1. Introduction
1.2 Analytical Framework
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1.2 Analytical Framework
1.2.1 Definitions
According to Morgan, “in a deterrence situation one party is thinking of attacking, the other knows it and is issuing threats of a punitive response, and the first is deciding what to do while keeping these threats in mind”. (Morgan 1983, PP. 33-42) For this leading author on deterrence, to successfully implement deterrence is about finding how best to threaten, and in the case of deterrence failure, how best to punish.1 Because Taiwan doesn’t have armed nuclear capability, I talk here about conventional deterrence.
For John J. Mearsheimer, “conventional deterrence (…) is a function of the capability of denying an aggressor his battlefield objectives with conventional forces (i.e. non-nuclear).”(Mearsheimer, 1983)
For Morgan, deterrence is a rather simple idea, even a primitive one. It comes from the assumption that nothing besides the threat of retaliation will make an adversary think twice before attacking. Deterrence must involve a psychological reaction of fear within the attackers’ mindset, instill uncertainty about the success of his attack plans, present him with high risks and finally invite him to a more careful assessment of the costs of using force. The defender must raise the cost of an attack to levels so high so the challenger is rationally convinced that an attack is unworthy.
Because rationality of decision-making is particularly flawed in deterrence relationships, I will not assume total rationality either for Taiwan and China, and instead make use of Morgan’s concept of “sensible decision-making” throughout the thesis. Morgan’s sensible decision-making is an attempt to bridge the gap between an imperfect rational decision-making model for deterrence and how things happen in reality. Sensible decision makers are said to be good targets for deterrence because they know the rationality of their decisions are flawed by a multitude of factors resulting from the lack of information they are given about the issues at stake. As a result, leaders are likely to be prudent when confronted by a thick “fog of war.”
A hybrid of general and immediate deterrence
For Morgan it is also important to know if the case I am discussing involves general or immediate deterrence. When it comes to Taiwan, it appears that both apply. According to Morgan, immediate, pure, deterrence concerns “a relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it” (Morgan, 1977). A situation of
1Morgan, Patrick, “Deterrence – A conceptual analysis”, Sage Publications, 1977, ISBN 0-8039-0819-9, page 17.
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immediate deterrence is very clear and threats are clearly communicated, such as between China and Taiwan. In immediate deterrence situation, which is said to be rare, tensions could translate in war anytime. However, it is a defining element of the relation between Taiwan and China since 1949 because China has never abandoned the use of force for bringing unification.
In the same time, both sides of the Taiwan Strait engage in a thriving economic relationship, people travel freely between Taiwan and China and the issue has been going on for almost seventy years. So, while immediate deterrence applies to Taiwan, so does “general deterrence”. For Morgan, “general deterrence embraces a broader range of military-related activities and is readily employed in tandem with other conflict management tools”. He adds: “General deterrence comes into play where two or more actors have a potential for significant conflict so the idea of war is not irrelevant or farfetched” (Morgan P. , Deterrence, A conceptual analysis, 1977). Admittedly, general deterrence is harder to break, however, tensions can escalate and go out of control very quick.
A case of unilateral deterrence
Taiwan is in a case of unilateral deterrence because, in the Taiwan Strait, China is the only party to consider an attack.2 Most of the time, a situation of unilateral deterrence implies that there is a gap in military capabilities between the attacker and the deterrer, it is the case in our situation, where China dominates largely.
In unilateral deterrence, “deterrer A must understand the objectives and cost/benefit calculation of attacker B. But because it is hard, deterrer A will have to work with estimates and limited data (…). [Then] A must acquire the capability to impose costs on B graver than it is willing to accept”. (Morgan P. , Deterrence, A conceptual analysis, 1977)3
Taiwan’s deterrence is based on punishment
The distinction between deterrence based on denial and punishment was first elaborated by Glenn Snyder in 1958. For Freedman:
- “Denial has coercive elements but essentially tends towards control, the threat is designed in order to control the situation sufficiently and deny the opponent
2 Morgan, Patrick, “Deterrence – A conceptual analysis”, Sage Publications, 1977, ISBN 0-8039-0819-9, page 83.
3 Ibid. 83.
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strategic options. In calculating costs, the opponent would have to consider those that would be incurred in the battle for control;
- Deterrence through punishment by contrast, is pure coercion in that the opponent is not denied choice, but is given powerful incentives to choose in a particular way;” (Freedman, Deterrence, 2004)4
Against China’s, “deterrence through denial” was possible when Taiwan’s military used to dominate the PLA in terms of capabilities but such is not the case today anymore.
