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23 Jelena Babić, “The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty,” Western Balkans Security Observer, No. 17 (April-June 2010), pp. 3-12.
24 Anand Menon, “Much Ado About Nothing: EU Defense Policy after the Lisbon Treaty,” in Riccardo Alcaro and Erik Jones (eds.), European Security and the Future of Transatlantic Relations (Rome, Italy:
IAI, 2011), pp. 133-147.
15 外事務與安全政策高級代表，以及由前比利時總理范宏畢(Herman Van Rompuy) 擔任歐盟理事會常任主席一職，這些決定完全是會員國間經過政治考量的妥協產
25 Giegerich and Wallace, “Not Such a Soft Power.”
26 Graham Avery, “Europe’s Future Foreign Service,” The International Spectator, Vol. 43, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 29-41.
27 Brendan Donnelly, “Europe in the World: All Change or No Change in Foreign Policy after Lisbon,”
The International Spectator, Vol. 45, No. 2 (June 2010), pp. 18-19.
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多的實踐與磨合。
結論
歐洲在各項政策的整合，以及政策之間相互影響所可能產生的溢出效應，本 身就是一項高度變遷的動態過程。歐盟在安全政策的統合也不例外，部分會員國 原本試圖透過極具進步性的歐盟憲法條約，將歐盟安全予以「超國家化」，但由 於統合的進程未臻成熟，終於功敗垂成。然而，正如同其他政策的整合一般，歐 盟安全也在意欲改善原有問題的前提下，得以向前推進。經過「省思」的階段，
歐盟得以在逐漸移除障礙的過程中，將原本歐憲條約所欲凸顯的精神，蘊藏於里 斯本條約當中，里約的制訂、協商、通過與實施的進程即呈現了歐洲安全與防衛 政策在高度變遷環境中，不斷進行建構的動態過程。歐盟在安全政策統合進程所 面臨的最大問題是協調性與集體能力的提升，歐憲條約與里斯本條約都著眼於這 些焦點，並試圖加以改善。
承襲了歐憲條約的主要精神，但又為了避免重踏失敗的覆轍，里斯本條約自 始即試圖在理想性與務實性之間尋求平衡。里約將歐洲安全政策傳統的「彼得堡 任務」予以擴大，甚至效法北約，納入「集體防衛」的特色，這些作法都使得歐 盟新的安全政策更具軍事性的色彩。但在此同時，歐盟瞭解到各會員國對於軍事 主權堅持的程度不同，各國的軍事意願與實力又相距甚遠，因此以「提升合作」
的架構推動「長期結構化合作」，使得歐盟安全的合作得以持續推動。在理想性 與務實性之間擺盪並逐漸尋求平衡，似乎也是歐盟在統合進程當中得以向前推進 的常規。
機制與角色的協調以及決策程序的「流線化(streamline)」，乃是里斯本條約 為達成一致性與能力提升兩大目標的重要工具。歐盟各角色長期以來在對外事務 上各司其職卻也難免各行其是，難以達到整合的目的，因此里約試圖統合歐盟集 體「對外行動」的功能與機制。里約雖然沿襲了歐盟條約的精神，以具有創意的 方式設立對外事務與安全政策高級代表與理事會常任主席的職位，以及歐盟對外 行動處等機制，但在名稱與實質的功能上，採取較為保守的態度，以避免如同歐 憲條約陷入過於理想化的窘境。特別在功能與權力的分工上，里約對於此兩大重 要職務，均強調其實質功能，而非象徵性，因此兩者均具有對外代表性，而理論 上位階較低的高級代表一職，反而被賦予更大的權力，歐盟對外行動處的設置更 提供高級代表完整而龐大的輔佐機制，且在條約上明訂，理事會主席的職權不應 損害高級代表的權力。相較於歐憲條約，里約另一個具高度妥協性的設計，即是 條件多數決的「有條件式」的擴張，例如經會員國一致決可延伸條件多數決的範
17
28 Richard G. Whitman and Ana E. Juncos, “The Lisbon Treaty and the Foreign, Security and Defence Policy: Reforms, Implementation and the Consequences of (Non-)Ratification,” European Foreign Affairs Review, No. 14, No. 1 (2009), pp. 25-46.
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任務的擴張、機制與角色間的協調、抑或是內部安全與外交安全介面的擴大，均 可看出歐盟朝向所謂「政治共同體」的努力。當然，歐盟是否真正有意成為一個 更為緊密的聯盟，仍需視里約能否有效提供會員國達成聯盟目標的平台，以及各 角色能否具體落實里約的規範。里約是否得以有效解決歐洲安全政策面臨的困 境，相當程度依賴以下兩方面，一是歐盟會員國是否得以將歐洲一體的安全政策 予以「內化」；二是以歐盟做為一個整體能否有效融合各會員國的安全政策，強 化「共享主權」的範圍。29長期而言，歐盟與會員國間存有合作的文化，歐盟的 對外關係是建立在包容性與強調價值的基礎上，試圖就結構性的衝突管理與預防 進行統合。30
29 Oana Topala, “How Common Is CSDP? Solidarity and Mutual Defence in the Lisbon Treaty,”
European Security Review Briefing, No. 4 (April 2011), see
<www.isis-europe.org/.../2011_artrel_631_esr53-briefing4-solidarity-mutuality.pdf>.
30 Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture,” International Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 3 (July 2001), pp. 587-603.
