海上長城的重構或破壞？：中國崛起與南海海上交通線之政策　(2000-2014) - 政大學術集成

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(1)Building or Breaking the Great Wall at Sea: The Rise of China and the Politics of Sea Lines of Communication in the South China Sea (2000-2014). 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學 José Luis Plata Díaz. ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Advisor: Professor Alan Yang Hao. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. International Mater’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University July 2014.

(2) Page left in blank for Letter of Authorization. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 2. i n U. v.

(3) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 3. i n U. v.

(4) Abstract This research applies game theory (stag-hunt model) to a hypothetical situation of cooperation on Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) protection in South China Sea (SCS). The results indicate that, in theory, the best option for all disputant countries in the issue is to cooperate in order to increase the security of their oil imports, trade, and ships crossing the region. To overcome the gap between the theoretical model and the reality, we have identified those factors that will hinder the implementation of cooperation on SLOCs protection, sovereignty, resources, and military development; as well as those that can be used to counterbalance the effect of negative ones, previous joint maritime patrols, non-traditional security cooperation, and the future South China Sea Code of Conduct (SCS COC).. 政治大. Finally, we have presented the South China Sea Peace Island Initiative, a proposal to coordinate and create new joint maritime patrols in the region as a mean to reduce tensions, build confidence, and improve the relationship between disputants.. 立. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. We conclude presenting the main findings of this research, as well as those policies that will be useful to implement cooperation on SLOCs protection in SCS.. y. Nat. sit. n. al. er. io. 摘要本研究採用賽局理論 (stag-hunt model) 來推論假設南海海上交通線 (SLOCs) 安全合作的情形．根據結果顯示，爭奪南海的國家，其解決衝突最好的策略應以合作的方式來提昇無論是在石油進口、貿易活動以及該地區船隻航行等方面的安全性。. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 為縮短假設情境與現實情況的差距，一方面，我們找出海上交通線安全合作之難點：主權、資源、和軍事發展；另一方面，也提出能促進其合作的正面因素：舊有的海上聯合巡邏、非傳統安全合作相關領堿、以及未來的南海行為準則 (SCS COC)。最後我們介紹了「南海太平島提案」，試圖建立與協調新的海上聯合巡邏來降低該地區的緊張關係，建立彼此之間的信任，並改善衝突的情況。根據本研究結論表示，我們的研究發現以及一些政策將能協助實施南海海上交通線安全的合作。 4.

(5) INDEX Acronyms. 7. Tables & Figures. 9. Chapter 1. Introduction 1.1 Introduction and Problematics 1.2. Aims and Research Questions 1.3 Background Discussion 1.3.1 Strategic and International Politics Approach 1.3.2 Legal Approach 1.3.3 Energy and Non-traditional Security Approach. 10 16 18 19 22 25. 政治大. Chapter 2. Research Design and Methodology 2.1. Introduction 30 2.2 Game Theory and Realism: absolute gains, relative gains, and the zero-sum game issue 32 2.3 Previous Researches on Game Theory and Stag-Hunt 47 2.4 Research Limitations 51. 立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. y. 57. sit. Nat. Chapter 3. Background Information 3.1 Sea Lanes of Communication and Non Traditional Security Threats. 70 76 78 85 86 93 96 101. n. al. er. io. 3.2 Sea Lines of Communication and Alternatives Routes 3.3 The String of Pearls and Military Development 3.4 Chinese Military Development and Consequences 3.5 China’s Delaying Strategy 3.6 China and the South China Sea 3.7 US-China Relationship 3.8 ASEAN, China, and the Code of Conduct 3.9 China and Cooperation in SCS. Ch. engchi. Chapter 4. Case Study 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Game Theory in South China Sea 4.3 Factors that Facilitate Cooperation 4.3.1 Previous Joint Maritime Patrols 4.3.2 Non-Traditional Security Cooperation 4.3.3 South China Sea Code of Conduct 5. i n U. v. 104 104 126 128 131 134.

(6) 4.4 Factors that Hinder Cooperation 4.4.1 Sovereignty 4.4.2 Resources 4.4.3 Military Development. 138 139 144 147. 4.5 South China Sea Peace Island Initiative. 151. Chapter 5. Conclusions. 157. References. 171. Annex I. South China Sea Claims. 195. 政治大. Annex II. Maritime Blockades and its Effects. 立. 196. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 6. i n U. v.

(7) ACRONYMS ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area AMM ASEAN Ministerial Meeting ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASBM Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BPD Barrels Per Day CBM Confidence Building Measures CCP Chinese Communists Party COC Code of Conduct COLREGS Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. 政治大. CUES Code for Un-alerted Encounters at Sea. DOC Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. 立. EEZ Exclusive Economic Zones. ESPO East Siberia Pacific Ocean pipeline. ‧ 國. 學. GDP Grow Domestic Product IMB International Maritime Bureau. ‧. IMO International Maritime Organization ISC Information Sharing Center. y. sit. io. n. al. er. Asia-Pacific). Nat. IWG International Working Group (on Confidential and Security Building Measures in the. JWG Joint Working Group. Ch. MALSINDO Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia patrols MBA Military Bases Agreement. engchi. i n U. v. MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola MSP Malacca Strait Patrols NM nautical miles PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy PRC People’s Republic of China’s ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy in Asia ROC Republic of China SCS South China Sea SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SLOCs Sea Lines of Communication 7.

(8) SOM Senior Officials Meeting SS non-nuclear powered submarines SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine SSN nuclear powered attack submarine TAC Treaty of amity and cooperation in Southeast Asia UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas US United States. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 8. i n U. v.

(9) TABLES Table 1. Prisoners' dilemma Game. Payoffs in level of preference. 37. Table 2. Arms Race Game. 46. Table 3. Total Piracy attacks/hijackings, and attacks/hijackings to Chinese ships from 2008-2009. 61. Table 4. Piracy attacks to Chinese ships by year. 61. Table 5. Pros and Cons of Building its own Oil Tanker Fleet. 74. 政治大. Table 6. Prisoners' Dilemma Game. 立. Table 8. SLOCs Cooperation Game. 111. ‧. FIGURES. 106. 學. ‧ 國. Table 7. Stag-Hunt Game. 105. y. Nat. 38. er. io. sit. Figure 1. Game in tree form. Figure 2. SLOCs Cooperation (stag-hunt) with sequential movements (tree form) 122. n. al. i n C h e nTree Figure 3. Simplified SLOCs Cooperation hi U g c(stag-hunt). v. Figure 4. Roll-back in simplified SLOCs Cooperation Tree (stag-hunt). 9. 124 124.

(10) Chapter 1. Introduction 1.1 Introduction and Problematics The South China Sea (SCS) is one of the Asian regions in which some countries are involved in territorial disputes over its islands, reefs, and sea waters. The main zones of confrontation are the Spratly Islands, and the Parcel Islands. The disputes in both zones create tensions in the region that can evolve into military conflict, diminishing the perspectives for cooperation, and avoiding the peaceful management and. 政治大. resolution of the issue. For instance, in the last years tension over the territorial. 立. disputes has been varying over time, with different peaks as the occupation of Woody. ‧ 國. 學. Island by the PRC in 1974 (CIA, 2013a), or more recently, the standoff on April 2012. ‧. between the Philippines and the PRC 1.. er. io. sit. y. Nat. The main issue in South China Sea is sovereignty over the islands and reefs that can. al. n. iv n C h e n gofcnatural provide with the rights for the exploitation h i Uresources, and also the right to. create artificial structures in its Exclusive Economic Zone (UNCLOS, 2013), which could also be used for military projection by countries with enough military and economic resources. Moreover, the control of these regions is especially important for countries whose energy imports and trade go through the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) that cross these seas. Non-traditional threats like piracy, 1. For more detailed information see Chapter 3, background information. 10.