Taiwan doesn’t possess the “denial” option because it cannot convince China anymore that opting for war is bound to fail. Then, because China has reasons to believe that it could take Taiwan by force, threatening punishment, or the promise to incur inacceptable costs to an invading force, would be Taiwan’s remaining option.
1.2.2 Thesis Architecture
For the main body of my thesis, I will use the framework about conventional deterrence provided by John J. Mearsheimer in his volume “Conventional Deterrence” (1983).
Mearsheimer’s most important teaching is that for assessing the success of a deterrence posture, it is needed to know what military plan the challenger has.
In other words, for assessing the health of a defender’s deterrence, one must ask her/himself first about the particular strategy envisioned by the potential attacker and then look at how the defender is planning to defend itself. Accordingly, our plan is organized on a dichotomy with at first (1) the overall Chinese plan for taking Taiwan, and second, (2) Taiwan’s deterrence posture.
On the one hand I separate the challenge posed by China to Taiwan into two separated but mutually reinforcing strategies, the one short-of-war, and the other military; then try to explain the effects of both on Taiwan’s deterrence. On the other hand, I divide Taiwan’s deterrence into several and distinct forms of answers, ranging from its expression of commitment to self-defense, to its attempts to limit the effect of China’s pressure and its military capabilities. In order to give a picture of Taiwan’s deterrence, I attempt to combine the effects of all of these factors altogether.
Within this architecture, I will discuss internal issues relevant to China’s threat and Taiwan’s deterrence with the various theoretical tools provided by other leading authors on deterrence such as Robert Jervis, Janice Gross Stein, Richard Ned Lebow, Patrick Morgan and Lawrence Freedman.
4 Freedman, Lawrence, “Deterrence”, Polity Press, 2004, ISBN 0-7456-3112, page 37.
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1.2.3 Problem Statement & research question
The goals defended by Taiwan and China are in conflict with each other; China wishes to unify, by force if necessary, and Taiwan seeks to resist annexation. This clash of goals participate in making compromise a difficult option for both sides of the Strait.
Therefore, China has not given up its threats and Taiwan has been seeking to maintain a sound deterrence posture.
China’s objective is total. To achieve it, China makes use of a compellence strategy which objective is unlimited, accepting only one acceptable outcome: taking Taiwan.
To this end, China uses both military and non-military means, with Taiwan having to face the threat both ways.
(1) First, China’s attempts to achieve breakthroughs by undermining Taiwan’s deterrence posture through actions short of war, such as military intimidations, harassment on the international stage, economic pressures as well as political warfare.
(2) Second, China continues to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with the objective to outgun Taiwan in a potential armed confrontation.
Regarding extended deterrence, the U.S. has recently tightened its ties to Taiwan but this development takes place amid greater Sino – U.S. tensions.
Figure 1 Taiwan Deterrence in 2018, source: Hugo Tierny.
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The goal of this work is to assess the health of Taiwan’s deterrence in June 2018. I determine Taiwan’s objectives this way: (1) to deter a Chinese armed aggression in order to (2) ensure that the future of Taiwan lays in the hands of Taiwanese people.
Taiwan’s deterrence has to do with self-determination, however, China is inhibiting Taiwan’s freedom of choice with its military threats and other forms of pressures.
Taiwan’s deterrence then encompasses the need to address China’s military and non-military options. Our research question encapsulates what I have just written about:
How well does Taiwan Deter China from Subjugating the island?
The word “subjugate” implies that China’s objective is total and unrestricted. And this implies for Taiwan that its countermeasures should be comprehensive, with a military and non-military aspects.
With this question, I aim to calculate the health of Taiwan’s deterrence, by weighing Taiwan’s resilience against China’s limited methods, and Taiwan’s military capabilities against China’s war plans.