China’s Military Modernization and Current Capabilities

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4.3.2 China’s Military Modernization and Current Capabilities

So China has a plan, but does it have the capacity to use it against Taiwan in 2018? To have a well-regarded or crafted military plan is not equal to the actual capability of carrying it out. In Chinese military writings, analysts refer to this by talking about the

“two incompatibles”, which is what “the PLA perceives as a gap between its current capabilities and its goals.”²³³

Because of China’s incomplete military modernization and ongoing weaknesses, to unleash a blitzkrieg on Taiwan may not be possible yet, however the PLA is currently working on fixing its weaknesses. In order to efficiently face the scenario of a war in the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese military is creating at a rapid pace a state of the art projection capability. Xi Jinping has made clear that he would intend to transform China into an expeditionary power while unification with Taiwan figures prominently in the PLA eight “strategic tasks.”

Figure 10 Illustration of the PRC's military capabilities and threat, source: ROCNDR 2017

Since the PLA modernization primarily aims at a Taiwan contingency, China envisions future conflicts to involve greater maritime, air and joint-operations combat. The PLA’s modernization objectives relevant to a war in the Taiwan Strait include: to improve the PLA’s capability to effect complex joint operations and build the capability to win

“informationized local wars”²³⁴, to enhance capabilities for “maritime military struggle”,

233Rand Corporation, “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation - Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)”, Library of Congress, Santa Monica, CA, February 2015, ISBN/EAN:

9780833088307, page 69, URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR893.html.

234“The concept of “informatization” figures prominently in PLA writings and is roughly analogous to the U.S. military’s concept of “net-centric” warfare: a force’s ability to use advanced information

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to accelerate the PLAAF shifts towards more offensive operations and the PLAA adaptation to long-distance mobility operations (rather than their traditional “sitting”

defense posture), to enhance efforts to strengthen A2/AD²³⁵ to dissuade or to defeat a possible third-party intervention during a Taiwan contingency (with the development of long range weapons in air, maritime, space, electromagnetic and information domains) as well as to augment broader capabilities in cyber and space operations.²³⁶ China also aims at strengthening defense technologies by building a more capable research and development (R&D) architecture for driving military innovations ahead.

The Chinese armament industry is maturing since China is investing in indigenous acquisitions, and as a consequence, the dependence of China to foreign equipment is decreasing. It now succeeds in fielding armaments that are comparable to weapon produced by the U.S and continues to develop top-tier advanced weapons such as hypersonic missiles, maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MARVs), electromagnetic railguns, counter-space weapons and unmanned/AI equipped weapons.

China’s forces modernization poses an extraordinary challenge to Taiwan’s defense which has traditionally enjoyed the natural geographic advantages of island defense, technological superiority and the American security umbrella.

A number of information and the global architecture of what follows has been inspired by a RAND Corporation survey of China’s military modernization.²³⁷ We completed the structure with information relevant to a Taiwan conflict.

4.3.2.1 Organizational Reforms

Xi Jinping, who is also the CMC’s chairman, launched a series of reforms aiming at a major reorganization and restructuring of the PLA command system, leadership, administration in order to achieve the goal of conducting “integrated joint operations”

and to create a military better suited for expeditionary missions.

At the top, the CMC’s Equipment Development Department oversees updates of China’s military doctrine and weapons development while within the PLA, each

technology and communications systems to gain operational advantage over an adversary. PLA writings highlight the benefit of near real-time shared awareness of the battlefield in enabling quick, unified effort to seize tactical opportunities.”Source: Annual Report to U.S. Congress, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China in 2017", Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, 2017, page 39.

235 Chinese publications generally do not use this term.

236Annual Report to U.S. Congress, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China in 2017", Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, 2017, page 39.

237 Read: Rand Corporation, “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation - Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)”, Library of Congress, Santa Monica, CA, February 2015, ISBN/EAN: 9780833088307, URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR893.html.

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services’ equipment department are responsible for managing the acquisition processes of new weaponry.²³⁸

Figure 11 PRC military budget, source: ROCNDR 2017

The PLA budget has rose exponentially for two decades. China is now the second largest military spender in the world after the U.S. with an annual budget of around

$200 billion, with exact figures still being unclear (officially $150 billion). In 2020 it is expected to reach $260 billion.²³⁹ For the U.S. Department of Defense, China has the

"fiscal strength and political will to sustain increased defense spending,” and can do so

“for the foreseeable future.”²⁴⁰ Comparatively, Taiwan’s defense budget is of approximately $10 billion, or around 20 time less.

