都市更新權利變換制度的委託代理、產權結構與契約關係之研究 - 政大學術集成
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(2) 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 2. i n U. v.
(3) 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.
(4) A Study on the Principal-Agent Relationship, Structure of Property Rights,and the Contractual Relationship of Rights Transformation System for Urban Renewal. Abstract In the process of rights transformation of urban renewal, the relationships between land owners and the implementers are the typical Principal-Agent Relationship in modern economic activities. Based on the related rights and obligations under the regulations of urban renewal, land owners and the implementers execute urban renewal business. Due to the differences of asymmetric information, inconsistent goals, and risk preference, the decision-making and/or actions of implementers based on the opportunism, will often unfavorable to the benefits of land owners. Therefore, the problem of Principal-Agent Relationship arises that increases agent cost. Both sides cannot generate the foundation of highly mutual trust, and thus creates the major reason of delaying and inefficiency for urban renewal. This paper studies and analyzes the Principal-Agent Relationship of both land owners and the implementers from both sides with their interaction of contract under unban renewal regulation mechanism, and further from the land owners perspective to design ways of monitoring to protect rights and benefits of land owners, to facilitate the implementation of urban renewal business.. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. When the land owners and the implementers organize as a Production Team on a very urban renewal unit, the land owners initially hold stronger control rights on both proposing step and agreement step; along the implementers hold agreement letters exceeding the official threshold of urban renewal regulations, they will control better execution rights, and the landowners hold weaker surveillance control rights. The current value allocation of rights transformation for urban renewal employs common sharing of expenses with the implementers. After deducting the common sharing of the discounted price substitute payment of the land and buildings after the rights transformation, the remaining lands and buildings shall be allocated to the original landowners according to the rights value proportion before each piece of land rights was transformed. In so doing, the land owners obtain 4.
(5) most of the residual claim. Under such separation of the control rights and the residual claim, whether the value allocation of the rights transformation is as suitable arrangement for property rights? Will it be the incentives to the urban renewal participants? Whether it will facilitate the efficiency of urban renewal promotion? These are the main points of the analysis of this paper. Land owners and the implementers with the same Renewal Unit retain a short-term and once-for-all cooperative nature. According to the regulations of current Urban Renewal Act, both parties of the transaction by signing an agreement as the key contract of implementing urban renewal business. After signing up the contract, due to the different ratio of specific investment input by both sides of the transaction, the initial contract thus normally has been delaying or doubtfully signed. Even worse, after eventually signing the contract, there are still uncertain disputes on rights and obligations. Via the thoughts of Incomplete Contracts Theory, this paper not only analyzes the contractual relationship and the specific investment relationship of land owners and the implementers, but also recommends a new transaction contract model to decrease the opportunism behaviors of both sides, and further more, to facilitate the implement of urban renewal business.. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Key Words: Urban Renewal, Rights Transformation, principal-agent relationship, Control Right, Residual Claim, Incomplete Contracts. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.
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(10) 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v.
(11) 53 1. 62. 2. 政 治 大 ,2002. 72. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 3. (hold out). (. sit er. io. v. n. Public- Private Partnerships. Ch. engchi. i n U. 62 3 4 5. 5. 53 53. 2. ,2001). y. Nat. al 4. 1. 82. 52-55. 62 63-73 2003 (1994). 89 (1997) 87. 11. 29 (2000) 11. 25 (2002) 8700232460. 1. 21 (2005.
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(19) 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 9. i n U. v.
(20) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 舺 實施者. 土地權利人. (代理人 代理人) 代理人. (委託人 委託人) 委託人. 舺. 舺 擬定都市更新 事業計畫草案. 舺. 多數 不同意. 舺 終止與特 定實施者. 立. 舺. ‧ 國. 多數決同意權成立. 少數不同意. ‧. 舺. 合作. 學. 舺. 政 治 大. 提送都市更新 事業計畫報核. 都市更新. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 提送權利變換 計畫報核. Ch. 持續進行. engchi. i n U. v. 權利價值異議 與行政救濟. 權利價值分配. 舺. 共同負擔 折價抵付. 折價抵付後 剩餘價值分配. 開始重建開發工程. 完成都市更新事業. 1-1 10. 舺.
