Sense Sensitivity and Sophistication in Shaping the Future of Cross-Strait Relations
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(2) .,r. ISSUES & STUDIES wefind that the respondents' positions on loosening or tightening cross Strait trade are largely determined by sensitivity aspects rather than sense and sophistication dimensions. This finding agrees with the idea of neo-functionalism, that politics maintains .firm control over economic transactions. which presumably weakens the autonomy ofpolitics. KEYWORDS: cross-Strait relations; cross-Strait exchanges; symbolic poli tics; trade policy; political sophistication.. * * * The current phase of cross-Strait relations is fundamentally one of "political confrontation with economic integration." I Because contemporary domestic public opinion in Taiwan is entrenched2 and the external environment is dominated by trilateral relations among the island, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the United States,3 most signs point to continued stability. Regardless of whether the Blue or Green camp is in power, the current political confrontation across the Taiwan Strait seems likely to continue for a long time. 4 Hence any changes. I. IWU Yu-Shan, Kangheng huo hucong: liang'an guanxi xin quan (Balancing or bandwagon ing: cross-Strait relations revisited) (Taipei: Cheng Chung, 1997), 159. See also Wen-hui Tsai, "Convergence and Divergence between Mainland China and Taiwan: The Future of Unification," Issues & Studies 27, no. 12 (December 1991): 1-28; and Ralph N. Clough, "Growing Cross-Strait Cooperation despite Political Impasse," in Breaking the China Taiwan Impasse, ed. Ronald S. Zagoria (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), 115-25. 2Chen Yih-yan and Chen Lu-huei, "Moleng Iiangke de taidu haishi buqueding de weilai: Taiwan minzhong tongduguan de jiexi" (Ambiguous attitudes or an uncertain future: an analysis of Taiwanese views on unification versus inaependence), Zhongguo dalu yanjiu (Mainland China Studies) (Taipei) 46, no. 5 (2003): 1-20; and Szu-yin Ho and I-chou Liu, "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People in the 1990s," American Asian Re view 20, no. 2 (2002): 29-74. 3Wu, Kangheng huo hucong, 171-207; and Yu-Shan Wu, "From Romantic Triangle to Mar riage? Washington-Beijing-Taipei Relations in Historical Comparison," Issues & Studies 41, no. 1 (2005): 113-59. 4Taiwanese political parties are usually lumped into two "camps" based on their ideological stance toward mainland China. The Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT, ti!I ~ :t), the People First Party (PFP, ,fJI.~:t), and the New Party (NP, mr:t) generally favor greater interaction with the PRC and oppose Taiwan independence; they are frequently re ferred to collectively as the "pan-Blues" U~it). The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, ~i.jl!-tV:t) and the smaller Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU, 1; ~ 00 #.tJlll MI.) generally op pose greater interaction with the PRC and tend to favor eventual independence; together they are known as the "pan-Greens" (i~~). In addition to this usage, the terms "Blue" and. 24. December 2006. The Future o/Cross-Strait Relations. in relations between mainland China and Taiwan in the future are most likely to occur very gradually and as a result of economic integration. Conventional wisdom suggests that economic interaction should eventually reach a level where it begins to "spill over" into the political arena. 5 Deepening economic ties between the two sides, in this view, are likely to lead gradually toward political unification. 6 In preparing for this. "Green" are also regularly used to describe the political leanings of individual politicians, administrative regions, and media outlets, with the unification/independenee issue serving as the primary cleavage. 5For related discussions, see Wu, Kangheng huo hUcong, 69; Yu-Shan Wu, "Economic Reform, Cross-Straits Relations, and the Politics of Issue Linkage," in Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits, ed. Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang, and Samuel S.G. Wu (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 111-33; Cheng-Tian Kuo, "The Political Economy of Taiwan's Investment in China," ibid., 153-69; Yung Wei, "Maixiang minzu nei gong tongti: Taihai Iiang'an hudong moshi zhijiangou, fazhan yu jingyan" (Toward a common na tion: structural, developmental, and investigative modes of Taiwan's cross-Strait interac tion), Zhongguo dalu yarljiu 45, no. 5 (2002): I-55; Keng Shu and Lin Rui-hua, "Liang'an jingji zhenghe de zhengzhi yingxiang: Iiang'an zhenghe de fenxijiagou"(The political effect of cross-Strait economic integration: a framework for analysis of cross-Strait integration) (Paper presented at the Second Asia-Pacific Academic Conference, hosted by the Graduate Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Nanhua University, Chiayi, 2004); Tse-Kang Leng, "A Political Analysis ofTaiwan's Economic Dependence on Mainland China," Issues & Studies 34, no. 8 (August 1998):132-54; Christopher M. Dent, "Being Pulled into China's Orbit? Navigating Taiwan's Foreign Economic Policy," ibid. 37, no. 5 (September/October 2001): 1-34; Paul J. Bolt, "Economic Ties across the Taiwan Strait: Buying Time for Compromise," ibid., no. 2 (March/April 2001): 80-105; J.D. Kenneth Boutin, "Cross-Strait Trade and In vestment: Economic and Security Implications for the Republic of China," ibid. 33, no. 12 (December 1997): 70-93; Tse-Kang Leng, "Economic Interdependence and Political Inte gration between Taiwan and Mainland China: A Critical Review," Chinese Political Science Review 26 (1996): 27-43; Chen-yuan Tung, "Cross-Strait Economic Relations: China's Leverage and Taiwan's Vulnerability," issues & Studies 39, no. 3 (September 2003): 137-75; Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Guofu Tan, "Taiwanese Investment in Main land China as a Policy Tool," ibid. 28, no. 8 (August 1992): 14-31; and Yu-Shan Wu, "Ma inland China's Economic Policy toward Taiwan: Economic Needs or Unification Scheme?" ibid. 30, no. 9 (September 1994): 29-49. 6See, for example: Yung Wei, "From 'Multi-System Nations' to 'Linkage Communities': A New Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations," Issues & Studies 33, no. 10 (October 1997): 1-19; lean-Pierre Cabestan, "The Cross-Strait Relationship in the Post Cold War Era: Neither Reunification Nor 'Win-Win' Game," ibid. 31, no. I (January 1995): 27-50; and Yung Wei, "From Functional Integration to Structural Readjustment: Taipei Beijing Relations and the Role of the United States," Journal o/Contemporary China 13, no. 40 (August 2004): 427-60. For related discussions, see Steve Chan and Cal Clark, "The Mainland China-Taiwan Relationship: From Confrontation to Interdependenee?" in Cheng, Huang, and Wu, Inherited Rivalry, 47-62; Bolt, "Economic Ties across the Taiwan Strait," 80-105; Keng Shu, "'Lianzhui shequn': WTO beijing xia liang'an minjian hudong de fenxi gainian" (Knitting together social networks: a conceptual analysis of popular social inter action across the Taiwan Strait under the WTO), in Shimao zuzhi yu liang'an/azhan (The. December 2006. 25.
