評估2018年台灣嚇阻中國的能力：台灣針對中國侵略的防堵程度如何? - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University 碩士論文. 政治大立Master’s Thesis ‧. ‧ 國. 學 sit. y. Nat. 評估 2018 年台灣嚇阻中國的能力：台灣針對中國侵略的防堵程度如何?. n. al. er. io. Assessing Taiwan’s Deterrence against China in June. Ch. 2018.. engchi. i n U. v. How well does Taiwan deter China from Subjugating the Island?. Student: Hugo Tierny Advisor: Yuan I. 中華民國 107 年 06 月 DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07.

(2) 06 / 2018. 評估 2018 年台灣嚇阻中國的能力：台灣針對中國侵略的防堵程度如何? Assessing Taiwan’s Deterrence against China in June 2018. How well does Taiwan deter China from Subjugating the Island? 研究生: 田予光. Student: Hugo Tierny. Yuan I 政治 Advisor: 大. 指導教授:袁易. 國立政治大學. 學. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. Nat. y. ‧. io. sit. 碩士論文. er. ‧ 國. 立. a. n. v A Thesis submittedl toCthe International Master’s Program in ni hengchi U. Asia-Pacific Studies – National Chengchi University In partial fulfillment of the Requirement For the degree of Master in China Studies 中華民國 107 年 06 月 06 / 2018. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07.

(3) Authorized page. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07.

(4) Authorized page for online publication. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07.

(5) Acknowledgment. On this occasion, I would like to address my warmest thanks to my thesis advisor Pr. Yuan I (袁易), professor at the Institute of International Relations of the National Cheng-chi University in Taipei, Taiwan, who greatly reinforced my confidence in the choice of my subject and then provided me with acute remarks and availability whenever I needed. I also express my deepest gratitude to Pr. Kuo Yujen (郭育仁), my professor at National Sun-Yat-Sen University in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, whose sustained support and dedication in class greatly participated in my wish to continue to study the geopolitics of the Taiwan Strait. I thank Pr. Emmanuel Lincot from the Catholic Institute of Paris, France, whose support was determinant for many of my projects here, and who always knew how to find the right words for stimulating my interest in Asian affairs.. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. I also thank Yen Ming-wei (顏銘緯), Lan Wen-ting (藍文婷), Antoine Boissy and Nassim Elouarzadi for their critical advices and proofreading. Warmest thanks also to my partner in crime Emily Gao (高晏如), for bringing me joy, gaiety and laughter every day.. ‧. I am grateful to my sibling and father Lucas and Gérard, who have provided me through moral and emotional support, from France. I am also grateful to my best friends who have supported me along the way, Mehdi, Charles, Silvère, Louis, Aymeric and Didier. This remark applies also for all my Taiwanese friends who welcomed me here as a guest, made me discover the uniqueness of their beautiful island and convinced me to come back here: Charles, Borys, Jialin, and Amber. You all made this happen.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Hugo Tierny. Ch. engchi. v. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(6) Abstract The goals defended by Taiwan and China are in conflict with each other; China wishes to unify, by force if necessary, and Taiwan seeks to resist annexation. The Chinese pressures against Taiwan intensified following the election of Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) in 2016. John J. Mearsheimer argues that deterrence is a function of the specific strategy available to the potential attacker. Therefore, one needs to understand both the attacker and the defender’s strategies in order to analyze the condition of a deterrence posture. Accordingly, this thesis will attempt to assess Taiwan’s 治政 strategies deterrence by opposing China’s 大for bringing unification 立 responses. to Taiwan and its allies’. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. This study also aims to cast a new light on Taiwan’s deterrence by considering that the Chinese threat on Taiwan is two-fold, with two separated but mutually reinforcing strategies, one being political, the other military. Both form a consistent whole, an escalation process designed to push Taipei to abide by Beijing terms.. er. io. sit. y. Nat. n. a l holds but the combination v i Taiwan’s deterrence of China’s n Ch U e n g chigh misperceptions of its adversaries, h i motivations, short-of-war tactics, and growing military power could, over the long-term, create the conditions for a deterrence failure. The U.S. has recently tightened its ties to Taiwan but this development takes place amid greater Sino – U.S. tensions, which is hardly a sign of stability. Also, Taiwan is having a tough times to modernize its military at a pace commensurate with that of China. Finally, Taiwan is struggling to escape the trap set by China’s short-ofwar tactics.. Hugo Tierny. vi. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(7) 台灣與中國捍衛的目標彼此相互衝突。如果有必要，中國甚至不惜以武力統一台灣，而台灣則是設法抵抗對岸的併吞。中國對台灣施加的壓力隨著蔡英文（民進黨）在 2016 年當選總統而加劇。約翰‧米爾斯海默主張嚇阻是對潛在敵方可行的具體策略，因此，我們必須了解敵方以及防守方的策略，方可分析嚇阻評估條件。也就是說，我們試圖由反對中國對台統一策略以及其盟友的回應，來評估台灣的嚇阻策略。. ‧ 國. 學. 本論文試圖以中國對台兩種不同但卻相輔相成的威脅為考量，其一為政治，另一個則為軍事，來解釋台灣的嚇阻策略。政政治大治及軍事形成了一個整體不斷加劇，目標在於促使台北服從立北京所開出的條件。. ‧. 台灣尚有嚇阻能力，但是關於中國在敵人、高動機、不交戰策略以及不斷增長的軍事力量的錯誤看法的結合，可能會造就嚇阻失效的態勢。美國近期加強與台灣的關係，卻是在中美緊張局勢加劇的情況下發展，這絲毫不是穩定跡象。除此之外，台灣在軍事現代化苦於追趕中國步伐。最後，台灣在 al v i 逃脫中國所設下不交戰策略的圈套上陷入困境。 n C. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. hengchi U. Hugo Tierny. vii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(8) Keywords – List of Figures and Tables. Asia pacific geopolitics / Cross strait relations / deterrence / deterrence theory / Taiwan – China relations / Taiwan deterrence / Taiwan – US relations / Threat security Asia.. Figure 1 Taiwan Deterrence in 2018, source: Hugo Tierny. ......................................... 6 Figure 2 Taiwan's location in Western Pacific, source: Project 2049 Institute ........... 50 Figure 3 Chinese military exercises pictures which circulated on the net, source: Lee. R.V., "Satellite Imagery: China Staging Mock Invasion of Taiwan?” The Diplomat Magazine, August 09, 2015. ........................................................................................ 75 Figure 4 The Chinese M503 flight route, source Taiwan Sentinel .............................. 78 Figure 5 Cross Strait investment, source: Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs ....... 81 Figure 6 PLA Theater Command, source: Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017 .................................................... 87 Figure 7 The Chinese Campaign Layout, source: Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat, p.142............................................................................................................................. 88 Figure 8 Amphibious Staging Areas, source: Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat, p.92 ...................................................................................................................................... 91 Figure 9 Illustration of the PRC's military capabilities and threat, source: ROCNDR 2017.............................................................................................................................. 94 Figure 10 PRC military budget, source: ROCNDR 2017 ............................................ 96 Figure 11 Taiwan Strait SAM and SRBM Coverage Source: Annual Report to US Congress 2017 ............................................................................................................ 104 Figure 12 Chinese / Taiwanese identity in Taiwan, source: NCCU Election Center 127 Figure 13 Major Taiwanese Military Bases, source: Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat, P.218 .............................................................................................................. 184 Figure 14 Air forces balance in the Taiwan Strait, source: Annual report to Congress 2017, 95...................................................................................................................... 169 Figure 15 ROC / PRC Military balance, Ground forces, source: Annual report to the US congress 2017 ............................................................................................................. 173 Figure 16 Comparison Asian defense budget, source: Report to Congress of the U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017. ...................................... 190 Figure 17 US Military Bases in the Western Pacific, source: Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat, p.262 ................................................................................................. 32. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Hugo Tierny. Ch. engchi. viii. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(9) TABLE OF CONTENTS. Acknowledgment ........................................................................................................... v Abstract ......................................................................................................................... vi Keywords – List of Figures and Tables ...................................................................... viii TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................. ix 1.1. Background ..................................................................................................... 