(21) 舺. 舺. 舺. 舺. 舺. 立. 舺. 舺. 舺 政 治 大 舺. 舺. Nat. 舺. n. al. er. io. sit. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 舺. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 舺. 舺. 舺. 1-2. 11.
(22) 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 政 治 大. 學 ‧. ‧ 國 io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. 舺舺. Ch. engchi. 12. i n U. v.
(23) 22 23. 1992 11. 1993. Nat. y. 1998 ,2002). n. al. er. io. sit. (. ‧. 2001. 24. 1973. (2002). 學. ‧ 國. 立. 政 治 大. Partnrships. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Public- Private. 25. 22 23 24. (1984) (1972). (1987) (1974). (1988) (1987). (1989) (1996). (1995 (1999. (1994) (2000). (1997) (2002). (1997) (2005). (1998). (1998). 5. 25. (2000). 13.
(24) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺 26 27. 28. 29. (1987). (1988) (2000). 政 治 大. 立. 3. 4. 5. 28 29 30. (1984) (2000) (1998) (1987) (2005). sit. y. n. al. er. 30. io. 27. 6. ‧. Nat. 26. 1. 學. ‧ 國. 2. 1982 (1995). Ch. (1991) (2000) (1999) (1988) (2007). e n g(c h i. i n U. v. ,2006). (1991) (1997 (2004) (2004) , (2000) (2007) (1995) (2000). 14. ( 2 0 0 6).
(25) 31. (2001). 2009. 立. 政 治 大. ‧ 國. 學 (. ‧. 32. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 33. 2004). (2005). Ch. engchi. i n U. v. (. ,2007). (2007). 31. (2008) 32. (2007) 33. (1984) (2009) (2001) (2008). (1996). (1997). (2001). (2003). (2003). (2004). (2004). (2006). 50. 15.
(26) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. (. ,2006). 34. 35. 36. 政 治 大. 學. ‧ 國. 立. 37. 38 39. ‧. Nat. y. 40. n. er. io. al. sit. 41. (2006). 34. (2006). (2000) (2007). Ch. (2002). engchi. (2003). i n U. v. (2003). ,. 35. 36. 37 38 39 40 41. (2000) (2002) (2003) (2004) , (2000) (2006) (2008) (2006) (2006) (2007) (2006) (2007) (2005) (2006) (2007) 16. , (2009). (2006).
(27) (2009). (Mechanism Design Theory). 學. ‧ 國. 立. 政 治 大 Joint Venture. ‧. (2006) Christman. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. (2007). 17. i n U. v.
(28) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 2006. 1. 立. 2. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 18. i n U. v.
(29) 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 42. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. (2006) (2007). 42. 2006 19.
(30) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 20. i n U. v.
(31) 政 治 大Team Production. Alchian and Demsets 1972. 立. (shirking). ‧. ‧ 國. 學 y. Nat. n. er. io. al. sit. Alchian and Demsets. 1 3. Ch. 2. engchi. (Free ride problem). i n U. v. Alchian and. Demsets 43. 44. 43. Alc hi a n, A. A. a nd H .De ms e t s.( 1 9 7 2 ) , P r o d uc ti o n,I n fo r mat io n Co st s, a n d Eco no mi c Or ga n iza tio n. Amer ica n Eco no mi c R ev ie w. 6 2 ( 7 ) :8 0 44 p .8 1 21.
(32) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. Alchian and Demsets(1972). 45. 立. 政 治 大. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Hart(1995). ‧. ‧ 國. 學 Alchian and Demsets(1972). Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Coase(1960). Grossman and Hart(1986) Moore(1990). residule right of. control. Alchian and Demsets. 45. Hart and. Coase. p .8 3 22.
