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第四章 結論
由於傳統文獻在探討廠商是否進入產業的決策，忽略了租稅環境對廠商的影 響，因此，本文以 Bennett and Estrin（2013）設定模型為基本模型，在利潤稅制 與公司稅制等兩種稅制下，分別探討廠商進入產業的決策。文中的主要發現：首 先，利潤稅制下，稅制的中立性成立，此時，稅率大小亦無法影響廠商進入市場 決策，課稅前後廠商家數相同。其次，在公司稅制下，稅制的中立性不成立，且 先進者家數一定與後進者家數則較課稅前少，結果與一般經濟直覺一致。再者，
一般經濟直覺會認為降低稅率可以吸引廠商投入新市場，然在公司稅制下，本文 的結果卻得出稅率與先進者家數不確定關係，即可能出現稅率越高，先進者家數 越高。這是一個很有趣的發現，一般經濟直覺會認為先進者在公司稅制下，繳越 多稅金，先進者家數應該會較課稅前少；然而，本文得出的結果卻可能與一般直 覺不同，可能的理由為公司稅制先進者進入市場時，其進入市場時點屬收入與工 資成本不確定的情形，稅率越高雖然增加稅金成本，然亦代表稅基可扣除的費用 金額提高，在廠商無法確定淨獲利情形下，吸引原為後進者之廠商成為先進者投 入市場。而市場均衡家數在廠商收入及工資成本可確定後，此時，公司稅制廠商 會因增加稅金成本及租稅不中立情形，造成其家數較課稅前低
由於本文是在假設廠商付出相同沉沒成本及工資，並未考量廠商的異質性，
建議未來後者的研究方向可朝向設計市場上有大小廠商之分，再探討利潤稅制及 公司稅制對先進者與後進者最適家數之影響。
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