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delegations from the lower level and whose main agency is the Secretary of the General Popular Congress; however, it has no legislative powers, as Obeidi suggests,
“[Its] role can be seen as coordinator, tabulating and shaping the recommendations and decisions made ate the local level, which presented by… the BPCs” (Political
Culture 144). Similar to the council of ministers in other states, General Popular
Committee is appointed by General Popular Congress and comprises several secretaries, just like ministers.48In the Revolutionary Sector, there are two main actors: the Leadership of Revolution, Gaddafi himself, and the Revolutionary Committee (RC). Within the sector, Gaddafi held most of power and projected his influence on Sector of People’s Power through RC composed of people appealed by Gaddafi’s ideology and permeating every BPC and Popular Committee. In addition, RC, as important instrument for controlling society, was well-armed and wide-spread across Libya, and directly responsible to Gaddafi (Mattes 65-68).
In 1990s, the significance of tribes in Libyan society was rediscovered by the regime. As a result, in 1993 the regime established Popular Social Leadership (PSL) composed of “respected natural leaders” from local communities and serving as an instrument to maintain local order (Obeidi, Political Culture 118-120).
Political Institution in Libya
Concerning the Libyan political institution, its adaptability might be not as high as at first glance. Although until the outbreak of the Arab Spring the Jamahiriya system had maintained for over thirty years (from 1977 to 2010), the regime went through no power-transfer. In fact, Gaddafi had reined Libya for forty-two years before 2011. Though one of his sons, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, was believed to be the most possible successor for him, the power-transfer did not happen before the Arab Spring.
Despite under lots of international pressure, Gaddafi regime had faced less domestic challenged by the Arab Spring. The challenges the Gaddafi regime faced mainly came from two sources: (1) antagonism from the West, especially from the US and (2) domestic dissents. The Western antagonism originated from the explicit or
48 The number of the secretaries is not fixed. For the changing tendency of its number, see Obeidi,
“Political Elites” 108.
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implicit support from Libya to international terrorism49, and the animosity was concretized in a series of economic sanctions on Libya, including unilateral sanctions by the US between 1982 and 2004 and the multilateral sanctions by the UN from 1992 to 1998. On the other hand, the main domestic challengers to the regime included tribal rebellions and Islamist groups, including Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), formed in about 1990 by former jihad in Afghanistan during the invasion of the Soviet, and Muslim Brotherhood, originating from the offshoot of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and resurging in the 1970s (Pargeter, “Qadhafi” 85-92, 94-98).
The economic sanction, from 1990s to early 2000s, did not destroy the Gaddafi regime; on the contrary, it accidentally helped the regime to repress the domestic dissents and survive internal challenges. In economic aspects, those sanctions on Libya certainly had negative impacts on Libyan economy, for example, the life of ordinary people; however, it had less influence on the core of Libyan economy, including the operation of oil sector and the building of Great Man-Made River (Niblock ch. 8, ch. 9). In political aspects, the external threats projected Gaddafi “as the defender of the Libyan people against an aggressive and ill-intentioned West,”
which may provide the regime enough legitimacy and authority to survive fatal rebellions by two vital tribes, serving as pillars of the regime’s survival: Warfalla and Magarha. In 1993, the regime strengthened its grip on the Libyan society through introducing PSL, restoring the functioning of RC,50 and establishing new controlling instruments, like purification committee and volcano committee (Niblock 87-90).
In mid 2000s, Libya started to break the international isolation, which brought it more advantage to oppress domestic dissents legitimately. The resolving of Lockerbie dispute between the West and Libya and the giving up of Weapons of Mass Destruction cancelled the long-standing sanction on Libya, and the outbreak of the 911 terrorist attack created the ally between the US and Libya on the ground of “war on terror”. Under such a context, in the name of anti-terrorism Gaddafi had legitimacy to strengthen its security forces and fatally crush Islamist groups, such as LIFG. At the same time, the US and UK also assisted the regime by extraditing and providing intelligence about Libyan opposition abroad (Pargeter, “Qadhafi” 99-102). In short, the series of international sanctions and “war on terror” surprisingly help Gaddafi to
49 Some of the famous cases in which Libya is believed to involve include the Murder of Fletcher in 1984, Berlin discotheque bombing in 1986, and Lockerbie bombing in 1988.
50 In 1987, RC was publicly criticized and derived of its powers by Gaddafi, and suspended between 1989 and 1992, period before the multilateral sanction, see Niblock 89; Vandewalle 140-141.
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maintain his rule in the price of slight reforms.51 In other words, there was only little motive for Gaddafi regime to adjust itself.
About the complexity, Libyan political institution exemplifies the typical weak political institution mentioned by Huntington, that is, system “which depends on one individual” (18). Despite of the formal structure of Libyan political institution which seems to be two sectors as mentioned above, the real power distribution in Libya is just like a concentric circles sketched by Obeidi: Gaddafi remains as the core of these circles. The first circle, whose power come from the personal relation with Gaddafi and who is qualified to discuss with him during the process of decision-making, is dominated by “Men of Tent”, who chiefly came from members of Gaddafi’s own family or tribe. In addition, there are still some members of RCC, who came from colleagues of Gaddafi in Benghazi military school and participated in 1969 revolution, and members of RC. The members of RCC, PSL, and RC consisted the second circle, that is, the intermediary elite groups. The third one included personnel in General Popular Committee, General Popular Congress, and BPCs, who provide legitimacy for Gaddafi’s policy (“Political Elites” 111-113). The dependency on single power core is obvious in Libyan institution.