(33) (hold out). (. 立. 2001. 2003). 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. (Alchian and Demsets, 1972; Jesen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980) ( Fama ,1980; Eisenhardt, 1989 ; Lassr&Kert , 1996) 2003 (Michael Jesen and William Meckling,1976) Ross,1973. 23.
(34) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. (Fama 1980. Eisenhardt 1989). 政 治 大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. (. i n U. v. 2001. 2003) Sappington. 1991 Jesen and Meckling( 1976). 24.
(35) (Bilateral Pruncipal-Agent Relationship Spence and Zeckhauser,1971 Ross,1973 Jessen and Meckling,1976 Holmstrom,1979). (Generalized principal agent relation. 政 治 大. Myerson, 1982;Holmstrom, 1982) (Common Agency Bernheim and Whinston,1985,1986) (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) (Multilateral Pruncipal- Agent Relationship Epstein and Peters, 1999). 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. (Common Agency). n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Bernheim and Whinston(1985) Nash. 46. Nash (. 2003,P.10) 25. 46.
(36) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. Alchian and Demsets (Alchian and Demsets,1972; Jesen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980) Ross 1973. 2006. joint venture. (2007). 立 (2006). 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 47. 91 98. 12. 31. 93. 81. 12. 47. 26. 3. 21.
(37) 政 治 大. Grossman and Hart(1986) Hart and Moore(1990) incomplete. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. residule right of control. Ch. Hart and Moore(1990). engchi. i n U. v. residual rights specific rights. Hart and Moore(1990) 48. 48. Hart,O. and Moore. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy, 1990,Vol.98.p.1150 27.
(38) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺 49. Asset. Specificity. Grossman and Hart(1986) 50. hold up Grossman and Hart(1986). 立. Hart and Moore(1990) 治 政 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. io. sit. y. Nat Fama and Jensen. 49. al. n. authority. er. Aghion and Tirole(1997) real authority. Ch. engchi. i n U. formal. v. 1983. Williamson Williamson,1996. 50. Grossman, S.and O.Hart, ,. 1986. ,“The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of. Vertical and Lateral Integration.”Joural of Political Economy, 94 28. p.693.
(39) Fama and Jensen 1. (initiation. 2. (ratification). 3. (implementation). 4. (monitoring). 立. 政 治 大. decision management. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. control. decision. Fama and Jensen(1983). n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 29. i n U. v.
(40) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. Grossman and Hart(1986). 立. Hart and Moore(1990). 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 30. i n U. v.
(41) — Hart and Holmstrom(1987). --. 1 2 Hidden Knowledge. 3 Tirole 2001. 政 治 大 Optimal Complete Contract 立. ‧ 國. 學. 51. ‧. Foss and Foss 2000. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Coase(1937). 1937. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The Nature of the Firm. 52. Grubb 2000. 51 52. Tirole,J. Corporate Governance.Journal of Econometrica,2001,Vol.69.p.14 Ronald Coase. The Nature of the Firm J .Economica,1937,(4) 386–405.) 31.
(42) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. Klein 1980 Grossman and Hart 53. 1986. Segal 1999. Tirole(1999). Rasmusen 2001 Maskin 2002 1 2 3. 政 治 大. 立 Grossman and Hart,1986. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 1986. (Williamson,1985 Tirole, Hart and Moore,1988). n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Hart and Moore 1988. Ch. 54. engchi. i n U. v. Observable but Observable but. Indescribable Unverifiable. 53. Grossman, S.and Hart, O.,The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Joural of Political Economy, 1986;Vol.94,P.25 54 Hart,Oliver D. and Moore,J. Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation.Journal of Econometrica, 1988, Vol.56.p.757. 32.
(43) Grossman and Hart 1986 Hart and Moore. Integration 1988. D0 D1. 立. D3. Hart 1986 Matouschek(2004). D0. io. n. al. Ch. engchi. sit. y. Nat. Matouschek(2004). er. Grossman. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 1. D2. 政 治 大. i n U. v. 2 Hart and Moore 1988. Williamson. D0 D1 Relation-Specific Investment 2002. 33.
