本文建立一個三家廠商的混合寡占模型以探討廠商間的技術授權行為及其 對政府民營化政策之影響。在模型中，假設有一家公營廠商及兩家民營廠商生產 同質產品並從事 Cournot 數量競爭，並假設其中一家民營廠商可將其擁有可降低 生產成本之製程專利技術授權給其它廠商，此外，假設公營廠商生產之邊際成本 高於另兩家民營廠商。技術專利廠商在單位費用授權、固定費用授權及混合費用 授權等授權模式中選擇最適的授權契約；技術專利廠商的授權決策選擇則有四 種：僅授權給公營廠商、僅授權給民營廠商、同時授權給兩家或者不授權；政府 民營化政策的選擇則僅有維持公營或完全民營化兩種。
本文在混合寡占市場結構下得到的主要結果如下：首先，當技術專利廠商欲 將其技術授權給公營廠商時，在某些參數條件之下，公營廠商可能不會接受民營 廠商的技術授權，反之，當公營廠商接受民營廠商的技術授權時，單位權利金授 權、固定權利金授權及混合權利金授權三種授權模式皆為可行，且當採單位權利 金授權時，其單位權利金必小於一單位的製程創新程度，這些結果皆與過去文獻 所得廠商間授權行為必發生之情況大不相同。再者，當技術專利廠商欲將其技術 授權給另一家民營廠商時，其最適授權模式為收取固定權利金，此一結果與過去 文獻的主要結果，當兩廠商間之原始邊際成本無差異時，技術專利廠商的最適授 權契約為單位權利金授權並不相同。最後，技術專利廠商同時授權給公營廠商及 另一家民營廠商之情形將不會發生，此一結果亦與過去文獻之論點，在寡占市場 結構下的授權行為，技術專利廠商必定會授權予兩家明顯不同。
上述這些發現大多和以往與技術授權相關文獻所得民營廠商間的授權行為 有所差異，其皆與混合寡占下之訂價原則息息相關，顯示出混合寡占此一有別於 寡占的市場結構，對廠商間的技術授權關係之成立及技術專利廠商最適授權模式 之制定有不同以往的影響，故在探討技術授權等議題時，應將混合寡占市場結構 納入考量。此外，為進一步探討民營化議題，本文並且討論寡占市場結構下的技
術授權行為，其結果則多半與過去文獻一致，唯有在僅授權給一家廠商時，其最 適授權模式，可能因被授權廠商原始的生產效率不同而有所差別。
最後，若考量技術授權，則得到其可能降低政府民營化公營廠商的誘因之結 果，可望進而改變政府的民營化政策，使政府在原先不考量技術授權下本欲民營 化公營廠商之決定，因公營廠商本身或由另一家民營廠商接受技術專利廠商之技 術授權而獲得暫緩，且無論公營廠商最終民營化與否，技術專利廠商必與市場中 的其中一家廠商發生授權關係，這些結果在在顯示在混合寡占市場中考量廠商間 的技術授權行為有著不可或缺的重要性，並且接受民營廠商的技術授權可望成為 政府民營化公營廠商的替代方案之一。
參考文獻
Cato, S. (2011), “Privatization policy and cost-reducing investment by the private sector”, The Manchester School, 79, 1157-1178.
Chang, M.-C. (2010), “Insider patent holder licensing in an oligopoly market with different cost structure: Fixed-fee, royalty, and auction”, Economics Bulletin, 30, 20-31.
Chirwa, E.W. (2001), “Privatization and technical efficiency: Evidence from the manufacturing sector in Malawi”, African Development Review, 13, 276-307.
Cremer, H., Marchand, M. and Thisse, J.-F. (1989), “The public firm as an instrument for regulating an oligopolistic market”, Oxford Economic Papers, 41, 283-301.
De Fraja, G. and Delbono, F. (1989), “Alternative strategies of a public enterprise in oligopoly”, Oxford Economic Papers, 41, 302-311.
Forfuri, A. and Roca, E. (2004), “Optimal licensing strategy: royalty or fixed Fee?”, International Journal of Business and Economics, 3, 13-19.
George, K. and La Manna, M.M.A. (1996), “Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership”, Review of Industrial Organization, 11, 853-860.
Heywood, J.S. and Ye, G. (2009), “Partial privatization in a mixed duopoly with an R&D rivalry”, Bulletin of Economic Research, 61, 165-178.
Ishibashi, I. and Matsumura, T. (2006), “R&D competition between public and private sectors”, European Economic Review, 50, 1347-1366.
Kamien, M.I. and Tauman, Y. (1986), “Fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 471-491.
Kamien, M.I., Oren, S. and Tauman, Y. (1992), “Optimal licensing of a cost-reducing innovation”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 21, 483-508.
Kamien, M. and Tauman, Y. (2000), “Patent licensing: The inside story”, The
Manchester School, 70, 7-15.
Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. (1986), “How to License Intangible Property,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 567-590.
Lin, M.H. and Ogawa, H. (2005), “Cost reducing incentives in a mixed duopoly market”, Economics Bulletin, 12, 1-6.
Lu, C.M., Lee, J.Y. and Huang, C.S. (2009), “Technology Licensing and Enterprise Systems”, International Conference on Business Management and Information Technology Application (BMITA 2009), Kaohsiung.
Matsumura, T. (1998), “Partial privatization in mixed duopoly”, Journal of Public Economics, 70, 473-482.
Matsumura, T. and Matsushima, N. (2004), “Endogenous cost differentials between public and private enterprises: A mixed duopoly approach”, Economica, 71, 671-688.
Matsumura, T. and Shimizu, D. (2010), “Privatization waves”, The Manchester School, 78, 609-625.
Matsumura, T. and Ogawa, A. (2012), “Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly”, Economics Letters, 116, 174-177.
Merrill, R.G. and Schneider, N. (1966), “Government firms in oligopoly industries: A short-run analysis”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80, 400-412.
Mukherjee, A. and Sinha, U. (2011), “Can cost asymmetry be a rationale for privatization?”, Working Paper.
Plane, P. (1999), “Privatization, technical efficiency and welfare consequences: The case of the Côte d'Ivoire electricity company (CIE)”, World Development, 27, 343-360.
Poddar, S. and Sinha, U. (2010), “Patent licensing from a high-cost firm to a low-cost firm”, Economic Record, 86, 384-395.
Poyago-Theotoky, J. (1998), “R&D competition in a mixed duopoly under uncertainty and easy imitation”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 26, 415-428.
Sen, D. (2005), “Fee versus Royalty Reconsidered,” Games and Economic Behavior, 53, 141-147.
Sen, D. and Tauman, Y. (2007), “General Licensing Schemes for a Cost-reducing Innovation,” Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 163-186.
Shy, O. (1995), Industrial Organization: Theory and Application, the MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Wang, X.H. (1998), “Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model”, Economics Letters, 60, 55-62.
Wang, X.H. and Yang, B. (1999), “On licensing under Bertrand competition”, Australian Economic Papers, 38, 106-119.
Wang, X.H. (2002), “Fee versus royalty licensing in a differentiated Cournot duopoly”, Journal Economics and Business, 54, 253-266.
Willner, J. (1994), “Welfare maximisation with endogenous average costs”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 12, 373-386.
Yi, S.S. (1998), “Whom to license patented technology”, Managerial and Decision Economics, 19, 189-195.