(11) political instability in key countries (e.g. oil production countries, countries in the Malacca strait, etc.), or blockades to cargo ships/oil tankers by other actors, can cause great damage to the economy of countries like China or Japan. In case of China, it has taken different measures to tackle these threats, among them increasing its patrols in the SCS, sending military ships to the Gulf of Aden, establishing ports with commercial and probably military uses in the Indian Ocean, the building of its own oil tanker fleet, or the development of alternative oil import routes by using pipelines. All. 治政大 at the same time that some of these measures try to increase Chinese energy security, 立 ‧ 國. 學. of them can be used with dual purpose (Pehrson, 2006), as for instance been more assertive in the territorial disputes, or perhaps for future military projection, or to seek. ‧. sit. y. Nat. hegemony in the Asia Pacific region. Therefore, this second interpretation of Chinese. n. al. er. io. growth is creating mistrust among other countries, which are afraid that China’s aim is. i n U. v. not to develop peacefully. China could increase its power in order to be more assertive. Ch. engchi. in its territorial claims, decreasing the probability of cooperation with other countries, gaining more bargaining power to settle the disputes in its benefit, or even to try to become a regional hegemon (O'Rourke, 2014).. 1.1.1 Main Stakeholders in SCS In this section we present the main actors involved in the dispute, ASEAN, China,. 11.

(12) United States, and Taiwan, as well as their main concerns and interests in the region. 2. 1.1.1.1 China The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) official claims over the SCS date back to 1951, when Chinese foreign minister Zhou Enlai in a statement indicated Chinese sovereignty over the different groups of islands and reefs (mainly Paracel and Spratly Islands) in the region. The nine dash line that appeared for first time in atlases from the mainland was similar to the eleven dash lines showed in a previous atlas published. 治政 in 1947 (Gao & Jia, 2013), under the Republic of China大 (ROC) Government. 立 ‧ 國. 學. The nine dash line encircles the Pratas Islands (Dongsha Qundao), the Paracel Islands. ‧. sit. y. Nat. (Xisha Qundao), the Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha Qundao), and the Spratly Islands. n. al. er. io. (Nansha Qundao). All these zones are claimed by PRC and ROC, which at present. i n U. v. controls Pratas Islands. The nine dash line has been criticized by Singapore and the. Ch. engchi. United States, and it has been considered legally groundless by some ASEAN countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, whose, together with Brunei, also have interests in protecting their sovereignty in SCS. The discontinuous line is ambiguous as there is no official explanation of it, and thus it is not clear if Chinese claims only include the islands, or also underwater rocks, the. 2. In order to have a general idea of each disputant’s claims in SCS see the map in Annex I. 12.

(13) seabed, and the water column (Zou, 2012).. Thus, this ambiguity may make think other claimants that Chinas ambitious is to control the entire SCS, including island, rocks, reefs, waters, seabed, and resources.. 1.1.1.2 ASEAN This part presents those ASEAN countries that are involve in the disputes in SCS, as. 政治大. well as their claims over the Island, rocks and waters. These countries are Brunei,. 立. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam. Due to China use the nine dash line to. ‧ 國. 學. claim its historical rights over the SCS, all the claims from ASEAN countries present. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Brunei. ‧. overlaps with those claims from Chinese government.. al. n. iv n C Brunei has claims over some partsh ofe thenSpratlyhIslands g c i U and their surrounding waters (Zou, 2012). They have overlapping claims with the Philippines and Malaysia (Buszynski, 2010). For intance, since 2002 its claims have generated disputes with Malaysia over the exploitation rights of two overlapping oil blocks (Buszynski & Iskandar 2007).. 13.

(14) Indonesia During last years, Indonesia has tried to play a moderator role in the disputes, due to it had not a clear announcement from China that there were claims overlapping between the two countries in the SCS. However, Chinese publication of maps in 2009 with overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) with those of Natuna Islands, the aggressive behavior of Chinese enforcement vessels against Indonesian patrol ships in 2010 and 2013, the Air Defense Identification Zone in East China Sea (ADIZ), as well. 治政大 than half of the SCS, may as the fishing ban around Hainan Island that affect more 立 ‧ 國. 學. have led Indonesian Government to announce its position and declared its dispute with China in the region (Murphy, 2014).. ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. Malaysia. i n U. v. Malaysia claims part of the Spratly Islands, which overlap with those claims of the. Ch. engchi. Philippines. It also has interest in the exploiting of its EEZ for the extraction of resources, and thus has conflicts with Brunei in those oil blocks where their claims overlap (Buszynski & Iskandar 2007).. Philippines The Philippines claim part of the Spratly Islands, including Kalayaan (Freedomland) 14.

(15) as an extension of the island of Palawan, which also overlaps with the Malaysian claim in this zone (Buszynski, 2010). They have continuous tensions with China, especially after sending on March 2014 a memorial about its dispute in SCS with China, to a UN arbitration tribunal in the Hague (Poling, 2014).. Vietnam Vietnam, together with China and Taiwan, claims all the Paracels and part of the. 治政大 in part with those of the Spratly Islands, and therefore its claims overlaps also 立 ‧ 國. 學. Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei (Zou, 2012). Although the Paracels are occupied by China, Vietnam maintains its claims over them, as well as over the Spratly, which are. ‧. sit. y. Nat. occupied by different ASEAN claimants (Buszynski, 2010). Vietnam has frequent. n. al. er. io. tensions with China over the islands, and recently some of their vessels collided in the. i n U. v. Spratly protesting Chinese decision to send an oil rig to Vietnam EEZ for oil exploiting (Tuan, 2014).. Ch. engchi. 1.1.1.3 United States US is involved in different zones of the Asia Pacific Region, especially in both China Sea regions, the East with its alliance with Japan, and the South with its alliance with the Philippines and its arms trade with Taiwan. Thus US wants to maintain its 15.

(16) presence, not only to reinforce its alliances, but also to protect its interest, as for instance freedom of navigation, or to contain the rise of China.. 1.1.1.4 Taiwan Taiwan, although is not officially recognized as a country by all ASEAN countries, it can be considered as stakeholder with interests in the dispute as China’s nine dash line is similar to the eleven dash line previously drew by the ROC government (Gao & Jia,. 治政 2013). Moreover, the biggest island in the Spratly, the 大 Taiping Island, is under Taiwan 立 ‧ 國. 學. control. Although it has the best logistic facilities, however, due to the long distance between this island and Taiwan, is not of great important for Taiwan self-defense, and. ‧. sit. y. Nat. therefore the Taiwanese Marine Corps were replaced by Coast Guard Administration. n. al. er. io. units in 2000 (Chen, 2011).. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1.2. Aims and Research Questions The aim of this study is to obtain a deeper understanding of China’s behavior in South China Sea, it policies to increase its energy security, its military development, as well as its motivations and interests in increasing its presence in the Asia pacific region.. 16.

(17) We also aim to better understanding ASEAN countries’ and Taiwan’s position in the dispute, as well as to interpret United States’ role (US) and its interests in the region. This information will help us to provide answer to the following questions:. Research Questions 1- Will cooperation on Sea Lines of Communication with China in the South China Sea be more difficult in a middle/long term, due to both, the progressive. 治政大 policy? development of its military capabilities, and its oil energy 立 ‧ 國. 學. From this one these other questions are derived:. ‧. y. sit. n. al. er. io. South China Sea?. Nat. 2- Which factors prevent cooperation on protection of Sea Lines of Communication in. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 3- Which factors facilitate cooperation on protection of Sea Lines of Communication in South China Sea?. 4- How to move from the game theory theoretical framework to real cooperation on protecting the Sea Lines of Communication?. 17.

