（CAPEX）其係數為 -0.186（t 值 = -2.93），槓桿比率（LEVG）其係數為-0.164（t 值 = -8.59），法人股東持股比例（INST）其係數為-0.1110（t 值 = -5.79），金融機
（RSize）其係數為 -0.0129（t 值 = -4.30）、董事持有公司股份之比例（DIROWN）
其係數為 0.1750（t 值 = 4.56）、管理階層持有股票選擇權（SO）其係數為
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0.0125（t 值 = -1.97）、外資持股比例（FRGN）其係數為 -0.0827（t 值 = -2.22）為 正相關，除內部董事占比不顯著外，資產規模之對數及管理階層持股票選擇權等皆 具統計顯著性。
就管理階層持有股票選擇權的影響，Sander 及 Hambrick (2007) 分析執行長持 有大量股票選擇權對於其採行策略的行為及公司績效表現的影響。結果發現股票選 擇權使執行長會更願意下賭在不確性高的投資項目，例如：鉅額研究發展支出、頻 繁地進行併購活動。同時帶來較極端公司績效，甚至發生鉅額損失遠遠高過異常的 盈餘。故當管理階層績效表現會影響企業超額現金，在日本企業管理階層有股票選 擇權，超額現金之持有越多。外資持股比例的部分，Guo et al. (2015) 表示外資會具 有監督功能，能抑制經理人追求個人利益而產生異常的生產成本及費用等，因此，
企業外資持股比例越高，其持有的超額現金越多。
現金持有與海外營收的關聯性（表 9）以 VIF 測試最大值為 2.9，並無共線性 之疑慮。
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表 9 超額現金持有與企業海外營收之關聯性（一般迴歸_應變數為超額現金）
係數 t 值
FsalesC 0.0305* 1.75
ln(BS) -0.0006 -0.18
INDIR 0.0108 1.37
RSize 0.0129*** 4.30
CAPEX -0.1860*** -2.93
LEVG -0.1640*** -8.59
DIROWN 0.1750*** 4.56
SO 0.0125** 1.97
INST -0.111*** -5.79
FRGN 0.0827** 2.22
FINAN -0.1870*** -6.62
Observations 29,809
Fixed Effect Year, Industry
Clusterred Firm
R-squared 0.057
其中*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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表 10 超額現金持有與企業海外營收之關聯性（中位數迴歸_應變數為超額現金）
係數 t 值
FsalesC 0.0401*** 3.27
ln(BS) 0.0006 0.26
INDIR 0.0022 0.47
RSize 0.0089*** 4.26
CAPEX -0.162*** -3.81
LEVG -0.0441*** -3.57
DIROWN 0.115*** 4.06
SO 0.0020 0.50
INST -0.0717*** -5.32
FRGN 0.0599** 2.48
FINAN -0.0907*** -4.67
Observations 29,809
Fixed Effect Year, Industry
Clusterred Firm
R-squared 0.037
其中*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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表 11 現金持有與企業海外營收之關聯性（一般迴歸_應變數為現金）
係數 t 值
FsalesC 0.0714** 4.22
ln(BS) -0.0026** -0.65
INDIR 0.0002** -0.04
RSize -0.0250** -11.87
CAPEX -0.1484* -2.39
LEVG -0.2530* -17.55
DIROWN 0.2026* 5.29
SO 0.0117** 5.15
INST -0.1089** -7.11
FRGN 0.1465** 5.66
FINAN -0.1242** -6.26
Observations 29,809
Fixed Effect Year, Industry
Cluster Firm
R-squared 0.057
其中*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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表 12 現金持有與企業海外營收之關聯性（中位數迴歸_應變數為現金）
係數 t 值
FsalesC 0.0305** 1.75
ln(BS) -0.0007*** -0.18
INDIR 0.0108*** 1.37
RSize 0.0129*** 4.30
CAPEX -0.1860** -2.93
LEVG -0.1639** -8.59
DIROWN 0.1746** 4.56
SO 0.0125*** 1.97
INST -0.1106*** -5.79
FRGN 0.0827** 2.22
FINAN -0.1873** -6.62
Observations 29,809
Fixed Effect Year, Industry
Cluster Firm
R-squared 0.057
其中*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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伍、結論
本次研究目的主要欲討探討租稅成本是否造成企業超額現金持有之差異，以 作為政府租稅政策施行時的考量，其中租稅成本以海外營收規模作為衡量。
在 2000 年初，許多美國學者爭議是否應將美國對企業所得課稅方式，從屬人 主義改為多地主義，以更利於美國政府。雖然未有定論，然而不可否認的是，美國 企業因為會計及稅負認列時點之差異，而調整現金持有的情況；同樣地，美國企業 也會因為政府暫時性盈餘匯回之免稅機制，而改變其現金持有的決定。由此而延伸 出本研究所欲探討在經濟規模、高稅率類似的日本，該國企業是否會因為租稅成本 的差異而影響現金持有的行為？
結果發現，會發現當一家日本企業其海外營收占總營收比例越高時，其超額現 金持有越高，可合理推測日本租稅制度所產生的成本，影響日本企業在營收配置，
將大部分的海外營收置於稅負成本相對較低的地區，減輕公司稅負負擔，並持有較 高的超額現金，此結果與假設預期相符合。
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