For Chase, “the PLA can be expected to continue to improve its training and exercises and to strengthen its professional military education system.”²⁴¹ Trainings have increased in number and realism with the new Zhurihe Opposing force, a unit trained to fight similarly to China’s likely adversaries, such as the U.S. military and with simulations of large scale and complex joint-operations involving long-distance operations on land, in air and at sea.

In trainings, it appeared that the forces mimicking western fighting tactics often gained superiority over PLA troops, which impressed Xi Jinping and PLA generals.

Consequently the PLA has been eager to “americanize” its doctrine and organization

238 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017, page 201, URL: http://www.uscc.gov.

239Annual Report to U.S. Congress, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China in 2017", Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, 2017, page 66.

240 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017, page 201, URL: http://www.uscc.gov.

241 Rand Corporation, “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation - Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)”, Library of Congress, Santa Monica, CA, February 2015,

ISBN/EAN: 9780833088307, page 20, URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR893.html.

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(with Chinese characteristics, of course).²⁴² Conversely, China has been demobilizing a lot of its military personnel and panned to reduce its force by 300,000 personnel (originally by the end of 2017 but it is likely that this will take a little longer). The goal is to cut in the “fat” of the PLA by dismissing non-combat personnel.

Modernization also goes through the establishment of theater commands (the Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern and Central theaters), which are, according to the RAND researchers, "responsible for warfighting and improving routine readiness through joint operations, training, and strategy and plans development. These changes required the reassignment of some units.”²⁴³The establishment of theaters will likely support the PLA’s ability to prepare for war against Taiwan.

In order to ease command and control (C2) within the newly created Joint Staff Department (JSD – replacing the General Staff Department), the PLA is going through a vast reorganization of its four former general departments into fifteen subdivisions which report directly to the CMC. Likewise, Xi Jinping inaugurated in April 2016 China’s new Joint Operations Command Center which exercises authority over and integrate the operations of the PLA’s army, navy and air force. In 2015, China also created the Strategic Support Force (SSF), an organization merging PLA’s capabilities in space, cyber and electronic warfare (EW) and the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) in order to “improve resources allocation and centralize support to PLA forces”, with one support center located in each of the five newly created theaters²⁴⁴. The reforms have also elevated all components of the PLA (like the navy or the air force) at the same level of priority as the PLA army.

In the case of a Taiwan contingency, the effects of these reforms would be that the transition of China’s chain of command from peace to war would be easier and that its reaction to changes on the battlefields would both be faster and more efficient. A higher budget and the creation of supporting structures for war operations also signal that the PLA will be offered greater equipment and resilience in terms of replacing / maintaining war equipment, better trained troops, and more specialized units. In other words, the PLA will be more able to effect the complex, joint operations required for a war of aggression in the Taiwan Strait.

4.3.2.2 PLAA – Army

The PLA has been transformed into a more suitable force for offensive and expeditionary operations (such as against Taiwan) by creating a smaller but more flexible and mobile force. This went through the development of army aviation units

242 Tse, D., "China's Americanized Military", The Diplomat, December 13, 2017, URL:

https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/chinas-americanized-military/.

243Annual Report to U.S. Congress, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China in 2017", Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, 2017, page 1.

244 Ibid. 2.

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(attack-helicopters), special operations forces, electronic warfare, better C4I equipment for better communication between units and C2, long-range artillery units, air-defense systems, and air-land mobility (heavy-lift aircrafts, light mechanized infantry).

When it comes to human resources, the PLAA is now a better trained force, especially for amphibious operations, with exercises including joint operations and new equipment, real-time ISR, precision targeting for close air support assets, special warfare units and nighttime reconnaissance and attack training. It is also an increasingly professional force, relying more on NCOs than it used to in the past.²⁴⁵ Also the PLA made numerous efforts to make the military career more attractive for young Chinese (higher wages and instauration of retraining for the life after serving). The officer corps also gained in quality since the PLA has opened specialized academies for its officers.