(18) 1.3 Background Discussion In this section we describe the academic findings in the three main approaches to tackle the SCS dispute, explaining their characteristics, and selecting the one this research is going to apply. The three approaches are: strategic and international politics, legal, and energy and non-traditional security.. 治政大 the situation from realism The strategic and international politics approach presents 立 ‧ 國. 學. and high politics perspectives, in which military buildups, alliances, and the balance of power play the main role in the management of the SCS issue. It describes Chinese. ‧. y. sit. n. al. er. io. dispute.. Nat. recent behavior, its strategy in the dispute, and offers possible options to manage the. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The legal approach, tries to explain the meaning of the nine dash line, as well as to delimit states’ claims, whether they are based on historical claims, customary law, or UNCLOS legislation, in order to achieve a resolution of the issue base, for instance, in an arbitration tribunal. It also presents the Code of Conduct for SCS as a mean to decrease tensions and move forward in the resolution of the issue.. 18.

(19) Finally, the energy and non-traditional security approach supports the idea that non-traditional security threats can damage energy and trade imports of littoral states, as well as those of states with interests in the region. It also argues that Chinese energy diversification will not be enough to decrease its dependency on oil imports by sea, and thus, proposes cooperation to strengthen the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) to confront non-traditional security threats at sea.. 政治大 1.3.1 Strategic and International Politics Approach 立. ‧ 國. 學. The strategic approach leaded by governmental policies, is the one who have been always present in the SCS, however, the opinions referred to the dispute changed over. ‧. sit. y. Nat. time. Goldstein (2011) reviewed recent Chinese naval literature identifying different. n. al. er. io. viewpoints related to SCS issue. Among them, there are the followings:. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1- China has to adopt a cautious and compromising policy 2- There is a perception of threats to China and its interests 3- China is not getting benefits from the SCS resources 4- Exists a pattern of escalation in writings from mid-2010. The last point suggests that Chinese military policy in SCS can become more 19.

(20) aggressive in the future, especially if US takes a more active role in the region, which can trigger more Chinese military deployment in SCS, as for instance by exchanging the presence of law enforcement patrol ships for military vessels. Moreover, as it is within Chinese capabilities, there is a possibility that China will carry out an air and sea strike against a weak regional navy, in order to deter other claimants to take more assertive initiatives in the issue (Goldstein, 2011).. 治政大deciding to use its army to Taylor (2011) also agrees with the possibility of China 立 ‧ 國. 學. undertake an attack due to its current increase of capabilities. However, he mainly focuses on its strategy in SCS since the mid-1990s, which considers is one of delaying. ‧. sit. y. Nat. the resolution of the dispute, occupying territories, consolidating its ability to exercise. n. al. er. io. jurisdiction, and deterring others. This strategy is threating weaker states involved in. i n U. v. the dispute, and is destabilizing the situation. Thus, to try to counterbalance this, the. Ch. engchi. strategy also includes efforts to prevent the escalation of tensions while, at the same time, seeking to consolidate China’s claims through diplomatic, administrative and military means.. Taylor proposes a possible solution that will force China to compromise in the issue and improve relations with other states, as for instance If China seeks to prevent the 20.

(21) formation of a counterbalancing coalition, especially one led by the United States (Taylor, 2011).. Sheldon (2012) also mentions the possibility of US cooperating with SCS states to counterbalance China through the US Air-Sea Battle doctrine, which could be used to deter or defeat China anti-access strategy within the first island chain, especially if they have a closer cooperation with Japan and Austria as allies.. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. On other perspective for the issue, he argues that US is a strong supporter of ASEAN multilateral negotiations for the development of a COC for SCS, and believes that. ‧. sit. y. Nat. ASEAN has to move forward from confidence building to other kind of initiatives, as. n. al. er. io. for instance joint management of maritime resources in order to have improvement in the situation (Sheldon, 2012).. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Buszynski (2010) also shared this possible solution to the issue, supporting the idea of maritime energy cooperation in SCS that will provide more benefits to all the countries involved, instead of a policy based on military buildup to demonstrate effective occupation and to support their legal claims, which will continue with the standoff, and will increase tensions as countries’ forces are developed and deployed. 21.

(22) In sum, the strategic and international politics approach, shows that there is a pattern of escalation in writings from mid-2010 that suggests Chinese military policy in SCS can become more assertive in the future if there is direct intervention of external actors, which will make Chinese delaying strategy in the dispute to change to a more aggressive one. Thus, scholars propose several initiatives in which disputants avoid the consequences of military buildups by cooperating to obtain mutual benefits, for. 治政大 Most authors agree that instance through the joint management of maritime resources. 立 ‧ 國. 學. is early to try to solve the sovereignty issue between the disputants, and we agree with them, but we consider that is also early to start with cooperation on resources, due to,. ‧. y. sit. n. al. er. io. dispute.. Nat. like sovereignty, they are seen as relative gains for all the countries involved in the. 1.3.2 Legal Approach. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. There is recently an increasing interest for solving the South China Sea (SCS) dispute base on the legal approach, using historical rights and UNCLOS legislation as main arguments. Gao and Jia (2013), present Chinese claims on SCS using the nine dash line to protect its title to territory, as well as its historic rights. The main problem is that the other disputants in the issue, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 22.

(23) Indonesia, do not consider it legal, and thus reject it.. One of the reasons it is not accepted by other disputants is because the nine dash line meaning is ambiguous, and does not clearly states if it refers to the sovereignty rights over SCS waters; its Islands, reefs and rocks, or the seabed and continental shelf. According to these two authors, although the original interpretation of the lines can be understood as referring to the whole waters, islands, natural structures, seabed, and. 治政 continental shelf, however, the nine dash line at present大 has three different meanings: 立 ‧ 國. 學. 1- It represents the title to the Island groups inside it. ‧. sit. y. Nat. 2- It maintains Chinese rights in fishing, navigation, and resources extraction. n. al. er. io. 3- It can be interpreted as maritime delimitation lines (e.g. between its Islands and other coastal states).. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Thus, based on the customary law of discovery, occupation, and historic title, the authors argue that China has sovereignty over the islands, other natural structures, and, in accordance to UNCLOS, over their waters and seabed. In spite of their personal opinion, they agree that a solution between history and present reality have to be achieved, proposing the joint development of resources as one of the options, and, 23.

(24) eventually, even discussing the sovereignty issue (Gao & Jia, 2013). Although, we agree that cooperation in some issues should start to improve the relationships among actors in the region, however, we consider that starting negotiating about resources and sovereignty will be more difficult due to they are considered relative gains, which implies one part loses what the other part gains, and also because the tensions that recently has risen in the SCS will make more difficult any kind of agreement related to these two issues.. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Other important point to take into account in the legal approach is the development of a Code of Conduct (COC) for SCS to reduce tensions, manage, and eventually solve. ‧. sit. y. Nat. the disputes in a peacefully way. ASEAN and China have been discussing the issue. n. al. er. io. for more than 18 years with some advances, as for instance the creation of the. i n U. v. Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), and the Joint. Ch. engchi. ASEAN-China Working Group (JWG) to implement the DOC. Although China prefers to discuss the sovereignty/resources dispute with each government in bilateral negotiations, however, when developing a common code for all the sates involved, it prefers to seat with ASEAN as a group. Moreover, it can, as previously did, create an excuse to freeze discussions when consider one of the disputant’s behavior is inappropriate, or when there is external actors’ interference (e.g. U.S.), this can delay 24.

