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5. 結論
傳統出口貿易政策之討論常圍繞於從價及從量補貼，然而成本補貼亦為一 可行之政策方式，而 Liang et al. (2017)係於廠商間成本同質之假設下分析不同 政策之社會福利效果，因此本文擴展翁堃嵐及郭虹瑩(2010)一文，在多家本國 廠商於固定邊際成本下生產時，比較從價、從量及成本補貼三種出口貿易政策 社會福利水準之大小。本文發現，在固定總產出的情形下，若忽略補貼造成之 社會成本，當廠商之邊際成本同質，從量、從價及成本補貼三種貿易政策之社 會福利水準相同；當廠商之邊際成本有異質性時，從價及成本補貼下之社會福 利水準相同，且低於從量補貼貿易政策下之社會福利水準。若考慮補貼造成之 社會成本，當廠商成本同質，且廠商之平均邊際成本高於成本補貼下之平均成 本，成本補貼之社會福利水準最高，從量補貼次之，從價補貼為末；廠商之平 均邊際成本低於成本補貼下之平均成本，從量補貼之社會福利水準最高，成本 補貼次之，從價補貼為末。當廠商邊際成本有異質性，且廠商之平均邊際成本 高於成本補貼下之平均成本，從價補貼之社會福利水準為三種政策之末，而從 量補貼及成本補貼下之社會福利水準大小無法直接判定；廠商之平均邊際成本 低於成本補貼下之平均成本，從量補貼之社會福利水準最高，成本補貼次之，
從價補貼為末。因此，在固定邊際成本，且總產出相同之生產模型下，三種貿 易政策之優劣取決於廠商成本之異質性以及廠商平均邊際成本與成本補貼下之 平均成本之關係。為進一步分析三種貿易政策下社會福利水準之高低，本文亦 在不限制總產出的情況下求取使社會福利極大化之補貼率以及政策實施後之社 會福利水準，並以數值模擬分析得到類似之結果。
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