1. 1.2. Analytical Framework ..................................................................................... 3. 1.2.1. Definitions................................................................................................ 3. 1.2.2. Thesis Architecture .................................................................................. 5. 1.2.3. Problem Statement & research question .................................................. 6. 立. 政治大. 1.3. Literature Review and Author’s findings ........................................................ 8. 1.4. Chapter Outline ............................................................................................. 11. 學. 2.. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1. ‧ 國. 1.. China’s challenge to the security in East Asia and Taiwan’s extended deterrence 13. ‧. 2.1 The U.S., China and Taiwan .............................................................................. 13 Context ................................................................................................... 13. 2.1.2. Logics of the Triangular Taiwan-Sino-U.S. Relations .......................... 14. 2.1.3. Rapprochement or Detachment? ............................................................ 18. er. io. sit. y. Nat. 2.1.1. al. v i n 2.2.1 Context ........................................................................................................ 28 Ch U i e h n c g............................................................... 2.2.2 Rationales for Rapprochement 28 Japan and Taiwan .......................................................................................... 28. n. 2.2. 2.2.3. Building Trust ........................................................................................ 30. 2.2.4. Limitations ............................................................................................. 32. 2.3 Taiwan Deterrence, a Function of the Balance between Great Powers? ........... 34 3.. The View from Beijing ........................................................................................ 36 3.1 Concepts and Context ........................................................................................ 36 3.2 A History of Evolving Chinese Perceptions of Taiwan ..................................... 37 3.3 A Sense of Victimhood ...................................................................................... 40 3.4 China’s Nationalism and Taiwan ....................................................................... 42 3.5 Taiwan as China’s “Internal Matter” ................................................................. 44 3.6 Ideological Misperceptions ................................................................................ 46 3.7 Taiwan's Geography and China’s Global Ambitions......................................... 49. Hugo Tierny. ix. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(10) 3.8 The 19th CCP Congress and Taiwan .................................................................. 51 3.9 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 53 4.. China’s Strategies ................................................................................................ 55 4.1 Concepts & Context ........................................................................................... 56 4.1.1 Chinese Limited-aims Strategies ................................................................ 56 4.1.2 China’s Unlimited strategy – War option ................................................... 59 4.2 China’s Limited-aims Strategy and Short-of-war Pressures .............................. 63 4.2.1 China’s Political Warfare is a “Big stick” .................................................. 63 4.2.2 Isolate and Marginalize Taiwan Empirically .............................................. 76 4.2.3 The War Threshold – “Peaceful Options have been Exhausted”................ 83 4.3 China’s Unlimited Strategy – China’s “Blitzkrieg” and the PLA Capabilities . 86 4.3.1 China’s Invasion Plan ................................................................................. 86. 政治大 4.3.3 China’s Plan Impediments 立 ........................................................................ 107 4.3.2 China’s Military Modernization and Current Capabilities ......................... 94 Taiwan’s resilience and resistance ..................................................................... 115. 學. ‧ 國. 5.. 5.1 Concepts & Context ......................................................................................... 115 5.1.1 Taiwan’s Commitment.............................................................................. 115. ‧. 5.1.2 Taiwan’s Resilience .................................................................................. 117. y. Nat. 5.1.3 Taiwan’s Resistance .................................................................................. 119. sit. 5.2 Taiwan’s Commitment and Communication to China .................................... 123. al. er. io. 5.2.1 Taiwan’s Official Message: the Deterrence Threat .................................. 123. n. 5.2.2 Taiwan’s National Identity and case for Self-determination .................... 124. Ch. i n U. v. 5.2.3 China and Taiwan’s Different Conceptions of a Nation-state .................. 129. engchi. 5.2.4 China’s Bureaucratic Culture .................................................................... 131 5.2.5 Xi Jinping and Taiwan .............................................................................. 133 5.2.6 Cross-strait Conciliation?.......................................................................... 136 5.2.7 Conclusion: Taiwan’s Commitment ......................................................... 139 5.3 Taiwan’s Answer to China’s Limited-aims Strategy ....................................... 140 5.3.1 Homefront: Democracy and National Unity ............................................. 140 5.3.2 Taiwan’s Economic Challenges ................................................................ 146 5.3.3 Taiwan’s International Engagement and Communication ........................ 153 5.3.4 Conclusion: Taiwan’s Answer Against China’s LAS .............................. 161 5.4 Taiwan’s Answer to China’s Military Option ................................................. 163 5.4.1 Doctrinal Context ...................................................................................... 163 5.4.2 Raw Capabilities & Roles on the Battlefield ............................................ 168. Hugo Tierny. x. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(11) 5.4.3 Force Readiness ........................................................................................ 182 5.4.4 Peacetime Matters ..................................................................................... 188 5.4.5 Conclusion: Taiwan’s Answer to China’s Unlimited Option ................... 195 6.. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 197 6.1 Asia-Pacific Regional Security and Taiwan’s Extended Deterrence ........... 197 6.2. Clashing interests & rife misperceptions in the Taiwan Strait ................ 199. 6.3 China’s “Limited-aims Strategy” impact ..................................................... 202 6.4 China’s Blitzkrieg? ...................................................................................... 207 6.5 Final Words .................................................................................................. 211 7.. References .......................................................................................................... 212. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Hugo Tierny. Ch. engchi. xi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(12) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Hugo Tierny. Ch. engchi. xii. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(13) 1. Introduction 1.1 Background Taiwan, or the Republic of China (ROC), is a sovereign state facing the irredentism of a much larger country, China, or the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has never renounced the use of force to bring the island under its control. The goals defended by Taiwan, which is to resist annexation, and China, which is to unify, are clashing. After its democratization, Taiwan’s identity renewed itself with a majority of Taiwanese unwilling to be part of China. Most Taiwanese people favor the continuation of the status-quo, or the continuation of de facto independence of Taiwan from China. On the other side of the Strait, China remains an authoritarian regime to which, despite its enrichment, most Taiwanese feel estranged. China is highly dissatisfied with the status quo which emerged after Taiwan’s democratization and shifting national identity. Unintentionally, Taiwan presents a threat to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ruling legitimacy over China because the island, which shares cultural ties with the continent, adopted a fully democratic model of governance. In addition, Chinese decision-makers have many geostrategic interests in mind when they contemplate seizing island.