(25) the development of the COC or even avoid its implementation. In fact, as Chinese Foreign minister mentioned, China is in no hurry to conclude an agreement on a COC (Thayer, 2013). Thus, even when the COC will be one of the most important advancement in managing the SCS dispute, we consider that firstly it is necessary to implement faster and less complicate measures to improve the situation in the region, as for instance measures that provide absolute gains to all the actors involved.. 治政 To sum up, the legal approach will be useful, but just大 after focusing in less sensitive 立 ‧ 國. 學. issues that can prepare the path to discuss sovereignty and resources disputes. Examples of these issues are in the field of non-traditional security in SCS, as they. ‧. y. sit. n. al. er. io. problem.. Nat. affect all the actors involved making them to have a common interest in solving the. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 1.3.3 Energy and Non-traditional Security Approach The academic literature also presents a more recent approach to the SCS issue focus on energy and non-traditional security. The main idea is that non-traditional security threats can damage energy and trade imports of littoral states, as well as those of states with interest in the region. Ho (2006), argues that these kinds of threats have been overstated due to the number of piracy armed robbery and maritime terrorist 25.

(26) attacks in the SCS region are very low compared with the proportion of ships that cross the straits (60,000 yearly). Moreover, this author also presents different national, bilateral, and multilateral measures that have decreased the risk of piracy attacks.. Despite of these remarks, he concludes that the trade flow and the demand for energy in the region will increase the dependence on sea transportation, and thus proposes that countries should move to a cooperative regime in order to strengthen the security of the SLOCs (Ho, 2006).. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. In a similar approach, Gautam (2014) shows how Chinese energy policy is concerned. ‧. sit. y. Nat. with its dependence on oil imports that can threat its national security. Thus, in order. n. al. er. io. to achieve energy security, it has been supporting a strategy based on increasing its oil. i n U. v. imports through pipelines, its number of oil tankers, as well as on the development of. Ch. engchi. a deep blue water fleet that can provide support to its vessels operating far from Chinese shores. In spite of its efforts, at present pipelines only provide 14% of Chinese oil import demand; therefore, they only help to diversify its energy imports, which will still concentrate on sea lines routes.. Although China could rely on the oil global market to protect its imports, it prefers to 26.

(27) keep developing its military to provide protection to its oil tankers (Gautam, 2011), which, on the other hand, will cause concerns in other states in the region, especially those involved in sovereignty disputes with China in the SCS.. From our point of view, we also agree with many of these opinions, and thus we believe that the approach for managing the SCS issue should be one based on the energy concerns of the states involved, not with the aim of initiating cooperation on. 治政大firstly, cooperation on joint joint resources development from the beginning, but, 立 ‧ 國. 學. protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to allow the flow of trade and energy without impediments.. ‧ sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. In conclusion, the strategic and international politics approach highlights the. i n U. v. importance of military buildups in the region and alliances to maintain disputants’. Ch. engchi. claims, and to consolidate their positions. However, it can create more tense situations between different actors, especially if external actors get involved in the issue, which can cause a more aggressive response from China.. The legal approach pretends to determine and clarify disputants’ claims in order to initiate a legal process base on International law and UNCLOS legislation. Although 27.

(28) it will be an important advance in the issue, however China prefers to negotiate the issue bilaterally, not through an arbitration tribunal. Moreover, even when the development of a COC will proof useful to decrease tensions in SCS, China will not accept it as a mean to solve the sovereignty issue, and will still prefer to negotiate with each disputant and not with ASEAN as a whole.. Both, the legal and the strategic and international politics approach, propose joint. 治政大 in the dispute. We agree it development of SCS resources as a way to move forward 立 ‧ 國. 學. will be an important advancement in the issue, but we also consider that a more cautious approach is needed, one in which cooperation starts from less sensitive issues,. ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. for instance SLOCs protection.. i n U. v. The energy and non-traditional security approach is basically concerned with. Ch. engchi. guarantee energy supplies, mainly oil and gas imports by sea, and with the non-traditional security threats that can cut this energy imports to Asian countries. Initiatives that tackle these problems will be easier to agree on due to they focus on securing the SLOCs, commons that can be used by all the stakeholders in the region, which implies all of them have a general interest in increasing their protection, this will make states’ participation synergic, and will produce a win-win situation based on 28.

(29) absolute gains that will be better accepted than agreements on relative gains, which in the case of sovereignty and resources in SCS implies dividing the benefits among the disputants.. In sum, we consider this approach the less controversial because it does not deal directly with sovereignty or resources in situ, but with the protection of commons, which is something all states with interest in the region are concerned with. Therefore,. 治政 the energy and non-traditional security approach is 大 the one we decided to apply 立 ‧. ‧ 國. 學. during this research.. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 29. i n U. v.

(30) Chapter 2. Research Design and Methodology 2.1. Introduction This study starts with an introduction to realism, offering the basic concepts about absolute and relative gains that are used during the process of rational choice and that will determine the different stakeholder’s movements in the chosen game. It follows with an overview of basic game theory concepts that will be applied during the case study, and end with the limitations of this research.. 治政大 as it involves economy Our case study can be analyze using different theories, 立 ‧ 國. 學. relations, institutional design, and influence of Asian cultural values, among other factors. However, due to Chinese economy and its military power are in a process of. ‧. sit. y. Nat. growth and adaptation at regional and at international level, which can be seen with. n. al. er. io. mistrust by different countries and make cooperation more difficult, therefore, we will. i n U. v. make use of some concepts from realism theory that reflect these types of changes in the rise of China.. Ch. engchi. Realism is known to describe and explain properly military buildups, balances of power, and the mistrust caused by raising countries. Moreover, realists believe that cooperation is not always possible, it has limitations, and presents problems related with relative gains and or the transformation of these payoff into capabilities by other 30.

(31) states (Waltz, 1979, p.106.; Mearsheimer, 1994, p.12). As we intend to show the possibility of cooperation on SLOCs, we borrow the relative/absolute gains and zero-sum game concepts from realism, which are used during the process of rational choice and that will determine the different stakeholder’s movements in each situation (e.g. in the chosen game in game theory).. The scope of this research is to analyze Chinese behavior in SCS and Asia Pacific, in. 政治大. order to determine the probability of cooperation on Sea Lines of Communication. 立. (SLOCs) in the region, to establish the conditions under we can move from the ideal. ‧ 國. 學. situation presented in the game theory model to reality, and to assess the cooperation. ‧. outcomes in this case. We are going to base the study on SLOCs due to there are. y. Nat. er. io. sit. closely linked to Chinese oil imports, which are extremely important as China cannot cover all its demand by itself, it needs to transport this resource mainly using the. al. n. iv n C SLOCs, and because China needs h it to i Upart of its economy, but mainly emove n g cnothonly most of its military vehicles. Moreover, SLOCs is a key factor for Chinese development because is the basic mean of transportation for Chinese trade, and thus, making it a very important part of Chinese Grow Domestic Product (GDP).. We only focus on SLOCs cooperation, but other issues like resources, and sovereignty, are also very important for the states in the region. However, due to space constrains, 31.

(32) this study will not research about cooperation on resources search and extraction, or cooperation to overcome the sovereignty issue in SCS.. 2.2 Game Theory and Realism: absolute gains, relative gains, and the zero-sum game issue This part introduces the basic concepts of game theory from a realist perspective,. 治政大are the interpretation realists defining them, explaining when they are used, and which 立. sit. y. Nat. 2.2.1 Absolute Gains, Relative Gains, and Zero-Sum Game. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. do from them as well as the considerations about their utility.. n. al. er. io. In this research we use game theory to create an ideal situation in which the payoffs of. i n U. v. cooperation will be the best outcome for all the stakeholders taking part in the case. Ch. engchi. study. Depending on the theory we chose to apply into a case study, it will provide different probabilities of cooperation between the stakeholders taking part in the situation. We consider this is because theories have different conceptions of cooperation, its viability, and its real utility, and thus, depending on the theory used, our ideal scenario can provide more or less maneuver for cooperation. However, if we want to create a specific theoretical situation, we should create one that reflects 32.