(44) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. Matouschek(2004). Grossman and Hart 1986 Hart and Moore 1988 pareoto. Klein 1996. 政 治 大. 立. ‧ 國. 學. 3. Hart and Moore 1988. ‧. Grossman and Hart 1986 D2. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 4. Ch. engchi. Grossman and Hart 1986. i n U. v. D3. locked-in hold up. 34.
(45) (sunk-cost). , 2006. 立. Foss and Foss. 政 治 大 2000. n. al. er. io. sit. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Nat. Integration. Williamson 1971. Ch. engchi. 35. i n U. v. Vertical.
(46) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. Coase(1937). The Nature of the Firm. Coase(1960) 55. 立. Coase. 政 治 大 57. ‧ 國. 學. Coase. ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 55. 3 56 57. Coase, R.H.. 1960. 56. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. ,“The Problem of Social Costs.”Journal of Law and Economics,. p16 p.8 p15 36.
(47) 立. 政 治 大. Alchian and Demsets 1972. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 1980. Eisenhardt 1989). Ch. engchi. 37. i n U. v. (Fama.
(48) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 舺 舺 舺 舺 舺 舺 舺. 立. 舺. 政舺 治 大 舺. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 舺. sit. y. Nat. 舺. n. al. er. io. 舺. Ch. engchi 舺. 2-1. 38. i n U. v.
(49) 政 治 大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 58. 59. (. ,2003). Joint Venture ( 58 59. 25 3. 1. 5 39. ,2006).
(50) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. (Fama,1980. 立. Eisenhardt, 1989). 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 40. i n U. v.
(51) 政 治 大 ( §6) 2. §5). 立. §7). 1 (. ‧ 國. 學. 1 §9 10) 2. §10. 鏞. ). 3. ‧. (. (. n. er. io. al. Ch. §14). (. engchi. 60. (. §10. 鶚. ) (. 60. §11). sit. Nat (. (. y. (. §10. 鏞. ) 97 41. i n U §10. v). 鏞.
(52) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. (. (. 立. §21). 1. 政 治 大. 4. 5. ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. (. 3. 學. ‧ 國. 2. §19). Ch. engchi. i n U. §10 22). (. §7. 22)1. 2. 3. 42. v.
(53) (. (. §22. 鏞. §11. 22). ). ( §19○1 §22) §19 鶚 窳. (. 政 治 大. 立. ‧ 國. 學. 3. ). ‧ y. Nat. 61. io. n. al. Ch. engchi. 1. sit. §19. er. (. i n U. v. ( §22. 3. (. (. 61. §88) §22 3. §22. 3. 2 §89) 3. ( §22 ) 5. 22. 3. §92) 4. 3. 43.
(54) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. (. §22. 4. 3. ). 1. 3. 5. 1. 政 治 大. 立. 學. ‧ 國. 2. 3 2. ‧. 3. 4 5. sit. n. al. er. io. 4. y. Nat. 6. 1. Ch 7. engchi U. v ni. 5. 6. 8. 9 10. 11 12. (. 44. §19○2 ).
(55) (. (. 立 ). 政 治 大 (. ‧. 62. y. Nat. io. sit. 1. 2. n. al. er. 1. ). §30). ‧ 國. 鏞. 3. 學. §30. §19. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 2 3 4. 5. 5% 6% 12%. 62. 13. 45.
(56) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. (. (. 政 治 大. §32). 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 sit. y. 29). n. al. er. §22). 19. io. (. §10. Nat. (. (. §8. §31. Ch. engchi. i n U (. v. §10 19 29). 16) (. 46. §8). 鏞. ).
(57) ( §16). (. §55). (. §56) 1 2. 立. 3. 政 治 大. 63. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 63. 47. i n U. v.
(58) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 政 治 大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 3-2). io. sit. y. Nat. (. n. al. er. 3-1). 學. (. Ch. engchi. 48. i n U. v.
(59) ( (. ). 立. 3-1. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. (. Ch. engchi. ). 3-2. 49. i n U. v. ).
