivity then takes the form of Gothic elements, seen most often when characters are pushed to a breaking point in their sufferings. As Clery observes, 14 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(22) suffering as an inevitable element in human experience, and therefore he considers the Gothic to be most obvious when characters suffer: “The Gothic achieves its strongest and most typical effects through spectacle, yes, but it is specifically a spectacle of suffering (designed to arouse ‘fear, suspense, curiosity and sympathy’) rendered in highly visual, even pictorial terms” (70). Consequently, Gothic is the genre that allows people to make sense of pain. Manifesting the horror facilitates the process by which they can harness their anxiety because it concretizes their fear—the anxiety which has hitherto been held only in their imaginations. When sympathy creates a context within which characters in these novels can visualize potentially undesirable outcomes, they can make more rational decisions. Lamb bolsters my argument by suggesting that sympathy is an active action, motivated by. 政治大. passion: “[Sympathy] assigns to passion an active virtue” (3). Lamb explains that. 立. sympathy cannot be merely understood in terms of values, thoughts, or beliefs, but rather. ‧ 國. 學. that sympathy is comprised of both action and passion (3). In other words, Lamb argues that sympathy allows passion an active role. For him, then, sympathy is an active,. ‧. conscious process. Because it is conscious, it implies that the sympathizer must, at least to an extent, remain detached or outside the process, paving the way for the existence of. y. Nat. sit. this “other voice” in the character’s imagination. As a result, then, sympathy becomes a. er. io. psychological conversation between the public aspects of the characters’ psyches and the. n. a of themselves which allowi vthe characters to detach impartial spectator—i.e., the parts. l C n their situations objectively. U themselves from their circumstances so caniconsider hthat e nthey h gc Laura Hinton explains this concept by pointing out that Isabel has the dual role of a. “present-absent sympathetic spectator” (311) who is both a character and a detached observer of herself. This dual role ensures that she can assume a more neutral, less emotionally charged perspective in her internal discussions. This conversation with pain helps make a space for the Gothic reminiscence, which keeps the disastrous energy at bay and ensures that the realist novel can maintain its general framework of order and morality. The Gothic shows a pessimistic view of what Robert Hume calls “unresolvable moral and emotional ambiguity” (290) by representing these ambiguities in the image of evil monsters which will be eliminated. Hume states that Gothic writers, tainted with a pessimistic worldview that was “confined to the limits 15 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(23) of reason,” did not share the realists’ optimism. Instead, Gothic writers considered that men have “no faith in the ability” to “transcend or transform it [discontent with everyday world] imaginatively” (289). Thus, sympathy becomes an important way to understand the function of the darker side of realism. Sympathy helps harness the excessive energy by allowing characters to have conversations with their inner selves. In my first chapter on Frankenstein, I examine how this early Gothic novel integrates a pathological psyche with mystery and suspense to create a concrete being, Frankenstein’s creature. Maggie Kilgour states that Frankenstein is a Gothic novel, not because there is a monster, but because the novel “demonizes its own creation” (190). Shelley addresses the possibility of evil when sympathy is twisted to serve the wrong motivation—in the Creature’s case, sympathy is subsumed by his rage to hurt the. 政治大. innocent. Thus, passion intensifies the motivation behind his pursuit of his goal. For the. 立. Creature, his goal, what motivates him, is the desire to be accepted. Sympathy is a. ‧ 國. 學. cognitive process which characters use to achieve their goals. It also motivates imagination and fellow-thinking. John Brewer, in his “Sentiment and Sensibility,”. ‧. illustrates that during the eighteenth century people gradually arrived at the consensus that body and mind are intertwined. Similar to the human body, a natural system, like a. y. Nat. sit. society or economy, that shall be governed and managed with regulation, consisting of. er. io. correlated organs of a collective sympathy (24-25), Frankenstein’s different phases of. n. a is in need of sympathy for iunderstanding. narration point to the anxiety that Frankenstein v l C n runs into trouble because he thinks thathhe e must h i theUCreature’s desire after n g cgrant. sympathizing with him. Later, Frankenstein regrets his decision. This decision leads to disaster because his sympathy is propelled by a surge of strong feeling that is temporary. Instead of a more permanent, intellectually motivated reason, a surge of temporary, strong emotion is behind Frankenstein’s sympathy for the Creature. It is this surge of sympathetic emotion which causes Frankenstein to be moved by the Creature’s tale and—albeit unconsciously—endorse the Creature’s behavior. Lee E. Heller points out that Frankenstein addresses the force of human nature, along with its possibilities and limitations which concerned nineteenth-century people. In Frankenstein, Shelley stresses the importance of sympathy by emphasizing Frankenstein’s communication with his split self—the Creature— and by sympathizing with the Creature. At