(33) properly the issue in question, in our case this implies choosing a game theory model that fits to SLOCs cooperation, as well as choosing those factors that can broad or shrink the gap between the theoretical framework and the reality. In the present situation we consider that one of the main factors that can influence cooperation in SCS is Chinese military development, and thus, our theoretical model based on game theory also borrows from realism some interpretations of concepts presented in both theories.. 政治大. 立. ‧ 國. 學. In game theory, as in many other theories, cooperation is also possible under certain conditions. However, it will be limited by the types of gains an actor can obtain in that. ‧. sit. y. Nat. situation: relative gains or absolute gains. Relative gains imply that one actor’s. n. al. er. io. payoffs represent the losses for the other, and, on the contrary, absolute gains imply. i n U. v. that one actor’s payoffs are independent of the other actor’s payoffs. This shape the. Ch. engchi. rules and determine if the game they are playing is a zero-sum game, when the player´s gains are relative, or a non-zero sum game, when the player´s gains are absolute (Viotti & Kauppi, 2010).. 2.2.2 What Realism Thinks About Cooperation? The importance of realism in our case study is derived from its connection with game 33.

(34) theory as well as it power to describe and explain why China and other Asian countries are increasing their military capabilities in the region. As we consider Chinese military development an important factor that can influence interactions in the SCS issue, thus we include realism interpretations about cooperation, absolute gains, and relative gains in this section.. According to realism, cooperation it is possible whether the actors are motivated with. 治政大focusing on maximizing one absolute gains or relative gains. Absolute gains imply 立 ‧ 國. 學. state’s profits. Relative gains, on the other hand, means that they not only are interested in their own gains, but also how good their profits are compared to other. ‧. sit. y. Nat. cooperating states. However, due to states are concerned with the balance of power,. n. al. er. io. they are mainly motivated by relative gains, which makes cooperation more difficult.. i n U. v. Besides relative gains, the other factor that makes difficult cooperation is the concern. Ch. engchi. about cheating, which can make the cheating state getting relative advantage from the agreement. When deals reflect the distribution of power, and decrease concerns about cheating, then cooperation is possible to a certain extend (Mearsheimer, 1994, p.12-13).. As a consequence, cooperation will be easier if the stakeholders are mainly concerned 34.

(35) with absolute gains and no with relative gains. Moreover, in order to maintain the agreement and avoid cheating, it should include some assurances for it monitoring, implementation, and compliance.. 2.2.3 Rational Choice & Game Theory This research uses game theory from the realism’s standpoint, due to game theory is based on actors’ rational choices. Realism make a similar assumption, it considers. 治政 states are instrumentally rational, which means they try大 to maximize their possibilities 立 ‧. ‧ 國. 學. of survival (Mearsheimer, 1994).. sit. y. Nat. In this study we will use simple game theory to show how protection of SLOCs can. n. al. er. io. be seen as a non-zero sum game that will facilitate the prospect for cooperation inside. i n U. v. a theoretical framework, to finally compare it with the present situation in order to. Ch. engchi. identify those factors that influence positively or negatively cooperation in SCS. We consider that to improve the situation in SCS, it is necessary to start with cooperation on Sea Lines of Communication, as they can be considered as a common that can be shared by all the stakeholders in form of absolute gains, and thus, leading their interactions to a non-zero sum game situation in which cooperation is easier to achieve than in zero-sum game ones. 35.

(36) Rational Choice can be defined has the optimum strategy for one actor to a given competitive situation. Game theory is the process through one actor decides his optimum strategy, normally, under conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information. Each actor has to rank order preferences, estimate probabilities, and try to find out what the other actor is going to do (Viotti, & Kauppi, 2010).. 2.2.3.1 Game Theory Concepts. 立. 3. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. This section introduces the basic game theory concepts that are applied during the case study in SCS.. ‧ sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. The Rules of the game. i n U. v. When we talk about games in this theory, we refer to those simplified representations. Ch. engchi. of strategic situations that can be found in different fields of human life (business, politics, diplomacy, military, etc.). These games have basic common characteristics:. - The list of the players. 3. Unless otherwise specified, based on: Dixit, Avinash K. & Susan Skeath. Games of Strategy.. New York: Norton, 1999. 36.

(37) - The strategies available for each player’s actions - The payoffs from all the possible combinations of strategies - All players are considered rational maximizers.. They can be represented, for instance, in a game table like the famous prisoner’s dilemma game (Table 1). In the case of this game, two suspects for committing a crime that are in different cells are told separately (without knowing the other’s. 治政大be freed but his partner will decision) that if one confesses who did the crime, he will 立 ‧ 國. 學. expend four years in prison. Otherwise, if both confess they will expend three years in prison, and finally, if both stay quiet they will expend only one year in prison. ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. (Osborne, 2009, p.14-15).. Quiet. Ch. i n Quiet e n2 g c h i U 0. Suspect 1. 2 Fink. v. Suspect 2. 3. Fink 3. 1 0. 1. Table 1. Prisoners' dilemma Game. Payoffs in level of preference.. List of players: suspect 1, suspect 2 Strategies available: quiet, fink Payoffs: 0, 1, 2, 3 (level of preference: 0 is the worse outcome, 3 is the best one) Players are rational maximizer: want to expend the less time possible in prison.. 37.

(38) Types of game according to player’s movement order There are two types of games according to the order of strategic movements: sequential and simultaneous games.. In sequential games, there is an order of play in which players take turns to move, and each knows the movements made by the previous player. These games are usually represented in games trees (see Figure 1), which is also called the extensive form of a game.. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. China. n. al. altruistic. 1, 3. selfish. 3, 1. 2, 2. Figure 1. Game in tree form. Ch. engchi. y. selfish. sit. io. 4, 4. Disputants. er. Nat. Disputants altruistic. ‧. selfish. altruistic. i n U. v. In simultaneous games, players must move without knowing what the other players have chosen to do and cannot change its action. These games are represented in a game table (see the previous prisoners’ dilemma example, Table 1), which is the strategic form of a game.. 38.

(39) Types of equilibrium Equilibrium means that each player is using a strategy that is the best response to other players’ strategies. Depending on if the game is sequential or simultaneous, the equilibrium can be found by:. -. Rollback Equilibrium: occurs in games with sequential movements. It is reached using the rollback methodology, which implies to think what happen in the. 治政大the branches, decision node terminal nodes of the game tree, and go back through 立 ‧ 國. 學. by decision node until reaching the initial node, reasoning which combination of players’ strategies leads to the equilibrium.. ‧ sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. Nash Equilibrium: occurs in games with simultaneous movements. In these kind. io. -. i n U. v. of games we cannot use rollback, thus we have to find a configuration of. Ch. engchi. strategies that makes each player’s strategy it best choice when other players also use their equilibrium strategy. It can be identified using different ways: with dominant strategies, eliminating dominated strategies, minimax strategy, or cell by cell inspection.. 39.

(40) Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Games The terminology in game theory can cause some confusion due to the concept of cooperative is not equal to cooperation. Avinash and Skeath (1999), define cooperative games as follow:. -. Cooperative games: are those games in which the enforcement of a joint agreement is possible, perhaps because it is enforced with all the members at the. 治政大 by a third party that can moment of the sign, or because the players are monitored 立 ‧ 國. ‧. Non-Cooperative games: are those games in which the enforcement is not. sit. y. Nat. -. 學. enforce the agreement.. n. al. er. io. possible, and thus individuals can act in their own interests.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Although their names make to think the opposite, even the non-cooperative type allow for cooperation in the case of repeated interactions between the players, and if it is on each player own interests to take the cooperative action during the indefinite numbers of interactions (see: the Shadow of the Future).. 40.