(60) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. (. ,2006) (. ). 1990. (. 立. 2006). 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 3-3. (. (. 3-4. §31. 鏞. Ch. engchi. §30. 鏞. ). ). A 50. i n U. v.
(61) B A B. C. C C1. C C2. C1. B+C1 A+C2. 舺. 立. 舺. 政 治 大 舺. 舺. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 舺. 舺. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 舺. n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v舺. 舺 舺 舺 (. ( ). 3-3. 51. 窳舺.
(62) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. C2 C C1. A. B. B. B. A. A. A. 立舺. 舺. 政 治 大 舺. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. C1. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. A: B: C=C1+C2 A+B+C= C1: C2: B+C1: A+C2:. 舺. Ch. engchi. 3-4. 52. i n U. v.
(63) 64. 立. 政 治 大. (. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 64. 53. i n U. v. §30. 鏞. ).
(64) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 54. i n U. v.
(65) (Fama,1980. 立. Eisenhardt,1989). 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Jensen and Mecklin. Ch. engchi. 1976. 55. i n U. v.
(66) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. (. §10 19 29). 65. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 65. 56. i n U. v.
(67) ( §22○3 ) (. §32). 政 治 大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. (. §19 29). n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi (. ,2006. 2006. §19. 2007. 57. i n U 29). v.
(68) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 1. ‧ 國. (. y. sit. n. al. er. io. 66. ‧. §49). 1. §. ( §45) §46) ( §47 48). Nat. 2 3 4 5. (. 學. 44). 政 治 大. 4. Ch. engchi. 66. 302 58. i n U. v. 5. (.
(69) 立. 政 治 大. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. 2006. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 59. i n U. v.
(70) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 67. §88) 2. 1. ( (. §22 §22. 3. ( §89) 3. 3. ( ). §22. §22 §92) 4. 3. 5 (. 1. §22. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. io. sit. y. ). n. al. er. 鏞. 67. ) 5. Nat. §29. 3. 3 4. (. 3. 22. Ch. engchi. 3. 88. 89. 92. 60. i n U. v.
(71) 立. ‧ 國. ‧ y. 3-2. io. 1000. n. al. Ch. engchi. 61. sit. 3-1. 84.62%. er. Nat. 0.645%. 1. 學. 3 4. 政 2治 大. i n U. v.
(72) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 3-1 600. 601 -800. 801 -1000. 1001. 8. 9. 5. 4. 26. 30.77%. 34.62%. 19.23%. 15.38%. 100.0%. 3-2. 立. 政 治 大 0.51%-10.0% 10.1%. 0.5%. 3 11.54%. ‧. ‧ 國. 11 42.31%. 學. 12 46.55%. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 62. i n U. v. 26 100.0%.
(73) 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 63. i n U. v.
(74) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 64. i n U. v.
(75) 政 治 大. 立. ,2003). ‧. ‧ 國. 學. (. Joint Venture. y. Nat. sit. n. al. er. io. ,2006). (. Ch. i n U. v. i Relationship e n g c h Principal-Agent (principal) (agent). (Jesen and Meckling,1976) Ross(1973). (Fama,1980 Eisenhardt,1989). 65.
(76) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 66. i n U. v.
(77) (Alchian and Demsets,1972; Jesen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980) (Fama,1980 ;Eisenhardt ,1989). Ross,1973. (. 立. 政 治 大. §22). ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat 68. Ch. engchi ( 91. i n U. v. §10 鏞 ) 3 21. 98. 12. 31. 93 63 81. 68. 69. 87. 302. 69. gov.tw. http://www. uro. taipei. 12. 67.
(78) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 1. 2. 3. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. (. v. §10). 70. 70. 94. 6. 24. 0940084053 68.
(79) 政 治 大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. i e nRoss g c h1973. i n U. v. … …. 97. 6. 3. 0970804501 … 69.
(80) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. (. 立. 政 治 大. ‧ 國. 學. 1972. Alchian. ‧. Nat. y. and Demsets. §32). sit. n. al. er. io. (Bilateral Principal-Agent Relationship Spence and Zeckhauser,1971 Ross,1973 Jessen and Meckling,1976 Holmstrom,1979). Ch. engchi. 70. i n U. v.