(3) ISSUES & STUDIES. The Future ofCross-Strait Relations. possibility, governments on both sides of the Strait will continue to take measures to forestall political change and to actively promote their own goals through policies such as those advocating "patience over haste" (A,~rn Xl.',jieji yongren) or "fiscal sacrifice" (:ffllJ!,5~;f'j, butie rangli).7 No matter what the current policy is, however, the expansion of economic ties between the two sides appears to be inevitable,8 raising the question: Does economic integration imply eventual political unification? Despite this question's importance, there is no convincing answer to this central issue in cross-Strait relations. Most of the current literature features analysis based on Western theories and makes unjustifiably bold 9 predictions. A few scholars have attempted to draw lessons from ex amples that appear similar to the current cross-Strait situation, but overall, this research is comparatively weak, and there is no consensus among ob servers about the future of cross-Strait relations. Our own view is that the key to making progress on this problem is to relax the assumption that the state is a unitary actor. Previous research has tended to use dyadic. World Trade Organization and cross-Strait development), ed. Hsu Kuang-tai and Fong Shiaw-Chian (Taipci: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 2003),457-87; Keng Shu, "Understanding the Impacts of Nonofiicial Contacts across the Taiwan Strait: Toward a New Analytical Framework" (Paper presented at the FPRI Asian Conference/32nd SinO-American Conference on Contemporary Chinese Affairs, Philadel phia, 2003); and Keng Shu and Lin Zongsheng, "Quanqiuhua beijingxia de Iiang'an guanxi yu Taishang jiaose" (Cross-Strait relations and the role of Taiwanese businessmen during globalization), Zhongguo datu yanjiu 48, no. I (2005): 1-28. tWu, Kangheng huo hucong, 119; Keng, "'Lianzhui shequn'," 477-79; and Keng Shu, "Jingmao jiaoliu de zhengzhi yingxiang: Zhonggong de dui-Tai xinzheng yu Taiwan de liang'an yanjiu" (Trade's political int1uence: the PRe's new Taiwan policy and Taiwan's cross-Strait research), Zhongguo datu yanjiu jiaoxue (Mainland China Research Instruc tion), no. 1(2005): 1-6. 8See John Q. Tian, Government, Business, and the Politics ofInterdependence and Conflict across the Taiwan Strait (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); and Charles Hsi-chun Kao, Li Cheng, and Lin Chu-chia, eds., Uang'an jingyan ershi nian: 1986 nian yilai liang 'an de jingmao hezuo yu fazhan (Twenty years of cross-Strait experience: cross-Strait trade and cooperation since 1986) (Taipei: Tianxia wenhua, 2006).. models to analyze cross-Strait relations 10 and as a consequence it inevitably neglects factors within or separate from "the state," such as trends in do mestic public opinion, the intcrnal policymaking process, or cross-border exchanges, Furthermore, this assumption leads cross-Strait research to focus on governmental policy and elite interaction, and "to focus only on contemporary, day-to-day dcvelopments instead of developing an interest and expertise in examining cross-Strait rclations in depth and over the long tenn." 11 As democratization and globalization sweep across the world, it is necessary to revisit old methods and assumptions. By providing a stronger theoretical foundation and by focusing on long-term trends on the two . sides, we hope ultimately to offer a more general account of cross-Strait relations. However one views the deepening and consolidation of Taiwan's democratic system, it is clear that "state" control and shaping of "society" has gradually become a thing of the past. 12 It appears that the "state" is no longer able to avoid relaxing its grip on cross-Strait exchanges; conse quently, relations between Taiwan and the mainland are no longer best thought of as those between sovereign, antagonistic powers. Fresh con sideration of this observation is critical to future dialogue about relations between the island and the mainland-research on cross-Strait issues needs to return to a practical focus on popular society. I.l As the two sides march into the era of globalization, as individual identifications with the "ancestral homeland" weaken, and as social links increase rapidly across. l<xeng and Lin, "Liang'anjingji zhenghe de zhengzhi yingxiang," 6-7. For its origin, see Tun-jen Cheng, "The Mainland China-Taiwan Dyad as a Research Program," in Cheng, Huang, and Wu, Inherited Rivalry, 1-22. IlWu, Kangheng huo hucong, 2.. 9Ramon H. Myers and Linda Chao, "Cross-Strait Economic Relations and Their Implica tions lor Taiwan," Issues & Studies 30, no. 12 (December 1994): 97-112; Cabestan, "The Cross-Strait Relationship," 27-50; Hsin-hsing Wu, "The Political Economy of ROC-PRC Relations," ibid. 31, no. I (January 1995): 51-62; Wei, "Maixiang minzu nei gongtongti," I-55; and Ramon H. Myers, Terry Cooke, and Tun-jen Cheng, "Cross-Strait Economic Ties: Agent of Change or a Trojan Horse?" Asia Program Special Report /18, no. 2 (2004): 1-18.. 12See Keng, '''Lianzhui shequn"'; and Keng, "Understanding the Impacts ofNonofTicial Con tacts." For further analyses, see Szu-yin Ho, "Walking the Tightrope: The ROe's Democ ratization, Diplomacy, and Mainland Policy," Lvsues & Studies 28, no. 3 (March 1992): 1-20; and Jie Chen, "The Int1uences of Democracy on Taiwan's Foreign Policy," ibid. 36, no. 4 (July/August 2000): 1-32. i3Chan and Clark, "The Mainland China-Taiwan Relationship"; Karen M. Sutter, "Business Dynamism across the Taiwan Strait," Asian Survey 42, no. 3 (2002): 522-40; and Steve Chan, "The Politics of Economic Exchange: Carrots and Sticks in Taiwan-China-U.S. Re lations," Issues & Studies 42, no. 2 (June 2006): 1-22.. 26. December 2006. December 2006. 27.
(4) .,.-.. ISSUES & STUDIES. The Future. the Strait, individuals and non-governmental organizations are likely to become more able to influence cross-Strait relations. 14 Taiwan has a choice between "balancing" (~jtA~, kangheng) and "bandwagoning" (,!~, hucong) in its approach to relations with the mainland. Next to the gap in levels of economic development between the island and the mainland and the degree of support for Taiwan from the United States,15 Taiwan's domestic "public attitudes" are likely in the future to be the most important variable influencing which of these policies is favored, however. Cross Strait interaction in the end will determine the future of cross-Strait rela tions, but governments' tightening or loosening of exchanges will still in fact be tied closely to public opinion-the authority of the Taiwan govern ment ultimately rests on its selection through regular, democratic elections, and in suggesting and determining government policies, leaders of demo cratic countries must always ultimately accede to the wishes expressed by public opinion. However, is the continued liberalization of cross-Strait trade and popular exchanges inevitable, and will it eventually build up to the point where it has unavoidable effects on domestic politics? Even if govern ment interaction across the Strait is limited, non-governmental exchanges continue to expand, regularly disturbing the status quo. These kinds of exchanges, especially trade, although undertaken by non-governmental actors, are subject to limits on their scope and method imposed by the two governments. Of course, Taiwan's most important policies governing cross-Strait relations are still decided with an eye toward public opinion. However, where do people in Taiwan stand on cross-Strait issues, and what factors affect their views? Academics have not examined these questions systematically enough. The purpose of this essay is to remedy this short. 