論阿拉伯之春期間內戰是否發生：以阿爾及利亞和利比亞為例 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學外交學系 Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University 碩士論文 Master Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. 論阿拉伯之春期間內戰是否發生：以阿爾及利亞. ‧. 和利比亞為例. Nat. er. io. sit. y. Whether Civil War Happened During the Arab. n. Spring: Exemplified by Algeriav and Libya al i n Ch engchi U. 指導教授：劉長政 Advisor: Liu, Chang-Cheng 作者：楊邵帆 Author: Yang, Shao-Fan 日期：民國 103 年 6 月 16 日 Date: June 16, 2014.

(2) Contents Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... iv Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................... vi Abstracts ............................................................................................................................ viii 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 1.1. Research Goals .................................................................................................................. 1 1.2. Literature Review ............................................................................................................ 3 1.2.1. Arab Spring in General ......................................................................................................... 3 1.2.2. Situation in Different Country before or During the Arab Spring ...................... 7. 政治大 1.3. Research Design ............................................................................................................. 23 立 1.3.1. Research Questions ............................................................................................................ 23 1.2.3. Theories for the Onset of Civil War.............................................................................. 19. ‧ 國. 學. 1.3.2. Research Methods ............................................................................................................... 24 1.3.3. Research Limitations ......................................................................................................... 25. ‧. 1.3.4. Research Frameworks ....................................................................................................... 26. y. Nat. 2. The Existed Potential Causal Factors behind the Onset of Civil War ..... 27. sit. 2.1. Unit of Analysis ............................................................................................................... 27. er. io. 2.2. Dependent Variable ...................................................................................................... 27. al. 2.3. Independent Variable ................................................................................................... 28. n. v i n C h................................................................................................... 29 Motivation for Rebelling. U i e h ngc Opportunity for Rebelling ............................................................................................... 32. 2.3.1. 2.3.2.. 3. Can Theory Explain the Cases? ............................................................................ 39 3.1. Whether Civil War Occurred? .................................................................................... 39 3.2. Potential Causes Behind Civil War ........................................................................... 42 3.3. Modification for Interpretation ................................................................................ 49 3.4. How Cases Performed? ................................................................................................ 51 3.4.1. How to Apply Theories? ................................................................................................... 51 3.4.2. Which Independent Variables Might be Necessary? ............................................ 54 3.5. Normal Cases ................................................................................................................... 56 3.5.1. Iraq as a Case ........................................................................................................................ 57 3.5.2. Yemen as a Case ................................................................................................................... 59. i.

(3) 3.6. Brief Summary ................................................................................................................ 62. 4. Focusing on Two Deviate Cases: Algeria and Libya ...................................... 63 4.1. “Peace Duration” Hypothesis ..................................................................................... 63 4.2. “Anocracy” Hypothesis ................................................................................................. 64 4.2.1. Praetorian Polity as Theoretical Basis ....................................................................... 65 4.2.2. The Price for Using Polity Score .................................................................................... 67 4.2.3. Impacts from Cleansing Contaminated Components ........................................... 69 4.2.4. Bring Theoretical Complexity Back ............................................................................. 70 4.3. Algeria as a Case ............................................................................................................. 72 4.3.1. Civil War Experience and Bouteflika’s Reconciliatory Policy ........................... 72 4.3.2. Civil‐Military Division in Algeria .................................................................................. 74. 治政大 4.4. Libya as a Case ................................................................................................................. 85 立 4.4.1. Old Scores Against Gaddafi Regime ............................................................................. 85 4.3.3. Old Hatred Out of Focus and Internal Division within Opposition ................. 83. ‧ 國. 學. 4.4.2. “Jamahiriya” in Libya ......................................................................................................... 87 4.4.3. Old Hatred as a Trigger and the Cooperation between Dissents..................... 96. ‧. 4.5. Brief Summary ................................................................................................................ 99. 5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 100. y. Nat. io. sit. Appendix I. Research Frameworks ...................................................................... 101. n. al. er. Appendix II. Potential Causal Factors in Theories .......................................... 102. i n U. v. Appendix III. Explanatory Performance by the Three Theories ................ 103. Ch. engchi. Appendix IV. Explanatory Performance by F‐L and Boix .............................. 105 Appendix V. Explanatory Performance by C‐H and Boix .............................. 106 Appendix VI. Explanatory Performance by F‐L and C‐H ............................... 107 Appendix VII. Explanatory Performance by F‐L .............................................. 108 Appendix VIII. Explanatory Performance by Boix .......................................... 109 Appendix IX. Explanatory Performance by C‐H ............................................... 110 Appendix X. Frequency of Indexes Appearing in Civil War .......................... 111 Appendix XI. Specificity of Indexes to Civil War .............................................. 112 Appendix XII. Polity Score or X‐POLITY Captures Praetorian Polity ........ 113 ii.

(4) References ........................................................................................................................ 114. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. iii. i n U. v.

