Condition Favoring Mobilization
3. Can Theory Explain the Cases?
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3. Can Theory Explain the Cases?
I will firstly use congruence method to assure the performance of the fifteen cases on dependent variable in Section 3.1 and independent variables in Section 3.2.
In Section 3.3, because the study does not take the large-N method, some variables need to be adjusted before starting to interpret their impacts.
In Section 3.4, I will decide the best way to apply theories when explaining the happening of civil war: to pursue explanatory effectiveness and theoretical parsimony at the same time, should I apply all of three or take the combination of two from them or just use one among them? In addition, I will try to identify the key causal factors behind the difference between cases with civil war and without civil war.
In Section 3.5, I will assure the explanatory power of the key causal factors identified in Section 3.4 by revealing their impact on Iraq and Yemen, the two cases consistent with the theoretical prediction.
3.1. Whether Civil War Occurred?
As I mentioned in Section 2.2, F-L presents nine conditions defining civil war.
Among them, Condition A, B, and C are primary and the rest conditions are complementary. For the convenience of discussion I re-number them as below:
Condition A: The conflict involved fighting between agents of or claimants to a state and organized, non-state groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies.
Condition B: The conflict killed at least 1,000 over its course, with yearly average of at least 100.
Condition C: At least 100 were killed on both sides, including civilians attacked by rebels. This condition is to rule out the massacre situation that is without organized or effective opposition.
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Condition D: The start year is the first year in which 100 were killed or in which a violent event occurred that was followed by a sequence of actions that came to satisfy the primary criteria.
Condition E: If main party to the conflict drops out, we code a new war start if the fighting continues.
Condition F: War ends are coded by observation of a victory, wholesale demobilization, truce, or peace agreement followed by at least two years of peace.
Condition G: Involvement by foreign troops does not disqualify a case as a civil war for us, provided the other criteria are satisfied.
Condition H: The conflict was coded as multiple wars in a country when distinct rebel groups with distinct objectives are fighting a coherent central state on distinct fronts with little or no explicit coordination.
Condition I: If a state seeks to incorporate and govern territory that is not a recognized state, we consider it a “civil war” only if the fighting continues after the state begins to govern the territory (“Ethnicity” 76).
In this study, Libya, Syria, and Yemen are taken as cases with civil war, because their situations fit the above conditions.
About Libya, there are conflicts between government and organized, non-state groups, such as National Transitional Council (NTC), which fits Condition A. Being consistent with Condition B, the casualties in Libya is between 12,700 to 25,000 deaths in 2011. Fitting Condition C, the death of rebels is between 5,500 and 7,500;
the counterpart of governmental agents is between 2,200 and 3,300 in Libya (“Libya (2011 – First Combat Deaths)”).
In Syria, there are non-governmental sides, such as Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighting against the regime, which fits Condition A. In 2011, there are 5,000 deaths in Syria, which passes the threshold set by Condition B. Being consistent with Condition C, there are: about 3,000 rebel deaths and 2,000 governmental force deaths in 2011 (“Syria (2011 – First Combat Deaths)”).
As to Yemen, the Houthi movement is one of several oppositions fighting against the government in Yemen, which is consistent with Condition A. Fitting Condition B, the 2011 casualties in Yemen is about 2,000, which doubtlessly overpasses the 1,000
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deaths threshold in Condition B. About Condition C, there is no separated information about the deaths of rebels and government available to me. However, based on the purpose behind Condition C: assuring the effective and organized resistance, it is not unreasonable to count Yemen as case with civil war, because the escape of the incumbent leader implies the fact that the government is not capable of controlling domestic situation. Overall, Libya, Syria, and Yemen are evidently three cases with civil war among the fifteen cases in question (“Yemen (2004 – First Combat Deaths)”).
There two controversial cases: the riots in Iraq after the withdrawal of the US troop in December 2011 and the prolonged unrest in Bahrain since February 2011.