14Shih Chih-yu, Liang'an guanxi gailun (An overview of cross-Strait relations) (Taipei: Yangzhi, 1998); Shih Chih-yu, "Liang'an guanxi zhong de tuwei yishi" (Breakthrough consciousness in cross-Strait relations), in Jiaguo zhi jian-kaizhan liang'an guanxi de nengdong jiyuan (Between home and country--opportunities for change in cross-Strait relations), ed. Shih Chih-yu (Taipei: Xin Taiwanren wenjiao jijinhui, 2003), 3-9; and Shih Chih-yu, "Liang'an guanxi zhong de bentu shijian" (The practice ofnativization in cross Strait relations), ibid., 341-60.. 15Wu, Kangheng huo hucong, 120. 28. I. December 2006. fir Cross-Strait Relations. coming. After asking, "How is Taiwan's mainland policy determined?" Wu Yu-Shan (~.L J..,) describes two basic factors-"power distribution" and "vote-maximization"-which he uses to discuss factors external and inter nal to Taiwan and to establish a theoretical framework for rescarching cross-Strait relations. 16 The first factor means that, because of the current power asymmetry between mainland China and Taiwan, along with the mainland's desire to assert sovereignty over the island, policy toward the PRC is highly constrained by external factors, and the island must choose between two policy options: either "balancing" or "bandwagoning." How ever, as the economic gap across the Strait narrows or otherwise changes in the future, the second factor will become more relevant. It focuses on Taiwan's "internal factors" and is based on the assumption that the main land policy position of each political party and faction will be increasingly determined by a strategy aimed at maximizing votes. Thus, policy posi tions will closely track public opinion,17 which in tum will provide the ultimate foundation for Taiwan's mainland China policy. Caught between appealing to "interests" or "identity," a desire on the part of every political party to maximize votes and win elections will lead them to abandon their previous strongly-held positions on mainland policy and instead move toward the political center, while at the same time operating under ideolog ical constraints that may be unique to each party and faction. Echoing Wu's argument, we view Taiwan's approach to cross-Strait issues as in essence determined by domestic political calculations and. I~U Yu-Shan, "Taiwan de dalu jingmao zhengce: jigou yu Ii xing" (Taiwan's mainland trade policy: structure and rationality), in Zhengbian zhong de liang'an guanxi lilun (Debates on cross-Strait relations theory), ed. Bao Tzong-Ho and Wu Yu-Shan (Taipei: Wunan, 1999), 153-210. 17 For theoretical justifications, see John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "Chiefs, Staffers, Indians, and Others: How Was Taiwan's Mainland China Policy Made," in Cheng, Huang, and Wu, In herited Rivalry, 137-52; and Jih-wen Lin, "Two-Level Games between Rival Regimes: Domestic Politics and the Remaking of Cross-Strait Relations," Issues & Studies 36, no. 6 (NovemberlDecember 2000): 1-26. For exemplary research. see Emile C.J. Sheng, "Cross Strait Relations and Public Opinion on Taiwan," Issues & Studies 38, no. I (March 2002): 17-46; and T. Y. Wang, "The Perception of Threats and Pragmatic Policy Choice: A Survey of Public Opinion in Taiwan," ibid. 41, no. 1 (March 20(5): 87-111.. December 2006. 29.
(5) ISSUES & STUDIES. The Future ofCross-Strait Relations. ideological disputes. These in tum are driven by the underlying distri bution of public opinion among the electorate, which raises the question: What determines this distribution? Does the expansion of trade and other forms ofcross-Strait exchanges lead to adjustments in the "normal distribu tion" of opinion about whether "interests" or "identity" should decide the direction of cross-Strait policy? Those sections of the public that have interests in cross-Strait trade should be a growing voice in favor of unifi cation, but in reality the current support for continued political separation will not be reduced any time soon-the strength of native Taiwanese iden tity continues to increase, and under the current mix of suspicions, resent ments, and lack of national confidence, sober discussion of the benefits of cross-Strait relations is frequently drowned out by personal attacks on the national loyalty of the speaker.18 We find this contradiction between the pull of "interests" on the one hand and "identity" on the other to be deeply interesting. In particular, the purpose of this paper is to explore one key cross Strait issue: Will individual "rational interests" eventually overwhelm the pull of "affective identity"? And with the continued expansion of cross Strait exchanges, will first-hand experience of the mainland imperceptibly change the strength of these forces? Our own view is that behind Tai wanese views about whether to increase trade ties with the mainland lies a dichotomy between "rationality" and "affection": included in the former are ideas such as "competitiveness," "personal benefits," and "career ben eilts," and in the latter are ideas such as "provincial identity," "personal identity," and "political identity." Daily, up-close experience of cross-Strait interaction is bound to influence these perceptions. Below, we first discuss cross-Strait trade relations and the contribu tions of the theoretical literature, describing the assumptions and data used in previous research. We then investigate the ties between the public's "sense," "sensitivity," and "sophistication" and attitudes toward cross-Strait. trade, followed by a discussion of our conclusions. In brief, this essay attempts to move away from traditional cross-Strait research on states, parties, and factions and instead focuses on more fundamental categories, drawing on the views of the general public to identify the root factors shaping cross-Strait relations, and trying to create a more stable basis from which to describe what the future of cross-Strait relations may hold.. "Sense" and "Sensitivity" In recent years, scholarly interest in rational interest and affective identity theories-which we term "sense" and "sensitivity" aspects, respec tively-has formed two distinct theoretical research orientations. In both the conduct of their private lives and in their actions in the public sphere (especially political actions), individuals are motivated to act by a com bination of material interests and various emotions, making it difficult to disentangle the causes of a particular action. 19 The goal of this article is to understand how these two very different sources of motivation combine to affect the structure of Taiwan-mainland China relations. Because Taiwan and the mainland are characterized by "political dis tance but economic integration" (ilt~(:>Jj'...i$ , ~~~~1;--, zhengzhi shuli, jingji ronghe), economics is the key factor to understanding cross-Strait relations. 20 Since Taiwan and the mainland have different resource bases and are at different levels of economic development, each side has a com parative economic advantage and can reap gains from trade?l The pursuit. 18Chang Yia-chung, "Lun liang'an zhili" (A discussion of cross-Strait governance), Wenti yu yanjiu (Issues and Studies) (Taipei) 42, no. 6 (2003):1-27.. 19See Wu Naiteh, "Mianbao yu aiqing: chutan Taiwan minzhong minzu rentong de bian dong" (Romance and bread: a preliminary study of the identity change in Taiwan), Taiwan zhengzhi xuekan (Taiwanese Political Science Review) 9, no. 2 (December 2005): 5-39; and Chien-min Chao, "Will Economic Integration between Mainland China and Taiwan Lead to a Congenial Political Culture?" Asian Survey 43, no. 2 (2003): 280-304. 20Wu, Kangheng huo hucong, 123. 2lKao Charng, Liang'an jingmao guanxi zhi tansuo (An exploration of cross-Strait trade relations) (Taipei: Tianyi, 1997); and Kao Chamg, "Liang'an guanxi zhong de shichang youyin" (Market factors in cross-Strait relations), in Shih, Jiaguo zhijian, 203-14.. 30. December 2006. December 2006. 31.