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Self-determination is legitimate for the Taiwanese people. And from the necessity to protect this fundamental right derives the need to deter China from launching a war against Taiwan. Undeniably, in this situation, there is a clearly identified challenger, China, and a deterrer, Taiwan.. i n U. v. China constantly tries to alter the status quo in its favor. Recently, it intensified its pressures against the island following the election of Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) in 2016. Similarly, the balance of forces is increasingly shifting to China’s favor, given its rapid economic and military rise.. Ch. engchi. On the one hand, whatever Taiwan does, China does not seek conciliation and will not compromise on its decision to take control of the island, forcefully if necessary. On the other, Taiwanese express a strong opposition to be ruled by China under current terms. Given such antagonistic goals, the risk of conflict is real: As Taiwan asserts its difference from China, the latter falls short of peaceful options and is left with the dilemma of resorting to force or to postpone its goal of unification. The resolution of this Chinese dilemma lies, for a fair share, in the capability of Taiwan to maintain its solid deterrence posture. This subject is timely given China’s rapid modernization of its armed forces. It is also engaging in relentless political warfare and all sorts of pressures to diminish Taiwan’s international space, inhibit the Taiwanese defense spirit, and undermine national stability. A war in the Taiwan Strait would be devastative for Taiwan and China and it. Hugo Tierny. 1. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(14) would have serious repercussions for the entire world. Also, the risk remains that it would drag the United States and Japan, which both regard Taiwan as a strong, albeit informal, ally, into an escalating confrontation with China. Arising dangers against peace drive the necessity for Taiwan to maintain a solid deterrence. The goal is then to persuade Chinese planners that resorting to force to solve the “Taiwan issue” would bring them more harm than benefits and that their pressures do not bear credible results.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Hugo Tierny. Ch. engchi. 2. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(15) 1.2 Analytical Framework 1.2.1 Definitions According to Morgan, “in a deterrence situation one party is thinking of attacking, the other knows it and is issuing threats of a punitive response, and the first is deciding what to do while keeping these threats in mind”. (Morgan 1983, PP. 33-42) For this leading author on deterrence, to successfully implement deterrence is about finding how best to threaten, and in the case of deterrence failure, how best to punish.1 Because Taiwan doesn’t have armed nuclear capability, I talk here about conventional deterrence. For John J. Mearsheimer, “conventional deterrence (…) is a function of the capability of denying an aggressor his battlefield objectives with conventional forces (i.e. nonnuclear).”(Mearsheimer, 1983). 政治大. For Morgan, deterrence is a rather simple idea, even a primitive one. It comes from the assumption that nothing besides the threat of retaliation will make an adversary think twice before attacking. Deterrence must involve a psychological reaction of fear within the attackers’ mindset, instill uncertainty about the success of his attack plans, present him with high risks and finally invite him to a more careful assessment of the costs of using force. The defender must raise the cost of an attack to levels so high so the challenger is rationally convinced that an attack is unworthy.. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Because rationality of decision-making is particularly flawed in deterrence relationships, I will not assume total rationality either for Taiwan and China, and instead make use of Morgan’s concept of “sensible decision-making” throughout the thesis. Morgan’s sensible decision-making is an attempt to bridge the gap between an imperfect rational decision-making model for deterrence and how things happen in reality. Sensible decision makers are said to be good targets for deterrence because they know the rationality of their decisions are flawed by a multitude of factors resulting from the lack of information they are given about the issues at stake. As a result, leaders are likely to be prudent when confronted by a thick “fog of war.”. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. A hybrid of general and immediate deterrence. For Morgan it is also important to know if the case I am discussing involves general or immediate deterrence. When it comes to Taiwan, it appears that both apply. According to Morgan, immediate, pure, deterrence concerns “a relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it” (Morgan, 1977). A situation of Morgan, Patrick, “Deterrence – A conceptual analysis”, Sage Publications, 1977, ISBN 0-8039-08199, page 17. 1. Hugo Tierny. 3. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(16) immediate deterrence is very clear and threats are clearly communicated, such as between China and Taiwan. In immediate deterrence situation, which is said to be rare, tensions could translate in war anytime. However, it is a defining element of the relation between Taiwan and China since 1949 because China has never abandoned the use of force for bringing unification. In the same time, both sides of the Taiwan Strait engage in a thriving economic relationship, people travel freely between Taiwan and China and the issue has been going on for almost seventy years. So, while immediate deterrence applies to Taiwan, so does “general deterrence”. For Morgan, “general deterrence embraces a broader range of military-related activities and is readily employed in tandem with other conflict management tools”. He adds: “General deterrence comes into play where two or more actors have a potential for significant conflict so the idea of war is not irrelevant or farfetched” (Morgan P. , Deterrence, A conceptual analysis, 1977). Admittedly, general deterrence is harder to break, however, tensions can escalate and go out of control very quick.. 立. 政治大. A case of unilateral deterrence. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. Taiwan is in a case of unilateral deterrence because, in the Taiwan Strait, China is the only party to consider an attack.2 Most of the time, a situation of unilateral deterrence implies that there is a gap in military capabilities between the attacker and the deterrer, it is the case in our situation, where China dominates largely.. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. In unilateral deterrence, “deterrer A must understand the objectives and cost/benefit calculation of attacker B. But because it is hard, deterrer A will have to work with estimates and limited data (…). [Then] A must acquire the capability to impose costs on B graver than it is willing to accept”. (Morgan P. , Deterrence, A conceptual analysis, 1977)3. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Taiwan’s deterrence is based on punishment. The distinction between deterrence based on denial and punishment was first elaborated by Glenn Snyder in 1958. For Freedman: -. “Denial has coercive elements but essentially tends towards control, the threat is designed in order to control the situation sufficiently and deny the opponent. Morgan, Patrick, “Deterrence – A conceptual analysis”, Sage Publications, 1977, ISBN 0-8039-08199, page 83. 3 Ibid. 83. 2. Hugo Tierny. 4. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(17) -. strategic options. In calculating costs, the opponent would have to consider those that would be incurred in the battle for control; Deterrence through punishment by contrast, is pure coercion in that the opponent is not denied choice, but is given powerful incentives to choose in a particular way;” (Freedman, Deterrence, 2004)4. Against China’s, “deterrence through denial” was possible when Taiwan’s military used to dominate the PLA in terms of capabilities but such is not the case today anymore. Taiwan doesn’t possess the “denial” option because it cannot convince China anymore that opting for war is bound to fail. Then, because China has reasons to believe that it could take Taiwan by force, threatening punishment, or the promise to incur inacceptable costs to an invading force, would be Taiwan’s remaining option.. 政治大. 1.2.2 Thesis Architecture. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. For the main body of my thesis, I will use the framework about conventional deterrence provided by John J. Mearsheimer in his volume “Conventional Deterrence” (1983). Mearsheimer’s most important teaching is that for assessing the success of a deterrence posture, it is needed to know what military plan the challenger has.. er. io. sit. y. Nat. In other words, for assessing the health of a defender’s deterrence, one must ask her/himself first about the particular strategy envisioned by the potential attacker and then look at how the defender is planning to defend itself. Accordingly, our plan is organized on a dichotomy with at first (1) the overall Chinese plan for taking Taiwan, and second, (2) Taiwan’s deterrence posture.. al. n. v i n On the one hand I separate the C challenge posed by China to Taiwan into two separated U h i e h n c g short-of-war, but mutually reinforcing strategies, the one and the other military; then. try to explain the effects of both on Taiwan’s deterrence. On the other hand, I divide Taiwan’s deterrence into several and distinct forms of answers, ranging from its expression of commitment to self-defense, to its attempts to limit the effect of China’s pressure and its military capabilities. In order to give a picture of Taiwan’s deterrence, I attempt to combine the effects of all of these factors altogether. Within this architecture, I will discuss internal issues relevant to China’s threat and Taiwan’s deterrence with the various theoretical tools provided by other leading authors on deterrence such as Robert Jervis, Janice Gross Stein, Richard Ned Lebow, Patrick Morgan and Lawrence Freedman.. 4. Freedman, Lawrence, “Deterrence”, Polity Press, 2004, ISBN 0-7456-3112, page 37.. Hugo Tierny. 5. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(18) 1.2.3 Problem Statement & research question The goals defended by Taiwan and China are in conflict with each other; China wishes to unify, by force if necessary, and Taiwan seeks to resist annexation. This clash of goals participate in making compromise a difficult option for both sides of the Strait. Therefore, China has not given up its threats and Taiwan has been seeking to maintain a sound deterrence posture. China’s objective is total. To achieve it, China makes use of a compellence strategy which objective is unlimited, accepting only one acceptable outcome: taking Taiwan. To this end, China uses both military and non-military means, with Taiwan having to face the threat both ways. (1) First, China’s attempts to achieve breakthroughs by undermining Taiwan’s deterrence posture through actions short of war, such as military intimidations, harassment on the international stage, economic pressures as well as political warfare. (2) Second, China continues to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with the objective to outgun Taiwan in a potential armed confrontation. Regarding extended deterrence, the U.S. has recently tightened its ties to Taiwan but this development takes place amid greater Sino – U.S. tensions.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Figure 1 Taiwan Deterrence in 2018, source: Hugo Tierny.. Hugo Tierny. 6. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(19) The goal of this work is to assess the health of Taiwan’s deterrence in June 2018. I determine Taiwan’s objectives this way: (1) to deter a Chinese armed aggression in order to (2) ensure that the future of Taiwan lays in the hands of Taiwanese people. Taiwan’s deterrence has to do with self-determination, however, China is inhibiting Taiwan’s freedom of choice with its military threats and other forms of pressures. Taiwan’s deterrence then encompasses the need to address China’s military and nonmilitary options. Our research question encapsulates what I have just written about: How well does Taiwan Deter China from Subjugating the island? The word “subjugate” implies that China’s objective is total and unrestricted. And this implies for Taiwan that its countermeasures should be comprehensive, with a military and non-military aspects. With this question, I aim to calculate the health of Taiwan’s deterrence, by weighing Taiwan’s resilience against China’s limited methods, and Taiwan’s military capabilities against China’s war plans.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Hugo Tierny. Ch. engchi. 7. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(20) 1.3 Literature Review and Author’s findings. For the main theoretical body of my thesis, I rely on six leading volumes on deterrence. The most important of these is “Conventional Deterrence” (1983), written by John J. Mearsheimer, from which I borrow the architecture of this essay. Mearsheimer built his theory from a comparative case study involving deterrence failures and successes in the past. By comparing the decision-making of actors involved in each of them, Mearsheimer tried to find similar patterns to explain why wars broke out at some times but not at others. Then he applied the teachings he gathered to the situation of Central Europe during the 1980s (then contemporary, the book was published in 1983) when NATO commanders feared a conventional Soviet offensive and were concerned about how to deter it. Mearsheimer said that, according to his theory the Soviet would not attack. He was proved right.. 政治大 Mearsheimer says about conventional deterrence that it is “a function of the costs and 立action [and] it is most likely to obtain when an attacker risks associated with military ‧. ‧ 國. 學. believes that his probability of success is low and the attendant costs will be high” (Mearsheimer, 1983). In addition, “the likelihood that deterrence will obtain in a specific instance largely depends on which strategy the potential attacker is considering.”(Mearsheimer, 1983). Translated to our situation, this means Taiwan’s deterrence will obtain if the island’s defense capabilities are capable enough and if China is not able to find a satisfactory attack plan. Because Mearsheimer sees conventional deterrence from the viewpoint of the nation that is contemplating war (China in our case), I should ask ourselves: What are the strategies envisioned by China for taking-over Taiwan, and what is Taiwan doing to deter them? After I answer this question I will be able to estimate the health of Taiwan’s conventional deterrence.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The six other volumes about the theory of deterrence I used were written by Robert Jervis, “Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics” (1976), Richard Ned Lebow & Janice Gross Stein, “Psychology and deterrence” (1985), Patrick Morgan, “Deterrence – a conceptual analysis” (1977) and “Deterrence now” (2003) and Lawrence Freedman’s “Deterrence” (2004). These volumes provided many of the much needed theoretical tools useful for identifying and discussing the patterns of Taiwan’s deterrence. Combined to Mearsheimer’s theoretical guidelines, teachings were used throughout the writing in order to back the argumentation with a solid theoretical basis. There of course exist a number of other valuable discussions on deterrence, and, however fewer, on conventional deterrence. Conversely, English resources are scarce when it comes to Taiwan’s deterrence. Many other works about deterrence cite Taiwan’s deterrence as an example among others, while few of them examine Taiwan as a case study. In addition, a lot of prominent works about deterrence focus on lessons gathered during the Cold War, rather than actual issues. This lack of existing literature is surprising because there is no doubt that the. Hugo Tierny. 8. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(21) relationship between China and Taiwan is about deterrence. Also, deterrence in the Taiwan Strait is a very interesting issue which bears strategic implications for the entire Asia-Pacific region, if not globally. This remark has exceptions however. There is the work of Ian Easton, the writer of a volume entitled “The Chinese Invasion Threat” 5, in which he presents the potential Chinese war plan to take Taiwan, the island’s likely military response and the implications for America’s foreign policy. His volume is highly referenced with Chinese language sources and is rich of valuable details about the nature of the balance of forces and the decision-making of both Taiwan and China. Easton has graduated from the same Master degree as the author of this work, in NCCU, Taipei, Taiwan. He is now an analyst for the think-tank Project 2049 Institute in the United States. There is also the work of J. Michael Cole, a Canadian journalist based in Taipei. Mr. Cole became a public figure in Taiwan after he spent numerous years documenting and analyzing cross-strait relations. His works about China’s political warfare and Taiwan’s civil society are certainly ones of the best available, so I took inspiration from many of his analyses in this work. He is now the editor in chief of the online magazine Taiwan Sentinel as well as a Taipei-based Senior Fellow with the China Policy Institute and the Taiwan studies Program at the University of Nottingham, U.K., he is also an associate researcher with the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC) in Taipei, Taiwan.