由實證結果顯示，北歐公司在發行 ADR 後，沒有如過去文獻指出海外上市 得以為公司帶來股價溢酬而有助公司績效的提升，由於北歐公司於美國發行 ADR 的時間點適逢金融海嘯，因而造成發行 ADR 後之績效表現不如從前，大環 境的影響下削弱了 ADR 之發行可能為公司帶來之正面影響。
而企業海外上市是否會因受外部法律規範的影響而提升公司治理與績效，進 一步探究美國沙賓法案對發行 ADR 公司之影響發現，企業有提升公司治理之效 果，但相對的因美國 SOX 帶來的成本效應而使績效不如從前。另外，北歐公司 發行 ADR 之情況不如 Boubakri (2010)所說的美國 SOX 後企業較偏好可融資型態 之 ADR，北歐公司主要還是以發行 level I ADR 為主，因發行型態受法規管制較 寬鬆，負面影響較不明顯。企業可能為因應全球化市場，期望提升知名度與拓展 市場而在海外掛牌。另一方面，北歐公司因公司治理法的規範，使績效有明顯的 提升，與西班牙與印度的代表性法法規一樣，國內法規確實落實了公司治理，也 使得市場給予公司正面的評價。
整體來看，北歐公司在發行 ADR、美國沙賓法案與北歐公司治理法後皆有 提升內部公司治理之效果，而且也因法令效力的不同而對內部公司治理產生不同 程度的影響，印證空前由聯邦政府強行通過的美國 SOX 確實對公司治理產生較 明顯的變化，而北歐當地法規則有較發行 ADR 帶來較明顯的影響，顯示 ADR 之發行僅受到體制內的影響，且因發行型態受到的管制又更寬鬆，為企業帶來的 公司治理效益不大。
而在探討公司治理與績效的關聯性發現，北歐公司發行 ADR 之行為實與股 權集中度影響績效有關，發行不具籌資功能之 level I ADR，使公司得以維持適 當的股權結構，當內部人因持股與公司利益有更深的關聯時，愈有提升公司績效
24
的誘因；董事會委員會設立愈完善，監督機制得宜下，與企業績效愈有正面的相 關性；而 CEO 任期愈長，則愈能夠以其豐富的經驗帶領企業實現更高的價值。
在研究限制方面，本文資料來源受限於資料庫之不齊，針對北歐發行 ADR 之公司我們只能透過 Compustate 以及企業公告之年報蒐集資料，部分樣本資料 也因此而受限。再者，北歐發行 ADR 之型態多為 level I ，故無法針對發行型態 做比較，甚至事件研究對發行型態之選擇等較多面向之探討。
未來，本文得以延伸之研究，(1)可以將資料對象由北歐發行ADR公司擴展到 北歐非ADR公司，藉由配對公司探討ADR之發行動機以及公司治理之差異等更為豐 富的議題。(2)以工具變數(Instrumental variables)處理變數內生性問題，藉由二階 迴歸(two-stage least squares) 做進一步探討(Michael F.et.al,2002)。(3)藉由迴歸分析 在同一條迴歸式中依序加入事件之交乘項，使得在三種事件對公司治理影響程度 的比較上更為客觀。
25
26
27
Delete financial & insurance industries
16 16
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Compensation 虛擬變數，1表示公司有設立薪酬委員會；0則沒有設立薪酬委員會(A. Klein, 1998)
Remuneration 虛擬變數，1表示公司有設立薪酬委員會；0則沒有設立薪酬委員會
29
30
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed), unpaired t test.
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表 8-1、北歐地區 ADR 發行前後對公司治理與整體績效的影響
Obs Pre-
Obs Post-
Difference T Obs Pre-
Obs Post-
Difference T
ADR ADR ADR ADR
公司特徵變數 前後 1 期 前後 2 期
Tobin's Q 64 2.6 64 2.13 0.47 0.8 121 3 126 2.06 0.95 1.86 **
MB 64 6.82 64 4.55 2.27 0.93 121 7.99 126 3.05 4.94 1.99 **
ROA 71 0.07 69 0.03 0.04 2.21 *** 133 0.07 135 0.04 0.03 2.43 ***
ROE 71 0.25 69 0.12 0.13 1.65 ** 133 0.23 135 0.06 0.17 2.53 ***
Risk(ROE) 62 0.09 68 0.14 -0.04 -1.15 117 0.13 132 0.17 -0.04 -0.51
Risk(ROA) 62 0.03 68 0.04 -0.01 -0.84 117 0.03 132 0.04 -0.01 -0.99
LnSales 71 7.5 69 7.6 -0.1 -0.33 134 7.35 135 7.65 -0.3 -1.36 *
LnAsset 71 7.75 69 7.92 -0.17 -0.77 133 7.66 135 7.97 -0.32 -2 **
SalesG 63 0.35 68 0.2 0.15 1.06 119 0.35 132 0.14 0.21 2.52 ***
AssetG 63 0.38 68 0.21 0.17 0.81 119 0.39 132 0.13 0.26 2.19 **
D/A 71 0.57 69 0.55 0.01 0.5 133 0.55 135 0.55 0 -0.11
D/E 71 1.99 69 1.75 0.24 0.59 133 1.82 135 1.34 0.47 1.38 *
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed), unpaired t test.