(81) 政 治 大 Bernheim and Whinston(1985) 立. ‧ 國. 學. Bernheim and Whinston(1985). ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 71. i n U. v. Nash.
(82) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Jensen and Mecklin 1976. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 72. i n U. v.
(83) 71. (. (. §45). (. §44) §46). (. §47 48) (. §49). 政 治 大. 立. sit. io. n. al. ). er. 4-1. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Nat. (. Ch. 72. 71 72. 87 87. engchi. 4 4. 302. 73. i n U. v.
(84) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 舺 (. --. 窳舺. 舺 (. (. 窳. ( 窳舺. 窳舺. 4-1. 立. 政 治 大. n. 73. 73. sit. er. io. al. ,2007. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Nat. (. Ch. engchi. http://www.cpami.gov.tw. 97 74. i n U. v.
(85) 1 2. ( (. §8. 16). 3 4. ( (. §55). §56). 政 治 大. 74. 5. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 1. §10 19 29). (. Ch §10. i n U. e19n g 29)c h i. v. 2. (. 74. §22). 舺 75.
(86) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. (. 立. §32). 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat 4-2. Ch. engchi. 76. i n U. v.
(87) 鏞/鏞0. 舺. 鏞/鏞0. 舺. 舺. 舺. 舺 舺. 舺. 舺. 立. 政 治 大 舺. 舺. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 舺. 舺. 舺. Nat 舺. n. Ch. er. io. al. sit. y. 舺. 舺. engchi U. v ni. 舺 舺. 舺 舺. 舺 舺. 舺. 4-2. 77.
(88) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. Bernheim and Whinston(1985,1986). 政 治 大. (. 學. ‧ 國. 立 2005). ‧. (. 1996). n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. Bernheim & Whinston(1985,1986). Bernheim & Whinston Nash Macho-Stadler(1998). 78. i n U. v.
(89) Mezzetti(1997). 75. Bernheim & Whinston. 政 治 大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 1. Ch 76. engchi. i n U. v. 2. 75. 鏞5 舺. 舺. 舺. 舺 舺. 舺 舺. 76舺. 舺 79. 舺.
(90) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 3. 4. 5. 政 治 大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 4-3). n. al. ,2006). er. io. sit. y. Nat 3. 1. Ch. 91. 4 engchi U. 3. 21. 98. v2 i n. 12. 93 92 77. 77. (. http. //www.uro.taipei.gov.tw 80. (. 31.
(91) 舺 舺. 舺. 舺. 舺. 舺. 舺. 舺. 舺. 舺. 舺. 舺. 舺. ‧. 舺 舺. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat 4-3. 舺. 學. ‧ 國. 立. 舺. 政 治 大. Ch. engchi. 1 81. i n U. v. 舺 舺.
(92) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 2 3 4 5. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. 1. Ch. engchi. 2. 82. er. io. al. 4-4). sit. y. Nat. (. i n U. v.
(93) 3. 立. 4. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 83. i n U. v.
(94) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. (. 窳舺. (. 窳舺. 舺. 舺 窳舺. (. 舺 (. 舺. 舺 舺 窳舺. 立. 學. ‧ 國. 舺 (. 窳舺. ‧ y. Nat. 舺. n. al. er. io. 4-4. sit. (. 政 治 大. Ch. engchi. 84. i n U. v. 舺 窳舺.
(95) 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Macho-Stadler(1998) Bernheim & Whinston(1985,1986) Nash. 85.
(96) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 86. i n U. v.
(97) 政 治 大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Coase(1960) Grossman and Hart(1986). Hart and Moore(1990). residule right of control (2006) 1999 (2003) (2006) 87.
(98) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. joint venture. 學. .. ‧. ‧ 國. 立. 政 治 大. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. Grossman and Hart(1986). 88. i n U. v.
(99) 2006 residule claim. 立. 政 治 大 Hart and Moore(1990). ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 89. i n U. v.