About Iraq case, it was a continuous unrest there since the US invasion in 2003, so I believe that we need to take the complete period from 2003 to 2013 into consideration when deciding whether Iraq was under civil war or not in 2011. First of all, we need to put our focus on Iraq in 2013 when the situation was quite fit the above civil war conditions. In 2013, Shiite-dominated government set after December 2005 represented the “state side” which constitutes one of indispensable components for Condition A, and the Shiite-dominated government fought against the “non-state side”: anti-government Sunni groups plus Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which is satisfied the other component for Condition A. The 2013 death toll, 7,818, goes across the Condition B’s threshold: 1,000 (“UN Casualty Figures for December, 2013”). About Condition C, there is only information about the separated estimations for civilian deaths and government forces’ death from January to November: 7,157 and 952 respectively (“UN Casualty Figures for November 2013”). Although they are not estimation for the whole year, they already pass through the Condition C’s threshold. After assuring the 2013 situation as civil war, according to Condition D, it is not unreasonable to argue that the spillover effect of the Arab Spring, especially the consequent political disorders in Iraq providing opportunities for mobilizing and Syrian civil war since 2011, and the power vacancy after the US withdrawal in December 2011 as “a sequence of actions” led to the observable civil war in 2013.
Finally, despite the presence of the US troops from 2003 to 2011, according to Condition G, it cannot exclude the possibility to count Iraqi situation during this period as civil war. Overall, I tend to count Iraq in 2011 as a case with civil war, though it is not an undoubted categorization.
In Bahrain case, though the riots had not been put down completely from February 2011 to at least April 2014, the situation there dose not fit even Condition A
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to C for calling it as “civil war”. Concerning Condition A, based on the International Crisis Group (ICG) report, I cannot observe non-state groups “organized” enough to compete with the government.18 About Condition B, the protest pursuing democracy and the end of discrimination against the Shiites killed less than 100 during the three-year-period from 2011 to 201419, and it does not pass through the 1,000 deaths threshold. As to Condition C, both of government and opposition does not lose at least 100 deaths. Most of deaths are civilians; in other words, the situation in Bahrain seems more like a unilateral repression mainly conducted by the government’s troops and troops from GCC. As a result, I take the situation of Bahrain in 2011 as without civil war.
Except for the above five cases, situation in the rest ten cases does not fit the above definition of civil war, and hence I count them as cases without civil war.
In sum, there are four cases with civil war, including Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. On the other hand, the other eleven cases would be considered as cases without civil war.
3.2. Potential Causes Behind Civil War
FF*IOD
Unequal economic distribution and lack of industrial transformation may cause economic grievance, and “FF” and “IOD” proposed by Vanhanen are used to catch them. FF is “the area of family farms as a percentage of the total area of holdings”, and Vanhanen judges family farms or not by three criteria: (1) providing the employment for not more than four people; (2) owned by the cultivator family or held in owner-like possession; (3) below upper hectare limit (47-51).
IOD is the mean of two things: (1) Urban Population (UP): the ratio of urban population to total population; (2) Non Agricultural Population (NAP): the ratio of non-agricultural population. The computation of NAP needs to be elaborated here. I only have access to data about the ratio of agricultural population (AP), so I use the formula: 1-AP to derive NAP (Vanhanen 43-45, 55-57).
18 For details about political opposition groups in Bahrain, see ICG, “Popular Protest in North African and the Middle East (III)”.
19 The demonstration since 2011 has claimed more than 80 civilian’s lives and 13 policemen, see
“Bahrain Courts”; “Bomb Blast”.
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There is no access to new data about FF, so I continue to use data collected by Vanhanen (appendix 3 in 251-273). The data about AP and UP of each case in 2010 comes from the World Bank.
About the measurement of IOD, there are seven cases have missing value on AP in 2010. I replace the missing value of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE by the mean of their performance during 2001 to 2009. As to Libya and Oman, cases even without data about AP during 2001 to 2009, I take AP in 1986 for Libya and AP in 2000 for Oman. Lebanon is completely without data on AP, so I take the performance of Lebanon as missing value.