32
表 8-2、北歐地區 ADR 發行前後對公司治理與整體績效的影響
Obs Pre-
Obs Post-
Difference T Obs Pre-
Obs Post-
Difference T
ADR ADR ADR ADR
公司治理變數 前後 1 期 前後 2 期
Board Size 70 8.82 68 8.92 -0.09 -0.2 133 8.75 134 9.07 -0.32 -0.92
Independent 54 0.58 56 0.61 -0.03 -0.64 103 0.59 108 0.61 -0.02 -0.68
Audit 71 0.66 68 0.86 -0.2 -2.91 *** 135 0.64 134 0.87 -0.23 -4.53 ***
Compensation 71 0.38 68 0.38 0 -0.03 135 0.4 134 0.37 0.03 0.45
Remuneration 71 0.33 68 0.38 -0.05 -0.54 135 0.31 134 0.38 -0.07 -1.2
Nomination 71 0.61 68 0.66 -0.05 -0.51 135 0.61 134 0.69 -0.08 -1.36 *
Insti_Top1 54 0.16 56 0.19 -0.03 -0.73 106 0.17 108 0.19 -0.02 -0.97
Insit_Own 54 0.41 56 0.42 -0.01 -0.18 106 0.41 108 0.41 0 -0.08
Own Concern 54 0.06 56 0.08 -0.02 -0.9 106 0.06 108 0.08 -0.02 -1.24
Insider Own 65 0.06 66 0.06 0 0.09 124 0.07 129 0.06 0.01 0.67
CEO Own 63 0 63 0 0 0.85 121 0 124 0 0 1.95 **
CEO Tenure 70 4.72 68 4.54 0.12 0.32 133 4.63 133 4.49 0.14 0.34
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed), unpaired t test.
33
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed), unpaired t test.
34
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed), unpaired t test.
35
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed), unpaired t test.
36
表 11、迴歸模型變數相關分析
Tobin's Q Ln Asset D/E Insider Own CEO Age
CEO
Tenure Committee Independent Tobin's Q 1.0000
Ln Asset -0.2239 *** 1.0000
D/E 0.0580 0.1090 *** 1.0000
Insider Own 0.0833 ** -0.3324 *** -0.0362 1.0000
CEO Age -0.0871 ** 0.0943 ** 0.0351 -0.0616 1.0000
CEO Tenure 0.0359 0.1214 *** 0.0297 0.0359 0.2465 *** 1.0000
Committee 0.0654 * 0.2557 *** 0.0306 0.0081 0.0041 0.1078 *** 1.0000
Independent 0.0288 -0.0972 ** -0.0353 -0.3277 *** -0.048 -0.0638 -0.2015 *** 1.0000
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed), using Pearson correlation test
37
表 12-1 、北歐國家公司治理與績效的關聯性分析(複迴歸結果)
Tobin′sQ = α0+ α1Independent + α2Committee + α3Insider Own + α4CEO Age + α5CEO Tenure + α6Ln Asset + α7𝐷 𝐸⁄ + α8Industry Dummy + α9Year Dummy + ε.
變數 / 模型 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Insider Own 2.9025 ** 2.3955 ** 4.0882 ** 4.1496 ** 4.1324 ** 4.2023 ** 3.9026 **
CEO Age -0.0583 ** -0.0587 ** -0.0736 ***
CEO Tenure 0.1146 **
Committee 0.876 *** 1.0528 *** 1.1303 *** 1.0814 *** 1.1830 *** 1.0630 ***
Independent 1.1399 1.2734 0.7540 0.8953 0.7289 Control
Ln Asset -0.1939 ** -0.2633 *** -0.2379 * -0.2376 * -0.2619 ** -0.2650 ** -0.2415 * D/E 0.1161 ** 0.1179 ** 0.1012 0.0992 0.1109 0.1067 0.1020
year dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 676 676 464 467 442 444 437
Const 2.626 *** 3.0981 *** 2.1780 1.0986 3.9687 3.9184 4.2462
Adj R-squared 0.1308 0.1425 0.1528 0.1535 0.1668 0.1678 0.1735
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed)
38
表 12-2、北歐國家公司治理與績效的關聯性分析(複迴歸結果)
Tobin′sQ = α0+ α1Independent + α2Committee + α3Insider Own + α4CEO Age + α5CEO Tenure + α6Eventi+ α7Ln Asset + α8𝐷 𝐸⁄ + α9Industry Dummy + α10Year Dummy + ε.
