• 沒有找到結果。

險,與 Henriques (2015)的結果一致。

‧ 國

立 政 治 大 學

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

26

本文的實證結果發現,燃油避險與外匯避險對公司價值有正向的關係,但 利率避險卻會傷害公司價值。因此,避險與公司價值無絕對的關係,主要仍是 取決於公司所面臨的風險。全球航空業皆面臨燃油價格波動風險,因此燃油避 險對全球航空公司價值皆有正向的影響。但只有經營國際線的航空公司會面臨 外匯風險,因此外匯避險僅對匯兌曝險大的航空公司會有正向的影響,對無匯 兌風險的航空公司反而會傷害其公司價值。至於利率風險與個別公司的資本結 構、借款利率的種類皆有相關,因此必須蒐集各個公司完整的資料才能找出利 率避險傷害公司價值的原因。建議未來的論文可以朝利率避險如何影響公司價 值的議題發展及針對經理人詳細的獎酬制度對避險行為的影響深入探討。

Australia New Zealand

1.Qantas Airways Ltd. 1995~2014 20.Air New Zealand Ltd. 1996~2014

2.Virgin Australia Holdings Limited. 2003~2014 Pakistan

Canada 21.Pakistan International Airlines Corp. 1997~2014

3.Ace Aviation Holdings Inc. 1996~2014 Russia

4.Air Canada 2006~2013 22.Aeroflot Russian Airlines 2000~2014

5.WestJet Airlines Ltd. 1996~2014 Singapore

Chile 23.Singapore Airlines Ltd. 1997~2014

6.LATAM Airlines Group S A 1996~2014 South Africa

China 24.Comair Ltd. 1999~2014

7.China Eastern Airlines Corp., Ltd. 1996~2014 Sweden

8.China Southern Airlines Co Ltd. 1997~2014 25.SAS AB 2002~2014

Finland Taiwan

9.Finnair Oyj 1996~2014 26.China Airlines, Ltd. 1997~2013

France 27.EVA Airways Corp. 2000~2014

10.Air France-KLM 1997~2014 Thailand

Germany 28.Thai Airways International Public Co. 1998~2014

11.Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft 1997~2014 Turkey

Hong Kong 29.Türk Hava Yollari Anonim Ortakligi 1997~2014

12.Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd. 1998~2014 United Kingdom

Ireland 30.International Consolidated Airlines Group 1996~2014

13.Aer Lingus Group plc 1997~2014 31.Easyjet Plc 2000~2014

14.Ryanair Holdings PLC 1997~2014 United States

Japan 32.Alaska Air Group, Inc. 1995~2014

15.ANA Holdings Inc. 1996~2014 33.Continental Airlines Inc. 1996~2014 16.Japan Airlines Co Ltd 1997~2014 34.FLYi Inc.

Korea (South) 35.Great Lakes Aviation Ltd.

17.Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. 1997~2014 36.Hawaiian Holdings Inc. 1995~2014

Malaysia 37.JetBlue Airways Corp. 2001~2014

18.Malaysian Airline System Bhd. 1997~2013 38.SkyWest Inc. 1995~2014

Netherlands 39.Southwest Airlines Co. 1995~2014

19.KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 1996~2014

Floating-rate for syndicate loan 150.67 141.36 90 9.3 650

Capital expenditures /Sales 0.14 0.14 0.11 -0.0 1

Floating-rate for syndicate loan 119.00 110.12 68 52.5 313

Capital expenditures /Sales 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.0 1

Floating-rate for syndicate loan 319.07 141.32 300 133.3 650

Capital expenditures /Sales 0.15 0.19 0.9 0.0 1

Floating-rate for syndicate loan 132.74 150.81 65 9.3 650

Capital expenditures /Sales 0.17 0.18 0.12 -0.0 1

Floating-rate for syndicate loan 198.81 113.89 197.2 20.0 425

Capital expenditures /Sales 0.11 0.07 0.09 -0.0 0

Floating-rate for syndicate loan 176.87 111.73 162.33 26.5 425

Capital expenditures /Sales 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.0 0

Floating-rate for syndicate loan 124.46 164.58 63.8 9.3 650

Capital expenditures /Sales 0.18 0.19 0.11 -0.0 1

‧ 國

立 政 治 大 學

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

41

表 3 燃油避險行為對公司價值的影響

表 3 以兩個模型(Model 1 及 Model 2)來檢視避險行為對公司價值的關係的結果,兩個模型 不同的地方只有(Model 1)的變數是隔年燃油需求避險比率(Hedge Ratio),(Model 2)的變數是使 用燃油避險衍生性商品(Fuel hedged indicator)的虛擬變數。

