Algeria and Libya
4.3. Algeria as a Case
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(1) Can a political party survive after the leaving of the historic founder or leader?
(2) Can a party subject the social forces within it, that is, its constituency? Or it is just the creature of its constituency?
(3) Is the inter-party shift of individuals or social forces prevalent?
By discussion the above questions in the two cases below, we can clarify whether the political institutionalization in the two cases is strong enough.
In sum, it is all about give-and-take. If we want to observe in a macro vision, we have to overlook some dimensions of reality in exchange for convenience to collect date about larger number of cases and interpretation. In turn, if we only want to have a discussion on the substance of few cases, we afford to pay more attention to details of these cases. And I will do this in the following two sections.
4.3. Algeria as a Case
Algeria, one of the two outliers in this study, has relatively short “peace duration”, roughly from 2000 to 2010 and is an “anocracy”, which according to the prediction of the theory tends to encounter civil war; however, was faced by only demonstrations in 2011. So, it is necessary to discuss the substance of this case here.
In this section, I will start by briefly introducing the old hatred incurred by the civil war from1992 to 1999 and discuss the impact of reconciliatory policies taken by Bouteflika. Then, I will evaluate the Algerian military-civilian division political institution in general and multi-party system in specific. Finally, I will conclude by how the old hatred and political institution in Algeria effected the situation during the Arab Spring.
4.3.1. Civil War Experience and Bouteflika’s
Reconciliatory Policy
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The Algerian civil war continued from 1992 to 1999 (Sarkees and Wayman).
After the introduction of multi-party system by the President Chadli Bendjedid in 1988, Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the emerging Islamist party, easily defeated National Liberation Front (FLN), the ruling party, in both the 1990 provincial and municipal elections and the 1991 first round of national parliamentary election.
Perceiving the threat of losing power into the hand of Islamists, the army pre-empted the potential power transfer: canceling the scheduled second round of election, forcing Bendjedid to quit, and disbanding the parliamentary (Le Sueur ch. 2). Under the tough measures taken by the military, the demonstration on the Algerian streets radicalized into fierce fights between the armed Islamists and the government agents.
On the one hand, the army bloodily repressed the oppositions, forcefully disappeared suspected oppositions, arrested FIS leaders, including Ali Belhadj, Abassi Madani, and Abdelkader Hachani, and limited the press freedom; on the other hand, the armed Islamists took various forms of violence, including direct resistances, assassinations and bomb setting, against security forces, political elites, such as General Khaled Nezzar, and civilian population (Le Sueur ch.3).
Does the series of violent conflicts between the Algerian army and the Islamists fit the definition of civil war mentioned in Section 3.1? About the Condition A, there were direct clashes between the security forces representing for the government and the non-state Islamist groups. About the Condition B, there are mainly several estimations of the civilian death toll in the Algerian civil war mentioned by scholars:
some take 100,000 deaths (Brynen et al. 31; Mortimer 159) and others take 150,000 deaths (Hagelstein 9; Tlemçani 4, 6), still others take 100,000 to 200,000 deaths and plus 7,000 forcibly disappeared (Zoubir and Aghrout note 28), and all of them surpass the threshold: 1,000. Concerning the Condition C, the death toll on the non-state side is definitely over 1,00. However, no complete record for the casualties on state side is available, but according to Le Sueur, only in 1992 more than 200 security forces were killed (61).
To mollify the division between the Islamists and the army, through two times national referendum the Algerian government took the 1999 Law on Civil Concord and the 2005 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which provided compensation to the victim families and amnesty to both armed Islamist, mainly to Islamic Army of Salvation (AIS), a armed wing of FIS, and government security
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forces.37 According to the estimation provided by Le Sueur, there were about 5,000 Algerians who was given amnesty and 5,000 prisoners was set free after the passing of the 1999 Law on Civil Concord.
There are inevitably both positive and negative opinions towards these reconciliatory policies. Aiming at 1999 Law on Civil Concord alone, Mortimer provides his own evaluation:
Under the terms of civil concord, a substantial number of combatants, especially those of the AIS, turned in their weapons and returned to civilian life. Although some elements of the insurgency did not accept the amnesty, the level of violence that had plagued Algeria since 1992 began to diminish (162).
About the effects of both reconciliatory policies, Entelis claims, they “achieved their broad objectives of bringing relative peace to the country for which most Algerians were thankful and appreciative” (660). Le Sueur had some criticisms on the reconciliatory policies. By avoiding inquiry into the responsibility for civil war, especially those of state agencies, and reflection on the traumatic memory of civil war deeply and truly, those policies might only achieve temporary peace and left the problem among Algerian society unresolved (195-206). In sum, it is impossible for any policy to avoid criticisms, but these reconciliatory measures certainly, to some extent, released the longstanding tension among Algerian society.
4.3.2. Civil-Military Division in Algeria
The dynamics of power distribution between the military and civilian establishments has been the focus in the history of political development after the independence of Algeria. And the belonging of the minister of defense, a position that represents the power to intrude the inner affairs of the military, is an indicator reflecting the power relation between the army and the civilian: When the defense minister is held by the army, it means that the army’s power raises due to the fact that it might act without external interference. In contrast, if the position is under the control of civilian, the government reins the military to some extent.
37 In 1999 Law on Civil Concord, those who committed massacres, setting off bombs in public were excluded from the scope of seeking amnesty; however, according 2005 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, not only the former two crime but also committing rape could prevent one from obtaining amnesty. See Le Sueur 80, 91.
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After the France was defeated by the alliance between FLN and the Army of National Liberation (ALN), Ben Bella, one of the leaders, in FLN held the presidency in 1962. Within around two years, Houari Boumediene, the head of ALN, wrested the presidency through a coup d'état. Under the control of Boumediene, FLN became the only legal political party monoplizing the power; in addition, Boumediene kept the defense minister for himself (Mortimer 156-157).
During the presidency of Bendjedid, the army overrode the civilian government.
Bendjedid was the successor of Boumediene after 1978. When experiencing the economic and political crises, Bendjedid ceded the post of minister of defense to General Nezzar in 1990 (Le Sueur 44-45). The power relation between the army and the civilian government started to change. After the 1992 military intervention and the outbreak of civil war, the army became the “kingmaker” in Algeria; that is, the president of Algeria needed to be set with the back of the army (Le Sueur ch. 3).
There was a change in the civil-military relation since 2004. In 1999 presidential election, President Bouteflika was also a product of king-making. Nonetheless, Bouteflika was elected as the president again without the support of the army in 2004.
Bouteflika built his own legitimacy and power base by enhancing the international reputation of Algeria and promoting reconciliatory policies for civil war, and he started to demilitarize the government through a series of changes in military personnel: the resign of General Mohamed Lamari, Chief of Staff, who is one of significant military heads, the replacement of four Algerian military regions’ heads, and the changing of Head of the Land Forces and General Secretary of the Defense Ministry (Volpi, “Algeria’s Pseudo-Democratic” note 43; Mortimer). Finally, he created a new post: “Minister Delegate to Defense” to deal with military affairs, and kept the minister of defense for himself (Mortimer).
It might not be sure yet that Algerian civilian establishment completely controlled the army. In 2010, there were some signals for the fight back from the military: an assassination of Ali Tounsi, the head of national police and being responsible for creating a security force royal to the president, which was with suspected connection with the army, and an investigation to corruption initiated by military-controlled intelligence agency, which led to the resignation of personnel close to the president in Ministry of Energy and Sonatrach, a key national hydrocarbon company (Entelis 2011). After that, the civil-military relation became ambiguous.