Game Theory (2010/3/1)
Textbook: Microeconomic Theory by Mas-Collell, Whinston, and Green Grade: Homework: 40%, Midterm 30%, Final 30%
Outline:
1. Description of a game (chap 7)
Normal form
Beliefs and mixed strategy
Extensive form
2. Dominance and Rationalizability (chap 8)
Dominated and dominant strategy
Rationalizable strategy
Iterated dominance and Rationalizability 3. Nash equilibrium (chap 8)
Best Response and Nash equilibrium
Mixed Nash equilibrium
4. Subgame perfect equilibrium (chap 9)
Sequential rationality, backward induction, and subgame perfect equilibrium
Bargaining games with perfect information
Repeated games and Folks theorem 5. Bayesian Nash equilibrium (chap 8, 14, 23)
Static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Auctions
Mechanism design and bargaining problems 6. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (chap 9, 13, 23)
Dynamic games of incomplete information
Weakly Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Sequential equilibrium
Signaling games (costly signals)
Cheap-talk games (costless signals)
Reference:
Fudenberg and Tirole: “Game Thory” (1991) Gibbons: “A Primer in Game Theory” (1992)
Kreps: “A Course in Microeconomic Theory” (1990)
Mas-Collell, Whinston, and Green: “Microeconomic Theory” (1995) Myerson: “Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict” (1992)
Osborne and Rubinstein: “A Course in Game Theory” (1994)
