97 年 12 月 29 日
報告人姓名 湯京平 服務機構
及職稱
國立政治大學政治學系 教授
時間 會議地點
2007 年 7 月 3 日至 6 日 荷蘭阿姆斯特丹
本會核定 補助文號
NSC 95-2414-H-004-069
（吳大猷先生紀念獎）
會議 名稱
(中文)第七屆組織、社區與國家多樣性國際研討會
(英文)Diversity in Organizations, Communities & Nations (7th) 發表論文
題目
(中文) 新興多元政治下的權力持續
（英文）The Persistence of Power in Emerging Pluralistic Politics:
The Case of a Chinese Urban Community Election in Shanghai
附 件 三
報告內容應包括下列各項：
一、參加會議經過
該會議於阿姆斯特丹近郊的學校 OZW-School of Health 舉行，會場是一棟充滿後現代流
線感的建築，似乎和會議的主題「多樣性相互呼應」。歷經十個小時的航行，由機場搭
五、攜回資料名稱及內容
攜回所採購之新舊書籍 8 本，並自網頁下載論文 10 餘篇。
會議論文
The Persistence of Power in Emerging Pluralistic Politics:
The Case of a Chinese Urban Community in Shanghai
Ching-Ping Tang Professor
Department of Political Science National Chengchi University
886-2-29393091 x 50740 polcpt@ccu.edu.tw
Chung-Yuan Chiu Master Political Science
National Chung-Cheng University
Shu Keng Associate Professor
Graduate Institute of East Asian Study National Chengchi University
The Persistence of Power in Emerging Pluralistic Politics:
The Case of a Chinese Urban Community in Shanghai Introduction
In spite of its disputable human rights record and many other critiques, the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) is among a handful of communist parties that still remain in power in the world. Even more surprising is that, over the past quarter of a century, this notorious regime has led the country to astounding success in economic development even under international economic sanctions following the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989. Such a combination of unexpected phenomena, together with the sharp contrast in the cases of Eastern European countries and former Soviet Union states, has inspired spirited reflection upon the traditional wisdom regarding the political requirements for economic development.1
Among other issues, a burgeoning literature has focused on the state capacity either in carrying out necessary economic reforms and deploying development strategies on the one hand, or in maintaining sustainable social stability under rapid economic transition and dramatic social changes on the other. Such an examination of the quality of the governing systems as a prerequisite for good economic performance dates back to the scholarly attention paid to the East Asian miracle first by Japan and followed by little dragons such as Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore since more than two decades ago. The tentative conclusion seems to support the proposition that a strong state
embedded in society can most effectively govern the market and orchestrate the reforms necessary for economic development.2
Echoing such a state-centered argument, the ongoing experiments of the
1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner (eds.), Economic Reform and Democracy (Baltimore & London:
John Hopkins University Press, 1995); David Kotz, Revolution From Above: The Demise of the Soviet System (London & New York: Routledge, 1997). For recent debates, see Yu-Shan Wu, “Chinese Economic Reform in a Comparative Perspective: Asia vs. Europe”, Issues & Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4/Vol. 39, No.1 (Dec.
2002/Mar. 2003), pp. 93-138; Wing Thye Woo, “A United Front for the Common Objective to Understand China‟s Economic Growth: A Case of Non-antagonistic Contradiction,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June, 2003), pp. 1-23; Yu-Shan Wu, “Institutions and Policies Must Bear the Responsibility: Another Case of Non-antagonistic Contradiction,” Issues & Studies, Vol.39, No. 2 (June 2003), pp. 24-40.
2 For example, Chalmers A. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1986); Gordon White & Jack Gray (eds), Developmental States in East Asia (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1988); Daniel I. Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market:
Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989); Alice H.
Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press,
post-communist transition since the late 1990s also demonstrate the importance of the political infrastructure for a country to survive the traumatic reform process. Studies indicate that the shark therapy conducted by many post-communist transition leaders has caused great social uncertainty by bringing about the reconstruction of the political and economic governing system. By contrast, the gradualist approach in China seems to be a workable reform path for socialist transition.