first sight, Shelley 16 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(24) demonstrates faith in sympathy, seeing it as a moral virtue that elicits good behavior. But Shelley soon casts doubt on sympathy’s reliability, raising the question of whether the Creature uses sympathy as a tool to manipulate Frankenstein into creating a female for him. Sympathy is unreliable because it can be a whimsical feeling which results in a behavior that one regrets later. In my chapter on Jane Eyre, I argue that Charlotte Brontë seeks to exult the value of sympathy, which is shown most perfectly in the final unification between Rochester and Jane. To sympathize is to share, feel, and agree with each other. Thus, Jane and Rochester’s wholesome unification is a full sympathy, a harmonious “perfect concord,” both in body and mind. This complete unity between two individuals is the best expression of sympathy, a theme on which the entire novel is built. However, sympathy is. 政治大. not acquired easily; it is a long process. Brontë has various characters approach sympathy. 立. through different stages. Ultimately, she finds that sympathy is incomplete unless it. ‧ 國. more broadly.. 學. includes natural sympathy, which refers to sympathy with human natures and with nature. ‧. In comparison to Shelley’s sympathy, sympathy in Jane Eyre is also illustrated in the form of two definitive sensibilities at war with each other. However, Brontë’s concern. y. Nat. sit. is with discovering the perfect sympathy, although she is well aware of how malevolent. er. io. sympathy can turn when it is misguided. The supernatural voice inside Jane’s head blurs. n. a sympathy. Brontë’s explication the line between external and internal of sympathy is iv. l C n valuable to Victorianists because Brontë h eprovides h i Uinto the way that Victorians n g cinsight conceived of the sympathetic connection between humans and nature.. At other times, however, sympathy seems to be anything but a present quality as she shows in her depiction of the unsympathetic townspeople, St. John, Mr. Lowood, and the Reeds. Brontë sees sympathy as a force which, if Jane is not careful, can blind her to the implications of her decisions. Jane’s false sympathy for St. John almost causes her to betray herself. Nevertheless, Brontë still maintains her optimistic view of sympathy, as she ends the novel with Jane’s and Rochester’s perfect concord, an ideal sympathy. Whereas Shelley casts doubt on the Creature’s sincerity, Brontë complicates sympathy in that she adds the question of agency. Brontë develops this idea of a nature that is very closely aligned with humanity, as opposed to a much more believable nature that is 17 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(25) essentially oblivious to humans, one that in no way prioritizes them. Brontë shows that the natural world helps these who, in critical times, share its essence. Brontë’s version of sympathy is illustrated by the natural world, which reflects the psyche of those characters who share its nature. My last chapter echoes the former chapter by addressing the reworking of Brontë’s perfect sympathy in The Portrait of a Lady. In the first half of The Portrait, Henry James shows the traditional marriage plot in which a woman searches for an ideal marital partner with whom she can achieve perfect sympathy. In this sense, Henry James’ Portrait is not so different from Jane Eyre. Like Jane and Rochester, Isabel and Osmond appear to have achieved perfect sympathy in the beginning of their relationship, where each one’s nature, temperament, and judgement is in perfect accord with the other’s. But. 政治大. soon James reveals that this perfect sympathy is faulty, for its foundation is built on false. 立. theories about each other, theories of who each wants the other to be, rather than who the. ‧ 國. 學. person really is.. My dissertation reveals that at the end of the nineteenth century, the way that. ‧. novelists portrayed sympathy changed. Rather than focusing on the need to educate their readers about moral feeling, Henry James, along with other late Victorian novelists like. y. Nat. sit. Thomas Hardy, began to prioritize the treatment of reality. In other words, they began to. er. io. “[treat] fictional characters as if they were real people” (Pennell 138). Contrary to. n. a eighteenth-century belief—if someone felt sympathetic towards i v others, they believed that l C ncentury, people realized that U this emotion illustrated their virtue—inhthe i e nlategnineteenth h c behavior is not necessarily an accurate reflection of internal thoughts; in fact, it is. possible to separate the two. In The Portrait, James argues strongly for this concept. Sympathy’s presentation in sensibility, language, and physiognomy increase its tension with each of these factors, and it becomes more ambiguous and complex across the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century, people believed that physical feeling was more communicative than language. Sympathy was based on the belief that outward expressions reflect inward emotions. As a result, it was possible for people to feel with others who show their sentiments through their physiognomy. But towards the end of the nineteenth century, people lost faith in the mere presentation of the exterior emotion, for rather than a demonstration of true feeling, they began to believe in the possibility that 18 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(26) emotions are a performance, or mannerisms. One of the important requirements for sympathy is that it reciprocate others’ feelings, but rather than reflecting how a character feels in his physiognomy, the character can conceal his true thoughts. He can separate what he thinks and what he shows without his physiognomy necessarily being in accord with his facial and bodily expression. From a character like Frankenstein, with perfect emotional transparency which is hard to find in reality, to Jane and Rochester’s intense reading of and constant examination of their physiognomies, and then to the manipulation and artificial performance of the masters of sympathy Madame Merle and Gilbert Osmond, characters can perform sympathy without actually feeling sympathetic. Sympathy, thus, rather than a genuine sensibility, becomes an artificial performance which can be perfected and. 