其中事件變數分別為發行 ADR 之虛擬變數(ADR Dummy);美國頒佈沙賓法案之虛擬變數(USSOX Dummy);公司治理法案頒布之 虛擬變數(Nordic code Dummy)
變數 / 模型 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Insider Own 3.5154 ** 3.5072 ** 3.3035 ** 4.2227 ** 4.3905 ** 4.1204 ** 4.0882 ** 4.1324 ** 3.7987 **
CEO Age -0.0359 -0.0462 * -0.0565 ** -0.0687 ** -0.0583 ** -0.0742 ***
CEO Tenure 0.0876 * 0.1168 * 0.1147 **
Committee 0.9573 *** 0.9760 *** 0.8938 ** 1.0542 *** 1.1006 *** 0.9501 ** 1.0528 *** 1.0814 *** 0.9575 ***
Independent 1.2657 * 0.8834 0.7654 1.1137 0.7294 0.5605 1.1399 0.7540 0.5623 Event
ADR Dummy -0.5458 * -0.5492 * -0.5004
USSOX Dummy 0.0963 1.6208 2.5645
Nordic code Dummy 0.5245 0.3598 0.6070 Control
Ln Asset -0.2105 * -0.2358 * -0.2343 * -0.2383 * -0.2622 * -0.2328 -0.2379 * -0.2619 ** -0.2392 * D/E 0.0820 0.0949 0.0938 0.1019 0.1119 0.1080 0.1012 0.1109 0.1076
year dummy no no no no no no no no no
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 412 391 384 436 414 407 464 442 435
Const 2.3962 ** 4.5891 *** 4.8155 *** 1.7954 5.1467 ** 4.9698 ** 2.1780 3.9687 3.3514 Adj R-squared 0.1492 0.1606 0.1619 0.1523 0.1659 0.1711 0.1528 0.1668 0.1723
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed)
39
表 13-1、北歐國家公司治理與績效的關聯性分析(穩健性檢定)
MB = α0+ α1Independent + α2Committee + α3Insider Own + α4CEO Age + α5CEO Tenure + α6Ln Asset + α7𝐷 𝐴⁄ + α8Industry Dummy + α9Year Dummy + ε.
變數 / 模型
MB (1) (2) (3) (4) Insider Own 10.5542 ** 16.0979 ** 16.6233 ** 16.1119 * CEO Age -0.2441 ** -0.2748 **
CEO Tenure 0.2167
Committee 3.9094 *** 5.2714 *** 5.4054 *** 5.1266 ***
Independent 3.1859 2.0534 1.5856 Control
Ln Asset(Size) -1.0080 *** -1.0002 * -1.1573 * -1.0505 D/A(Leverage) 19.5427 *** 22.6729 *** 23.8499 *** 23.1513 ***
year dummy yes yes yes yes Industry dummy yes yes yes yes
N 676 467 444 437
Const -2.1893 -8.362 -0.0744 2.9511
Adj R-squared 0.0995 0.1032 0.1180 0.1177
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed)
40
表 13-2 、北歐國家公司治理與績效的關聯性分析(穩健性檢定)
MB = α0+ α1Independent + α2Committee + α3Insider Own + α4CEO Age + α5CEO Tenure + α6Eventi+ α7Ln Asset + α8𝐷 𝐴⁄ + α9Industry Dummy + α10Year Dummy + ε.
其中事件變數分別為發行 ADR 之虛擬變數(ADR Dummy);美國頒佈沙賓法案之虛擬變數(USSOX Dummy);公司治理法案頒布之虛擬變數 (Nordic code Dummy)
變數 / 模型 MB (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Insider Own 13.9205 * 14.3671 * 14.1751 * 15.9911 * 16.9079 * 16.4745 * 11.3335 ** 15.9567 * 15.3204 * CEO Age -0.1415 -0.1539 -0.2341 * -0.2557 * -0.2463 ** -0.2782 **
CEO Tenure 0.0893 0.1878 0.2182
Committee 4.7850 *** 4.8534 *** 4.7240 ** 4.9703 *** 5.0704 *** 4.7439 ** 3.9352 *** 4.9389 *** 4.6306 ***
Independent 3.4400 2.4431 2.1947 2.2559 1.0210 0.5338 1.4554 0.9009 Eventi
ADR Dummy -3.1065 ** -2.8656 * -2.7970 *
USSOX Dummy 1.4084 7.8375 9.6659
Nordic code Dummy 1.0863 1.1184 1.5741
Control
Ln Asset -0.7456 -0.9095 -0.8654 -1.0548 -1.2062 * -1.0762 -0.9567 ** -1.1192 * -1.0065 D/A 18.8174 *** 20.4007 *** 20.0307 *** 23.6647 *** 24.9652 *** 24.2441 *** 19.6374 *** 23.7900 *** 23.1268 ***
year dummy no no no no no no no no no
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 412 391 384 436 414 407 629 442 435
Const -3.9361 4.0302 4.2839 -6.5422 6.3354 5.9741 -2.7567 0.0834 -1.1119 Adj R-squared 0.0820 0.0904 0.0876 0.1032 0.1174 0.1165 0.0958 0.1163 0.1160
***, **, * Indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed)
41
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