以下兩個模型皆採用 OLS 迴歸模型假設。

log( Tobin’s Q )= α+β1(CapExp/Sales)+β2(Long-term Debt/Asset)+

(Model 1) β3(log(Asset))+β4(Total Cash flows/sales)+β5(Cash/sales)

+β6(Dividend Indicator)+β7(Hedge Ratio)+β8(FX Hedged Indicator) +β9(IR Hedged Indicator )+β10(Pass-through) +β11(Charter)+ε

log( Tobin’s Q )= α+β1(CapExp/Sales)+β2(Long-term Debt/Asset)+

(Model 2) β3(log(Asset))+β4(Total Cash flows/sales)+β5(Cash/sales)

+β6(Dividend Indicator)+β7(Fuel Hedged Indicator )+β8(FX Hedged Indicator) +β9(IR Hedged Indicator)+β10(Pass-through) +β11(Charter)+ε

表 3-1 為全部樣本的迴歸結果。之後將全部樣本依地區、油價波動程度和是否加入聯盟分成 9 個子樣本。表 2 為各別地區 Model 1 的迴歸結果。表 3 為各別地區 Model 2 的結果。表 3-4 依油價波動程度不同分類的 Model 1 迴歸結果。表 3-5 依油價波動程度不同分類的 Model 2 迴歸結果。表 3-5 為加入聯盟與未加入聯盟 Model 1 和 Model 2 的迴歸結果。

Capital expenditures /Sales -0.201 -1.392

(-0.19) (-1.33)

Long-term Debt/Asset -0.412 0.808

(-0.45) (0.94)

log(Asset) -0.201* -0.214*

(-1.67) (-1.94)

Total cash flows/Sales 2.693 3.109*

(1.57) (1.91)

Cash/sales -0.102 0.0656

(-0.26) (0.16)

Dividend indicator 0.617** 0.560**

(2.27) (2.18)

Charter indicator -0.217 0.152

(-0.75) (0.55)

Fuel pass-through indicator -0.059 -0.0223

(-0.20) (-0.08)

FX hedged indicator 1.494*** 1.629***

(4.01) (4.59)

IR hedged indicator -1.018*** -1.231***

(-2.82) (-3.55)

Hedge Ratio for next year’s fuel requirement

Fuel hedged indicator

1.406**

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Capital expenditures /Sales -2.063 2.072 1.250*** -3.612

(-0.95) (0.81) (3.73) (-0.88)

Long-term Debt/Asset -5.348*** 8.517*** -0.427 -10.77*

(-3.80) (4.29) (-1.34) (-1.88)

Dividend indicator 1.836*** -1.190** 0.596*** 1.606

(4.96) (-2.20) (2.71) (1.37)

Charter indicator 1.776*** -0.0786 0.536*** -1.900**

(2.88) (-0.12) (3.58) (-2.52)

Fuel pass-through indicator 0.227 -0.240 -0.158 0.242

(0.38) (-0.39) (-1.29) (0.22)

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Capital expenditures /Sales -5.377** 1.025 1.182*** -5.087

(-2.60) (0.42) (3.40) (-1.52)

Long-term Debt/Asset -2.544* 9.050*** -0.461 -2.279

(-1.68) (4.61) (-1.38) (-0.56)

Dividend indicator 1.434*** -0.779 0.420* 0.782

(3.76) (-1.56) (1.69) (0.91)

Charter indicator 2.371*** 0.483 0.577*** -1.631**

(3.51) (0.74) (3.70) (-2.54)

Fuel pass-through indicator -0.655 -0.538 -0.137 1.021

(-1.23) (-0.86) (-1.07) (1.59)

FX hedged indicator 1.575** -1.296 -0.312** 2.395**

(2.11) (-1.31) (-2.10) (2.21)

IR hedged indicator -1.275* -0.295 0.152 -1.726*

(-1.83) (-0.42) (1.19) (-1.68)

Fuel hedged indicator 0.701 1.195 0.0352 -0.671

(0.95) (1.07) (0.27) (-0.61)

Constant -2.337 3.762* -0.576 9.208***

(-0.86) (1.84) (-1.35) (4.28)

N 140 117 77 53

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Variables 1995-2001 2002-2007 2008-2014

Capital expenditures /Sales 5.077 -1.182 1.589

(1.48) (-0.77) (0.53)

Long-term Debt/Asset 2.356 -0.115 -2.840

(1.42) (-0.06) (-1.48)

log(Asset) 0.0596 -0.270 -0.716**

(0.23) (-1.05) (-2.31)