Although quite plausible retrospectively, such a proposition apparently simplifies the complicated dynamics of reforms. Several times in their history, the Soviet Union and many other Eastern and Central European countries have struggled against the gridlock of command economies with their piecemeal reforms, but they have eventually failed. It is common sense to every political leader that drastic reform measures would entice strong counter strikes and uncertain chain effects, and therefore such measures are much more risky. It is quite plausible to propose that when the society is under tight party control, the political leaders should have no incentive to undergo any large-scale political reforms that might endanger their dominance. On the contrary, when social control has been substantially weakened, such as the cases in Budapest, Warsaw, and Moscow where mass strikes were rallied by environmentalists and workers on the verge of democratic transition, political leaders will tend to consider the shark-therapy alternatives more seriously.3 In other words, the capacity of the state in social control could play a key role in the choice of the strategies adopted by these countries.
For a long time since the death of Chairman Mao, China conducted reforms step by step without causing uncontrollable social turmoil. The case of China reveals incredible effectiveness in controlling the social unrest that rapid market transition and social change could have caused as in the cases of the other former communist regimes. The scale of the problems tends to be drastically extended given the breadth of territory, the sheer size and diversity of population, and the complexity of landscape and associated physical environment with which this country is endowed. As the reform proceeded, the fiat power of party cadres in the command economy drastically diminished after the market transition, the ideology for mass political mobilization faded away, the administrative
3 Kornai, János, The Road to a Free Economy: Shifting from a Socialist System: The Example of Hungary (New York: Norton, 1990); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991);
Vedat Milor (eds.), Changing Political Economies (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Minxin Pei, From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA &
London: Harvard University Press, 1994); Kazimierz Z. Poznanski (eds.), The Evolutionary Transition to Capitalism (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995); David Stark, Post-Socialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998);
Kenneth J. Arrow, et al., Special Issue on Economic Transition, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 156, No. 1 (Mar. 2000), pp. 1-310.
controlling mechanisms slackened, and grassroots elections introduced, political elites indeed had to surrender substantial power to economic and social actors. Macro-societal trends are not so much determined by omnipotent planners, but by the strategic response of interest holders to institutions that are also subject to rapid transition. Against such a backdrop, the CCP‟s success in social control has become even more puzzling.
To solve this puzzle, this study examines the subtle exercise of grassroots social networks that have been utilized by party cadres in Chinese urban settings. This case study explores how market transition and electoral institutions have essentially reshaped the political contours of an urban community near the city of Shanghai, and how the grassroots party cadres have reacted accordingly in carrying out their missions of social control. This case indicates that these end-pipe party cadres in communities can
effectively utilize such informal mechanisms as a political legacy and as personal struggle skills to effectively adapt to the new institutional environment and power structures.
These findings attest to a symbiotic coalition between the party-state and the burgeoning society. While the fledging social groups sought to extend their influence in the public sphere through the opportunities provided by newly-introduced democratic devices, the party-state intended to reinforce its reign through more sophisticated manipulation of its relationship with these social groups. The democratic devices, or specifically the grassroots elections, were drills for incorporating the social network into the existing social mobilization system, while the election results were used to measure the
achievements associated with such drills. The base-level cadres largely fared well by applying the political skills learned in previous mass political campaigns. This study, furthermore, makes a unique contribution by delineating in detail the challenges of newly-emerging clientelism in urban China and how political elites have remained functional and have stayed in power. A broader implication regarding community governance in a fast-changing society can also be inferred from this study.