(41) The Shadow of the Future This idea for initiate cooperation in non-cooperative games like prisoner’s dilemma is part of the concept the Shadow of the Future, an expression which means that next encounter between the same two players must be important enough to make the unwillingness to cooperate unprofitable. This happens when players do not know how more times are they going to interact, thus, when the shadow of the future is long enough to hide the remaining number of interactions, the payoff for cooperation are. 治政 bigger than for noncooperation (Axelrod, 1984, p.174).大立 ‧ 國. 學. Collective Action Games. ‧. sit. y. Nat. These kind of games are those in which the aim of the collective (society, group of. n. al. er. io. countries, group of players, etc.), are best achieved if they take an specific action or. i n U. v. actions, even when these actions are not in the best personal interests of those players.. Ch. engchi. This implies that the collective optimal outcome is not the Nash equilibrium of the game, and thus, the game will not automatically end in this optimal situation. In order to achieve this ideal situation, we need to understand the essence of the game, the players’ system values (that they are rational do not imply that always have the same values), and how can we modify it to obtain the optimal outcome for the collective group. 41.

(42) Some characteristic of collective actions games are the followings: -. Non-excludable: a player who has not contributed to the support of an specific plan of action (e.g. establishing a. common vigilance patrol in a neighbors. community, establishing join security patrols in SCS, etc.), cannot be prevented from getting the benefits.. the. benefit. (e.g.. the. patrols. provide. security to. 學. obtaining. ‧ 國. -. 治政 Non-rival: a player’s benefits are not diminishing 大 because others players are also 立 all. the. community/region).. ‧ sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. Pure public good: refer to those goods that possess non-excludable and non-rival. io. -. characteristics (e.g. a public park in the city).. -. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Pure private good: refer to those goods in which non-players can be excluded from their benefits. Moreover, if one actor obtains the benefit, no other actor can enjoy them (e.g. a cold pill). Normally, goods are in between the excludable/non-excludable and rival/non-rival spectrum.. 42.

(43) The Importance of a Focal Point This refers to an outcome in which all players understand that, among all the possible equilibria of the game, the focal point is the obvious to choose. All players’ expectations must converge to that point, which means that all actors consider that equilibrium as the one which provide them with better payoffs. This easily happens in assurance games, where one of the equilibria have higher payoff for both of the players. However, in some occasions there is other equilibrium which worse payoffs. 治政大 for all the participants for the players but less risky due to it is the best response 立 ‧ 國. 學. independently what other players’ strategies are (see for instance table 2. US and U.S.S.R. arm race). In other cases can be difficult make players to converge their. ‧. sit. y. Nat. expectations on the same focal point, mainly because is more a matter of player’s. n. al. er. io. backgrounds, history, culture, norms of behavior between groups, etc., than a question. i n U. v. of mathematics (Dixit & Skeath, 1999). Therefore, in some occasions it is necessary. Ch. engchi. to make strategic moves in order to modify the rules of the game, leading the opponent to make decisions that favors our preferred outcome (e.g. the focal point).. Strategic moves Sometimes, a player may try to shape the game is playing to compel or deter other player to take a specific action in the moment he has to choose his strategy during a 43.

(44) sequential game. Those devices used to manipulate the rules of the game are called strategic moves. They highly depend on the order of moves in which, in the case of the player with the initiative (the one who move first), the action must be observable to the other player, and must be irreversible, that is, cannot be changed it in a later point of the game.. Strategic moves modify the rules of the original game to create a new game with two. 治政 stages. In the first stage the player indicate how he大 will act (which strategy he is 立 ‧ 國. 學. going to use) during the second stage. The second stage is the original game, normally with some modification of the payoffs and the order of moves.. ‧ sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. During the first stage a player can make three different strategic moves: commitments, threats, and promises:. -. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Commitments refer to a declaration made by a player A indicating that its future movement in stage two is unconditional. For instance, player A can say “I will do X in the game we are playing”, and during the second stage he will do X independently of player B’s strategy.. 44.

(45) In the cases of threats and promises, they belong to the category of response rules, statements made by one player that indicate his future response to other player’s specific actions during stage two.. -. Threats are response rules that try to deter the other player to choose a specific strategy. Player A can say “If you choose X that annoys me, I will do Y (e.g. I will hurt you)”.. 政治大. 立. Promises are response rules that try to compel the other player to choose a. ‧ 國. 學. -. specific strategy. Player A can say “If you do Z that pleases me, I will do W (e.g. I. ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. will reward you)”.. i n U. v. These strategic moves only work if the other player believes that the first player will. Ch. engchi. do what he announced at the first stage, which makes credibility an important factor for the effectiveness of the strategic movement, and thus, has to be taken into account.. Types of collective action games These games appear in three different types: prisoners’ dilemma, chicken games, and assurance games. In this research we focus only in assurances games as we consider 45.

(46) is the one who better describe the theoretical framework for SLOCs cooperation in SCS, as we will explain in the case study section.. -. Assurance Games. Assurance games are those that have two or more possible equilibria in a single game. It may involve no conflict in payoffs among the players participating in the game, and thus all the players will prefer the same equilibrium.. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. A clear example is the US and U.S.S.R arms races during the Cold War (Table 2), in which both superpowers had two strategies, to cooperate to avoid weapons build up. ‧. sit. y. Nat. or to defect. Both countries are interested in deprived the other actor from defect, and. n. al. er. io. may sacrifice defection ability if others do the same. Thus the table for this game will be as follow (Jervis, 1978) 4:. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. U.S.S.R Cooperate Cooperate. Defect. 4. US. 1 4. Defect. 3. 3 2. 1. 2. Table 2. Arms Race Game. 4. Table modified from the original to show payoffs instead of order of the actors’ preferences. 46.

(47) As. an. assurance. game,. it. presents. more. than. one. Nash. equilibrium,. cooperate/cooperate and defect/defect, among which both players will prefer the situation in which both countries cooperate, which provides the biggest payoff. The problem is that the defect strategy is less risky if they are not sure about the other player’s intentions, and thus the defect/defect equilibrium is the probable outcome of the game if other measures are not taken (e.g. confidence building measures, monitoring, verification, etc.). We will talk again about this when applying assurance. 治政 games (in form of stag-hunt game) to our case study in大 the next chapter. 立 ‧ 國. 學. This model also reflects the classical model of the stag-hunt, which uses the same. ‧. sit. y. Nat. table, strategies (cooperate or defect), and payoffs. As we consider that the situation of. n. al. er. io. SLOCs cooperation in SCS can be better described using the context from the. i n U. v. stag-hunt game, therefore, during the case study we will use this game to explain the. Ch. engchi. similarities and differences between it and the real situation in the region. The reasons for choosing this game will be explained in the following section.. 2.3 Previous Researches on Game Theory and Stag-Hunt Much of the literature about game theory is based on theoretical situations or 47.

(48) laboratory experiments that present, describe, and analyze models to predict the probable strategies used by the players. Although exist real applications of game theory to real problems, they do not exactly fit the situation we present in this study: to achieve cooperation on securing sea lines of communication. In spite of this, previous findings can facilitate our research by shedding light over the way to apply the stag-hunt model on the SCS dispute.. 政治大. Albers and Busby (2010), present a similar situation to the one that we analyze in our. 立. proposal of securing sea lines of communication, that is how to provide security from. ‧ 國. 學. wildfires to a common, a public landscape (in our case this resembles to securing the. ‧. SLOCs), which has some private urban interference (in our case this resembles to. sit. y. Nat. io. n. al. er. different stakeholders’ vessels using the sea lines), and at the same time avoiding the. v. private stakeholder to become a free rider (in our case this is represented by those. Ch. engchi. i n U. countries who do not contribute to SLOCs protection). They show how public resources focus on those zones with mixed ownership, which causes high cost for society, while private ownerships avoid the payment of securing their own territory. Contrary to these authors’ situation, our case study does not have a superior authority to manage and compel all the stakeholders to protect the SLOCs, making the problem of avoiding free riders more difficult to overcome.. 48.