(5) Acknowledgements Thanks to the conjuncture of appropriate timing and right persons, I can accomplish this work smoothly. The period of writing this paper is overlapped with one of the climaxes of political participation and political consciousness in Taiwanese history. Large-scale demonstrations, originating from the death of Hung Chung-Chiu, broke out between. 政治大. July and August 2013, and the Sunflower Student Movement happened between March and April 2014. Both historic events and the consequent atmosphere of. 立. Taiwanese society truly inspired me when writing.. ‧ 國. 學. The conflict between people and government happened in my real life. It impressed me and promoted me to think about the position of both sides. On the end of Taiwanese people, I sympathize with their distaste against the government that was. ‧. believed to be inefficient, weak, and corrupt, and I also realized the complexity of. y. Nat. people’s grievance: it was not only about concrete issues, such as Cross-Strait Service. sit. Trade Agreement but also about some abstract issues, such as the mixture of human. er. io. right, nationalism and horrible memory about 228 Incident. On the end of Taiwanese. al. n. v i n C hand even people, U influential businessmen, military e n g c h i it had not enough authority to define public interests and resolved the division of the opinion among Taiwanese. government, under the external pressure from China and the internal demand from. society. My own experience made it easier for me to get involved into the cases in the Middle East and North Africa. There are several persons indispensable for the accomplishment of my thesis and I would appreciate the direct or indirect help from them. First of all, I want to thank my companion, Ting-Xuan Li. She has been so thoughtful and patient to me, and without her I can never finish this work. Secondly, I thank my families: my father, Liang-Ho Young, my mother, Hsiu-Jung Lee, and my younger sister, Ya-Ting Yang for their infinite material and spiritual supports. Their backing helps me to conquer every difficulty during the writing. Five of my mentors played an essential role in the achievement of this study. My advisor, Chang-Cheng Liu, enlightened my knowledge about the affairs in the Middle iv.

(6) East and North Africa, respected my own opinions, and gave me enough space to using my creativity. My there reviewers, Yeh-Chung Lu, Da-Jung Li, and Szu-Ning Ping gave a lot of appropriate and practical advices for my thesis. Lu’s classes about nationalism, terrorism, and globalization interested me and inspired me to do research about civil war behind which nationalism might be one of key causes. In addition, I want to thank Chi Huang; in his class about statistics and methodology, my research ability and experience rapidly grew. I really esteem their professional teaching and recommendation. To me, all of them deserve to be called as the co-authors of this paper. Some persons provided me substantial help benefiting my research. Chieh Kao and Zi-Yang Huang discussed with me about my thesis. The former share his. 政治大. knowledge about hybrid regime, which is quite beneficial to me when dealing with one of two outlier cases: Algeria. I discussed with the latter about the frameworks of. 立. dissertation, and he selflessly told me his experience about structuring his own thesis.. ‧ 國. 學. Three of my friends in National Taiwan University, Ying-Sung Tsai, Pi-Cheng Huang, and Tai-Chi Yang, did me a great favor in collecting data needed for my study. Last but not least, some of my friends gave me timely encouragement while I. ‧. despaired, including my friends from CH Kids: Chih-Hao Haung, Da-Yuan Zheng,. y. Nat. Hung-Chang Huang, Chin-Chuan Hsu, and Tzu-Miao Chen; my roommate in the. sit. university, Chieh-Ju Yang; my neighbor and classmate in elementary school,. n. al. er. io. Tsung-Ming Yang; and two female friends: Ting-Yu Huang, Chia-Ling Hsu. With. i n U. v. their blessing and expectation, I have never lost my faith and kept going until finishing the paper.. Ch. engchi. Finally, thanks to all people love me, and all people I love.. v.

(7) Abbreviations AIS: Armée islamique du salut / Islamic Army of Salvation ALN: Armée de libération nationale / Army of National Liberation AQAP: Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula BPCs: Basic Peoples Congresses C-H: Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” CNCD: Coordination nationale pour le changement et la démocratie / National Coordination for Change and Democracy COW: Correlates of War. 政治大. CWP: Civil-War-Prone. FFS: Front des Forces socialistes / Socialist Forces Front. 立. FIS: Front Islamique du Salut / Islamic Salvation Front. ‧ 國. 學. F-L: Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”. FLN: Front de Libération Nationale / National Liberation Front FSA: Free Syrian Army. ‧. GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council. y. Nat. ICG: International Crisis Group. sit. ISIL / ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Levant / Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. n. al. er. io. LIFG: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group MENA: Middle East and North Africa. Ch. MRI: Mouvement de la Renaissance Islamique / (also known as Ennahda). engchi. iv n Islamic U Renaissance. Movement. MRN: Mouvement pour la réforme nationale / Movement for National Reform (also known as al-Islah) MSP: Mouvement de la société pour la paix / Movement of Society for Peace (also known as Hamas) NTC: National Transitional Council PDRY: People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen PSL: Popular Social Leadership RC: Revolutionary Committee RCC: Revolutionary Command Council RCD: Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie / Rally for Culture and Democracy vi.