In addition, multi-functioned RC also exemplified the less complexity of Libyan institution. RC, as the extension of Gaddafi’s power, served as an instrument to mobilize people, defense the regime from internal and external threat, and even make legal judgments (Mattes 65-68). It means that the power in Libya was less diversified.
Concerning autonomy, basically the recruitment of the Libyan elite was closed.
Although there is no detailed data about the composition of core elites, the first and second circle around Gaddafi, available; however, Obeidi had conducted a careful investigation into the third circle. About the General Popular Congress, the two leading posts was held by Muhammad Al-Zanati and Ahmad Ibrahim, both of them coming form Gaddafi’s tribe, in most of period between 1977 and 2006. From 1977 to 2006, according to statistics, 69% members came from RC, who were intimate to Gaddafi, 22% and 9% of them were from technocrats and military respectively.
(Obeidi, “Political Elites” 117-118, table 4.4) However, the bias in recruitment is less evident in General Popular Committee than in General Popular Congress. The members in General Popular Committee basically distributed according to the popular proportion of each region. And, most of them, 61%, came from technocrats rather
51 For the limited political and economic reforms in Libya, see St John 76-81, 100-112; Vandewalle 182-195.
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than RC, and Obeidi explained this as out of practical requirement to execute policies.
(Obeidi, “Political Elites” 119, 121-122) Despite lack of record about the core of elites, we know that pro-Gaddafi groups enjoyed advantage in Libyan institution from the fact that they even occupied most of key posts in the periphery of power, that is, the third circle.
As to coherence, theoretically BPCs or General Popular Congress, that is, the accountability groups, should be the key of decision-making; however, in practice, Gaddafi’s influence on policies is almost incontestable. Niblock argues that:
Qaddafi [=Gaddafi] is seen as holding all the levers of power, manipulating and controlling all aspects of Libyan politics and society. The structure of institutions that exist tends to be discounted, seen as a front to camouflage the realities of power. This characterization holds some truth, but it is also misleading. The dynamics of power and policy cannot be understood solely in terms of Qaddafi’s personal whims and wishes (82).
However, the influence casted by BPCs is extremely limited. One of rare occasions for BPCs to influence the policies mentioned by Niblock is the demand for the local facilities, such as electricity, schools, health centers, and roads (69-70). In general, as Mattes said, the functioning of BPCs has been under intensive intervention by the Revolutionary Sector and only less sensitive issues could be discussed freely (59-61).
As the result above show, Libya performs badly in all the four aspects:
adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. However, it is still abstract to realize the underdevelopment of the political institution. As a result, I try to present the underdevelopment of political institution by a concrete example: Cyrenaica, the eastern region in Libya.
In the history of Gaddafi ruling, Cyrenaica has born the tradition of resistance, the contradiction between Cyrenaica and the government comes from: tribalism and Islam. Actually, Libya is a state composed of three regions: Tripolitania in the west, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan in the south, and all of them has their own culture and identity.
During Sanussi monarchy, Cyrenaica was the power base of the King Idris and his tribe: Sa’adi. After Gaddafi, whose power base located in Tripolitania, controlled Libya in 1969, it was natural that the contradictions between the government and Cyrenaica surfaced. Rather than trying to absorb Sa’adi into political community, Gaddafi and his tribe, Qadhadhfa, formed a tribe alliance against Sa’adi with other two tribes Warfalla in Tripolitania and Magharha in Fezzan (Brahimi 611).
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Islam is the other sources of the suspicion and antagonism between Cyrenaica and Gaddafi. In nineteenth century, Sanussiya, a religious order, built its base in Cyrenaica and coordinate with existing local tribal structures and leaders. As a result, Cyrenaica, as Pargeter describes, “evolved into a kind of self-contained unit, where tribalism and Islam – both still defining features of the region today – were preserved” (Libya, 21). In 1980s and 1990s, Islamist groups revived, such as LIFG and Muslim Brotherhood, and many of their members came from Cyrenaica (ICG,
“Popular Protest in North African and the Middle East (V)” 17-18). In face of such a religious region, Gaddafi regime, keeping intensive anti-Islam position,52 the tension between the government and Cyrenaica gradually intensified.
The regime has never truly improved its bad relation with Cyrenaica. To tribalism, in 1993 Gaddafi built PSL to co-opt tribal leaders and maintain local order.
To Islamists, Gaddafi conducted wide-scale arrest and oppression in Cyrenaica; in March 1997, he set a collective punishment law aiming at anyone who helped Islamists (Pargeter, Libya 169). Under such iron-fisted policies, most Islamists start to suspend their activities and flee abroad by the end of 1990s. In general, Cyrenaica had suffered from long-standing neglect and discrimination in political and economic under Gaddafi.53 The above measures only temporarily oppressed the problem, but the Libyan political institution still could not fulfill the functions as Huntington said:
defining public interest among different social forces and forming a political community into which absorbs whole the population.