(49) The number of actors willing to initiate cooperation from the beginning is also an important factor. Becker and Easter (1999), use game theory to evaluate the possibility of cooperation for managing international water resources like the Great Lakes. They found that even when the non-cooperative solution is the dominant strategy; when coalitions are formed from a subset of participants cooperation is easier, and even the remaining players realize that is better for their own interest to cooperate.. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. On the other hand, in order to achieve cooperation for a common good, some studies. ‧. sit. y. Nat. show that the trust each actor has on others is an essential factor. Bosworth (2013). n. al. er. io. argues that the more trusting people can facilitate the provision of more public goods,. i n U. v. demonstrating this in experimental situations similar to the stag-hunt game, in which. Ch. engchi. players with high trust on others tend to contribute more to achieve general interests.. Moreover, in relation to assurance games, Borstein (2013) experimentally supports the idea that the temptation to defect for fear to other player’s strategy, is countered by both players’ preferences for obtaining better payoffs in the mutual cooperation situation, which is easier to reach when communication between disputant groups is 49.

(50) allowed.. Finally, according to Madani (2010), although our research is focused on the stag-hunt model, it is also important to take into account the evolution of the situation through different periods of time, due to its characteristics and structure can change, making that the theoretical model that better fits to the reality can be changing among stag-hunt, prisoners’ dilemma, chicken game, or others, something that eventually will be also reflected in. 治政 the stakeholder’s behaviors, 大 and 立. thus, changing player’s. ‧. ‧ 國. outcomes.. 學. preferences for the different strategies, which eventually will lead to different. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. In sum, previous uses of game theory, and specifically the stag hunt-model, highlight. i n U. v. the relevance of the number of actors initiating cooperation to cause a positive. Ch. engchi. spillover effect on others, give importance to trust between participants to facilitate coordination and thus boost the provision of a public good, support that communication facilitates all players to obtain better outcomes in assurance games, and advice to pay attention to the evolution of the situation, due to it can fit better to other theoretical models in different periods of time.. 50.

(51) These previous findings in the game theory literature are taken into account during this research in chapter 4 in order to create the theoretical framework that shapes the rules of the game for SLOCs cooperation in SCS. The stag-hunt model is the one we consider at present best fits to the SLOCs security cooperation, due to its cooperative strategy can provide more safety for the SLOCs than individual actions from each player, this mean that it allows to expand the pie, increasing the payoffs of all stakeholders, something that cannot be easily done with the resources and sovereignty. 治政 issues, which respond better to prisoners’ dilemma大 or chicken games in which 立 ‧. ‧ 國. 學. cooperation is more difficult to attain.. sit. y. Nat. io. er. 2.4 Research Limitations. In order to estimate the possibility of China cooperating with other SCS countries on. al. n. iv n C U a realist standpoint to analyze SLOCs protection, we have chosenhrational e n gchoice c h ifrom. and give an answer to this question. When choosing one specific theory, we are better in analyzing some aspects of the issue, but at the same time we put limits in others not considered or that are less important for the chosen theory.. It is not possible to use all the known theories and apply them into a case study to make an accurate prediction of what is going to happen in the future. If you consider 51.

(52) all the known theories at the same time to try to encompass everything, eventually, you are saying nothing. Thus, in order to have a concise and clear picture of the situation, we have to establish our preferences, be specific, and concentrate our research on one theory (in this study the game theory), as well as determining those factors that can influence the rational decision of the stakeholders involved in the dispute.. 治政大 of the SLOCs cooperation We applied the stag-hunt model to provide a simplification 立 ‧ 國. 學. initiative in reality, thus, it does not reflect completely the real situation. Moreover, it is important to take into account the evolution of the SLOCs situation and countries’. ‧. sit. y. Nat. relationships in the SCS, due to they can change its characteristics and structure over. n. al. er. io. time making that other theoretical models will fit better. In fact, for different kind of. i n U. v. issues, like those involved with relative gains (e.g. resources and sovereignty), other. Ch. engchi. games will be more adequate as they provide different case descriptions, different actors’ strategies, and different payoffs, which respond better to nature of those situations, and thus explain the possibility of cooperation in a more proper way.. In our initiative for SLOCs security cooperation, several countries with different military, economic, and institutional characteristics are involved, therefore all of them 52.

(53) cannot make equal contributions to improve maritime security. This point can cause difficulties when initiating the project due to some countries will have to provide more resources than others, and the gains in maritime security are supposed to be similar for all the participants because all of them can freely use the more secured SLOCs. However, the real gains on safety will be proportional to the number of vessels each country use in maritime trade and energy imports, and thus those countries with economies based on trade and energy imports by sea (e.g. China, Japan,. 治政 Singapore, etc.) will obtain more benefits, which 大 will decrease concerns about 立 ‧. ‧ 國. kept.. 學. distributions of relative gains due to the balance before and after the initiative will be. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. Other research limitation is the actor we use to promote SLOCs security cooperation. i n U. v. in SCS. We use Taiwan for different reasons, but the main is it has not been as. Ch. engchi. assertive and aggressive in its claims as other actors in the region, and thus can be seen as a more trustful stakeholder than others. However, it is not officially recognized by other states, is not so military-economically powerful as China or US, and the sovereignty issue with China can difficult its participation in initiatives with other countries in the region, thus, its contribution to the issue may be not so determinant as those of other countries. 53.

(54) One possibility to solve the previous problem is to use Japan as initiator of the cooperation, due to it will be a more powerful actor that can facilitate the implementation of the initiative, or US, who also have interests in the region, and as superpower can foster military, economical, or institutional cooperation. The problem is that, in the present situation, Japan is involved in sovereignty disputes with China in the East China Sea, US is not welcome by China due to its alliances with Japan and. 治政大states. Thus, at present will the Philippines, and because both countries are not SCS 立 ‧ 國. 學. be more difficult for China to accept these countries as promoters of initiatives in the SCS region, but in the middle-long term, if Chinese relationships with these two. ‧. y. sit. n. al. er. io. Japan.. Nat. countries improve, it will be possible to implement joint initiatives from US and. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Concerning the factors this study focus on to try to understand Chinese behavior in the region, we mainly consider the oil factor, sovereignty, Chinese military development, previous joint maritime patrols, non-traditional security cooperation, and the Code of Conduct (COC) for SCS. In our case we do not focus on economic relations between China and other ASEAN countries, nor in individual actors’ values and believes as for instance presidents of the countries involved in the disputes. We 54.

(55) believe that they are important, however in order to produce a research with specific answers, and to delimitate the scope of the research, we must focus on those factors that, after have done the literature review, we consider are the most determinant for the SCS issue.. In spite of this, it is not sure that all these factors applied in one theory, can describe, explain, and predict future developments in the issue. Therefore, in order to overcome. 治政 this handicap, it is necessary to reproduce the research大 using different theories and/or 立 ‧ 國. 學. factors to test if the results are the same or are different as those in our study. Moreover, it is also important to determine in which one we obtain results that fit. ‧. sit. y. Nat. better to the reality, or that provide with better tools to describe and predict the future. n. al. er. io. development of the situation, as well as to overcome the gap between the theoretical. i n U. v. desired framework and the real situation in SCS. As the scope of this study does not. Ch. engchi. cover all these designs, they will be taken into account in future investigations on the same topic.. Lastly, there is a personal limitation related with the understanding and use of game theory. We are using simple models to explain behavior and rational choices, thus I am confident that, although at present I do not have a comprehensive understanding of 55.

(56) this theory, I am sure that with the help of my professors, the academic literature, and other educational material available on the Internet, I will be able to overcome it.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 56. i n U. v.