(6) iSSUES & STUDiES. The Future o/Cross-Strait Relations. of rational interest, then, is bound to lead an increasing number of indi viduals to voice support for expanding cross-Strait interaction. However, growing trade ties also mean that Taiwan's economic reliance on the mainland increases day by day, which could eventually result in political unification-an outcome that the current authorities in Taiwan do not want. Consequently, a fear of economic dependency motivates policymakers to attempt to strengthen the island's ability to resist the mainland, and as Taiwan's economic dependency increases, the scope of these kinds of pol icies is also likely to expand. 22 At the moment, the need to win support from an increasingly assertive public means that the incumbent govern ment in Taiwan must heed popular opinion in deciding how loose or re strictive cross-Strait policies should be. If public opinion tends to favor economic interests, the government will find it more and more difficult to maintain restrictive policies, and the two sides could move gradually toward unification. On the other hand, the increasingly prevalent view that Taiwan should eliminate all things mainland ("Taiwanization") has be come an important force constantly pushing the two sides further apart. The long-standing antagonism across the Strait, especially visible in their different governing systems and ideological attitudes, has produced some thing close to two separate countries and contrasting national identities. 23 Although the two sides clearly depend on each other, this rising Taiwanese consciousness is gradually leading to greater and greater psychological distance. Ifpersonal identity dominates personal interest as the main deter minant of public opinion, then major changes in cross-Strait relations will be extremely difficult to implement, and the situation for the fore seeable future is likely to appear much as it does today. In contemporary Taiwanese society, the voices of both those avidly promoting Taiwanese consciousness and those seeking to speed liberaliza tion of cross-Strait exchanges grow louder by the day. Declarations of. 22WU, Kangheng huo hucong, 162. 2.lWU Yu-Shan, "Liang'an guanxi zhong de Zhongguo yishi yu Taiwan yishi" Taiwanese consciousness in cross-Strait relations), Zhongguo shiwu (China 71-89.. 32. December 2006. -.----~~-. a new national identity threaten the preservation of old ones, leading to near-universal political distrust and forming the underlying structure of Taiwan's current competitive party politics. 24 Yet the increasingly tempting economic opportunities on the mainland may force Taiwanese to choose between "bread"-economic interests-and "Iove"-affective identity.25 The massive scale of cross-border interaction, increasingly common even among ordinary Taiwanese,26 and the rapid growth of cross-Strait contacts will eventually have a profound influence on the island's domestic affairs. Taiwanese with significant experience on the mainland might have a deeper understanding of cross-Strait affairs; they in tum may influence the direction of popular sentiment in Taiwan which ultimately determines the flow of capital and talent between the two sides. Thus, the views of these individuals may shed light on long-term trends in the movement of resources across the Strait. On the other hand, cross-Strait relations are still best characterized by the expression, "same culture, but politically antagonistic" (;t 1t.1ilJ iI.t. ' .il'.bf21t J1:., wenhua tongyuan, zhengzhi duili). Will the experiences of those Taiwanese who travel and frequently between the mainland and the island give rise to mutual understanding, concern, and feeling, and eventually lead to a change in their identity, or wiII they instead maintain their "Taiwanese identity"? 27 The answer to. Clark, "The Paradox of the National Identity Issue in Chen Shui-bian's 2004 Presiden tial Campaign: Base Constituencies vs. the Moderate Middle," Issues & Studies 41, no. (March 2005): 53-86; and Wei-chin Lee, "Taiwan's Cultural Reconstruction Movement: Identity Politics and Collective Action Since 2000," ibid., I-51. 25Sec note 16 above; Carl K. Y. Shaw, "Modulations of Nationalism across the Taiwan Strait," Issues & Studies 38, 110.2 (June 2002): 122-47; and Michael Hsin-Huang Hsiao and Jiann-Fa Van, "Taiwan's New National Identity and Its Impact on Cross-Strait Relations" (Paper presented at the 35th Taiwan-American Conference on Contemporary China, Tai pei, August 28-29, 2006). 26According to statistics from the Mainland Affairs Council's Office of Economics (k I'£:f l!lit ~£i:t ht), from 1987 to the end of February 2006, Taiwanese had made a total of 38,640,600 trips to the mainland, and the number of mainland visitors to Taiwan had reached 1,332,500. 27See Keng, "Understanding the Impacts of NOllofficial Contacts." For parallel experiences, see Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph Man Chan, "Political Attitudes, Political Participation, and Hong Kong Identities after 1997," issues & Studies 41, no. 2 (June 2005): 1-35; and Abanti Bhattacharya, "Chinese Nationalism Contested: The Rise of Hong Kong Identity," ibid., 37-74.. **. December 2006. 33.
(7) ISSUES & STUDIES. The Future ofCross-Strait Relations. this question will deeply affect the future of the two sides. We argue that influences on future cross-Strait developments are rooted in the relative strengths of rational and afiective considerations in Taiwanese public opinion. If rational considerations dominate public opinion where cross-Strait issues are concerned, then Taiwan and the mainland may eventually move toward integration; but if affective con siderations take precedence, then Taiwan is likely to continue to insist on self-governance. In addition, those with cross-Strait contacts and experi ence are likely to hold different opinions on cross-Strait issues. A review of research into attitudes toward public policy issues is divided into two competing theoretical traditions: rational choice theory and the symbolic politics thesis. Rational choice theory is, as its name suggests, based the assumption of human rationality and it relies heavily on formal logic to analyze political phenomena. The key assumption in rational choice explanations of political behavior is that individuals con sciously seek to maximize their self-interest. Put another way, rational choice theory holds that people participate in political activities to serve their own interests, and in each case choose the action which provides the greatest personal benefit. "Rationality" is reflected not only in the choice of action but also in the choice of tactics and time, and can be modified by changing assumptions about individual knowledge and information. Ac cording to the rational choice explanation, electors decide who to vote for by examining the stances of political parties or candidates in comparison to their own, and in the end supporting the platform that in aggregate maximizes their self-interest. Rational choice is most concerned with dis cussions of whether individuals support specific policies or take political actions out of self-interest. Following Anthony Downs, this view holds that individuals favor specific policies which are most beneficial to their personal interests and vote for the party or candidate who advocates views or policies closest to their own preferences. 28. 28 Anthony. 34. Downs, An Economic Theory ofDemocracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).. December 2006. Rational choice theory stands in stark contrast to symbolic politics theory-as Sears and Funk have argued,29 self-interested behavior is a kind of goal-directed behavior, and as such several conditions must hold: benefits should be relatively short-term, material, and accrue directly to in dividuals. Rational accounting is a kind of benefit-maximization method; but while maximization of individual benefits induces rational behavior, it cannot affect common public attitudes. Rarely is it pointed out that in dividual knowledge about and personal experience in public affairs are not linked; therefore, people judge their individual situations and public affairs separately. The first scholar to push the term "symbolic politics" to the forefront of research was Murray Edelman. 30 He argued that most people perceive the environment they live in as complicated and threatening, and they feel powerless to change it. In response, people latch on to political myths, rituals, or other symbols popularized by political elites-these symbols help simplify a complex world and ease internal anxiety. Political elites playa key role in this process by designating political enemies, framing group identities, and building attachment to leaders, all of which helps reassure ordinary people and redirect their energies toward out-group vio lence or in-group obedience. The theorization of this so-called symbolic politics was later developed in greater detail by Sears et al.,31 who used it to explain voters' attitudes toward public policy as well as their po litical behavior. The symbolic politics defined by Sears et al. argues that symbolic and affective attitudes are formed through socialization during childhood and subsequently become rather impervious to change.32 Once. 29David O. Sears and Carolyn L. Funk, "The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitude," Experimental Social Psychology 24 (1991): 1-91. 30Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana.: University of llIinois Press, 1964); and Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action (Chicago: Markham, 1971). 31David O. Sears, Carl P. Hensler, and Leslie K. Speer, "Whites' Opposition to 'Busing': Self Interest or Symbolic Politics?" American Political Science Review 73, no. 2 (June 1979): 369-84; and David O. Sears, Richard R. Lau, Tom R. Tyler, and Harris M. Allen, Jr., "Self Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitude and Presidential Voting," ibid. 74, no. 3 (September 1980): 670-84. 32Sears, Hensler, and Speer, "Whiles' Opposition to 'Busing'.. December 2006. 35.