When it comes to the army aviation, the PLA army has been seeking to improve its equipment by acquiring attack and transport helicopters. The Z-10 and Z-19 helicopters are now believed to be carrying precision-guided munitions and air-to-air missiles while the full rotary-wing armada of the PLAA has been equipped with “improved sensors, data links, and electronic warfare equipment for conducting operations under

“informationized” conditions" according to the U.S. DoD.²⁴⁶

For armored vehicles and artillery, the objective is to develop equipment capable of being rapidly deployed on battlefield, and the U.S. DoD insists that the PLA Army is improving its capability to integrate with other arms so as to strengthen the efficiency of joint-operations.²⁴⁷

Special operations forces have also been strengthened in order to create a “more flexible and deployable force for supporting operations at home and abroad.”²⁴⁸ The use of Special Forces in a Taiwan contingency is acknowledged in many PLA internal publications, where they could be used to conduct local strikes, sabotages, assassinations and reconnaissance prior and during landing operations, thus provoking disarray within Taiwanese lines.²⁴⁹

4.3.2.3 PLAAF – Air Force

The PLAAF is the largest air force in Asia with more than 2100 combat aircraft and its modernization has been rapid. For Chase and Garafola (RAND): “The air force should play a decisive role in protecting Chinese national interests, field modern capabilities commensurate with China’s standing as a major power and enjoy the institutional

245 Ibid. 82.

246Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017, page 202, URL: http://www.uscc.gov.

247 Ibid.

248 Ibid. 203.

249Easton, “The Chinese invasion threat – Taiwan’s defense and American strategy in Asia”, The Project 2049 Institute, 2017, ISBN 9781546353256, page 266.

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status befitting its role as a ‘strategic service,’ an important consideration given the historical dominance of ground forces in China’s military.”²⁵⁰

The PLAAF’s efforts are mainly directed towards the development of long-range bombers and strike capabilities, fifth-generation fighters, airborne early warning and control, aerial refueling, strategic lift, air defense, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft.²⁵¹ The PLAAF modernization has also been driven by the will to make its mission more compatible with other arms, under a “joint operations mindset”.²⁵² The PLAAF has also regularized complex and realist trainings.

Against Taiwan, the PLAAF’s mission will be primordial. Its deployment reflects this fact with the fielding of many advanced aircrafts within unrefueled range of Taiwan (the PLAAF lacking aerial refueling capabilities and the island being situated a mere 130km from Chinese coasts at the narrowest point of the strait), so that air superiority and ground-attack missions over the island will be more convenient to conduct. Also, the PLAAF has acquired excellent long-range surface-air defense systems, which will surely complicate any Taiwanese counterattack operations against China. Finally, in order to support troops on the ground, China has been investing a lot in acquiring and developing support and reconnaissance aircrafts with consistent ISR capability.²⁵³ Fighters: China continues to import Russian-made fighters (SU-27-30-35 and J-11A) and now produces modern fighters (J-10, J-15, J-16, the stealth J-20 and J-31), some with 5^thgeneration advanced capabilities. China has made impressive progresses when it comes to air-to-air missiles, radar and electronic counter-measures.²⁵⁴ China now fields more than 600 4^th generation fighters while Taiwan fields a little more than 300.

China’s 5^th generation fighters are slowly entering service while Taiwan does not field any equivalents yet.

Strike: The PLAAF bombers and fighter-bombers (H-6K / JH-7, J-10) have been modernized in terms of combat range, weaponry and electronic equipment. The H-6K is a redesign of the older Xian H-6 bomber with turbofan engines to extend range and is now armed with modern LACMs and precision-guided munitions (CJ-20) able to reach Guam. The PLAN fields the H-6G, carrying ASCMs to take part in maritime warfare. These aircrafts are complemented by newly developed advanced unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) able to strike ground targets.

Aerial refueling: China is developing new aircrafts to replace its outdated fleet of IL-78MD and H-6U. The modern Y-20, which entered operational service in 2017, fits the

250 Michael S. Chase and Christina Garafola, “China’s Search for a ‘Strategic Air Force,’ ” China Brief, October 2, 2015.

251Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017, page 208, URL: http://www.uscc.gov.

252Annual Report to U.S. Congress, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China in 2017", Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, 2017, page 80.

253 Ibid. 81.

254Barrie, D., "It's not your father's PLAAF: China's push to develop domestic air-to-air missiles", Warontherocks, February 21, 2018, URL: https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/not-fathers-plaaf-chinas-push-develop-domestic-air-air-missiles/.

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role (longer range, bigger load). However, aerial refueling remains a weakness for the PLAAF.

