• 沒有找到結果。

第六章 結論與建議

第二節 研究限制及建議

立 政 治 大 學

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

77

使公司利潤減少,不利公司未來發展。

三、結論

由成長機會(報酬因素)與短期負債比率呈負向關係;成長機會(市值因素)與 自由現金流量呈正向關係推論,成長機會較高的國內上市櫃連接器公司多數以 保有營運活動所產生的高現金部位來滿足資金需求,避免舉債減少利息支出,

並利用充裕現金進行研發及具生產性的投資計畫,加強公司競爭能力帶動公司 未來盈餘成長,進一步提高公司的價值。

第二節 研究限制及建議

一、研究限制

本研究目的旨在剖析我國上市櫃連接器公司其成長機會,並探討以何種財 務策略取得穩健之資金來源,及維持適量的自由現金流量水準,可進一步來提 升國內中小型連接器廠商成長機會,以期窺探企業決策的模式,並不針對各產 業實證結果之差異進行深入之比較與產業分析。故相關實證結果僅適用於單一 連接器產業,無法類推整體電子產業。

另由於成長機會為不可觀測的變數,在作實證分析時須選取替代變數予以 衡量,因此採用過去實證文獻較常使用的替代變數納入迴歸分式中。本研究企 業成長機會之因素負荷量分析區分為報酬因素(Factor1)及市值因素(Factor2),以 代表原來所有的變項,累計數75.51%即代表可以解釋原來所有的變項的程度,

但未能找出完全具代表性之因素,此種作法或許會影響到實證結果之精確性。

二、研究建議

本研究根據實證結果,除窺探國內上市櫃連接器公司財務決策模式外,並 提出相關建議如下:

‧ 國

立 政 治 大 學

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

78

(一)融資政策

由成長機會(報酬因素)與短期負債比率呈負向關係;成長機會(市值因素)與 自由現金流量呈正向關係推論,國內上市櫃連接器公司為提高成長機會應以保 有營運活動所產生的高現金部位來滿足資金需求,避免舉債減少利息支出,並 利用充裕現金進行研發及具生產性的投資計畫,加強公司競爭能力帶動公司未 來盈餘成長,進一步提高公司的價值。

(二)股利政策

由本研究實證結果推論,國內上市櫃連接器公司為提高成長機會應以保有 營運活動所產生的高現金部位來滿足資金需求,故建議採用穩定股利額政策 (Constant growth dividend),要求公司對未來的支付能力作出較好的判斷。所謂 穩定股利額政策即以確定的現金股利分配額作為利潤分配的首要考量,一般不 隨資金需求的波動而波動,該股利政策除提供給投資人一個穩定的訊息外,亦 可作為許多長期投資人其穩定的收入來源,以便安排消費和其他各項支出,穩 定股利額政策有利於公司吸引和穩定這部分投資人的投資。一般來說,公司確 定的穩定股利額不應太高,要留有餘地,以免形成公司無力支付的困境。

2. 王美珍,2007,2008連接器產業展望,11月,工研院IEK產業報告。

3. ,2008,2009連接器產業展望,11月,工研院IEK產業報告。

16. 張育菁,2007,1998年兩稅合一實施後影響我國上市公司股利政策因素之研 究,國立成功大學企業管理學系未出版碩士論文。

陸與東南亞投資的實證,管理評論,第21卷第2期: 103-119。

24. 黃旭輝、陳隆麒與謝劍平,2001,公司成長機會對經理人持股與董事會組成 影響之研究,中山管理評論(春季),第9卷第1期: 37-59。

25. 黃孟嬌,2007,2006年全球連接器主要廠商動態分析,工研院IEK-ITIS計畫。

26. 黃家慶,2004,我國連接器廠商大陸投資狀況,工研院IEK產業報告。

32. 劉維琪、李怡宗,1993,融資順位理論之調查研究,管理評論,第12卷,7 月: 120-139。

33. 鄭沂蓉,2005,股本膨脹與盈餘資訊內涵之關聯性研究─以兩岸上市公司為 例,國立成功大學會計學系未出版碩士論文。

34. 鄭桂蕙,2005,庫藏股買回對股利發放之影響,會計評論,第41期: 77-101。

35. 謝明翰,2000,企業成長機會與融資政策、股利政策及高階主管酬勞之關聯

Announcements: Is There a Corroboration Effect?. Journal of Finance 39(4):

99-1091.

2. Baber, W. R., S. N. Janakiraman and S. H. Kang. 1996. Investment Opportunities and the Structure of Executive Compensation. Journal of

Accounting and Economics 21(3): 297-318.