(57) Chapter 3. Background information This chapter presents and analyzes the issues that we consider highly influence general cooperation in the SCS region. These are: Sea Lanes of Communication and Non Traditional Security Threats, Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and Alternatives Routes, The String of Pearls and Military Development, Chinese Military Development and Consequences, China’s delaying strategy, China and the South China Sea, US-China Relationship; ASEAN, China, and the Code of Conduct, and China and Cooperation in SCS.. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 3.1 Sea Lanes of Communication & Non Traditional Security Threats. ‧. sit. y. Nat. In recent years China’s economy has experimented a huge growth with a double digit. n. al. er. io. GDP index growth almost every year, from 2004 to 2010 (World Bank, 2013a), an. i n U. v. economy powered by its international trade, reaching a maximum peak in 2006 with a. Ch. engchi. 65% of GDP, and 47% of GDP in 2012 (World Bank, 2013b), and highly dependent on energy resources and maritime transportation with oil imports by sea reaching 90% of the total (Zhang, Qiang & Ying, 2013). China’s concerns over a disruption of the SLOCs has made Chinese interest to focus their attention on secure the lines that allow its trade to flow, and its oil imports to reach the mainland (Ministry of National Defense, 2013). Any interruption of Chinese trade will have negative effects on its 57.

(58) economy, especially an interrupt on its oil imports, which makes many analysts suggest that China should protect the SLOCs from different possible threats. As a consequence, China is paying a lot of attention to many factors related to them with great emphasis on energy security, military development, and transnational crime fight. Some examples of this are China tackling piracy in the Gulf of Aden (2008; Kim, 2011), or increasing the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the South China Sea region (Muscolino, 2013; Horta, 2012).. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. There are different types of threats to the SLOCs (Cole, 2008), among them we find environmental destruction, terrorist threats, transnational crime and piracy,. ‧. sit. y. Nat. nation-state threats (and their connection with terrorist-piracy), and sovereignty. n. al. er. io. claims. Besides maritime terrorism and piracy, other Scholar (You, 2007) also. i n U. v. identifies political instabilities in oil producing regions as additional threat to SLOC,. Ch. engchi. as well as the United States factor affecting China’s SLOC security, especially in a probable war scenario between China and Taiwan (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2008; You, 2007, Kennedy, 2009), in which the US may try, if the economic repercussions do not dissuade US to attempt it, a blockade on Chinese oil imports in the Indian Ocean to limit the oil flow that moves Chinese military machinery.. 58.

(59) Among the threats that can be harmful to the SLOCs, political instability in oil producer countries, piracy, and blockades, are those that can have important repercussions on the economy, politics, and energy security of the country affected, in this case China. These three aspects are taken into consideration in this research as they are related with the diversified employment of China's Armed Forces to tackle non-traditional security (which includes humanitarian relief, useful to re-establish political stability after a conflict), combating transnational crime (e.g. piracy), and. 治政大 protection of SLOCs (Ministry of National Defense, 2013). 立 ‧ 國. 學. 3.1.1 Piracy is an increasing illegal activity in the Horn of Asia, the Malacca strait,. ‧. sit. y. Nat. and the South China Sea (SCS), causing a negative impact in the SLOCs, which. n. al. er. io. affects the trade and oil imports of different countries (Bateman, 2010). China is one. i n U. v. of the countries that can be highly damaged by an attack on its ships, as many of its. Ch. engchi. oil imports come from this region, and around 80% of these imports have to cross the Malacca Strait (HIS, 2013), a special risky point related to SLOCs security. In the last years, there are some regions like Somalia, Indonesia, and to same extend the South China Sea, where there was an increment on piracy activity (IMB, 2008-2012). China respond to piracy can be seen it is support to countries like Malaysia, sharing information and intelligence with littoral states in the straits (Woolley, 2010), as well 59.

(60) at its military participation in patrols to tackle piracy in the Gulf of Aden (Kim, 2011), which shows its concern to fight this kind of transnational crime in order to protect its trade and oil cargos.. Chinese respond to piracy One of the Chinese responds to Piracy is sending warships to the Gulf of Aden (Kim, 2011), to take part in the international patrols that are been carrying out in the region.. 治政 Moreover, China has been investing in building ports 大 and some military bases in the 立 ‧ 國. 學. Indian Ocean, what some analyst call the string of pearls, supposedly to provide replenishment to its warships and or for commercial interest (Kuhrana, 2008).. ‧. sit. y. Nat. However, during the last years, the number of piracy and arm robbery acts in. n. al. er. io. international voyages has been varying, reaching in 2013 the lowest level in the last. i n U. v. seven years (IMB, 2013). If we take into account the numbers of: piracy total. Ch. engchi. attacks/total hijackings/attacks to Chinese vessels/Chinese vessels hijacked registered in the world from 2008 to 2012 (Table 3), we see that Chinese vessels suffered an average of 3 attacks per year, which is very small compare with the 60,000 ships that cross the Malacca strait every year (EIA, 2012).. 60.

(61) Year. 2008. Total. 2009. 2010. 2011. 2012. Average. 293. 406. 249. 439. 297. 336.8. 49. 49. 115. 45. 28. 57.2. 5. 2. 4. 4. 0. 3. 1. 1. 0. 0. 0. 0.4. Registered attacks Total hijackings Attacks to Chinese ships Chinese ships hijacked Table 3. Total Piracy attacks/hijackings, and attacks/hijackings to Chinese ships from 2008-2009 (IMB, 2008-2012).. 政治大. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Before Chinese participation in the international operation to tackle piracy in the Gulf. ‧. of Aden, the numbers of attacks to Chinese ships from 2003 to 2007 were: 2003, 2;. sit. y. Nat. 2004, 2; 2005, 1; 2006, 1; 2007, 2 (IMB, 2007), with an average of 1.6 attacks to. er. io. Chinese ships per year, less than the average after Chinese warships started to take. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. part in the international counter-piracy mission, which means that China’s. engchi. participation has not decrease the number of attacks to its ships in general (Table 4).. Year. 2003. 2004. 2005. 2006. 2007. Average. 2008. 2009. 2010. 2011. 2012. Average. Total. 445. 329. 276. 239. 263. 310.4. 293. 406. 249. 439. 297. 336.8. 2. 2. 1. 1. 2. 1.6. 5. 2. 4. 4. 0. 3. Registered attacks Attacks to Chinese ships Table 4. Piracy attacks to Chinese ships by year. In 2008 China starts its participation in international anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden (IMB, 2003-2012).. 61.

(62) Moreover, according to some studies (Erickson; Collins, 2008) China needs an average of two very large crude carriers (VLCC) to cover its energy imports. Even if the 3 attacks per year become hijackings to Chinese oil tankers, it only suppose a total loss of 1.5 days of oil imports, something that can easily be covered with the Chinese strategic petroleum reserves, which in 2009 was 103 million barrels (approximately equal to 10 days of oil reserves), and by the end of 2013 will contain 315 million. 治政大 daily consumption (IEA, barrels, which can cover more than 30 days of its present 立 ‧ 國. 學. 2012). Therefore, although international presence in these regions is necessary to avoid the growth of piracy activity, Chinese increase of military capabilities and. ‧. sit. y. Nat. ports/bases cannot be justified with the argument of protecting its own ships. In fact,. n. al. er. io. present Chinese cooperation in the international operations to tackle piracy can be. i n U. v. enough as long as the different countries keep participating, and the attacked ships. Ch. engchi. follow the Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy recommended by the International Maritime Bureau, which are useful to make pirates to abort their attack when they know they have been spotted or the attacked ship has been secured (IMB, 2011).. 62.

海上長城的重構或破壞？：中國崛起與南海海上交通線之政策 (2000-2014) - 政大學術集成

海上長城的重構或破壞？：中國崛起與南海海上交通線之政策　(2000-2014) - 政大學術集成