(8) RND: Rassemblement National Démocratique / National Democratic Rally YAR: Yemen Arab Republic. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. vii. i n U. v.

(9) Abstracts The main concern of this study lies in what is the cause behind whether civil war broke out during the Arab Spring (2011). By evaluating civil war theories by Boix, Collier and Hoeffler, and Fearon and Laitin, I find that applying the theory by Collier and Hoeffler alone can effectively and parsimoniously explains the situation during the Arab Spring. In addition, I identify two variables: “peace duration” and “anocracy”, which might be the necessary conditions behind the civil wars during the Arab Spring. To further assure the explanatory power of theories, I switch the focus to explore the reasons why there are exceptions, such as Algeria and Libya, out of the. 政治大. theoretical prediction. Finally, I present some recommendations for theoretical development and policy.. 立. ‧ 國. ‧. 摘要：. 學. Key words: civil war, Arab Spring, peace duration, anocracy, Algeria, Libya. y. Nat. sit. 本文主要關注：何種原因造成 2011 年阿拉伯之春期間的內戰發生與否。在評估. er. io. 由 Boix、Collier 和 Hoeffler，以及 Fearon 和 Laitin 所提出的內戰理論後，我發現. al. n. v i n C hduration)和「半民主」(anocracy)可能是內戰的外，我認為「和平持續期」(peace engchi U 必要條件。為了進一步確認理論的解釋力，我將焦點轉移至探索造成理論預測例單獨適用 Collier 和 Hoeffler 即可有效又簡約地解釋阿拉伯之春期間的情況。此. 外（如阿爾及利亞和利比亞）的原因。最後，我提出對理論發展和政策的一些建議。關鍵字：內戰、阿拉伯之春、和平持續期、半民主、阿爾及利亞、利比亞. viii.

(10) 1. Introduction 1.1. Research Goals The political violence/mobilization1 starting from Tunisia in 2010 inspired a series of corresponding political violence/mobilization sweeping other countries. 政治大. within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and most analysts and media gave the wave of events a name: Arab Spring. Its significant impacts in political, social,. 立. and economic aspects had attracted intensive academic attention.. ‧ 國. 學. At first glance, difference in the form and level of political violence/mobilization among different states in the MENA is evident. For instance, in Syria and Libya, the fights between people and the regime were violent, which only in 2011 caused 5,000. ‧. and about 12,700 to 25,000 deaths respectively. However, in Algeria and Egypt, the. y. Nat. political violence/mobilization appeared in the form of demonstration, which cause. sit. relatively less death tolls: 5 and 846 (“Algerian Protesters”; “Egypt Unrest”). The. er. io. question is: why such significant differences between Arab states in 2011?. al. n. v i n C hviolence/mobilization difference in the level of political e n g c h i U is so explicit. As Part 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 present, literature on the Arab Spring can be roughly divided into two types: Existed literature on the Arab Spring seems to pay less attention to it, though the. (1) literature taking Arab Spring as a general phenomenon; (2) literature focusing on the situation of a single country. The former has two main concerns: Firstly, why the Arab Spring happened? Secondly, why some regimes survived the Arab Spring, but others could not? Or why political violence/mobilization succeeded in certain countries, but failed in other countries? The latter focuses on more specific problems: why things in a single case proceeded in the way as being observed. For instance, why Hosni Mubarak in Egypt lost his throne during the Arab Spring? Why monarchies in 1. Most scholars did not discreetly use specific terms to describe different situations in different states. For the convenience of discussing, I used a ill-defined and extensive phrase, “political violence/mobilization,” to refer to events across the MENA during the Arab Spring. However, the main topic of my research is one well-defined form of the comprehensive “political violence/mobilization”: civil war. 1.

(11) Jordan and Morocco experienced relatively slight opposition? Why the situation in Syria went in this way? In sum, the former basically ignore the difference in the level of political violence/mobilization. As to the latter, though it emphasizes the distinctiveness of certain country’s situation, there is no systematic comparison made among different countries. After reviewing the literature on the Arab Spring, I find two gaps need to be filled. As the first type of literature, the first gap is: the difference in the level of political violence/mobilization between countries does not receive enough attention. The second gap is lack of discussion on the Arab Spring within frameworks of existed theory. Exemplified by the second type of literature, the discussion does not proceed in a systematic comparison. The first gap implies me that I need criteria to distinguish. 政治大. cases with high level of political violence/mobilization from that with low level of political violence/mobilization; the second gap implies that the discussion should not. 立. proceed in aimless way, that is, I need to conduct a case comparison with the guidance. ‧ 國. 學. of theory.. There are two justifications for me to apply civil war theories. First, they provide me a standard for distinguishing the cases with more intensive political from. the. cases. with. less. ‧. violence/mobilization. intensive. political. y. Nat. violence/mobilization, which is essential for further case comparison.2 Second, they. sit. provide several potential causal factors, which allow me to conduct case comparison. er. io. within the theoretical frameworks.. al. n. v i n C power comparison to test the predictive war theory. All states in this region h e nofgcivil chi U. Actually, the situation across the MENA in 2011 is quite suitable for a controlled. are with temporal and spatial similarities to some extent and, important of all, under. the influence of situation in Tunisia. Holding historical context and Tunisian impacts constant, we can explore: what are the causes behind the higher level of political violence/mobilization, that is, civil war, in some cases during the Arab Spring. Holding “what are the causes behind happening of civil war during the Arab Spring” as my central question, this study is expected to make some contributions. For theoretical development, I want to assure the explanatory power of civil war theory, and identifying the key variable behind civil war in 2011. Then, through precisely discussing the cases diverting from the theoretical prediction, I want to strengthen and deepen the existed theories. For policy recommendation, by 2. For further details about the definition of civil war, see Section 3.1. 2.