(8) ISSUES & STUIJJES. The Future ofCross -Strait Relations. individuals grow up and confront important public issues or initiate po litical action, they will raise these political symbols-examples of which include images from the struggle for American racial integration, or vari ous meanings of the term "blacks." These kinds of deep-rooted, long lasting symbols can trigger subconscious racial attitudes or similar pre dispositions, and frequent reactions. Thus, an individual's stance on and attitude toward a particular political issue is determined by political pre dispositions which are formed during one's adolescence. 3) If an individual receives outside information which contains the same symbols, it will evoke and activate the same symbolic nodes in one's memory, generating a subconscious emotional reaction. 34 However, in discussing the relationship between rational choice and identity, Hardin adds a new twist by arguing that group identity is managed through coordination and determined by self-interest.35 A prerequisite for individuals to identify with a particular group or to donate services is that the harm to their self-interest caused by personal donations can be com pensated for by group identity or some other benefits that in total outweigh the costs of participation. The incentive to identifY with or commit to a particular group is to some degree motivated by self-interest. Individuals who identify with a group are not born with that identity, nor do they care. more about group interests than individual interests-rather, identifying with a group itself is beneficia!.36 In other words, one's choice of identity is made only after careful consideration, through a kind of purpose-driven action. When individuals sense that they will benefit from group life, they will form an identification with that group. In fact, identity is a collection of interests, and not preexisting or generated by common socialization under special historical circumstances. Thus, symbolic politics draws heavily on theories of political social ization, which typically argue that a person's political preferences form during early adulthood and remain relatively stable thereafter--examples include political party identification or group attitudes. These attitudes later become major determinants of one's political attitudes. Symbolic politics also embraces cognitive consistence theories, in which an individ ual's adolescent attitudes are matched with hislher adult attitudes. Sears, Hensler, and Speer review previous analyses of self-interest and divide them into three kinds of research. 37 The first takes as its unit of analysis aggregate-level data, and examines how changes in economic indicators and related kinds of data affect voting behavior in congressional and presidential elections .. Examples include analyzing the relationship be tween the overall rate of economic growth and unemployment and the electoral performance of the ruling party. The second kind of research utilizes individual-level data to analyze the distribution of attitudes among members of different groups or communities of interest- -for ex ample, measuring women's attitudes toward policies that affect women. The third kind focuses on issues that directly affect individual attitudes or behavior. For example, if the current government introduces a plan to increase or cut social welfare expenditure, this kind of research would measure changes in the attitudes and behavior of welfare recipients. How ever, these three research approaches do not deal with the effect of "self interest" on political attitudes and behavior.. 33In the United States, some political predispositions imply a political party identification, political ideology (liberalism or conservatism), racial prejudice, etc. See David O. Sears, "Symbolic Politics: A Socio-Psychological Theory," in Explorations in Political Psy chology, ed. Shanto Iyengar and William McGuire (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 1993), 120. 34Sears, "Symbolic Politics"; David O. Sears and Harris M. Allen, Jr., "The Trajectory of Local Desegregation Controversies and Whites' Opposition to Busing," in Groups in Con tact: The Psychology ofDesegregation, ed. Norman Miller and Marilynn B. Brewer (Or lando, FI.: Academic Press, 1984), 123-51; Sears and Funk, "The Role of Self-Interest"; David O. Sears and Donald R. Kinder, "Whites' Opposition to Busing: On Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Group Conflict'!" Journal of Pel~50nality and Social Psychology 5 (J 985): 1141-47; David O. Sears and Richard R. Lau, "Inducing Apparently Self-Interested Political Preferences," American Journal ofPolitical Science 27, no. 2 (May 1983): 223 52; Sears, Hensler, and Speer, "Whites' Opposition 10 'Busing"'; Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen, "Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics"; and David. O. Sears, Tom R. Tyler, Jack Citrin, and Donald R. Kinder, "Political System Support and Public Response to the Energy Crisis," American Journal ofPolitical Science 22, no. I (February 1978): 56-82. :"Russell Hardin, "Self-Interest, Group Identity," in Nationalism and Rationality, ed. Albert Breton et at (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 14-42.. 36. December 2006. .:,. ~id., \6,41-42.. 37Sears, Hensler, and Speer, "Whites' Opposition to 'Busing"" 370.. December 2006. 37.
(9) ISSUES & STUDIES. The Future ofCross-Strait Relations. Given the previous discussion, one interesting question is whether members of the public make similar cost-benefit assessments when decid ing their attitudes toward public issues. As noted, symbolic politics theory claims that voters form attitudes about issues in response to symbolic stimulation. At the same time, symbols may be linked to prior political dispositions which are stable and not easily changed. As an illustration, suppose that Taiwanese respondents believe that "I am a Taiwanese, so Taiwan should come first," and "Taiwan's economic recession was caused by mainland China's economic attractiveness." This theory suggests that asking them about issues such as "Should Taiwan increase trade with the Chinese mainland?" unconsciously activates the link between "I am Tai wanese" and "Taiwan should come first," and triggers the latent political belief that "Taiwan's economic recession was caused by mainland China's economic attractiveness," with the result that their response to the issue of cross-Strait trade is likely to be a conservative one. Following ar guments made by Sears and his colleagues, who used both self-interest theories and symbolic politics models to explain a number of issues in American politics and found the explanatory power of symbolic politics to be quite significant,38 we ask: How do these two factors play into Tai wanese views of cross-Strait issues? Analyses of Taiwan's political competition find that "socioeconomic justice" and "national identity" are the two main cleavages around which party competition is organized. 39 However, concern about the costs versus benefits of expanding cross-Strait trade is driving the emergence of this new political issue, leading to a moderate shake-up of political parties around the identity issues that are traditionally crucial to the outcomes of elections. In analyzing the political consequences of cross-Strait trade interaction, Keng Shu (.lIk. B1) and Chen Lu-huei (~'*' ft'*f:) find that interac. tion does indeed affect the structure of Taiwanese public opinion, and they estimate that the regions which have largely benefited from cross-Strait trade (northern Taiwan) tend to prefer pan-Blue parties, while those regions which have seen a net outflow of trade and investment (southern Taiwan) identify more closely with the pan-Greens, and those regions that have experienced a mix of gains and losses, such as central and eastern Taiwan, express very complex and contradictory attitudes toward cross-Strait inter action, resulting in more evenly-divided support for the political parties. 40 These research findings-that economic costs and benefits have led to the rearranging of regional patterns of political representation-appear to con fonn to the expectations of rational choice models. These focus on "costs and benefits" explanations of political attitudes and rely heavily on the in fluence ofsocioeconomic justice concerns to explain political competition. However, they make little or no mention of identity aspects, and provide no way to handle the possible existence of identity "frames" that limit one's choice set. For at least the last fifty years, Taiwanese society has been divided along ethnic and national identity lines. In the I 980s ethnic identity served to enhance the strength of democratic activists, and since democratization it has featured much more prominently than national identity in the island's political competition. Since there is no easy way to resolve Taiwan's status with regard to the mainland in the short tenn, however, national identity is still an important political issue. 41 In discussing changes in Taiwanese ethnic identity, Wu Naiteh (~JJ it) notes that in the last ten years "Chi nese" ethnic identification has steadily declined, and "Taiwanese" ethnic identification has just as steadily risen. 42 Although the strengthening material attraction of the mainland is apparent on the island and may tip. 3SFor example, busing policy, employment guarantees, national health insurance, social order, etc. See Sears and Allen, "The Trajectory of Local Desegregation Controversies"; Sears, Hensler, and Speer, "Whites' Opposition to 'Busing'''; and Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen, "Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics.". 4°Keng Shu and Chen Lu-huei, "Liang'anjingmao hudong yu Taiwan zhengzhi bantu; nanbei qukuai chayi de tuishou?" (Cross-Strait trade and Taiwanese political territory: driving north-south regional divergence?), Wenti yu yarljiu 42, no. 6 (2003); 1-27.. t. 39yun-han Chu, Melvin J. Hinich, and Tse-min Lin, "Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan: A Spatial Analysis," World Politics 48, no. 411uly 1996): 453-81.. 41John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "Ethnicity, National Identity, and Domestic Politics in Taiwan," Journal ofAsian and African Studies 40 (2005); 13-28. 42WU, "Mianhao yu aiqing.". 38. December 2006. December 2006. 39.
