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第三節 研究建議
由於近年來社會風氣的改變，使得獨立董事成為大家關注的焦點，目前新聞 媒體的報導，常將獨立董事塑造成酬庸、肥貓等負面形象，認為公司僅為了符合 法規的要求而設置獨立董事，且都會找與公司高層所信賴的人馬，無法發揮監督 效果。藉由本研究可以發現市場認為獨立董事是有價值的，而非媒體上所認為的 酬庸職位，可以藉此作為獨立董事制度有效性的證據，建議公司或政府可以從增 加獨立董事的人數與背景著手，進一步提升公司價值或公司治理的成效。
本研究由於樣本期間橫跨多年，經歷法規制度與社會風氣的改變，無法在一 個相同的環境下分析市場反應，且自樂陞案發生以後的樣本目前仍不多，建議後 續研究可以繼續探討市場的反應會不會產生變化。專業背景的分類部分，由於資 料取得以及辨認上的困難，目前仍未有一個客觀的分類標準存在，期待後續研究 可以改善這個問題，以及建議政府可以加強此部分的資訊揭露。
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