State Capacity and Social Stability
Many students of the post-socialist transition are stunned by the sharp contrast in the political and social consequences of similar efforts in market transition conducted by different communist regimes.4 The legendary record of “third-wave democratization”
4 John W. Lewis & Xue Litai, “Social Change and Political Reform in China: Meeting the Challenges of Success”, China Quarterly, No. 176 (Dec. 2003), pp. 903–25; for social stratification and social inequality, see Victor Nee & Rebecca Matthews, “Market Transition and Social Transformation in Reforming State Socialism”, Annual Review of Sociology, No. 22 (1996), pp. 401-35 and Andrew G. Walder “Markets and Inequality in Transitional Economies: Toward Testable Theories”, American Journal of Sociology, No. 101
together with “shark therapy” in the economic reforms of many Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries quickly lost their luster because of the great economic fiascos and social upheavals that followed. By contrast, incremental economic reforms in China continued to be deployed after the withdrawal of tanks from Tiananmen Square, resulting in a growth rate that has averaged 9% since then.5 While political reforms zigzagged toward liberalization and partial democratization in the meantime, large-scale demonstrations were unseen and social stability were largely maintained in the course of the rapid economic transition.6
Such tranquility and stability should not be considered to be normal given the two contradictory characteristics of the post-socialist transition: self-constraint in the exercise of power and capacity-building for governance. The principal features of state socialism, according to Michael Harloe, is the central planning with monopoly ownership of the means of production and collective consumption by the state, political domination of the Communist Party, and the development of a distinctive class structure.7 The
post-socialist transition is usually initiated by a deliberative reform of the first feature that imposes substantial affects on the second and the third. The thrust of such reforms was the introduction of a market structure to replace the central command system that has yielded great inefficiency in past decades.8 This means that the party-state was asked to
reforms, see Andrew G. Walder, “The Decline of Communist Power: Elements of a Theory of Institutional Change”, Theory and Society, No. 2 (1994), pp. 297-324; For democratization, see Russell Bova, “Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective”, World Politics, No. 44 (1991), pp.
113-38; for the elite‟s wellbeing, see Andrew G. Walder, “Elite Opportunity in Transitional Economies”, American Sociological Review, No. 68 (2003), pp. 899-916; for urban development, see edited volume by Michael Harloe, Gregory D. Andrusz & Ivan Szelenyi, Cities After Socialism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
5 The average GDP of China from 1989 to 2005 is 9.16%, slightly lower than the average of 9.51% from 1979 (the year that reforms began) to 2005. Statistics are calculated using materials available at
http://investintaiwan.nat.gov.tw/zh-tw/env/stats/gdp_growth.html, checked on April 19, 2007.
6 The stability is expressed in a relative term against other post-socialist countries. A growing number of contentious incidents or rightful resistance, however, has in recent years been reported in both rural and urban areas, while good quality empirical studies have also quickly accumulated. For example, see Ching-Kwan Lee, Labor Protests in China’s Rustbelt and Sunbelt (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Jun. 2007); Kevin J. O‟Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance: Contentious Politics in Rural China (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Kevin J. O‟Brien, “Collective Action in the Chinese Countryside”, The China Journal, No. 48 (July 2002), pp. 139-54; Yongshun Cai, “The Resistance of Chinese Laid-off Workers in the Reform Period”, The China Quarterly, No. 170 (Jun. 2002), pp. 327-44; William Hurst and Kevin J. O‟Brien, “China‟s Contentious Pensioners”, The China Quarterly, No. 170 (Jun. 2002), pp. 345-60; Laura M. Luehrmann, “Facing Citizen Complaints in China, 1951-1996”, Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 5 (2003), pp. 845-66; Jonathan Unger, The Transformation of Rural China (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002); Jonathan Unger, “Power, Patronage, and Protest in Rural China”, in Tyrene White (eds), China Briefing 2000: The Continuing Transformation (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 71-94; Teresa Wright, The Perils of Protest: State Repression and Student Activism in China and Taiwan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001); Fayong Shi and Yongshun Cai, “Disaggregating the State: Networks and Collective Action in Shanghai”, China Quarterly, No.186 (Jun. 2006), pp. 314-32.
7 Michael Harloe, “Cities in the Transition”, in Gregory Andrusz, Michael Harloe, and Ivan Szelenyi (eds.), Cities after Socialism: Urban and Regional Change and Conflict in Post-Socialist Societies (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 1-30.
8 Peter Ferdinand, “Russian and Soviet Shadows over China's Future”? International Affairs, Vol. 68, No.
surrender its omnipotent allocation power to a neutral market mechanism and other non-state stakeholders, who were allowed to accumulate wealth via a newly-installed property right system and to participate in more and more decision making in the public sphere.
The aforementioned concession of the party-state in power should confront a
challenging demand for a strong public authority to sustain the reforms. The transition to a market needs to create and substantiate a whole new set of capitalist institutions, such as property rights arrangements and transaction rules of traditional as well as newly-invented commodities (e.g., lands, water resources, intellectual properties, internet bandwidth, etc.).