(10) ISSUES & STUDIES. The Future. the balance in the future, at present Taiwanese identity has become dominant. Yet pragmatic attitudes among people in Taiwan appear much. stronger than "Taiwanese nationalism" or "Chinese nationalism."43 One. reason may be that, in an increasingly globalized world, materialism and. satisfaction with public institutions are more important than identity. An. other possibility is that in the complicated cross-Strait environment, most. Taiwanese for the time being are not willing to choose between two con. trasting ethnic identities. One explanation is that new affective identities. take a long time to develop---given Taiwan's unusual situation, the emer. gence of a new "Taiwanese" identity has not been able to keep pace with. the rapid decline of the older Chinese ethnic identification. Our way of. thinking about this problem is thus: political attitudes are deeply affected. by both rational and affective factors. As Taiwan faces international. competition and pressure to move manu1acturing to the mainland, not only. will the host country be a rising economic competitor, but at the same. time the "dual identity" of industry could threaten national security. As. the public in Taiwan faces the trade-off between material and emotional. interests that cross-Strait exchange represents, will "rationality" or "affec. tion" weigh more heavily?. ,. Conceptualizing "Sense" and "Sensitivity" The methodological discussion in the previous section has argued that, in the 1ace of continuously increasing economic integration across the Taiwan Strait, ordinary Taiwanese draw on both rational interests (the "sense" aspect) and affective identity (the "sensitivity" aspect) to fonn. 43Categories were detennined by responses to the questions: "If after declaring independ ence, Taiwan could still maintain peaceful relations with the mainland, would you support Taiwanese independence?" and "IfTaiwan and the mainland's levels of political, economic, and social development were roughly similar, would you support unification?" Respond ents who agreed with the first question but disagreed with the second we call "Taiwanese. nationalists," while those who agreed with the second but not the first we call "Chinese na. tionalists," and those who agreed with both questions we call "pragmatists.". 40. December 2006. •. (If Cross-Strait. Relations. opinions about cross-Strait interaction. On the one hand, members of the Taiwanese public make rational ("sense") calculations of the benefits, opportunities, and costs of trade exchanges; on the other, during Taiwan's democratic transition, cross-Strait issues were dragged into arguments for and against greater democracy, fundamentally shaping people's po litical orientations and making cross-Strait relations a highly sensitive political subject. Consequently, we think that people's positions on cross Strait trade exchanges are developed from two separate dimensions--4)ne located on a "rational forecasting" axis and the other on an "aflective identification" axis. In contrast to Wu Yu-Shan,44 we believe that eco nomic and security interests are not the only factors on which individuals base their judgments, because "security interests" include the additional factor of "aflective identification.,,45 Considerations of security interests originate from an "us-versus-them" view: because the two sides have already been separated for more than fifty years, in international relations the island is caught in a zero-sum game, and the PRC's insistence on a "one China" policy, its constant efforts to isolate Taiwan in international affairs, and repeated threats to use military force to retake the island com bine to create a strongly negative impression of the mainland among the public in Taiwan. Taiwan's pan-Green parties46 exploit this impression for propaganda purposes during election campaigns-in this way security concerns ultimately affect politics, society, and Taiwanese political orien tations. In contrast, we believe that, on the rational interest dimension, individual views of cross-Strait relations are detennined by a mixture of concerns about one's "competitiveness," "career benefits," and "personal benefits.". 44WU, "Taiwan de dalu jingmao zhengce.. 45WU Yu-Shan does mention this point. He basically agrees that economic and security. benefits may be similar, but hypothesizes that trade with the mainland will in practice def initely bring risks. In relation to mainland China, Taiwan will find it difficult to obtain both economic and security benefits simultaneously. Moreover, he argues that the view that the establishment of economic relations with the mainland will eventuallv hann Taiwan's security is nearly universal. See Wu, "Taiwan de dalujingmao zhengce,'~ 153-210. 46See note 4 above.. December 2006. 41.
(11) ISSUES & STUDIES. The Future ofCross-Strait Relations. Within rational interest, "educational attainment" and "age" both represent the strength of one's individual "competitiveness." In general, educational attainment is an index of personal socioeconomic status and also indicates an individual's political knowledge and ability to judge national affairs. In addition, in the knowledge economy, educational at tainment has become the foundation of an individual's competitiveness the more highly educated a person is, the better prepared he/she is to learn new tasks or tackle new challenges. In addition to education, an indi vidual's age will also affect his/her energy level, memory, judgment, and other important abilities-in general, the older one is, the fewer job op portunities one will have, and the higher the cost of seeking alternative employment. Thus, educational attainment and age are key factors in competitiveness. If cross-Strait trade continues to expand, the effects will be felt very differently in different lines ofwork-hence, "career interests." The future benefits and costs oftrade will be distributed unequally through out the working popUlation-expansion ofties will produce both "winners" and "losers. ,,47 As a result, the long-term effect of "career interests" on at titudes toward cross-Strait interaction is an important factor to consider. Following this line of thought, which emphasizes that individuals ration ally calculate their interests to decide which course of action to take and maximize their returns, the responses of people in Taiwan to the question of whether they are willing to travel to the mainland form an important variable of interest.. consider the issue to be the single most important factor determining at titudes toward cross-Strait interaction; other issues also affect these at titudes, but only indirectly through their relevance to the unification/ independence question. 49 Lin Pei-ting (*f.JJli\.-lit) finds that among people who support unification, those who nevertheless identify with pan-Green political parties and as "Taiwanese" tend to want to reduce cross-Strait economic and trade relations, and among those who support independence, only those who identify as "Taiwanese" want to reduce economic and trade relations. In addition, among respondents who support the status quo, those who identify with pan-Blue parties tend to want to increase cross Strait trade and economic interaction, and those who identify with pan Green parties tend to want to decrease interaction. However, although this result is consistent with Wu Yu-Shan's 1999 analysis of identity in cross Strait relations, Lin uses this unification/independence stance as an attitude toward an issue, and consequently combines "unification/independence" and "cross-Strait interaction issues" into a single topic, making it very dif ficult to differentiate the two. In contrast, when we reanalyzed the em pirical data using "unification/independence stance" as a dependent vari able, we found that it was only respondents' provincial background that was clearly related to their stance on the unification/independence ques tion, and it was difficult or impossible to distinguish the causal direction of the relationship between other variables such as party identification. 50 Therefore, in considering the issue of cross-Strait relations, one must use respondents' unification/independence stance, which is treated as political identification, as an independent variable, which improves our ability to avoid endogeneity problems. Thus, in the "affective identity" dimension, we focus our investigation on "provincial identity," "personal identity," and "political identity.". Since it was first broached openly in 1991, the "affective dimension" question of unification versus independence has been considered a major part of political identity in Taiwan, and stances on this issue had a major effect on the island's politics in the 1990s. At present, the unification/ independence issue forms the major social cleavage in Taiwan. 48 Some. 47Michael D. Shafer, Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects ofStates (Cornell, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994). 48Chen Yih-yan and Sheng Shing-yuan, "Zhengzhi fenqi yu zhengdangjingzheng: 200 I nian lifa weiyuan xuanju de fenxi" (Political divergence and political party competition: an analysis of the 2001 legislative election), Xuanju yanjiu (Journal of Electoral Studies) (Tai pei) 10, no. I (2003): 7-40.. 42. December 2006. t. •. 49For example, Lin Pei-ling, "Zengjia huo jiangdi liang'an jingmao guanxi: yige rentong yu de taolun" (Increasing or reducing cross-Strait economic ties: an identity-interest analysis) (Paper presented at Taiwan's Elections and Democratization Study, International Academic Conference, Zhongyang yanjiuyuan zhidu yu xingwei yanjiu zhuanti zhong xin, Taipei, 2005). soChen and Chen, "Moleng liangke de taidu haishi buqueding de weilai.". December 2006. 43.