(12) investigating into the causes behind the difference in level of political violence/mobilization, I might make some recommendations to avoid the happening of such a destructive event like civil war. To sum up, the main goal of this study lies on exploring the causes behind the difference in level of political violence/mobilization between cases, and I will apply three theories about civil war to the fifteen cases when explaining the difference. I expect my study to make two contributions: (1) improving the existed theories; (2) making some policy recommendation.. 1.2. Literature Review 政治大 literature taking the Arab The literature reviewed here includes three types: 立 in Part 1.2.1; literature focusing on the 2011 Spring as a general phenomenon. ‧ 國. Part 1.2.3.. 學. situation in a single state in Part 1.2.2; and literature about civil war theory in After reviewing the former two types, I find that the difference in the level of. ‧. political violence/mobilization did not receive enough attention and that few literature. y. Nat. discussing the Arab Spring within existed theories. The final types of literature. er. io. sit. provide me opportunity to fill the two gaps above.. n. a. 1.2.1. Arab Springl inCGeneral. hengchi. i n U. v. Now, I will review literature treating the Arab Spring as a general social phenomenon by its two main concerns: (1) literature pursuing the causes behind the Arab. Spring;. (2). literature. discussing. the. success. of. certain. political. violence/mobilization or the survival of certain regimes during the Arab Spring.. Why the Arab Spring Happened? To review systematically the plausible causal paths proposed by literature about the first concern, I borrow the precipitant/precondition distinction from Eckstein. To analyze internal war, an inclusive concept containing every form of political violence/mobilization including civil war, Eckstein distinguishes precipitant, an event 3.

(13) which actually starts the conflict, from precondition leading to the environment which make it possible for precipitant to bring about the conflict. This distinction singles out the aspects of internal war amenable to be systematic analysis (precondition) from those happening simply by accident and hard to be analyzed. About the precipitant, the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010 is commonly taken as the start point of the following sequence of events. This event might inspire the sympathy among population in other Arab states or might reveal the perceived political opportunities for the dissatisfied to toppling down authoritarians across the MENA. So, in my research, I set the influence from Tunisia as constant to the fifteen cases under discussion. Concerning the preconditions behind the Arab Spring, scholars suggest various. 政治大. grievances in political, economic, and social aspects (J. Ismael and S. Ismael; Dalacoura; Salih). However, grievance is always more widespread than more. 立. intensive political violence/mobilization like civil war.. ‧ 國. 學. Some scholars mention the importance of Arab satellite channel, such as al-Jazeera, and social networking websites, including Twitter and Facebook (J. Ismael and S. Ismael; Dalacoura). A debate between Gladwell and Shirky reminds us of the. ‧. fact that though social media changed the rules of competitions between people and. y. Nat. the regime, such as increasing the spread of information, easing citizens’ public. sit. speeches, and elevating speed and scale of people’s coordination, we should not. er. io. overestimate its importance in making a mobilization viable or deciding winner and. al. n. v i n In the MENA, a region C where h e authoritarianism n g c h i U oppresses civil society and restricts traditional media, social media creates a social space not only for social loser.. mobilization but also for competition of different interest groups. Khondker warns that it is dangerous to overestimate the role of social media, and the conditions providing motivation and opportunity for rebelling in real world should not be ignored. Actually, social media is not only used by oppositions to mobilization but also used by the government to repression. In addition, Khondker thinks that there should be complementary rather than competitive relation between social media and traditional media, such as broadcast and print media. Howard and Hussain suggest that the importance of social media during the Arab Spring lies on strengthening the capabilities of oppositions to mobilization, that is, though social media is a powerful tool, the actors using it is indispensable. And, it is hard to ignore the factor in real world politics, such various grievances among people 4.