至於里斯本條約實施之後，歐盟能否在如此高度敏感議題進行整 合，除了條約明列的機制規範外，仍有賴會員國所展現的政治意志，以克服各自 將安全視為專屬領域的思維模式。
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赴國外出差心得報告
為 執 行 「 歐 洲 統 合 的 全 球 身 份 認 同 ： 理 論 建 構 與 『 另 類 』 模 式 (NSC 97-2410-H-004-084-MY2)」計畫，本人前往德國首都柏林與英國首都倫敦兩地訪 問，拜訪此西歐兩大國的重要學術機構、智庫與學者進行訪談。
地點：
德國柏林 英國倫敦
訪問單位：
德國
柏林自由大學歐洲研究所 德國國際安全事務研究所(SWP) 德國外交政策智庫(DGAP) 德國外交部歐洲司
英國
英國倫敦政經學院(LSE) 倫敦大學亞非學院(SOAS) 英國皇家三軍聯合研究所(RUSI) 英國國際戰略研究所(IISS) 英國外交部亞太司
訪談紀要：
Based upon my intensive interviews with those scholars and officials conducted during my visit to Germany and the UK, I have drawn the following observations on which further academic findings have been developed.
The EU has long been portrayed as a normative and civilian power by projecting
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its soft power within and without. By the means of culture, values and norms, the EU has continued to intensify its comprehensive engagement with its neighbouring areas and the outside world. The EU’s soft power has been widely perceived as its most appealing ‘weapon’ to assert its global power role. Europe’s drive to co-operate member states in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has received global recognition and its expanding interests in security and stability beyond its ‘near abroad’ reflect its efforts to find a proper role in accordance with the EU’s emerging global identity. The EU has become an influential world-wide actor, not necessarily through military force but through its ‘soft power’.
In addition to its ‘soft’ image and perception received by the outside world, the EU has also developed the ‘hard’ dimension of its power by delicately combining both the civilian and military capacities in a collective way in fulfilling a role that carries out preventive diplomacy, humanitarian rescue, conflict prevention and crisis management in areas of conflicts in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond. The EU has reinforced its capability in external policy by the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the framework of CFSP. The promulgation of the first-ever European Security Strategy (ESS) has further substantiated EU’s global strategic arrangements at a time when the highly-interdependent globalisation has increased the importance of comprehensive security.
To be a global power and to promote its values and norms, the EU needs not only capabilities but also willingness and determination. The question as to whether the EU’s lack of collective hard power is the major obstacle towards its global power status is hotly debated. As a result, it seems that the EU can hardly exercise its influence beyond its immediate neighbourhood in an effective way. However, hard power is designed as a means to solve ‘hard security’ issues that occur only in very extreme occasions, while soft power can be forceful for most of the peace time.
Moreover, a combination of hard and soft power can equip the EU with even more leverage of persuasion.
Yet, the EU’s political influence in those areas beyond its immediate borders has so far remained that of a subsidiary player, not a global power as it should be. At a time when the importance of other regions and emerging powers like China is rapidly increasing and when the US hegemony is challenged, the EU’s engagement in various regions is pivotal for its own values and interests. Europe and other powers should be complementary global actors in pursuing a commitment to effective multilateralism
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where all players involved, including the US, can benefit. The American regional and global strategic predominance may have to be maintained, but the EU and others have to take their own responsibilities to contribute to help maintain the security in areas concerned.
Despite its conventional apathy about the security situations in other areas, the EU has in the recent years paid attention to regions’ security and has found a role to play. The EU has to further its engagement in those areas by facilitating bilateral dialogue and peaceful resolution through initiatives from Europe. The EU should continue to encourage all parties to solve their problems peacefully and conduct pragmatic negotiations. Through the peace process, the EU can offer them its own experiences of mutual trust building by acting as a facilitator that can provide neutral agenda. Besides, the EU should promote its common values and norms in a way to help other societies transforming themselves to become a democracy which would guarantee the best interests of all actors around. Europe is capable of taking a lead role in pressing others to become a rising power whose behaviour will be in harmony with norms and values of a global civil society where the EU is the chief architect.
However, there are still some hurdles to EU’s commitment to regions’ affairs.
First, the EU must further familiarise itself with the opportunities and problems of other areas that are so complex and dynamic that it needs Europe to pay constant and sufficient attention to the fundamental evolutionary processes others are enduring.
The EU may have attached more importance to its relations with other regions, but a fuller understanding of the region requires Europeans to spare more efforts to a wide-range of issues concerning others’ developments.
Second, the EU has been widely perceived by others to have the lack of credibility as a united and coherent actor in dealing with global affairs. Many member states of the EU have long had traditional interests elsewhere and their common policy towards certain areas may not necessarily speak in one voice. They also have different agendas and interests in terms of major global affairs. The difference among the EU member states may hardly convince others that Europeans as a whole can be a reliable partner in dealing with security issues. If combined, the weight of the member states of the EU would make it an effective actor on the global stage.
Over all, other areas can be a test case for EU’s capability to act as a major global power by projecting its soft power and conducting a civilian dominated approach there, if the union has the willingness and determination. Looking around
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the globe, there is no other actors like the EU who can provide the whole world with a model of peaceful transformation and shared prosperity. EU’s values, such as rule of law, good governance, human rights and democracy, will continue to be its own hallmark for the globe as a whole.