(12) ISSUES & STUDIES. The Future o!Cross-Strait Relations. Turning to affective identity, discussions of ethnic identification in Taiwan usually involve questions of "provincial identity," which itself is actually a form of "primordial ism. " Primordialists consider blood ties, language, or long-standing cultural traditions as forming "primordial ties" which feature strong and unbreakable affective bonds that knit together group members. Previous research has found that relative to "native" Tai wanese, or "Minnanren" (r11l' i'flA), "mainlanders" who arrived in or around 1949 have a distinct view of cross-Strait issues, and because they have a stronger group consciousness and distinct views about political affairs, their level of political participation is also higher. 51 Diflerences in gener ation and provincial origin give rise to a combination of ties and emotions which subsequently affect views about the issue of cross-Strait exchange. In contrast to primordial ism, "instrumentalism," which is often invoked in discussions of personal identity and corresponding ethnic identity, argues that a group of people in specific historical circumstances interacting through commonly-shared social processes aid the construction of social networks and group consciousness, which can in turn spur in society the elimination of ethnic prejudice and encourage ethnic group consolidation. However, this interaction can also involve negative social processes that exacerbate initial differences and result in social conflicts. In the instru mentalist view, the cross-Strait dispute has gradually evolved from an in stitutional and ideological confrontation to one involving two separate countries and even two antagonistic ethnicities, and because personal identity has a major influence on individual views about cross-Strait ex changes, the character and evolution of identity in Taiwanese politics is a profoundly important issue. Finally, not only is the influence of personal identity on an individual's unification/independence stance important to discuss in the context of competitive party politics, it also no doubt has an even greater effect on the important variable of attitudes toward cross Strait exchanges.. In addition, the effect of first-hand knowledge-what we term the "sophistication" aspect-should not be underestimated. "How much ex perience does one have on the mainland?" is a useful research question, in that it can be used as a measure of political sophistication about cross. Strait interaction. Standard functionalist accounts of international rela tions would argue that, before people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can begin formal political negotiations, they would have to make inroads into one another's markets, culture, society, academic research, etc. Inter action in each social sphere assists in increasing economic integration and laying the groundwork for political unification. After Taiwan and the PRe entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) together, cross-Strait trade and investment changed from a one-way to a two-way street: limits on the transfer of goods and materials, capital, and personnel were lifted on both sides. This switch should change people's "rational calculations." Moreover, globalization has weakened the authority of the nation-state, shattered geographical boundaries, and softened the constraints of time and space, and both Taiwan and the mainland have been affected. Tradi tional industries are being replaced by new "information" industries, and many Taiwanese have increasing opportunities to develop new identities. 52 Frequent exchanges and contacts among the people on both sides of the Strait result in greater understanding, concern, and feeling, which may be changing allegiances. Will the Taiwanese public retain a "Taiwanese iden tity?" Will they alter their local identity or subsume it under some other identity? Or will they instead adopt a fluid identity which shifts in different contexts? These are possibilities that we cannot ignore. If individuals on the two sides interact, and as a result the Taiwanese identity is gradually transformed, and this increases support for expanding cross-Strait inter action, then voices in favor of unification in Taiwanese society may grow louder, or vice versa. Yet until now we have not had micro-level data that enable us to explore the slew of factors possibly int1uencing people's. tt. 51Wang Fu-chang, "Zuqun yishi, minzu zhuyi yu zhengdang zhichi: 1990 niandai Taiwan dc zhengzhi" (Group conseiousness, nationalism, and party support: Taiwanese group 1990s), Taiwan shehuixue yanjiu (Taiwan Sociological Review) 2 (1998):. 52U. 44. December 2006. December 2006. ¥Ing-ming, "Zixun shidai xia de Iiang'an guanxi: rentong he zhuquan wenti de taolun" (Cross-Strait relations in the information age: a discussion of identity and sovereignty issues), Zhongguo shiwu, no. 5 (2001): 68-83.. 45.
(13) "". ISSUES & STUDIES. The Future of Cross-Strait Relations. attitudes toward cross-Strait economic interaction. On the basis ofthe above analysis, this paper makes use of the "sense" and "sensitivity" framework to come up with the following three core predictions:. H3: Professional benefits: those who have professional superiority as determined by high "market competitiveness" tend to favor strengthening cross-Strait economic relations; those who are in "inferior careers" tend to favor reducing economic relations.. 1. Taiwanese pUblic opinion toward cross-Strait trade is a key factor influencing cross-Strait policy, and the movement of public opin ion determines the expansion or constriction of cross-Strait trade, While at the same time affecting the autonomy or unification of governments on the two sides.. 84: Personal benefits: those expecting to travel to the mainland tend to favor increasing cross-Strait economic relations.. 2. Taiwanese attitudes toward cross-Strait trade are determined by the two aspects of "sense" (rationality) and "sensitivity" (affec tion). In other words, both "self-interest" and "symbolic politics" generally play an important role in the rise and fall of cross-Strait trade. In addition, "sophistication" (political knowledge) may also have an influence. 3. Rational "competitiveness," "professional benefits," and "personal benefits"; emotional "provincial identity," "personal identity," and "political identity"; and knowledge acquired through "mainland experience" are the important factors affecting Taiwanese views of cross-Strait trade. From the previous three core predictions, we derive the fOllowing eight research hypotheses:. HI: Age competitiveness: the higher one's age, the more likely one is to favor reducing cross-Strait economic relations, and the lower one's age, the more likely one is to favor strengthening economic relations.. H2: Education competitiveness: the higher one's level of education, the more likely one is to favor increaSing cross-Strait economic relations; the lower one's level ofeducation, the more likely one is to favor reducing economic relations.. H5: Provincial identity: mainlanders are more likely than Minnanren to favor strengthening economic relations.. H6: Personal identity: those who consider themselves to be "Chi nese" tend to favor strengthening trade relations, while those who consider themselves to be "Taiwanese" tend to favor re ducing economic relations.. H7: Political identity: those who lean toward unification are more likely to support strengthening economic relations, while those who lean toward independence are more likely to support re ducing economic relations. H8: Sophistication (experience): one's experience on the mainland will influence one's view ofcross-Strait economic relations, and the more experience one has on the mainland, the greater one's tendency to favor strengthening economic relations.. In the following section these hypotheses are analyzed by establish ing a binary logit mode1. 53 This research utilizes data collected from the "2005 Cross-Strait Relations and National Security Public Opinion Sur vey" directed by Emerson Niou (+~ 1'). The survey was administered. 53We use as our measure of the dependent variable responses to the following question: "Some peoplc believe that Taiwan should enhance trade relations with thc mainland, because this will help Taiwan's economy grow; other people believe that Taiwan should reduce trade relations with the mainland, or otherwise they will affect Taiwan's national se curity. Which view do you agree with more?" Respondents' answers were recoded into one ofthree categories: "enhance trade relations with the mainland," "reduce trade relations with the mainland," or "no response." For the distribution of this variable, see Appendix L. 46 December 2006. December 2006. 47.