3. Baker, G. P. 1993. Growth, Corporate Policies, and the Investment Opportunity Set. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16: 161-165.

4. Barclay, M. J. and C. W. Smith. 1995. The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt.

Journal of Financial Economics 50(2): 609-631.

5. Barnea, A., R. Haugen and L. Senbet. 1985. Agency Problems and Financial Contracting. In Foundations of Finance Series, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:

Prentice Hall.

6. Baskin, J. 1987. Corporate Liquidity in Games of Monopoly Power. Review of

Economic and Statistics 69: 312-319.

7. . 1989. An Empirical Investigation of the Pecking Order Hypoesis.

Financial Management. Spring: 26-35.

8. Belsley, D. 1991. Conditioning Diagnostics: Collinearity and Weak Data in Regression, New York: John Wiley and Sons.

9. Bhattacharya, S. 1979. Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and the Bird-in-the-Hand Fallacy. Bell Journal of Economics 10(1): 259-270.

10. Brewer, B., W. E. Jackson and J. A. Jagtiani. 2000. Impact of Independent Directors and the Regulatory Environment on Bank Merger Prices: Evidence from Takeover Activity in the 1990s. Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

11. Cheng, D. C., B. E. Gup and L. D. Wall. 1989. Financial Determinants of Bank Takeovers. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 21(4): 524-536.

12. Christie, A. 1989. Equity Risk, the Opportunity Set, Production Cost and Debt.

Working Paper (University of Rochester, Rochester, NY).

13. Chung, K. H. and C. Charoenwong . 1991. Investment Options, Assets in Place, and the Risk of Stocks. Financial Management 20(3): 21-33.

14. Collins, D. W. and S. P. Kothari. 1989. An Analysis of Intertemporal and Cross-sectional Determinants of Earnings Respond Coefficients. Journal of

Accounting and Economics 11(2): 143-181.

15. DeAngelo, H. and R. Masulis. 1980. Optimal Capital-structure Under Corporate and Personal Taxation. Journal of Financial Economics 8(1): 3-29.

16. Diane K. S. and L. D. Barney. 1994. Using Dividend Policy and Managerial Ownership to Reduce Agency Costs. The Journal of Financial Research 17:

363-373.

17. Dittmar, A., J. Mahrt-Smith and H. Servaes. 2003. International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings. Journal of Financial and

Quantitative Analysis 38: 111-133.

18. Donaldson, G. 1985. Financial Goals and Strategic Consequences. Harvard

Business Review: 57-66.

19. Fraser, D. R., and J. W. Kolari. 1988. Pricing Small Bank Acquisitions. Journal

of Retail Banking 10 (4): 23-28.

20. Ferreira, M.A. and A. S. 2004. Why Do Firms Hold Cash? Evidence from EMU Countries. European Financial Management 10(2), 295-319.

21. Gaver, J. J. and K. M. Gaver. 1993. Additional Evidence on the Association between the Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend and Compensation Policies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16(1): 125-160.

22. Gay, G. D. and J. Nam. 1998. The Underinvestment Problem and Corporate Derivatives Use. Financial Management 27(4): 53-69.

23. Greene, W. H., Econometric Analysis, Fifth edition, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

24. Harford, J. 1999. Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions. Journal of Finance 54: 1969-1997.

25. Hausman, J. A. 1978. Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica 46(6):

1251-1271.

26. Henderson, H., and A. Gart. 1999. Key Variables Explaining Acquisition Premiums for Large Commercial Banks. Bank Accounting & Finance 12 (4):

29-33.

27. Holmstrom, B. and J. Tirole. 1989. The Theory of the Firm. Handbook of Industrial Organization: 61–133.

28. Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. American Economic Review 76(2): 323-329.

29. Jensen, M. C. and J. C. Smith. 1985. Stockholder, Manager and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory. Recent Advances in Corporate

Finance. E. I. Altman and M. G. Subrahmanyam. Homewood, Illinois, Irwin:

93-131.

30. Jensen, M. C. and R. Ruback. 1983. The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11: 5-50.

31. Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial

Economics 3: 5-60.

32. John, T. A. 1993. Accounting Measures of Corporate Liquidity, Leverage, and Costs of Financial Distress. Financial Management 22: 91-100.

33. Kester, W. C. 1986. An options approach to corporate finance. Ch. 5 in: E. I.

Altman, ed., Handbook of Corporate Finance, Wiley, New York, NY: 3-35.

34. Kim, C., D. Mauer and A. Sherman. 1998. The Determinants of Corporate Liquidity:Theory and Evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 33: 335-359.