(14) and corruption by the government. Although the government also learns to repression through the Internet, it cannot follow the rapid step of oppositions. In addition, Howard and Hussain think that traditional media is in the weak position this time. To Howard and Hussain, the fact that social media is a necessary condition for the Arab Spring is still in doubt. To some scholars, the existed group established on various origins, such as political preference, economic class, ethnicity, and family, might play an important role in political violence/mobilization during 2011. Dalacoura argues that pre-existing civil society and political opposition, for example, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, play some important role in the Arab Spring. Similarly, J. Ismael and S. Ismael are also aware of the impacts of existed divisions and coherence within a society.. 政治大. However, they argued that the impact of the existed groups was not fixed. Take the impacts of social division as an example, the Sunni-Shiite division was used by the. 立. Saudi regime to dissolve opposition based on a wide swath of population, but the. ‧ 國. 學. East-West division in Libya deepened the domestic contradictions.. The Regime Survival and the Success of Political. ‧. Violence/Mobilization. y. Nat. sit. The regime survival and the success of political violence/mobilization is the. er. io. second concern of literature treating the Arab Spring as a general social phenomenon.. al. n. v i n C h the happeningUof regime change. For example, violence/mobilization did not represent engchi there were large casualties in both Libya and Syria; however, the regime only It is noteworthy that during the Arab Spring more intensive political. appeared in Libya. Similarly, milder political violence was not equal to regime survival. For instance, both Jordan and Egypt experienced less intensive political violence/mobilization, but only the former survived the Arab Spring. Dalacoura presents three factors to explain regime’s survival: political leaders’ responses to domestic riots, relation between regime and army (or security forces), regime’s allies in society. Some scholars argue that it is regime type deciding regime’s survival or not. Monarchy might have some extra advantages than other types of regime to survive the domestic conflict. According to Brumberg, the survival advantages of monarchy lays on the fact that the king kept an appropriate distance from the political institution with bad impression to the society, so the king could serve as an neutral arbitrator and 5.

(15) manipulate “protection rackets”: protecting specific groups and building their feeling of under threat once total democratization bringing equal opportunities for every social group. By playing protection racket, the king could escape from pressure of further democratization. However, to other types of regime, the political leader deeply sticks into the corrupt institution so that cannot serve as an arbitrator and play protection racket, especially when the common grievance among people in the Arab Spring invoking the solidarity between different groups. There are other survival advantages for monarchy. For instance, Herb thinks that the monarchies can survive the Arab Spring due to their capability to make promises to political reforms and the zeitgeist perceiving the better life under the monarchy than under the republics. Furthermore, Gause points out, the survival advantage for. 政治大. monarchy lays in the social presence of the royal family members by filling key positions of government and army. These members might be the most loyal agents to. 立. control the whole society (“Why Reform”).. ‧ 國. 學. Goldstone argues in a reverse direction by demonstrating the weakness of non-monarchy originating form the characteristics coming from the survival strategies of “sultanistic regime”.3 The rule of “sultanistic regime” is based on concentrating. ‧. power at expense of formal institution and lack of ideological or religious as. y. Nat. legitimate bases. As a result, “sultanistic regime” tends to co-opt people and reward. sit. its cronies by materials; in addition, it tends to keep army divided for fear of coup. n. al. er. io. d'état. These characteristics led to obstacles for the survival of “sultanistic regime”.. iv n other U source. Comparing to monarchy, it was difficult for “sultanistic regime” to shift people’s. Ch. anger from itself to formal institution; without. engchi. of legitimacy, the. succession question of “sultanistic regime” is usually controversial and served as the focus for political struggles alienating other political elites. In addition, the cost to co-opt other elites and people would not stop to enhance until the leader cannot afford. Finally, army tends to defect due to divide-and-rule strategy taken by the leader in normal time. So, it is not that monarchy is so strong to survive but that non-monarchy is too weak to maintain. Some scholars disagree the advantages for monarchy, and they think that it is oil that helps the monarchy to stand its people’s anger rather than the monarchy per se. In other words, the real reason behind why monarchy seems to be more tenable than 3. In Goldstone’s definition, “sultanistic regimes” in the MENA includes Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Omar al-Bashir’s regime in Sudan, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya, and Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime in Yemen. See Goldstone 8-16. 6.

(16) non-monarchy is the oil resources, whose distribution coincidentally overlaps with the distribution of monarchies in MENA (Hertog; Lynch; Yom). Ross further elaborates the benefit to survival brought by abundant oil endowment: Evidently, oil endowment provides regimes abundant resource to repress or co-opt people. With low taxes and generous subsidies, people’s attention might be diverted from corruption and government incompetence. In addition, with oil wealth as a financial source independent from the people, it would be easier for the leader to keep its country’s finance opaque, so that the leader could hide the evidence for corruption from his people (“Will Oil Drown”). Also, less demanding international allies and its supports due to the geopolitical significance of those monarchies might be another important pillar for their survival. 政治大. (Lynch; Yom). In addition, powerful media asset to maintain monarchies’ legitimacy also explains the tenacity of monarchies (Lynch).. 立. In sum, the reason for the Arab Spring, the survival of regime and the success of. ‧ 國. the difference in the level of political violence/mobilization.. 學. political violence/mobilization is the main concern to this type of literature rather than. ‧. sit. y. Nat. 1.2.2. Situation in Different Country before or During. er. io. the Arab Spring. al. n. v i n Cpart, As I mentioned in previous consensus among literature on single h ethere n gare chi U. case: the event happening in Tunisia as the precipitant of the political violence/mobilization across the MENA during the Arab Spring. So, I will shift my reviewing focus to the preconditions behind each case in below. This part is composed of two steps: (1) reviewing literature on cases with the occurrence of civil war and (2) reviewing literature on cases without the occurrence of civil war.4. Cases with the occurrence of civil wars Libya. 4. For how the situation of these cases fit the definition of civil war, see Section 3.1. 7.