Total cash flows/Sales 4.565 1.091 2.362

(1.12) (0.26) (0.66)

Cash/sales -1.757 0.645 0.0406

(-0.96) (0.48) (0.09)

Dividend indicator 0.0832 0.483 1.514***

(0.15) (0.81) (3.35)

Charter indicator -0.651 0.357 0.182

(-1.17) (0.60) (0.33)

Fuel pass-through indicator 0.230 0.0888 -0.709

(0.34) (0.17) (-1.12)

FX hedged indicator 1.249 0.677 0.465

(1.58) (0.84) (0.70)

IR hedged indicator -1.673** 0.348 -0.981*

(-2.15) (0.38) (-1.89)

Hedge Ratio for next year’s fuel requirement 2.414** 0.734 0.919

(2.07) (0.64) (1.03)

Constant -1.233 1.790 7.749***

(-0.71) (0.98) (3.12)

N 71 108 125

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Variables 1995-2001 2002-2007 2008-2014

Capital expenditures /Sales 1.883 -3.400** 4.285

(0.75) (-2.27) (1.49)

Long-term Debt/Asset 2.455 3.776** -5.094***

(1.52) (2.33) (-2.85)

log(Asset) 0.429 -0.468** -0.812***

(1.63) (-2.14) (-2.87)

Total cash flows/Sales -1.973 0.343 7.471**

(-0.54) (0.09) (2.45)

Cash/sales 1.374 1.018 0.0830

(1.01) (0.88) (0.18)

Dividend indicator 0.145 0.732 1.519***

(0.27) (1.45) (3.49)

Charter indicator 0.108 0.448 0.495

(0.20) (0.85) (0.91)

Fuel pass-through indicator 0.0273 0.319 -0.0826

(0.03) (0.69) (-0.14)

FX hedged indicator 0.703 1.024 0.665

(0.84) (1.46) (1.10)

IR hedged indicator -1.318* -1.166 -0.842*

(-1.85) (-1.52) (-1.66)

Fuel hedged indicator 0.422 1.222* 0.921

(0.61) (1.71) (1.32)

Constant -3.030* 2.929** 7.524***

(-1.81) (2.09) (3.20)

N 105 138 144

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Variables Non alliance alliance Non-alliance alliance

Capital expenditures /Sales -1.860* 2.421 -2.926** 1.973

(-1.69) (0.82) (-2.41) (0.71)

Long-term Debt/Asset -1.291 -1.299 1.947 0.182

(-1.15) (-0.75) (1.60) (0.13)

Dividend indicator 0.605 1.087*** 0.802* 0.523

(1.54) (2.63) (1.93) (1.42)

Charter indicator 0.174 0.0303 0.535 0.0839

(0.43) (0.06) (1.29) (0.20)

Fuel pass-through indicator 0.162 -0.279 -0.00592 -0.0344

(0.42) (-0.57) (-0.01) (-0.08)

FX hedged indicator 1.040** 1.251** 1.577*** 1.587***

(2.12) (2.05) (3.20) (2.88)

IR hedged indicator -0.0248 -1.988*** -0.714 -2.136***

(-0.06) (-3.42) (-1.56) (-3.64)

Hedge Ratio for next year’s fuel requirement

Fuel hedged indicator

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Hedge Ratio=α+β1(CapExp/Sales)+β2(Long-term Debt/Asset)

(Model 3) +β3(log(Asset))+β4(Total Cash flows/sales)+β5(Cash/sales) +β6(Dividend Indicator)+β7(CEO Shares/shares outstanding)+ ε

Variables Model 3

Capital expenditures /Sales -0.105

(-0.77)

Long-term Debt/Asset -0.0609

(-0.52)

log(Asset) 0.0823***

(5.12)

Total cash flows/sales -0.692***

(-2.81)

Cash/sales 0.628***

(6.84)

Dividend indicator 0.0181

(0.40)

CEO shares/shares outstanding 0.0430

(0.24)

Constant -0.370***

(-2.79)

N 209

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

聯貸利率(固定利率)= α +β1(Fuel hedge Indicator)+β2(log(Tobin’s Q)) (Model 4) +β3(Long-term Debt/Asset)+β4(Amount/Aseet)

+β5(Total Cash flow/sales)+β6(Cash/sales)

+β7(Dividend Indicator)+β8(FX Hedged Indicator)+ε

聯貸浮動利率(Spread)= α +β1(Fuel hedged Indicator)+β2(log(Tobin’s Q)) (Model 5) +β3(Long-term Debt/Asset)+β4(Amount/Aseet)