Strategic lift: To transport its forces and drop materials and troops on Taiwan, the PLAAF can count on several transport aircrafts such the Russian-produced IL-76 and the Y-20.²⁵⁵ Once fully operational, the Y-20 will greatly increase China’s projection capabilities. Such aircrafts can carry cargo, troops and heavy equipment. They can also drop paratroopers and light armored vehicles. China has also agreed with Ukraine to domestically restart in 2019 the production of AN-225, a monster of 280 tons.²⁵⁶ China has also fielded the AG-600 large amphibious seaplane, able to carry an important payload, which could support amphibious operations.

Airborne early-warning and C4ISR systems: The PLAAF’s airborne early warning and C4ISR aircrafts include the KJ-2000, KJ-500 and Y-8J. The Y-20 could also serve as AWACS. They increase the PLAAF ability to detect, track and targets the enemy at long distance.

Anti-submarine aircrafts (ASW): The new Shaanxi Y-8Q turboprop aircraft, a derivate from an older Soviet design (AN-12), has entered service last year and is expected to fill the gap in China’s limited anti-submarine warfare capabilities. It is the first PLA combat aircraft of this type.²⁵⁷

UAV: China’s fielding of domestically developed UAVs continues to expand. China is developing UAVs with modern C4ISR, monitoring and targeting capabilities, and expects to use them in coordination with other arms. New designs include the Wing Loong I, Wing Loong II, WJ-600A/D, Yunying Cloud Shadow, and the CH-5.

Interestingly, the CH-5 has the capacity to carry 16 air-to-surface missiles. In the last two years, the PLA has also unveiled an armed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) UAV, the Gongji 1. Ranges, speeds and payloads have been increased comparatively to older designs.²⁵⁸

Air defense: China’s Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) extends to 550km from the country’s shore (covering all of Taiwan) and thus is a powerful threat to any aircraft flying under its perimeter²⁵⁹. The PLAAF has a large force of long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, including Russian-built SA–20 (S- 300PMU1/2), S-400 (yet to be delivered) and indigenous HQ–9 systems. China is developing and acquiring more SAM systems with greater capabilities and longer ranges. It has the capability to intercept incoming ballistic missiles. These systems will increase China’s ability to

255 Annual Report to U.S. Congress, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China in 2015", Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, 2015,page 51.

256 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017, page 210, URL: http://www.uscc.gov.

257Yeo, M., "China deploys new anti-submarine aircraft to fringes of South China Sea", June 22, 2017, URL: https://www.defensenews.com/space/2017/06/22/china-deploys-new-anti-submarine-aircraft-to-fringes-of-south-china-sea/.

258Annual Report to U.S. Congress, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China in 2017", Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, 2017, page 29.

259 Ibid. 29.

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control the airspace over the Taiwan Strait and complicate third-parties interventions in a Taiwan contingency.

4.3.2.4 PLAN – Navy

China’s project to acquire a strong navy can be read through Alfred Mahan’s famous theory of Sea Power which stipulates that a global power cannot exist without a dominant navy. Because China cannot instantly challenge the U.S. naval superiority in the short term, China, taking good note of Mahan’s theory, seeks control of the waters surrounding its national territory.

The PLAN modernization also reflects China’s wish to project its power.

In China’s 2015 defense white paper, it is mentioned that “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned” and that “the [PLAN] will (…) build a combined, multi-functional and efficient marine combat force structure.” ²⁶⁰ Consequently, the PLAN has extended its operational reach well beyond Taiwan, into what Chinese publications refer to “far seas”. The PLAN today is the largest navy in Asia with more than 300 surface ships, submarines, amphibious ships and patrol crafts equipped with modern weaponry, as well as one of the world’s most advanced and flexible force. Relatively absent from these impressive developments is a robust deep-water ASW capability.²⁶¹

Desire to create a “blue water” navy has led the PLAN to develop its long-range and expeditionary capacities with aircrafts carriers, large amphibious ships, multi-mission surface ships and modernization of its submarine warfare capabilities. Modernization as well as acquisition of ships and naval aircrafts alike obey to the PLAN’s goal to achieve maritime superiority within the first island chain (the “near seas”, including the Taiwan Strait) and bolster A2/AD by improving anti-air and anti-surface capabilities (shore and ship-based ASBMs), thus creating an impressive sea-borne deterrent against any third-party willing to intervene in a Taiwan contingency.²⁶²Against Taiwan, China

260Xinhua, China’s Military Strategy - 2015 White Paper, State Council of the People's Republic of China, May 27, 2015, URL:

http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm.

http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm.

在文檔中 評估2018年台灣嚇阻中國的能力：台灣針對中國侵略的防堵程度如何? - 政大學術集成 (頁 106-119)