(17) Ahmida lists several structural factors causing grievance among Libyan people during the Arab Spring. In political aspects, the excessive centralization of power deviates Muammar Gaddafi from its popular base. Also, the constant repression of the Gaddafi regime against the dissidents through security forces, such as 1996 massacre in Abu Salim prison, accumulates hatred against the regime. In economic aspects, oil wealth provides the Gaddafi regime resources to deal with economic problems, however; the international sanction due to the connection between the regime and terrorism and increasing corruption still harm the Libyan economy and weaken its capability to provide subsidies, which alienates middle and low class in the society. In addition, relative high education level of Libyan people and their accessibility to social media not only prompts the social changes but also exposes the incompatibility. 政治大. between the regime’s obsolete governing way based on tribalism and the modern society.. 立. Ahmida also presents the opportunities for the potential rebels in Libya. The. ‧ 國. 學. constantly political exclusion and repression by the regime deepens the opposition tradition in eastern Libya, which serves as an important territorial base for the rebellion and generates diaspora, about 100,000 exiled people by 1990, which serving. ‧. as potential supporters for the rebellion. In addition, the violent repression against the. y. intervention, which is beneficial to the survival of the rebels.. sit. Nat. peaceful protestors by Gaddafi regime alienates its own elites and invites foreign. er. io. In terms of foreign intervention, in addition to the intervention from the NATO. al. n. v i n C h during the ArabUSpring. military support in the Libyan situation engchi. and the Arab League, De Waal mentions the role of African Union and Sudanese Lacher provides an elaborate analysis on the various identities among Libyans. and its impacts on Libyan situation. The identities, such as families, tribes, and regions, might result in the disintegration of Libyan state institution, that is, the mass defection from the Gaddafi regime. Furthermore, not only the consolidation of the division between pro-regime side and anti-regime side in the Libyan civil war but also the inner division between the former elites of the Gaddafi regime and of the past monarchy within the oppositions might be explained by Gaddafi’s favoritism to certain identical groups. Similar to Lacher, Brahimi also mentioned the importance of tribalism and regionalism in Libyan civil war. In addition, Brahimi suggests another factor: personalized politics of Gaddafi regime, which leads to the situation that all the failure in economic and political aspects will be attribute to Gaddafi on the one hand, 8.

(18) and Gaddafi cannot accept any challenge to his authority on the other hand. As a result, serious conflict between the oppositions and the regime become inevitable.. Syria Haddad made an evaluation on the political, economic, and social situation in Syria by the Arab Spring and points out some disadvantages. Politically, corruption, favoritism, and lack of rule of law prevent the conducting of effective economic policies and make Syria a less attractive environment for investment. Economically, the Assad regime could not strike a balance between private sectors and public sectors. The private sectors controlled by capitalist connecting with the regime and the reduction of the public sectors cause unemployment and reduce subsidies. Also,. 政治大 development and not beneficial to ordinary people. The development of agriculture is 立 obstructed by bad policies and lack of water, and the depletion of oil wealth, the weak. the Syrian development focuses on service sector, which is not helpful for long-term. ‧ 國. 學. demand, and the limited investment constitute the obstacles to the development of industry. In short, the Syrian economy could not provide enough necessaries and jobs. ‧. for most Syrians. Socially, the economic inequality might turn the inherent ethnic and religious fragmented society into the economic polarization society, which was prone. Nat. sit. y. to civil unrests (“The Political Economy”).. er. io. Haddad also provides explanations for the conflicts between the regime and the opposition. The grievance of Syrian people comes from the new coalition between the. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. Assad regime and Sunni business community. The coalition basing on network of. engchi. favoritism and privilege caused the resources’ concentration on the urban area and the reduction on state subsidies, so most of people felt neglected by the regime and migrated toward the urban area, especially after the drought since 2003. The economic inequality generated grievance. Furthermore, the foreign intervention and the support from diaspora provide the opportunities for the potential rebels (“Syria’s Stalemate”). Hinnebusch provides a comprehensive explanation for the situation in Syria. To adapt to the new international environment after the Cold War, the Assad regime needs to reform, even partially abandon, the past survival strategy. The main challenge for the Assad regime is its fragmented society within which the core of the regime, the Alawites, is in face of the oppositions from the wide spectrum of social divisions. To alleviate this problem, in the past the regime resorted to two strategies: 9.