(100) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 政 治 大 (. 學. §5) (. ‧. §9). io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. ( ). ‧ 國. 立. Ch. engchi. 90. i n U. v.
(101) (. 立. §10. 11). 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. (. §22. 鏞. Ch. engchi. ). 91. i n U. v.
(102) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. (. §22. 鏞. ). 政 治 大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. (. Ch. §32. 鏞. engchi. 鶚. 92. ). i n U. v.
(103) (. §33). (. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 93. i n U. v. 5-1).
(104) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 94. i n U. v.
(105) 5-1. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 95. i n U. v.
(106) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. Alchian and Demsets(1972). 政 治 大. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Fama and Jensen 1983. ‧. io. n. al. sit. 5-2. er. Nat. y. 78. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1. 1 ( 2. §10 (. 11) §10. 11). 3 4. 78. (. 舺 96. §9. 10).
(107) 2. 1. 政 治 大. 立. §10. 11). sit. 10). (. n. al. er. §9. io. (. 11). y. §10. Nat. (. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 1. 2. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. ( §22) (. §25) (. 2. 97. §25-1).
(108) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 1. (. 19. 立. 政 治 大. 29). ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 2. §10. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. 1. 1 2 (. 98. §19. 29). v.
(109) 3 (. §19. 29). 4 (. §32). 2. 5-2. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. (2006). 99. i n U. v.
(110) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 79. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 79. Ch. engchi. 765 舺 100. i n U. v.
(111) ( §21) 80. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. (. 凃0. §22. Ch. engchi. v. 32). 舺 鶚鶚. i n U. 舺 舺. 鶚 舺 101.
(112) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 政 ( 治§32) 大. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. 5-2. 凃鏞. 81. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. §7-2. 舺 102. v. 5-1.
(113) 舺. ‧ 國. 學. 舺. 舺. 土地權利人控制權. 政舺 治 大. 由強轉弱. 立. 舺. ‧ y. n. 舺. 舺. 5-1. 103. v. 實施者控制權. e n g舺 c h i. i n U. 由弱轉強. Ch. sit. io. al. 舺. er. Nat. 舺.
(114) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 82. 1. ( 44). 2. 立. 3 4. 政 治 大( ( §46) (. §45). §47. 48). ‧ 國. 學. 5. §. (. §49). sit. n. al. 82. 凃3. 舺. (鶚003窳. 鶚006. 凃7. 5. er. 4. io. 1. y. ‧. Nat. 83. Ch. engchi. (鶚007. 舺 4. 30鶚 104. i n U. v. (鏞997. 舺. (鶚006.
(115) 政 治 大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 84. 85. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 50,000 150,000 50%. 180,000. 50,000. 50%. 84. 舺 85. 鏞鶚凃. 舺 105. 5-3.
(116) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 5-3 (. ). 75,000. (50%). 90,000. (50%). (. ). 75,000. (50%). 90,000. (50%). 政 治 大. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. 150,000. Ch. 75,000 180,000. engchi. er. io. 60,000. sit. y. Nat. 50,000. i n U. v. 5-4 1. 60,000. 150,000. 60,000. 180,000. 75,000. 150,000. 75,000. 180,000. 40% 2 33.3% 3 50% 4 41.6%. 106. 50,000.
(117) 5-4. 立. 40%. 33.3%. 50%. 41.6%. 政 治 大. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. sit. 50,000 75,000 150,000. er. io. 1 150,000 2 180,000 3 150,000 4 180,000. y. Nat 50% 50,000 180,000. ‧. 50%. Ch. engchi 50,000 33.3% 50,000 27.8% 75,000 50% 75,000 41.6%. 107. i n U. v. 5-5.
(118) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 5-5 33.3%. 27.8%. 50%. 41.6%. 5-6. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 5-6. 108. i n U. v.
(119) 2006. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 109. i n U. v.
(120) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Aghion and Tirole(1997). Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Alchian and Demsets(1972). 110.
(121) 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 111. i n U. v.