政治大. manipulated by mere behavior. Significantly, however, sympathy’s importance does not. 立. diminish. On the contrary, a deeper understanding of sympathy’s complexity in real life. ‧ 國. 學. allows those novelists to portray this depth in the form of the novel’s ambiguity. James further expands this suspicion on the work of sympathy. James’ examination. ‧. of sympathy is perhaps the most complex, as he explores sympathy’s limitations in addition to its potential for good. James turns the excess of the emotions, sentiments, into. y. Nat. sit. a more regulated form of consciousness. For him, sympathy is a much more conscious. er. io. process, something akin to forming our intellectual beliefs. From its earliest construction. n. a a character choose betweeni vgood and evil, sympathy as something which requires that l C n ultimately diffuses itself into a stream h of e consciousness in a character’s mind. James ngchi U. showed how an individual is made concrete in the novel by portraying a character’s map of consciousness, therefore paving the way for the “stream-of-consciousness” technique of the twentieth century. Patrick Parrinder states that “[The novel] can inform and lead into new places the flow of our sympathetic consciousness, and it can lead our sympathy away in recoil from things gone dead.” Parrinder maintains that, as opposed to George Eliot’s5 belief in the importance of the novel as an art form in and of itself, James regards. George Eliot pioneers in minimizing the author’s role in the story. In the novel’s early days, eighteenthcentury novelists like Samuel Richardson, Henry Fielding, and Laurence Sterne often included lengthy commentaries from the narrator. It can be argued that this sort of continuous interference makes the narrator almost a character in the novel. I exclude Eliot’s novels from my analysis for the reason that her sympathy is mainly in the context of others; the individual is not her primary focus. 5. 19 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(27) the novel as an important art form because of the way that it raises consciousness of the characters’ experience, but it does not address the nature of experience itself. Making the novel as a genre real—that is, realism—is James’ idea of the novel’s aestheticism. For Eliot, sympathy extends from a character to society at large, while for James, sympathy is much more internal to the character (135-136). Parrinder argues that as opposed to George Eliot’s sympathy which sees novels and art is important (in relation to sympathy as an extension of experience and relationship), instead, James regards the novel as an important art form in the way that it arouses consciousness in the characters’ respective experience, but not the nature of experience itself: “it is their consciousness of their situations which is artistically important, and not the nature of the situations themselves” (138). In a similar line, Wayne Booth maintains that morality will manifest. 政治大. itself when the novelist, James, achieves aestheticism in his work. Achieving this realism. 立. requires that the reader’s imagination align with the character—in other words, fellow-. ‧ 國. 學. thinking. Thus, Booth believes that authors have the responsibility to make their readers think along with the character’s action, for every action is a result of his moral judgment:. ‧. “When human actions are formed to make an artwork, the form that is made can never be divorced from the human meanings, including the moral judgments, that are implicit. y. Nat. er. io. “makes his readers” through the communication of the novel.. sit. whenever human beings act.” Booth suggests that, for Henry James, a successful novelist. n. a Resonating with Booth, Brewer suggests that since sympathy i v mainly works. l C n own lives and experience U through storytelling, novels allow readers their h etontranscend i h gc. other worlds (29). Thus, sentimental storytelling unites the reader, author, and character all in one sympathetic strata (29). James leads his readers to territory that they have never been to, where a new meaning and order is derived. The feelings revealed through the transport of sentimental reading create an intimate “desire to [establish] a sympathetic relationship with the person responsible for exciting their sympathy” (34)—the author. Thus, in addition to feeling sympathy for the characters, the readers will also feel sympathy with the author. Brewer continues to explain that bounded by sympathy, readers are more eager to participate in the lives of the characters, and that of their creator, the author6. That is when the author’s opinions, as well as his or her private life, 6. The author can also be intertwined with her novel. Mary Shelley first published Frankenstein in 1818. 