Chapter 3. Background information
3.4 Chinese Military Development and Consequences
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development of a submarine base in the Maldives is not clear, but there are evidences
that China has been trying to increase its presence in the zone through cooperation
with it government. Although China will not necessarily deploy military vessels in
these ports, some of them have the potential for China’s military use or could be
upgrade later (Kuhrana, 2008). Other authors consider that China is not really
developing ports to project its military presence in the Indian Ocean, at least for the
time being, and it is only for keep good relationships with these countries in order to
assure essential supplies to Chinese ships fighting non-traditional security in the Gulf
of Aden. According to this author other ports in the Indian Ocean with this function of
replenishment or transit point are: Colombo in Sri Lanka, Changi naval base in
Singapore, Karachi port and naval base in Pakistan, Aden port in Yemen, Djibouti in
the Gulf of Aden, and Salalah port in Oman. Although Chinese ships visit them for
replenishment, there are no clear indications that will be used as permanent military
ports for China (Kostecka, 2011).
3.4 Chinese Military Development and Consequences
During the last 20 years China’s annual GDP growth has been high, varying from
14% in 1993 and 7.8% in 2012. However, despite these fluctuations Chinese Military
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investment has been constant from 1993 to 2012, with a 2% of GDP expenditure per
year (World Bank, 2013c). Although it seems that China is not increasing its
investment in military capabilities, other sources consider that it has raised its military
budget. Contrary to official figures that say China’s military expenditure in 2010 was
$78 billion, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates it
was $119 billion. It also argues that Chinese military spending has risen 189% from
2001 to 2010, with an annual average increase of 12.5% (Perlo, Cooper & Ismail,
2012, p.159), a military development that, even when it was declared to be peaceful,
is creating suspicions about China’s real intentions in the region. Recent events, like
the US and Chinese warships that almost collided in the South China Sea (SCS)
region (Tow, 2014), the creation of a strict Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
overlapping with the Japanese one (NYT, 2013), or the implementation of the fishery
legislation in Hainan prefecture covering most of the SCS (Hsu & Murray, 2014),
make think that Chinese assertiveness in the region is growing, and will be higher
when its military capabilities were projected along the region.
One of the arguments to develop its army is the necessity of protecting Chinese
maritime interest, which include protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)
(Ministry of National Defense, 2013) due to they are considered essential for Chinese
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economy and energy security.
In fact, in recent years, China has experienced a modernization of its military forces
(Cordesman & Kleiber, 2007), which reflects this possible growth of its military
budget. For instance, it has increased the number of its 4th generation aircrafts (e.g.
Su 27, Su-30, J-10, J-11A/B) reaching 569 units (Shlapak, 2012), and also has built
5th generation aircrafts like the J-20 or the newest J-31 (Global Security, 2012a, b). In
relation to its naval forces, although some of its vessels are not new, China possess a
numerous fleet with more than 13 destroyers, including the new type 052D Aegis
destroyers (The Military Balance, 2012; Le Mière, 2014), 65 frigates, and submarines
that recently increased to 71, and among them are new acquisitions of Russian Kilo
class submarines, domestic developed new models as the nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN) Jin-class or Type 094, the nuclear powered attack
submarine (SSN) Shang-class or Type 093, and two new non-nuclear powered
submarines (SS), Yuan-class or Type 041 and Song-class or Type 039/039G (this last
one quieter than other diesel submarines) (O’Rourke, 2011). Moreover, China also
commissioned its first aircraft carrier Liaoning on 25th September 2012 (People’s
Daily, 2012b; Lanteigne, 2013), it was rebuilt from an old Soviet vessel the Varyag. It
is expected this is only the first of future ones, as some analysts consider that China
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will have to develop more advanced units in the long term to protect its maritime
security and development (Buszynski, 2012).
This increase on Chinese military capabilities seems to have created a response in
some South East Asian nations as Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines, which have acquired new military capabilities. However, some scholars
argue that it seems to be related more with the modernization of their armies, and the
keeping of the status quo in the region, rather than representing an arms race. Instead,
some authors consider that it can be defined as an arm dynamics (Bitzinger, 2010),
which hardly will match Chinese growing military capabilities (Sheldon, 2012).
Moreover, other scholars consider that the People’s Liberation Army development is
not aimed to become a hegemon in the region, but to protect some core interest from
inside the mainland to overseas (Fravel, 2008). The development of its army has five
strategic goals:
1- Regime security: maintaining Chinese Communist Party (CCP
monopoly)
2- Territorial integrity: protection from external threats
3- National unification: the Taiwan issue
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4- Maritime security: protecting sovereignty, maritime resources, SLOCs
5- Regional stability: avoiding/deterring peripheral armed conflict that can
damage China’s development
China pretends to achieve these goals by strengthening three general capabilities:
1- Internal control: main role of the People’s Armed policy.
2- Aria Denial: creating a buffer around its continental and maritime
periphery.
3- Limited regional force projection: projecting forces and sustaining
military forces beyond its borders.
The increase of Chinese military expenditure, together with the development of aerial
denial capabilities, and limited regional force projection, even when not necessarily
true, can be seen as China’s intentions to domain the region, and therefore
intensifying the security dilemma, which creates spirals of tensions that eventually
can drive into armed conflict. In fact, according to some studies Asian region is in an
emerging arms race, due to it has increased 61% its military expenditure from 2002 to
2011, has expanded and modernized its military capabilities, and possess a mix of
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internal and external technological factors that is creating three blocks, US allies, US
adversaries, and a neutral bloc with industrial age armed forces, which makes think
that a repetition of Europe during 19th - 20th century, its arms races and world wars, is
a real possibility in Asia (Tan, 2013, p.210).
The development of the String of Pearls together with the increase of Chinese military
capabilities, seem to respond to Chinese core interests like regime security, territorial
integrity, and regional stability. However, some of these core interest, national
unification and maritime security, can create doubts about China’s military
development real intentions, emphasizing the security dilemma, and triggering an arm
race to counterbalance its growth, which eventually can fuel territorial disputes in the
region (e.g. SCS), decreasing the probability of cooperation, and leading the situation
to an undesirable arms conflict.
3.4.1 Consequences
Despite the aforementioned arguments about the difficulties of blockading Chinese oil
imports, the stakeholders’ aim to peacefully resolve the disputes, and the steps to
develop a COC for SCS region, it seems that China is still following its initial plan for
development and is increasing its military investment (Perlo, Cooper & Ismail, 2012).
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Moreover, it has also decided to build more oil tankers to not depend on foreign
transporter companies. This will allow China to flag the ships with Chinese nationality,
and therefore to respond military to a blockade on its tankers, due to Beijing can
consider it as an interference to its sovereignty and national security (Erickson &
Collins, 2008). The development of the tanker fleet could be used as an excuse to
increase its military capabilities to protect them, which eventually can also be used
with other intentions, as for instance being more assertive in its territorial claims in
the Asia Pacific region. As a consequence, any attempt to engage China in energy
cooperation in regions like SCS, or negotiate with it about sovereignty issues, will be
less successful as China will has more bargaining power. Moreover, the string of
pearls strategy could be used to give support to the increased Chinese army, providing
China with more options for military projection, and facilitating it to become a
regional hegemon. However, other Asia Pacific states like India, Japan, ASEAN
countries, or United States will not be observing Chinese military development
without reacting to it. The possibility of triggering an arms race to counterbalance
Chinese military development will be high, and therefore tensions will rise making
Asia Pacific a more instable region.
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