(122) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 112. i n U. v.
(123) 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 113. i n U. v.
(124) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 114. i n U. v.
(125) ( §9 10 14 15) (. §19. 立. §10). 學 ‧. Eisenhardt(1989). io. sit. y. Nat. Fama(1980) (agent). n. al. er. (. 29). ‧ 國. (. §29). 政 治 大. (. §22. 3. Ch. engchi. ). 115. i n U. v. (principal).
(126) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. (. §32). Foss and Foss 2000. Complete Contracts Williamson 1971. 學. ‧ 國. ‧. io. sit. y. Nat. (sunk-cost). Incomplete Contracts. n. al. er. 1985. 治Moore 1988 Grossman and Hart 1986政Hart and 大 立. Ch. engchi. 116. i n U. v.
(127) 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 117. i n U. v.
(128) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 86. 鏞0. Ch. engchi. i n U. 鶚. 舺舺 舺舺. 舺 118. v. 86.
(129) 87. 88. 政 治 大. 立. ‧ 國. ‧ y. sit. n. al. er. io. 4. Nat. 2 3. §21). 學. 1. (. 5. Ch. engchi (. 凃7. i n U. §22○3 ). 舺 (. 窳. (. 窳. 舺 88. 舺 119. v.
(130) (. 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. §5). ( ( (. §37. 38. §41) ( §11). 39. 40 §6). (. §7). §30 31) (. (. §3). 1 2. ‧ 國. ‧. io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. 5. 立. 學. 3 4. 政 治 大. (. Ch. §19. engchi. 29). 120. i n U. v. §31).
(131) (. §32). 6-1. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學 er. io. sit. y. Nat. n. al. Ch. engchi. 舺. v. 舺 舺. 舺. 舺. D0. i n U. 舺. 舺. D1. 舺. 6-1. 121. 舺. 舺. D2. 舺. D3.
(132) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. Williamson(1983,1985) (Site specifity) 2 Human Capital specifity 4 (2003). 立. 89. 1. Physical specifity 3 Dedicated Assets specifity. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 凃9. 舺. Williamson 鏞 specifity 3 Assets舺specifity 舺. Ch. engchi. 鶚00鏞 (Site舺specifity窳 鶚 Human舺Capital舺specifity 4. 122. i n U. v. 鶚003 Physical舺 Dedicated舺.
(133) ‧. 90. y. sit. n. al. er. io. 2. §30). Nat. 1、 1. (. 學. ‧ 國. 立. 政 治 大. Ch. engchi. i n U. 2、. 3、 4、 5、 5% 90. 123. v.
(134) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 6% 12%. 政 治 大. Grossman and Hart(1986) Hart and Moore(1988) (Residual Rights of Control). 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al 91. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Grossman and Hart. 91. Hart and Moore. 舺 124.
(135) Grossman and Hart. 政 治 大. 立. 0. 學. ‧ 國. Hart and Moore. 1. ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Grossman and Hart(1986) Hart and Moore(1988. Ch. engchi. 125. i n U. v. 1.
(136) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 26 3-1 92. 600 1000. 46.55%. 30.77% 601 19.23% 1001. 0.51%. 10.0% 0.645%. 42.31%. 立. 800. 10.1%. 34.62%. 801. 15.38% 3-2 0.5% 11.54%. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Coase(1937). 92. 舺 126.
(137) Williamson(1985) Tirole(1986). 政 治 大 Hart and Moore 1988 立 ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Williamson 1971. Ch. i n U. v. i e nVertical g c hIntegration. Williamson 1971. 127.
(138) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. Grossman and Hart 1986 Hart and Moore 1988. 立. Integration. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 128. i n U. v.
(139) 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 6-2. Grossman. Ch. Hart 1986 Matouschek(2004). engchi. 129. i n U. D0. v.
(140) 舺舺. 舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺舺. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. D2. 130. i n U. v.
(141) 93. 政 治 大. 立. ‧ 國. 學. D3. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 93. 凃7. Ch. engchi. 4. 30鶚 131. i n U. v.
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