20 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(28) matter to readers. On the other hand, successfully making his readers’ eyes open, the author, in return, finds his reward in forming his readers into his peers: “[I]f he makes them well—that is, makes them see what they have never seen before, moves them into a new order of perception and experience altogether—he finds his reward in the peers he has created” (Booth, 397-398). The authors have more power in choosing their own readers by forming the character that accords with their tastes. In this manner, the novel becomes a platform on which an ongoing communication takes place (397). Between the eighteenth century and the twentieth, the idea of sympathy has become less material and social and more psychological. The conception of sympathy moves from a moral concept, a sentiment that shows one’s virtue, to an active cognition– thinking along with others. Representations of sympathy in these novels change from the. 政治大. very tangible image of Frankenstein’s creature to Jane’s internal voices to the very. 立. consciously constructed monologue in Isabel’s mind. The three novels in this study. ‧ 國. 學. illustrate the change in how psychological novels of the nineteenth century view the idea of sympathy: from the earliest idea (in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein) of sympathy as a. ‧. moral guide to the active process of cognition that sympathy becomes in Henry James’ The Portrait, and from the reification of actual monsters and supernatural elements to a. y. Nat. sit. more subtle and abstract heightened imagination of the psyche; from suppressing the. er. io. hostile self that turns monstrous and destructive to regulating it by allowing it to move. n. a Sympathy, thus, movesi vfrom an external morality to from the subconscious to the surface. l C n an internal conversation in the psyche.h e ngchi U. This thesis examines the ways in which these novels transform the definition of. sympathy. The three novels each show their concern with sympathy from a different perspective. Although it is hard to pin down the novel’s origin, the novel in the long. Clumsy as the transitions between Frankenstein’s narrations seem to be, the multiple narrations are nonetheless like neuroses connected in a psyche. Intertwined by different narrations as one character brings out the other character, Frankenstein, in the same way that Frankenstein creates a creature, is a creation itself. In Charlotte Gordon’s fascinating biography of Mary Shelley, she states that Shelley, pregnant while finishing her first draft of the novel, calls the book her “offspring” or “progeny” (375). Gordon further points out that there is a relation between Shelley’s own birthday and the novel she creates: The tale begins December 11, 17—, and ends in September 17—. (Although Mary did not provide the exact year, Walton sights the creature on Monday, July 31, and July 31 fell on a Monday in 1797.) Mary Wollstonecraft conceived in early December 1796, gave birth to [her daughter] Mary on August 30, 1797, and died on September 10, 1797. (375) For Shelley, the novel, her brain child is dear as her biological child. 21 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(29) nineteenth century always aims to form and enable a subject to become an individual. This project will contribute to the understanding of Victorian studies as a field by revisiting the Victorians’ subjectivity and individual relationships in a narratorial structure7. Considering each novel through its specific characteristics, I show that each author depicts its characters’ psyches in relation to nature, space, and temporality. This emphasis on a character’s psyche shows the importance of an individual, for it is in an individual’s own consciousness that the internal conversation takes place. I see that each character’s psyche stands for his/her own world, a microcosm of the novel with individual experiences, characteristics, and concerns. The issues that these three novels consider can be whittled down to individual fundamental moral questions: the tensions between an individual and society, between. 政治大. social mores and individual sensibilities, tensions that the characters in these novels try to. 立. resolve through sympathy. An example of this sort of conflict is the question of whether. ‧ 國. 學. Frankenstein should make the Creature a female companion. On the one hand, he wants to compensate the Creature for his wrongdoing, to protect his own family from. ‧. retaliation, and to fulfil his promise, but on the other hand, he is afraid of endangering the world with the Creatures’ future offspring. For Jane, a parallel conflict is the question of. y. Nat. sit. whether to live “in sin” or leave Mr. Rochester. The situation is complicated further by. er. io. the fact that she has never felt so loved by anyone else. For Isabel, this type of conflict is. n. a to her marital prison ratheri vthan eloping with resolved by her decision to return. l C n Goodwood. Those decisions are all made toU ethical questions, conflicts h einnresponse i h gc between these characters’ personal desires and their consciences.. Sympathy, thus, under those circumstances, is a useful tool as they ponder the possibilities of both sides without having to put themselves in precarious positions. Sympathy is a way of calculating the stakes before reaching the final decision. Sympathy catalyzes the characters’ epiphanies in their pain and vulnerability. It often results in the interplay between disillusionment and enlightenment, between pain and epiphany, a moment which significantly contributes to the characters’ personal development. These Like the characters in and readers of novels of the long nineteenth century, scholars also need to become emotionally involved in their subject matter since, as John Kucich points out, “thinking and reading with integrity demands that we continue to be both self-conscious and self-critical about our own efforts at ‘sympathetic understanding’” (20). 