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Besides these references, I have relied on secondary sources including various volumes about Taiwan and China, relevant official and government-issued publications (from Taiwan, the U.S. and China) such as Taiwan’s 2017 Quadrennial Defense Review and National Defense Report, U.S. diverse reports to Congress involving China’s armed forces and Taiwan, China’s 2013 Science of Military Strategy and 2015 PLA White Paper, as well as many think-tank and academic publications, which list is available below in the References section. For our study, I have also read and gathered in a database hundreds of online articles which data and insights will be mobilized throughout the essay.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. A “Non-military” aspect of Deterrence for Taiwan?. Like the majority of the challenger states studied in the deterrence literature, China has good incentives to achieve its objective without declaring a war. However, the method chosen is unique to every challenger. Here, China has never abandoned its threat to attack Taiwan, but the majority of its efforts are actually short-of-war. They are pursued. Easton, “The Chinese invasion threat – Taiwan’s defense and American strategy in Asia”, The Project 2049 Institute, 2017, ISBN 9781546353256. 5. Hugo Tierny. 9. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(22) over the long-term, with China seeking innovative way to persuade the Taiwanese to opt for unification. Therefore, a study of Taiwan’s deterrence could take into account the variety of Chinese efforts designed either to bring unification by peaceful means, or to soften Taiwan’s deterrence before a military option is envisioned. This limited, non-military strategy, would be made of the comprehensive set of economic and political warfare as well as of other frequent intimidation and pressures against Taiwan. Through such means, China would attempt to persuade the Taiwanese that the island’s inescapable fate is political unification with the continent. This idea, the existence of a non-military aspect of China’s challenge to Taiwan’s deterrence, is one of the central ideas of this work. It would mean that deterrence may be impacted, or “bypassed”, by non-military forms of influence or pressures exerted by a challenger state. For example, China would aim to impact Taiwan’s deterrence by using political warfare in order to undermine Taiwan’s national cohesion and defense spirit. To “bypass” Taiwan’s deterrence would mean that China seeks to achieve the totality of its unification objective without having to wage a war, a very attractive option. China could do so by decreasing the odds of using force to achieve unification, or diminishing the cost of force should the military option be ultimately chosen.. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. If China invests time and money in such tools, it may mean that it its leadership has reasons to believe that it will help to bring unification. In this way, China could attempt to lower the Taiwanese confidence in their long-term capability to withstand the pressure, and seek to lower the cost of a potential unification. National cohesion is key for a successful defense, explaining why China aims to undermine Taiwan’s one by inducing doubt and division as much as it can.. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Alternatively, China’s limited-aims strategy could be dangerous because exhausting the stock of so-called “peaceful options” gives China a rationale for employing force later. Limited strategies could therefore take the form of steps in an escalation process: when it decides that all peaceful options are exhausted, and that pressures have “born fruits”, China’s leadership could pursue at an unknown moment the unlimited, military option in order to achieve unification.. n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Therefore, with regard to Taiwan’s objective to safeguard sovereignty, its deterrence could encompass “something else”, than its military aspect and incorporate such fields as economic resilience, international standing, soft power and national cohesion. Protecting these “fronts” would be like putting up barriers as a double layer of defense. According to this view, I will consider in this work Taiwan’s efforts to diversify its economic partnership, strengthening of national identity, and attempts to engage the international community as part of a “short-of-war” aspect of its deterrence posture.. Hugo Tierny. 10. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(23) 1.4 Chapter Outline Chp1: In the introduction, I explained the deterrence situation at stake in the Taiwan Strait, replaced its context, its background and presented its main challenges. In the analytical framework and I presented our methodology. In the literature review I detailed which references I have chosen and how I used them in our analysis, then I presented our contribution to the existing literature about Taiwan’s deterrence. Chp2: I will present the logics of the current triangular Taiwan – U.S. – China relations, understand its implications for the security of the Asia-Pacific region, and calculate the health of Taiwan’s extended deterrence by assessing the current and future support of the island’s key security partners – first of which the U.S. and less importantly Japan. Chp3: I will present China’s objectives, intentions, motivations and interests in taking Taiwan.. 政治大. Chp4: I will detail the Chinese strategies for taking Taiwan, at first the limited-aims strategy and then the unlimited, war strategy. For the limited one, I will show how comprehensive its application is and how China’s limited actions are designed to erode, step by step, Taiwan’s deterrence. For the unlimited one, I will have to describe the modernization of the PLA and its current capabilities.. 立. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. Chp5: At first, I will present Taiwan’s formulation of its deterrence threat, its commitment in enforcing it and the way it is communicated to China. Then, I will present China's limited-aims strategies’ impact on Taiwan deterrence and Taiwan’s options to thwart them. Finally, I will try to detail Taiwan’s answer to China’s unlimited strategy, with the island’s military doctrine and capabilities.. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. n. Chp6: Our conclusion will strengthen our findings about the health of Taiwan’s deterrence.. Hugo Tierny. Ch. engchi. 11. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(24) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Hugo Tierny. Ch. engchi. 12. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(25) 2. China’s challenge to the security in East Asia and Taiwan’s extended deterrence 2.1 The U.S., China and Taiwan 2.1.1 Context Recently, the U.S. has been willing to move closer to Taiwan in the context of its strategic competition against China. Thus, since the election of Donald J. Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, the U.S. and Taiwan have tightened their security cooperation.. 政治大. Making sure that the island is not governed by a hostile government is a strategic American interest and the U.S. are bound by law, and some sort of moral commitment to defend the island because of its democratic government. But it is possible that Trump, a former businessman, is using Taiwan as a bargaining chip against China in hopes to obtain concessions in other areas. At the same time Taiwan is only one of the multiple American concerns in East Asia, and the relative decline of U.S. influence in this part of the world participates in the renewal of calls in the U.S. for a policy of arrangement with Beijing over the status of the island. Also, as China’s military capabilities have greatly improved since the third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, it remains an open question whether the U.S. would intervene should a conflict erupt in the Taiwan Strait.. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. For Mearsheimer: “On one hand, [the U.S.] has powerful incentives to make [Taiwan] part of a balancing coalition aimed at containing China. On the other hand, there are good reasons to think that with the passage of time the benefits of maintaining close ties with Taiwan will be outweighed by the potential costs, which are likely to be huge. Of course, in the near term, the United States will protect Taiwan and treat it as a strategic asset. But how long that relationship lasts is an open question.”6. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. U.S. President Trump has constantly offset all previsions. The former business mogul started his mandate by taking Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s congratulatory phone call and pledged to renegotiate the One China Policy only to reverse course and accommodate China in the heat of the last North Korea nuclear crisis. In the same time, Donald Trump engaged the United States in a sound isolationist process, left vacant the world’s economic leadership position for China to occupy, stepped back from the TransPacific Partnership (however designed to contain China) and asked its allies to take a greater responsibility for their defense. He did not hesitate to start a trade war with the U.S. closest allies and to renegotiate treaties and agreements his predecessors had signed. In sum, Trump is unpredictable.. 