(14) iSSUES & STUDIES. The Future ofCross-Strait Relations. through telephone interviews by National Chengchi University's Elec tion Study Center on May 27-31,2005, with 1,221 valid adult respond ents randomly drawn from throughout Taiwanese territories. Under 95 percent confidence level, the maximum sampling error is plus/minus 2.8 percent.. Table 1 The Logit Model of Cross-Strait Trade Stances Coefficient. •. (Standard error). Exp(8). RationaJ Aspects Age competitiveness (0 20-34). Data Analysis and Discussion. ,. 35-40 50 or above Educational competitiveness (0 = secondary school) Elementary and below or above Professional benefits (0 neutral profession). Superior profession Inferior profession Personal benefits (0 = no plans to travel) Plan to travel to the mainland. -0.255 0757. (0.228) (0.302)*. 0.775 0.469. 0.179 0.648. (0.302) (0.221)**. 1.195 1.91. (0.261) (0.231 ). 1.046. 0.840. As mentioned in the previous section, we measure people's views about cross-Strait trade on a scale constructed so that the view "enhance cross-Strait trade relations" is at one extreme and the opposite view "reduce cross-Strait trade relations" is at the other, with non-responses treated as missing values. All respondents who voiced an opinion about cross-Strait trade are grouped into one of these two views. Respondents' answers could be assigned to the "no response" category for a wide variety of reasons, which are impossible to disentangle without additional data. Therefore, the following discussion is limited to respondents who chose either "en hance cross-Strait trade relations" or "reduce cross-Strait trade relations." Independent variables in this research include the sense measures of "age competitiveness," "educational competitiveness," "professional benefits," and "personal benefits"; the sensitivity measures of "provincial identity," "personal identity," and "political identity"; and the sophistication measure of "mainland experience." Table 1 shows estimations of coefficients in the logit model along with the odds ratio for the two separate positions on cross-Strait trade relations. As can be seen in table 1, the effect of the sensitivity factors is most noticeable. Among these, provincial identity, personal identity, and po litical identity all appear to be related to Taiwanese positions on cross-Strait trade. The provincial identity odds ratio for respondents born on the mainland is 2.348 times higher than that for respondents born in Taiwan in other words, mainlanders are much more likely to favor enhancing trade relations than those born in Taiwan, as we predicted in Hypothesis 5. One possible explanation for this result is that the "provincial identity". Source: Emerson M.S. Niou, "2005 Cross-Strait Relations and National Security Public Opinion Survey," administered by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, May 27-31, 2005.. 48. December 2006. December 2006. 0.045 --0.174. 0.262. 1.299. Affective Aspects Provincial identity (0 = bensheng). Mainlander. 0.853. (0.318)**. 2.348. Taiwanese Chinese. -1.251 0.330. Political identity (0 = maintain status quo) Pro-unification Pro-independence. (0.202)*** (0.435). 0.286 1.391. 1.429 --0.801. (0.349)*** (0.215)***. 4.173 0.449. 0.187 0.329. (0.234). 1.205. 1.088. (0.304)***. 2.970. Personal identity (0 = both). Knowledge Aspect Mainland experience (0 otimes). 1-3 times 4 or more times. Constant N= 841; chi-square = 227.66; d.f.. 14; P < 0.000; pseudo R2 = 0.265. Notes: I. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.. 49.
(15) ISSUES & STUDIES. The Future a/Cross-Strait Relations. measure reflects mainlanders' greater cultural affinity with the PRC, which leads them to hold more liberal views about cross-Strait trade than do Min nanren. In we find a significant relationship between the provincial of respondents and their orientation on cross-Strait issues. The estimates of the effects of "personal identity" reveal that those respondents who considered themselves to be "Taiwanese" were less likely than those who considered themselves to be both "Taiwanese and Chinese" to favor enhancing trade with the mainland; however, while the estimate for those who considered themselves to be exclusively "Chinese" does not reach standard significance levels, its direction is still consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis 6. This result suggests that rising Taiwanese consciousness in cross-Strait trade may playa "gatekeeper" role-those who consider themselves to be "Taiwanese" may worry more than their "Chinese" compatriots about the political consequences of the course of cross-Strait trade. This result also serves to underline that those with "Taiwanese" consciousness tend to take a more conservative stance to ward all manner of mainland policies. 54 The estimates of the effects of "political identity" show that re spondents who "favor unification," in comparison to those who "support the status quo," have a significantly higher odds ratio in favor ofenhancing rather than reducing cross-Strait trade. Likewise, those who "favor in dependence," in comparison to those who "support the status quo," have a significantly lower odds ratio in favor of enhancing cross-Strait trade. In other words, there is a significant divergence in attitudes about cross Strait trade between those favoring unification and those favoring inde pendence-support for enhancing cross-Strait trade is greatest among those who favor unification, and least among those who favor inde pendence, which conforms to the expectations expressed in Hypothesis identity can be regarded as the existence of a kind of lItlcs-as we have seen, views about cross-Strait trade are rooted in attitudes symbolized in the expres. sions "unification" and "independence." Such are the views of those who favor unification relative to those who support the status quo; so too are the views of those who favor independence. Among the different "sense" aspects, we find "competitiveness" to be entirely consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2: "age competitiveness" clearly affects respondents' positions on cross-Strait trade. Of those re spondents aged 50 and over, in contrast to those aged 20 to 34, the pro portion favoring reduced cross-Strait trade relations was higher than the proportion favoring enhanced relations; the trend among those aged 35 to 49 is also in this direction, although the estimate does not reach statistical significance level. In addition, on "educational competitiveness," we can see that respondents whose educational attainment is at "university level or above" favor enhancing cross-Strait trade relations at a higher rate than those with a high school education. One possible reason is that in dividuals with at least a university education have a clearer understanding of how their personal interests are affected by cross-Strait trade. Given their superior competitiveness, they not only have nothing to fear from the effects of cross-Strait exchanges but also may benefit considerably from their continued development. Therefore, the more competitive in dividuals are, the more likely they are to favor enhancing cross-Strait trade relations. The most unexpected result is that the model estimates of the effects ofboth "professional benefits" and "personal benefits" were not significant. Our theory predicted that "winners"-respondents whose benefited overall from trade-would strive to consolidate or expand their superior position, and so would be more likely to favor enhancing eco nomic relations with the mainland; in contrast, "losers" would rationally seek countermeasures or other ways to mitigate their losses, and would be more likely to take a conservative view or even oppose enhancing cross Strait trade. However, our research on "self-benefit" motivations produced no clear results. We speculate that much of the administrative intervention in cross-Strait trade is interrelated-until now both sides have followed a non-confrontational cross-Strait trade policy, although the Taiwanese government's policies on trade with the mainland have taken on stronger. 54WU,. 50. "Liang'an guanxi zhong de Zhongguo yishi yu Taiwan yishl.". December 2006. December 2006. 51.
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