7. 22 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(30) characters refuse to degrade themselves; rather, they turn detrimental circumstances into opportunities for personal redemption. This thesis highlights the importance of sympathy from the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth century –i.e., as it opens up new ways of understanding the entire “long nineteenth century” of literary England by connecting psychological discourses to developments in the novel. I consider how they construct the narrations by eliciting sympathy from both the characters and the readers. Sympathy opens a conversation that pushes deeper into the human psyche and bridges the gap between the inner and the outer psyche. Sympathy asserts itself at the moments when characters encounter self-doubt, when things go awry in their lives. Because sympathy forces characters to ask questions of themselves, and, sometimes, even forces them into conflict with their own ideas and. 政治大. thoughts, it allows the novel to plumb the depth of the problem, the subject matter.. 立. The novel’s strength as a genre is in its abstraction. This abstraction reconciles. ‧ 國. 學. fiction with reality in the way that it allows us to stretch our imaginations and to test ideas without making decisions which could negatively impact our own real lives. Novels. ‧. often seem truer than reality because they are a condensed accumulation of many incidents in people’s lives. Consequently, we often tend to identify with the characters,. y. Nat. sit. while at the same time coming up with various interpretations of their experiences. Now,. er. io. even more than at other times, novels are worth our attention because our imaginations. n. a can sympathize with each other. are a crucial means by which we i v I see this sympathy as l C U n divisions. serving an important role in combatinghcontemporary e n g c h i social. To sympathize is to make an active decision to understand another person in fellow. thinking, although to understand does not imply either agreement or endorsement of their behavior. To sympathize is to acknowledge that people perceive the world differently; to “sympathize” from a vantage point of moral superiority cannot work because this sort of superiority cannot recognize different viewpoints. Since people tend to perceive sympathy through a moral framework, we constantly run the risk of sympathizing only with people whom we favor and whose beliefs we share. This “solidarity” can lead to tribalism. People see the world differently because of individual temperaments. Thus, we often feel contempt, rage, and confusion towards people who are different than we are.. 23 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.

(31) These emotions manifest themselves in a desire to exclude people who do not share our beliefs—in other words, tribalism. Sympathy is an active choice, rather than an action motivated solely by emotion. If we allow sympathy to be a completely emotional act, it will be impossible for us to sympathize with people whom we (either consciously or unconsciously) judge to be unworthy of our sympathy. Often, people rush to judgement before truly understanding the whole picture. To sympathize with someone does not guarantee endorsement of the other’s behavior. For example, Frankenstein realizes that if he allows himself to think along with the Creature—to experience this sort of fellow-feeling—he might inadvertently find himself endorsing the Creature’s behavior. Even the idea of unconsciously thinking along with the Creature repulses him. Thinking concurrently does. 政治大. not necessarily mean that both people are in agreement because thinking along with. 立. someone is different from agreeing. It is possible to disagree with someone even after. ‧ 國. 學. sympathizing with him. People often tend to consider sympathy through a moral framework. Sympathy is in some ways similar to the suspension of disbelief that is. ‧. required in reading a novel; it asks that readers put all thoughts of themselves aside in order to enter into others’ fellow thinking, to understand them. But to sympathize is not. y. Nat. er. io. personal ideologies.. sit. necessarily a virtue, for it might—potentially—only be strengthening the readers’. n. a is difficult because it requires The process of sympathizing i v us to overcome the. l C n discomfort we feel when we acknowledge h e beliefs i U with which we disagree. This n g corh ideas discomfort results, then, in anxiety, an anxiety rooted in the realization that the “other. side” could potentially be right. Thus, people have to give up what they already believe, and to admit that they are wrong. Consequently, refusing to sympathize is the easiest way to avoid insecurity and effort. I believe literature holds the power to speak directly to our innermost feelings. My goal is to consider the wisdom of these specific nineteenthcentury novelists not because they propose easy answers, but because they raise questions instead. This thesis aims to provide ways of encountering these textual concerns as a reflection of our own lives. What makes the characters great is their willingness to take action and, thus, to be transformed. The higher power that this transformation provides makes these characters 24 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202100028.