6. Mearsheimer, J.J., "Say goodbye to Taiwan", The National Interest, March-April 2014, URL: http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=5.. Hugo Tierny. 13. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(26) For Taiwan, which relies on U.S. arms sales to defend itself, Trump’s engagement with China and isolationist stance was worrisome. Analysts chanted: would the new U.S. president play the island as a bargaining chip against China? Will Donald Trump the businessman arrange a deal, a “grand bargain”, to decide over Taiwan’s fate? Even Taiwan’s 2017 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) acknowledged that the relations with the U.S., for the time being, is surrounded by uncertainty. In the meantime, China did not forget the humiliation it suffered during the 1996 cross-strait crisis when the U.S. sent a carrier group in the Taiwan Strait, forcing the PLA to back down – and modernizes its military with a strong focus on A2/AD capabilities, with the objective to deter any American involvement in a Taiwan contingency. However the current situation can also be seen as more comforting for Taiwan than during Obama’s years. A large segment of the current U.S. leadership is disappointed about the U.S. past conciliatory attitude towards China and have grown increasingly convinced that both the U.S. and the PRC are in fact strategic competitors. Therefore the U.S. position on China has re-shifted from conciliation to containment, and the Pentagon has shown greater willingness to team up with the U.S.’s regional allies. Accordingly, U.S. policymakers recently started to reverse course on Taiwan, announcing a series of friendly measures.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 2.1.2 Logics of the Triangular Taiwan-Sino-U.S. Relations. sit. y. Nat. io. PLA General Liu Yazhou. n. al. er. “Relations with Taiwan are relations with the United States”.7. Ch. engchi U. v ni. Caught between Washington and Beijing, Taiwan’s security environment is constrained by a multitude of factors it cannot entirely control. Wu wrote ““The weak and small [Taiwan] caught between empires either become piece of the international struggle or they wait to be devoured by the victorious in a fight that is totally irrelevant to them” (WU, 2014)8 Since 1949, the island lays at the cross roads of Chinese and American influences and is one of the stumbling block in the relations of both superpowers. The geographic situation of the island is one of the main explanation for the dispute; because Taiwan’s geostrategic localization at the center of the first island chain makes the island stand as a buffer between China and the U.S.’s strategic environments. As cited in Wachman A., “Why Taiwan? Geostrategic rationales for China’s territorial integrity”, Studies in Asian Security, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, page 135. 8 Wu R.w, “Pariah Manifesto” in Lee Shyu-tu, Williams Jack.F, “Taiwan’s struggle – Voices of the Taiwanese” Rowman and Littlefield, Plymouth UK, page 130-135. 7. Hugo Tierny. 14. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(27) Historically, Taiwan canalized both great powers’ energy. For the Americans, it was used for bartering difficult issues with China while the protection of the island reassured anti-communist forces at home. For the Chinese, Taiwan was the key for mobilizing the population against the perception of U.S. imperialist ambitions over China.9 Yu wrote, “if there were no such theatrical convenience as the Taiwan issue, the Sino-US relationship would have become much more intense, as both sides would then be forced to deal with some difficult and substantive issues.”(Yu, 2006)10 The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), an attempt to prevent the White House to completely abandon Taiwan at the onset of the U.S. normalization of its relations with China, was voted by both the U.S. Congress, Senate and ratified by President Carter in 1979. First, under the provision that "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability", the TRA promised the island sufficient arms sales and military cooperation for credible deterrence against China. Second, and significantly for the present context, the TRA stipulated that it is the policy of the U.S. to “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan”, all of which would be considered by the U.S. as a grave concern and a threat to peace and security in the Western Pacific. Third, it stated that if the island was threatened, the U.S. would therefore “determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate actions by the United States in response to any such danger.”11. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. However the U.S. support to Taiwan remains ambiguous. On the one hand, the TRA stipulates that any Chinese attempt to settle the conflict through coercion will be opposed by the U.S. On the other, the TRA does not explicitly mandate the U.S. to rescue Taiwan in the case of a PLA attack.12 In addition, U.S. President Ronald Reagan signed in 1982 the third U.S. – China Communiqué, unofficially promising China to gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan. But the communiqué was immediately complemented by the U.S. “six assurances to Taiwan” which tone suggested the opposite. Since then, subsequent U.S. presidents have alternatively made references to the communiqués, the TRA and the six assurances to Taiwan. For Bush, “Washington’s message to both Beijing and Taipei is that it will defend Taiwan under some circumstances and not others”. 13 Hence, neither Taiwan nor China know in which precise conditions would the United-States intervene in the event of a cross-strait confrontation, thus restraining each other adventurous policies.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Here stands what is known as the “U.S. strategic ambiguity”. For Rigger, “the policy is strategic because it constrains the other two players (by forcing them to make decisions Yu, M., “Political and Military Factors Determining China’s Use of Force” in Tsang, S., “If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics”, Asian Security Studies, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006, page 30, pp 17-34. 10 Ibid. 11 As cited in Goldstein Steven M, “China and Taiwan”, China Today, Cambridge UK, 2015, page 58. 12 Ibid 233. 13 As cited in Goldstein Steven M, “China and Taiwan”, China Today, Cambridge UK, 2015, page 183. 9. Hugo Tierny. 15. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(28) with limited information) while giving the United States maximum flexibility to pursue its interests in light of changing circumstances” (RIGGER, 2014).14On the one hand the U.S. has strategic interests in Taiwan, opposes China's use of force and fuels Taipei with weaponry. On the other hand, the U.S. has not promised it would support Taiwan in a war against China, especially not if the first declared independence. This being said, U.S. strategic ambiguity is logic because: (1) first, to promote the status quo preserves U.S. interests strategic over Taiwan and perpetuates its de facto independence; (2) second, to prevent Taipei to cross Beijing’s redline on formal independence permits the U.S. to safeguard its Taiwanese asset without provoking Beijing to attack, (3) third, Washington avoids any entrapment in a military escalation and its position can evolve with the circumstances. Strategic ambiguity nonetheless deters China because it involves great uncertainty regarding whether or not the U.S. would intervene in a war. For Taiwan and China, this ambiguity at least signals one thing: that the U.S. are satisfied with a stable cross – strait situation and do not see incentives for the situation to change.. 政治大 “To achieve both of its deterrence goals simultaneously, the US cannot be explicit about 立 the conditions under which it will defend Taiwan. Ambiguity… introduces just enough. ‧ 國. 學. uncertainty to dissuade the disputants from taking the risk of testing U.S commitment” (BENSON, Unpublished study of strategic ambiguity).. ‧. The third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 tested the U.S. commitment to Taiwan by bringing both powers close to a deadly escalation, as the U.S. President Clinton sent carrier groups to the Strait in order to deter China from interfering in Taiwan’s political affairs. The move was felt as a humiliation by Beijing, which then focused on its military buildup and developed solid A2/AD capabilities so that the U.S. would not interfere again in the Taiwan Strait and force China to back down.