本文建立一個兩國兩廠商的模型，在模型中，有一外國廠商選擇以出口或 FDI 的 模式進入地主國市場與地主國廠商競爭，藉以分析貿易自由化對於外國廠商之進入模 式，國際技術授權行為以及兩國福利的影響。本文假設外國廠商可與地主國廠商簽訂技 術授權後，使用或不使用自有創新技術生產的授權契約，本文發現以下有趣的結果，在 外國廠商採取出口模式下，當關稅稅率較低時，其最適授權契約為使用自有技術的單位 權利金授權契約，當關稅稅率較高時，其最適授權契約為不使用自有技術的固定權利金 授權契約。此外，我們也發現在某些參數條件下，地主國降低進口關稅(貿易自由化)可 能反而會讓外國廠商由出口策略轉而採取 FDI 的進入模式，而導致外國廠商、地主國 廠商及地主國福利皆下降，造成「三輸」的情況，也可能讓外國廠商由 FDI 轉為出口，
而造成三贏的局面。
本文的分析結果顯示，在考慮外國廠商的技術授權行為後，貿易自由化不但可能降 低外國廠商的利潤，甚至反會吸引其到地主國 FDI，並造成三敗俱傷的情況，此一結果 與過去探討外國廠商進入模式的文獻結果，截然不同。
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附錄
9
斜率的凸函數(convex function)。此外，
225
(iii) 當t2D ≤t≤tD時，授權契約為固定權利金，此時，外國廠商 1 的均衡利潤為
9
金，利潤為
即 7 ) ( 2 a−c
ε < ，則如圖 3(ii)所示，若調降關稅稅率導致外國廠商由出口變成 FDI，則其
臨界稅率 必大於 ，此時，若 ，則 ，因此，
外國廠商由出口變成 FDI 會導致地主國的福利提高(下降)。同理，若 ，亦即 t2c tm t2c>(<)tJ SWEDf(t2c)<SWEDf(tJ)=SWF
m Y
J t t
t > 1 >
17 ) ( 7 7
) (
2 a−c <ε < a−c ，我們亦可得出，調降關稅稅率導致外國廠商由出口變成 FDI，
導致地主國的福利提高或下降。若t1Y >tJ，則 a−c <ε<a−c 17
) (
7 ，則如圖 3(iii)所示，
若調降關稅稅率導致外國廠商由出口變成 FDI，則其臨界稅率 必大於 。此時，若關 稅 稅 率 由
t2c tJ t
t
t2c< < 調 降 為 ， 地 主 國 的 福 利 將 由 提 升 為
，因此，調降關稅稅率吸引外國廠商 FDI 並不會造成地主國之福利下 降，而產生「三輸」的情況。
tc
t< 2 SWEDf(t>t2c)
F J
EDf t SW
SW ( )=
38