(19) the first is try to establish coalition with peasants and workers through providing subsidies by its oil revenue, and the second is adopting nationalistic foreign policy to generate nationalist legitimacy. In the post Cold War period, the Assad regime lost the most important political and economical patron, the Soviet; as a result, Assad regime has no choice but to develop relation with the West. This leads to two difficulties for Assad regime: First, the regime needs to conduct economic liberation, which may be in conflict with its socialist policy providing subsidies. Second, the regime needs to transform its nationalist foreign policy, which is the source of its legitimacy but has made it under the international isolation for a long time. In short, to adjust the new world order after the Cold War, the Assad regime needs to abandon subsidy policy and nationalist foreign policy, which it had depended on for a long time.. 政治大. According to Hinnebusch, during the process of adjusting its survive strategies, the Assad regime sowed seeds of the Syrian civil war in 2011. The grievance among. 立. Syrian people came from the reforms conducted by the Assad regime. Economically,. ‧ 國. 學. to pursue the Syrian integration into international market, the Assad regime weakened the public sector and strengthened the private sector. Due to favoritism and corruption, capitalist with strong connection with the regime controlled most of. ‧. benefits. To ordinary people, the reduction of public sectors led to the loss of the. y. Nat. social protection, but the developmental focuses of private sectors on the trade,. sit. tourism, and banking (rather manufacture) could not fill the gap caused by reduction. er. io. of public works. As a result, the grievance generate from economic inequality.. al. n. v i n C h and tried to expand conducting nationalist foreign policies, e n g c h i U its social base by giving. Politically, the Assad regime could not satisfied nationalist constituencies through some freedom and resources to Islamist groups and middle class but not enough opportunity for political participation. So, the political grievance generated. Not only grievance prompting rebellion but also opportunity favoring rebellion comes from the pursing of reforms. To conduct reforms, Bashar al-Assad consolidates power by weakening the party apparatus, the worker and peasant unions, and the army serving as the administration tools and the bridges between the regime and the society in the past. As a result, the regime’s capabilities for control are weakened. In addition, the diaspora and the western encouragement played a role in prompting the opposition against the regime. To complement the explanations like those by Haddad and Hinnebusch emphasizing on the structural causes, Leenders switches his focus towards the early mobilization in Syrian. Taking Daraa as a case, where was one of the very early place 10.

(20) for the Syrian mobilization, Leenders argues that the social network connected with four factors that could explain some aspects of the social mobilization in Syria in 2011: (1) the family clan structure; (2) the labor migration to Lebanon, the Gulf States, and Jordan; (3) cross-border linkage to Jordan; (4) the criminal activities. The social network connecting with the first factor provided trust, plus relative less surveillance of the Assad regime due to the peripheral location of Daraa, so that there was a social space for people to share their grievances as the established repertoires for defiance in 2011. In addition, the clan value embedding in the social work made the regime’s violence as a cause of defiant mobilization rather than submission. The social network connecting with the second and the third factors provide people access to external resources and information, which not only introduce the encouragement. 政治大. from the success of mobilization in Tunisia and Egypt but also external resources to sustain the mobilization in Daraa. The forth factor provided necessary skills, such as. 立. smuggling, for mobilization in Daraa to access to external world even under the. ‧ 國. 學. containment of the Assad regime. Leenders further argues that the social network in several Syrian cities had similar characteristics. Many cities share the same mechanism of mobilization, so the process of mobilization across Syria is not in the. ‧. way of diffusion but in the way of simultaneously occurring in different places. The. y. Nat. development from the local mobilization to the national mobilization and the. sit. overcome of collective action dilemma, is caused by cross-referencing protest and. er. io. increasingly regime violence.. al. n. v i n social groups in Syria during C thehArab Spring. The e n g c h i Uformer is the role of Syrian. Álvarez-Ossorio and Talhamy discusses the roles playing by two important. intellectuals in the forming of the opposition against the Assad regime. The latter is. the Syrian Muslim Broterhhood, whose political position swayed between the Assad regime and the opposition against the regime after 1982 Hama massacre.. Yemen Fattah provides a list of potential causal factors behind the Yemeni situation during the Arab Spring. Fattah raises several structural factors leading to the grievance among Yemeni people. For example, the growing population pressure, and the following food insecurity, poverty, and unemployment, which President Ali Abdullah Saleh has dealt with these problems by oil revenue that is gradually exhaust. Also, corruption, the lack of water resource, the bad public facilities, such as road and 11.