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. i n U. v. Afterwards, Sino-U.S. relations worsened when the U.S. led-NATO coalition accidently bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (Serbia) in 1999. 15 The Bush era was opened on an “all out” strategy against China16 but both countries soon cooperated for reducing the Islamic terrorist threat. Later, President Obama led a strategy of “rebalancing” in order to contain the Chinese increasing influence in both Southeast and East Asia, and Sino-U.S. relations were further upset by China’s militarization of the South China Sea. Since Trump was elected, the relationship got worse, with China being labeled for the first time as a strategic competitor in the 2017 iteration of the National Security Strategy, signed by the president.. Ch. engchi. Trump is often considered as a bully who only understands strength and has little regard for democratic allies whose expectations don’t fully match U.S. interests. For Taiwan,. Rigger, S., “Why Taiwan matters. Small Island, Global Powerhouse (updated edition),” Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, Maryland, 2014, page 182. 15 Ibid, page 78. 16 Wachman A., “Why Taiwan? Geostrategic rationales for China’s territorial integrity”, Studies in Asian Security, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, page 137. 14. Hugo Tierny. 16. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(29) this is an extra signal for a potential U.S. ambiguity: Trump certainly could care more about the protection of democracy, but he is likely to get closer to Taiwan as long as playing this card is useful in the U.S. – China strategic competition. How long will that work to the benefit of the island in an open question. In U.S. domestic politics, the image of China is generally bad and the debate is often divided between those who think that the U.S. should accommodate a rising China and the partisans of a tougher line. Democrats are often smoother than the Republicans on that matter. However, more liberal politicians will emphasize China’s Human Right issues and therefore be opposed to arrangements with the CCP, sharing a common point with nationalist conservatives. China often serves as a scapegoat in U.S. elections, with candidates regularly attributing U.S. job losses to China’s cheap labor. Diplomatically, the U.S. has long alternated policies of containment and engagement for approaching China. Both powers compete in the economic and military domain, but they maintain close economic ties, making them interdependent. For Courmont, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China are ones of “'congagement”, a combination of “containment” and “engagement”. Aron wrote:“Peace impossible, War improbable” to define the main Cold-War trend between the United-States and the USSR; Courmont reversed the dictum for characterizing nowadays Sino-US relationship: “War impossible, Peace improbable”.17. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. Since President Tsai’s refusal to recognize the so-called “1992 consensus”, China has shut down all communication canals with the island and redoubled its pressures. The Chinese government is exasperated by the presence in Taiwan of a democratically elected government, which disturbs the resplendence of Xi Jinping’s Chinese dream of national and cultural unity. The fact that the renegade province places itself under the protection of the U.S. and adopted its political culture adds insult to the injury. For Wachman, China considers Taiwan as “a territorial marker of the imagined border of the sphere dominated by the U.S.”. 18 In sum, Taiwan being under U.S. influence is considered a liability for the Chinese. Therefore Taiwan is more than ever the symbol of the Sino-U.S. rivalry, with in the background Beijing’s accusation that Washington is trying to contain the China rise and the risk that, under American protection, the island further breaks ties with its “chineseness”, a humiliating affront for Beijing.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 17. Courmont, B., Une guerre pacifique. La confrontation Pékin-Washington, Editions ESKA, Paris, 2014, page 233. 18 Wachman A., “Why Taiwan? Geostrategic rationales for China’s territorial integrity”, Studies in Asian Security, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, page 135.. Hugo Tierny. 17. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(30) 2.1.3 Rapprochement or Detachment? 2.1.3.1 Detachment over the Long-term? Asians “know that China will still be in Asia in 1,000 years’ time, but we don’t know whether America will still be here in 100 years’ time.”19 Former Singapore Foreign Minister, Kishore Mahbubani. Strategically, the U.S projection power suffers from the gigantic size of the Pacific, and the rise of China has fueled calls to reconsider the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan. Generally, Americans know little about Taiwan and are primarily concerned by American internal matters and interests.. 政治大. Obama has long conducted a policy of arrangement with China but sought to counter its rising influence with the “Rebalance to Asia Strategy”; Trump’s policy towards China has been indecisive, with an alternation of conciliation and confrontation postures. On their parts, many U.S. strategists have stated their disappointment by Taiwan’s “inability” to raise its defense effort.20 According to such view, the U.S. could find that upholding its security commitment to Taiwan will become increasingly costly over the long haul and consider that it is best to retreat in the face of the China rise.. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Calls for conciliation with China are recurrent in American foreign policy since the 1970s. The U.S. hoped that the greater integration of China on the world stage would enrich its population, assuage its leadership, and lead to a political transition and a greater willingness to play by the current rules of the international community. During the 21st century, while considering that the U.S. entered a period of relative decline, some in the U.S. suggested that China was going to dominate in Asia over the long term anyway and that it was needed to negotiate in hope that multiplying pledges would finally lead to a friendly relationship in the future. Regarding Taiwan, this is how many Americans hold the defeatist view that China’s motivations to take-over the island are simply too strong to be opposed and that both superpowers should strike a deal over the issue.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Accordingly, U.S. Admiral Owens (former Vice-Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff) said about arms sales to Taiwan that they are “not in our best interest [and suggested that] a thoughtful review of this outdated legislation [the TRA] is warranted.”21For Shlapak, the moment when China will be capable to assemble “a As cited by Rachman G., “When China becomes number one”, Financial Times; June 6, 2011, URL: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/df1be35e-9073-11e0-9227-00144feab49a.html#axzz44ZdLov1q. 20 Cole, B., Niquet, V., “Amphibious capabilities” in Tsang, S., “If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics”, Asian Security Studies, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006, page 156, pp 148-156. 21 Hickey Dennis V., “Imbalance in the Strait”, dilemmas for US strategy, 2013, page 4. 19. Hugo Tierny. 18. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(31) military capable of providing the leadership in Beijing with credible options for the use of force against Taiwan, even in the face of US opposition” is coming. 22 Kaplan observed the rise of China and concluded that by 2020, the U.S. will no longer be able to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack23. Mearsheimer himself echoed these considerations in an article titled “Say Goodbye to Taiwan”. He wondered: “What happens in a future world in which the balance of power has shifted sharply against Taiwan and the United States, in which China controls much more relative power than it does today, and in which China is in roughly the same economic and military league as the United States?”24 Mearsheimer envisions that China will never allow Taiwan’s de jure independence and will soon raise its maritime power and projection capacities to a level commensurate with the one of the U.S. He argues that the U.S. protection of the island is too costly and that it may be increasingly impossible to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan – in part because the island lies at 100 miles from the Chinese coast and that the U.S is situated on the other side of the globe. Being a “Neo-Realist”, Mearsheimer believes that international relations are intrinsically anarchic and that every state tries to reach hegemony in its own sphere of influence. For him, China is on its way to become the next Asian hegemon and it will try to “dominate Asia the way the U.S. dominated the West”. In the end, Mearsheimer suggests that the U.S. alliance with Taiwan will not last long: China would inevitably attack and the U.S. would not risk a thermonuclear war with China for the sake of the island. This view was criticized by Cole, arguing that Mearsheimer does not “seem to regard the idea that China would threaten nuclear war – and certain annihilation – as unreasonable,” suggesting that Taiwan is not as grave an issue for China to risk a nuclear confrontation with the U.S.25This being said, for Mearsheimer, the only hope for Taiwan to preserve its independence would reside in a serious economic slow-down and political instability in China, obligating its leadership to focus on something else than its unification agenda.