Since such reforms have an effect on wealth re-allocation, effective measures are also needed to absorb the shock of institutional adjustments on different social members and to alleviate the social unrest associated with the reforms. Since the reforms proceed in a dynamic manner, there is also a need for determinant navigators to respond to contingent problems both strategically and promptly. In brief, to carry out the above functions a country needs to re-empower the political system, but with a totally different qualification.
This probably explains why economic reforms in the post-socialist transition are usually followed by large-scale political reforms. A corollary is that a successful post-socialist transition seems to depend on the overall improvement in capacity as the result of political adaptation.
The concept of state capacity has been getting vaguer as the terms are widely used to explain social and economic phenomena.9 Some of them refer to a general concept of governing ability, which might include such dimensions as institutional, political, and administrative capacity.10 Others refer to specific aspects, such as the party-state‟s ability to control and monitor lower-level agents,11 or use taxation ability as a proxy of
2 (Apr. 1992), pp. 279-92.
9 Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research”, in Peter. B.
Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge & New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.3-43; Stephen D. Krasner, “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics”, Comparative Politics, No. 16 (Jane 1984), pp. 223-46; Gabriel A., Almond, “The Return to the State”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No.3 (Sep. 1988), pp.
853-74; Eric A. Nordlinger, Theodore J. Lowi & Sergio Fabbrini, “The Return to the State: Critiques”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No.3 (Sep. 1988), pp. 875-901; Joel S. Migdal, “The State in Society: An Approach to Struggles for Domination”, in Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli & Vivienne Shue (eds), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Joel S. Migdal, “Studying the State”, in Marx Irving Lichbach &
Alan S. Zuckerman (eds), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 208-35; Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (New York & Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
10 See Yan Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
11
measurement.12 By recognizing the problem of ambiguity, yet others further distinguish different kinds of capacity, such as a passive function in maintaining social and economic order in contrast to an active one in promoting economic development (the developmental state) or social welfare services (the welfare state).13 While the latter has given rise to a fully-fledged literature on the developmental state,14 the former seems to have important theoretical implications for the post-socialist transition but has attracted insufficient scholarly attention.
The Economic Logic of Leninist Social Control
Upon transition, most countries would first encounter the very basic need to maintain the social and economic order due to the reallocation effects of the reform measures and the failure of the original Leninist control apparatus. The arbitrary interventions of central planners in daily economic decisions such as prices, quantities, commodities, organizational forms, the appointments of managers, wages, technology, and investment actually have essential implications for social control. According to Walder,15 the effective social control of these socialist countries has depended on the aforementioned distributive power that can reward as well as punish cadres within the state apparatus as well as ordinary citizens due to the constant consumer good shortages. Such shortages, created purposely via in-kind distribution and place rationing by central planners, have enhanced the controlling power by reducing the importance of money in obtaining daily necessities and maintaining real living standards.
Apparently there was a whole set of social institutions for such control mechanisms to be worked out. Another hallmark of these totalitarian regimes is the elaborate and overlapping surveillance systems. Many agencies, including secret police and party organs in work units as well as social organizations (women‟s associations, youth leagues, and labor unions), were in charge of collecting information on social members, that ranged from a subjective evaluation on individuals‟ party loyalty, political lines, ideological purity and moral characteristics to more objective descriptions of individuals‟ work performance, and political utterances, etc. It is not hard to imagine that whoever maintained personnel
12 Shaoguang Wang , “Zhongguo guojia caizheng nengli de xiajiang ji qi houguo [The Consequences of the Decline in China‟s Fiscal Capability]”, in Yang Gan & Cui Zhi-yuan (eds), Zhongguo gaige de zhengzhi jingji xue [the political economy of China‟s post-Mao reforms](Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1997).
13 Guoguang Wu (eds.), Guojia, shichang yu shehui [State, Market and Society] (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995).
14 For a thorough review of this literature, see the edited volume by Meredith Woo-Cumings, The
14 For a thorough review of this literature, see the edited volume by Meredith Woo-Cumings, The