+β5(Total Cash flows/sales)+β6(Cash/sales)

+β7(Dividend Indicator)+β8(FX Hedged Indicator)+ε

Model 4 Model 5

固定利率 浮動利率

Fuel hedged indicator 0.00889 0.00914

(0.74) (1.47)

log(Tobin’s Q) -0.0167 -0.00142

(-0.91) (-0.16)

Long-term Debt /Sales 0.0435* 0.00636

(-1.72) (0.70)

Amount/Asset -1.785 -0.00144

(-1.14) (-0.21)

Total Cash flows/sales 0.00391 0.0103

(0.07) (0.32)

Cash/sales -0.0899** -0.0184

(-2.20) (-1.27)

Dividend indicator 0.00170 0.00112

(0.23) (0.39)

FX hedged indicator -0.0227 -0.00708

(-1.93) (-1.21)

Constant 0.127*** 0.00799

(5.11) (1.11)

N 30 19

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

1. Rueyjiau Lin, 2009 .The effect of hedging on firm value and analyst forecast accuracy: Evidence from the global airline industry.

2. Bruno Lucio Santos Vieira, José Guilherme Chaves Alberto, Sidney Lino de Oliveira, Everaldo Bonaldo,José Luiz Silva Ribeiro, Alex Moreira,2014.Does Hedging Make Economic Sense For American Airlines?

3. Richard Cobbs ,Alex Wolf, Spring 2004.Jet Fuel Hedging Strategies: Options Available for Airlines and a Survey of Industry Practices.

4. MURILLO CAMPELLO, CHEN LIN, YUE MA, and HONG ZOU,2011. The Real and Financial Implications of Corporate Hedging.

5. JOHN R. GRAHAM and DANIEL A. ROGERS,2002. Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax Incentives?

6. David A. Carter, Daniel A. Rogers, and Betty J. Simkins,2006. Does Hedging Affect Firm Value? Evidence from the US Airline Industry.

7. Hany Ahmed, Alcino Azevedo1, Yilmaz Guney,2014. The Effect of Hedging on Firm Value and Performance: Evidence from the Nonfinancial UK Firms.

8. C Lester Westbrooks,2005.Airline Fuel Hedging: An Overview of Hedging Solutions Available to Airlines.

9. Stephen D. Treanor, David A. Carter,Daniel A. Rogers,Betty J. Simkins,2013.

Operational and Financial Hedging: Friend or Foe? Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry.

10. Bob van de Pol,2010.Does hedging increase firm value?

A closer look at fuel hedging in the European Airline Industry.

11. Khondoker Pear Mohammad,2014.Value of Hedging in US Airline Industry: A Perspective on Firm Value & Accounting Performance.

12. Yanbo Jin and Philippe Jorion,2006.Firm Value and Hedging: Evidence from U.S.

Oil and Gas Producers.

13. Yacine Belghitara, Ephraim Clarkb, and Amrit Judgec,2008. The Value Effects of Foreign Currency and Interest Rate Hedging: The UK Evidence.

14. Bartram,Söhnke M, Gregory W. Brown,and Frank R Fehle,2004.International evidence on financial derivatives usage, working paper, University of North Carolina.

15. Allayannis, George, and Eli Ofek, 2001.Exchange rate exposure, hedging and the use of foreign currency derivatives, Journal of international Money and Finance 20,273-296.

16. Nain, Amrita,2004. The strategic motives for corporate risk management, working paper, University of Michigan.

17.Ana Maria Alves Joaquim Henriques,2015.Does risk management increases the firm value?

18. Tufano,Peter,1996.Who manages risk? An empirical examination of risk

management practices in the gold mining industry, Journal of Finance 51,1097- 1137.

19.Géczy,Christopher,Bernadette A. Minton, and Catherine Schrand 1997. Why firms use currency derivatives, Journal of Finance 52,1323-1354.

20.Gay,Greald D., and Jouahn,Nam,1998. The underinvestment problem and corporate derivatives use, Financial Management 27,53-69.

21.Haushalter,G.David, 2000, Financing policies, basis risk, and corporate hedging:

Evidence from oil and gas producers, Journal of Finance 55,107-152.

22. Breeden,Douglas, and S .Viswanathan,1999.Why do firm hedge? An asymmetric information model ,working paper, Duke University.

‧ 國

立 政 治 大 學

N a tio na

l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y

52

23. Rogers,Daniel A.,2002.Does executive portfolio structure affect risk

management ?CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate derivatives usage,

Journal of Banking & Finance 26,271-295.

相關文件