The cases of the Tao and Atayal illustrate the complicated process of institutional adaptations not only as a response to harsh material environments, as cultural materialism has argued (Price 1982; Ross 1978), but also as a response to the penetrating influence from the external world. Deep-rooted informal institutions such as taboos and
customs—for example, bans on coastal fishing activities during the flying fishing period and eating flying fish after the end of the season in Tao’s case—may have originated from a wide variety of concerns such as health and sanitation troubles associated with eating
less well-preserved fish. Nevertheless, these taboos and customs may have unintended conservation effects, as shown in the case of Tao.
The issues here, however, are how these informal rules would evolve and what the implications for community-based natural conservation are. Aborigines in both cases were subsequently exposed to outside influences that diminished their adherence to traditional institutions and beliefs, eventually contributing to the breakdown of the local resource governance systems. Such changes may be triggered by other exogenous sources, such as the introduction of Christianity to the Tao people. In this case, as the Tao people began to lose their fear of punishment by the evil spirits, taboos associated with traditional conservation practices began to lose their restraining power on resource extraction activities.
Different sources of change may have synergetic effects. In the case of the Tao, the effects of newly introduced technology went hand in hand with the prevalence of Christianity. The introduction of motorboats, ironically as a goodwill gesture by the government, not only unleashed the resource extraction power of the local people, but also helped undermine the social cohesion associated with the building and operation of the traditional rowing boats. Initially, tribal taboos had prevented the Tao people from fully embracing the powerful fishing tool. Yet as more and more people were converted to Christianity and began to lose their fear of punishment by the evil spirits, motorboats
became more widely used to compete with external fishery activities and tribal taboos against over-fishing began to lose their restraining power. For the Atayal people, changes in the economy and government policies have led them either to sell their reserved lands to big financial conglomerates or to practice ethno-eco-tourism at considerable ecological costs. Both cases show that, if not properly designed, government policies meant to empower indigenous communities may actually create undesirable consequences.
Although the natural resource governance regimes in both the Tao and Atayal communities were under stress as a result of external influences, there have been differences in subsequent developments. The Atayal people in Smangus were able to transform their social and economic institutions and subsequently resumed their role as guardians of the nearby forests, while the Tao people on Orchid Island are still searching for ways to save the fast depleting coastal fishery.
Many contingent factors have contributed to the divergent developments in the two communities. For example, compared with the coastal fishery off Orchid Island, the local forest in Smangus has better defined physical boundaries, and it is much easier for the Atayal to control access to the forest by guarding the main entry points. The Tao people on Orchid Island face a more daunting challenge because the flying fish are migratory species; as such fishers from other parts of the region have access to them as
well. As argued by Ostrom (2005), a key condition for successful governance of a local common-pool resource is the presence of well-defined boundaries of the resource system and user group. Compared with the Tao people, the Atayal people have a better chance of maintaining sustainable use of their forest because they themselves receive most of the direct benefits from its preservation. The Tao people face a greater challenge because any unilateral reduction in fishing on their part may not necessarily help preserve the fish stock. Yet, despite this challenge, coastal fisheries are not doomed for depletion. While some aborigines are known to have depleted their local resources for short-term
consumption (Aswani 1998), others have developed ingenious institutions to preserve their coastal fisheries (Schlager 1990).
Another possible explanation for the divergent performance is the difference in adaptability between the two tribes. From an evolutionary perspective, the Atayal in the mountainous areas were surrounded by other hostile peoples and had been adaptive to external challenges. In the past few hundred years, they had to learn to deal with other mountainous tribes, the Han people from the mainland, and the Japanese. They defended their territory aggressively and fought numerous bloody battles for their very survival.
Their social institutions had also developed to fit their need for living together as a collective. This sense of collectivity, Gaga in the native language, proved important in later institutional developments as tribal members tended to have a strong sense of trust,
and to accept authoritative enforcement of collective rules.
In contrast,theTao people’snaturalenvironment segregated them from external
threats for long periods of time. Except for such natural disasters as typhoons or droughts, they only had to deal with their fellow villagers, many of whom are related to each other through kinship. Although the Tao people had developed some
collective-action arrangements based on principles of reciprocity, they basically had a decentralized, individualistic society that would have a hard time to organize
community-wide collective action. As external cultural challenges arrived, they confronted them more as individuals rather than as a group.
Another factor relates to the nature of their traditional values and beliefs. The
Atayal’straditionalbeliefconsisted ofmoreproactiveelements. In it,ancestors’teaching,