35. Kim, E. 1978. A Mean-Variance Theory of Optimal Capital Structure and Corporate Debt Capacity. Journal of Finance 33: 45-63.

36. Lehn, K. and A. Poulsen. 1989. Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions. Journal of Finance 44: 771-787.

37. Lewellen, W., C. Loderer and K. Martin .1987. Executive Compensation Contracts and Executive Incentive Problem: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of

Accounting and Economics 9(3): 287-310.

38. Lintner, J. 1956. Distribution of Incomes of Corporations among Dividends, Retained Earnings, and Taxes. American Economic Review 46 (2): 97-113.

39. Long, M. and I. Malitz. 1985. The Investment-Financing Nexus: Some Empirical Evidence. Midland Corporate Finance Journal 3(1): 53-59.

40. Mason, S. P., and R. C. Merton. 1985. The Role of Contingent Claims Analysis in Corporate Finance. Recent Advances in Corporate Finance, Homewood, IL:

Richard D. Irwin: 7-54.

41. Masten, S. E., and K. J. Crocker. 1996. Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility

Regulation. Journal of Regulatory Economics 9(1): 5-39.

42. Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts. 1992. Economics, Organization & Management, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall Inc.

43. Miller, M. H. 1977. Debt and Taxes. Journal of Finance 32(2): 261-275.

44. Mitchell, S. C. 1999. Trimethylaminuria: Susceptibility of Heterozygotes. Lancet,

354: 2164-2165.

45. Modigliani, F. and M. H. Miller. 1963. Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: Correction. American Economics Review 53(3): 433-443.

46. . 1958. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment. American Economic Review 48.

47. Myers, S. 1977. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial

Economics 5(2): 147-175.

48. Myers, S. 1984. The Capital Structure Puzzle. Journal of Finance 3(3): 147-175.

49. Myers, S. C., and N. S. Majluf. 1984. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have. Journal

of Financial Economics 13: 187-221.

50. Nielsen, J. F., and R. W. Melicher. 1973. A Financial Analysis of Acquisition and Merger Premiums. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 8 (2):

139-148.

51. Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 1999. The Determinants and Implications of Corporate Cash Holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 52: 3-44.

52. Palia, D. 1993. The Managerial, Regulatory, and Financial Determinants of Bank Merger Premiums. The Journal of Industrial Economics 41 (1): 91-102.

53. Pinegar, J. Michael and W. Lisa. 1989. What Manages Think of Capital Structure. Financial Management (Winter): 82-91.

54. Ross, S. 1977. The Determinations of Financial Structure: The

Incentive-signaling Approach. Bell Journal of Economics 8(1): 23-40.

55. Rozeff, M. S. 1982. Growth, Beta, and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios. Journal of Financial Research 5(3): 249-259.

56. Ryan, J. and E. J. Walsh. 1997. Agency and Tax Explanations of Security Issuance Decisions. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 24(7):

943-961.

57. Scott, J. H. 1976. A Theory of Optimal Capital Structure. Bell Journal of

Economics 7: 33-54.

58. Skinner, D. J. 1993. The Investment Opportunity Set and Accounting Procedure

‧ 國

立 政 治 大 學

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

85

Choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16(4): 407-443.

59. Smith, C. W. and J. Warner. 1979. On the Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants. Journal of Financial Economics 7(2): 117-161.

60. Smith, C. W. and R. L. Watts .1992. The Investment Opportunity Set and

Corporate Financing, Dividend and Compensation Policies. Journal of Financial

Economics 32(3): 263-292.

61. Smith, C.W. and R. Stulz. 1985. The Determinants of Firm’s Hedging Policy.

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 20(4): 391-405.

62. Stiglitz, J. E. 1973. Incentives and Risk-Sharing in Sharecropping. Cowles

Foundation Discussion Papers 353, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.

63. Titman, S. and R. Wessels. 1988. The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice.

Journal of Finance 43(1): 1-19.

64. Varaiya, N. P. 1987. Determinants of Premiums in Acquisition Transactions.

Managerial and Decision Economics 8: 175-184.

65. Woolridge, J. 1983. Stock Dividends as Signals. Journal of Financial Research 6(1): 1-12.

三、網頁部份

1. 台灣電子連接產業協會 http://www.e-teca.org.tw/

2. 公開資訊觀測站 http://www.newmops.tse.com.tw/

3. 工研院產業情報網 http://www.ieknet.itri.org.tw/

4. Bishop Report http://www.connectorstats.com/

5. 電子時報 http://www. digitimes.com.tw/

相關文件