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. As a consequence, advocates of terminating security ties with Taiwan say that since the U.S. cannot support Taiwan any longer, the best behavior would be to leave Taiwan to the Chinese and seek for an agreement in exchange. Neo-realists like Gilley proposed a “finlandization” of Taiwan, in the way the allied and the USSR had dealt with Finland in 1945. This position has received in 2012 the support of Brzezinski, President Carter’s former advisor on national security. The preferred solution for these personalities would be the Deng Xiaoping’s “One country two systems”, despite the evidence that this As cited in Zhang Baohui, “Peaceful unification vs. divided rule – Assessing political relations across the Taiwan Strait”, in Hu Weixing, New Dynamic in Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations. How far can the rapprochement go?” Routledge, Abingdon, 2013, page 124. 23 Chang C. Andrew, “Westerners perceptions of Taiwan and Taiwanese anxiety”, in Lee Shyu-Tu, Williams Jack F., Taiwan’s struggle: Voices of Taiwanese, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, Maryland, 2014, page 152. 24 Mearsheimer, J.J., "Say goodbye to Taiwan", The National Interest, March-April 2014, URL: http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=5. 25 Cole, J. M., “Convergence or conflict in the Taiwan Strait – the illusion of peace?” Routledge, 2017, page 194. 22. Hugo Tierny. 19. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(32) framework does not hold any water, as witnessed recently in Hong Kong. The main advocate of a “grand bargain”, a deal over Taiwan, is Charles L. Glaser, who agrees that the U.S. enters a phase of relative decline and that it should reconsider its commitment to defend Taiwan. Glaser argues that Taiwan should serve as a “bargaining chip” for demanding concessions to China in global affairs, thus, he hopes, paving the way for a friendlier Sino – US relationship. But one is left to speculate whether China would actually deliver on its promises.26Absent from Glaser’s study are indications that China’s strategic appetite would actually be encouraged after having seized Taiwan, not to mention the attitude of the 23 million Taiwanese who may well decide to resist annexation nonetheless. Other advocates of terminating U.S. security ties with Taiwan have put forward the inability of the Taiwanese to decide for themselves. Ross declared:“the Taiwan identity movement has not resulted in a widespread call for a formal declaration of independence”.27 This is a dubious argument because polls make plain clear that if not constrained for a Chinese attack, Taiwanese would have opted for independence already. As Mearsheimer himself noted in his article, “if one assumes China would not attack Taiwan if it declared its independence, 80.2 percent of Taiwanese would in fact opt for independence”.28. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. Uncertainty about the future is augmented by the U.S. president Trump’s changeable thinking and frequent disdain toward historic allies, as evidenced recently by its decision to unilaterally suspend South Korean – U.S. joint military exercises as an appeasement measure towards North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un whom he was threatening of military attacks a few weeks earlier. Accordingly to his orthodox view of the world, Trump has reneged on several agreements and treaties ex-President Obama had signed. Trump’s domestic populist governance and excesses together with his erratic foreign policy blew a serious blow to the credibility of the democratic model in the world. For Xuan, Trump’s policy “disheartens the US-led order’s supporters while gladdening its opponents,”29 first among which, Xi Jinping.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Against Taiwan, the CCP is waging an ideological battle to defend political autocracy and criticize democracy by arguing that democratic values are not universal and that liberal democracy is a hypocrisy practiced by decadent countries. Trump’s behavior disinhibits this effort by threatening the attractiveness of the liberal model, already facing a grave crisis in the world: since 2000, the world has lost about twenty democracies, all of which have adopted a more or less acute form of authoritarianism. 26. Glaser, Charles S., "A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? - The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation", International Security, Volume 39 | Issue 4 | spring 2015 p.49-90, MIT Press Journal, URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00199. 27 Chang C. Andrew, “Westerners perceptions of Taiwan and Taiwanese anxiety”, in Lee Shyu-Tu, Williams Jack F., Taiwan’s struggle: Voices of Taiwanese, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, Maryland, 2014, page 155. 28 See: Mearsheimer, J.J., "Say goodbye to Taiwan", The National Interest, March-April 2014, URL: http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=5. 29 Xuan, L.D., "Trump is weakening America and empowering its foes", Asia Times, June 17, 2018, URL: www.atimes.com/trump-is-weakening-america-and-empowering-its-foes/.. Hugo Tierny. 20. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.

(33) Tsai Ing-wen took office in this global context of dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the performance of democratic governance. The risk with the trend that President Trump is setting could mean that Taiwan’s democracy may not be a compelling argument anymore for supporting the island. For Taiwan, Trump’s disregard of democracy, allies’ interest, and temperamental behavior could mean that despite his administration’s friendly policies towards the island, the U.S. could decide to change this support into using Taiwan as a bargaining chip against China.. 2.1.3.2 Current Rapprochement and Challenges Despite calls for abandonment, the current U.S. policy towards Taiwan is actually of greater engagement and the Trump administration seems to be more interested in upholding its security commitment than ditching them.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Many analysts have been arguing that it is actually in the interest of the U.S. to reaffirm its support to Taiwan, and that conciliation with China is an ill-advised idea. Most of these advocates are increasingly influential in the U.S. foreign policy circles. For example, conservative think-tanks such as the Project 2049 Institute have been outspoken for renewed and strengthened U.S. support for the island. Most advocates take Taiwan’s unique identity as a given fact and quest for normal statehood as a legitimate demand; they also fully support Taiwan’s democracy and progressive social agenda.. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. Witnessing the huge Chinese military buildup in the South China Sea, they consider that China’s strategic objectives encompass much more than merely seizing Taiwan. For them, attacking Taiwan would just be a means to the end of forcing the U.S. out of Asia. Therefore they assess that the CCP is intrinsically hostile to the U.S. and that looking for conciliation will only augment China’s strategic appetite and aggravate the problem of the U.S. weakening credibility as a reliable security partner elsewhere. They argue that a Chinese seizure of Taiwan will lead to new security dilemmas and encourage an arms race between China and its regional competitors (Japan, South Korea). As a result, they make the case that the U.S. containing China’s strategic expansionism by drawing red lines and getting closer to its Asian partners is a much more productive approach for a stable Asia Pacific area than striking a deal over Taiwan. For them, U.S. policymakers must understand that an “abandonment” of Taiwan does not make much sense because it would open the door to all kinds of abuses by China. Therefore, they call for the end of strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan and its deeper integration within the U.S.-led security coalition in Asia.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Advocates of strengthened ties support that for China, the seizure of Taiwan is not an end but rather a mean to obtain hegemony over East Asia. Among such views, if the U.S. back off Taiwan, the remnants of its credibility as a protector of the international. Hugo Tierny. 21. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMAS.005.2018.A07 NCCU.