(21) electricity supplying networks, might add the dissatisfaction among Yemeni people. In addition, there was another source of grievance from the hatred of previous civil unrests, such as hostility between the Saleh regime and the Houthi movement, Shiites in the north, or the Hiraak movement, secessionists in south. Fattah also points out factors providing opportunities for the potential rebels. For instance, the continuing civil unrests were gradually weakening the regime’s capabilities for control. Mass defection, resulting from the inherent network of families, clans, and tribes within the state apparatus or the brutal repression against the peaceful protestors, also provided the support and the protection for the opposition. Also, the foreign interventions, such as Saudi Arab’s connection with the significant tribes within Yemen and the drone attacks conducted by the US in the. 政治大. name of preventing Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) from seizing the power, are mentioned. In addition, the analysis on the composition of the opposition groups. 立. resulting from the fragmented Yemeni society might reveal how the potential rebels. ‧ 國. 學. overcame the collective action dilemma.. Winter traces the long history of the conflict between the Saleh’s regime and the Houthi movement. His study reminds me of how the Houthi movement weakened. ‧. Saleh regime’s capabilities since 2003, which probably resulted in insufficient state. n. al. Egypt. Ch. engchi. er. io. Cases without the occurrence of civil wars. sit. y. Nat. capability and reveal the political opportunity for the rebels during the Arab Spring.. i n U. v. In 2011, Egypt experienced a mass mobilization between January 25 and February 11, and the events ended the rule of Husni Mubarak. Concerning the precipitant of the 18-day event, most scholars agree that the topple-down of Tunisian regime plays an important role (Lesch 46; Saikal 530-531; Shehata; Shahin). Also, the role of social media on political violence/mobilization during 2011 was widely acknowledged (Lesch 45-46; Shehata; Shahin 60-62). One of preconditions behind the event mainly comes from cumulative grievances among Egyptian people. In political aspects, most part of life in Egypt, such as the activities of labor union and political party, media, cultural expression, and university life, was under strict supervision by Mubarak regime (Lesch 36-37, 40; Shehata; Shahin 51-52). As a result, Egyptian people only had little freedom during the reign of 12.

(22) Mubarak. In addition, Mubarak’s foreign policy sticking to maintain peace with Israel and ally with the US also incited some grievance among Egyptians (Saikal 533-534). Also, Husni Gamal, the son of Mubarak, kept trying to build his own power bases for his future succession, and it led to two results: On the one hand, through blatant rigging, Gamal-led National Democratic Party monopolized power in November 2010 parliament elections. This excluded main oppositions, such as the Wafd party and Muslim Brotherhood, from the parliament and made them the potential participators in future extra-parliamentary activities (Lesch 38-40; Saikal 532; Shehata; Shahin 53). On the other hand, Gamal, without military background, built his own civilian faction undermining the power of the military, and it alienated the military, the most important ally of the regime, from the regime (Shahin 59). In sum, in politics. 政治大. Mubarak regime had displeased three sides: mass, opposition parties, and the military, which produced grievance against it.. 立. The neoliberal economic policies reducing public expense and promoting. ‧ 國. 學. privatization taken by Mubarak regime since 1990s deepens the economic polarization within Egyptian society. To ordinary people, decreasing subsidies increases the life pressure of ordinary people. In addition, the Egyptian economic. ‧. growth mostly comes from rent-seeking activities, such as worker remittances and the. y. Nat. operation of Suez Canal, rather than from productive activities, such as the. sit. competitive industry. As it failed to provide enough jobs for the quickly increasing. er. io. population, the number of unemployed young soared. However, the same policies. al. n. v i n C h532-533; Shehata;U Shahin 50-51). Besides, the Ahmed Ezz (Lesch 37-38; Saikal engchi process of privatization provided some officers opportunities to appropriate public benefited specific capitalists due to their close relation with the regime, for example,. funds for increasing their private wealth (Lesch 40-43; Shehata). As economic gap between poor majority and privileged minority expanded, it paved the way for the future political violence/mobilization. Deserving to be mentioned, the political violence/mobilization in 2011 is not the first time during the reign of Mubarak, and the previous opposition against Mubarak regime served as the bases for the mobilization in 2011. The demonstration trend in Egypt has started from 2003, and the mobilization in 2011 extracted experience and technologies from the precedents. Even, some members of existed opposition took part in 2011 mobilization, such as the April 6 Movement, the Campaign for (Mohamed) ElBaradei, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Tomorrow Party, the Justice and Freedom Party, and Labor Union (Lesch 43-45; Shehata; Shahin 55-59). Although 13.

(23) there were complicate division within opposition, the mobilization in 2011 achieved some level of organizational cohesion in two ways: emphasizing non-violent characteristics for fear of scaring moderate composition and temporarily giving up each sides’ political positions (Shahin 47-49, 62-63). In 2011 Mubarak regime was under huge pressure due to successful political violence/mobilization. The responses taken by the regime, partial and slow concession and massive repression between January 25 and February 2, were not helpful to solving the problems, and even radicalized the demonstration. During the period the Egyptian army kept neutral at first, and in the end forced Mubarak to resign.. Jordan. 政治大 situation in Jordan during 2011; however, the situation still under the control of King 立 Abdullah II.. The success of mobilizations in Tunisia and Egypt did have some impact on the. ‧ 國. 學. Scholars are interested in the peaceful and orderly demonstration starting from January 28, 2011 and tried to explain the situation in Jordan. Generally speaking,. ‧. there are five explanatory factors: two of them are relevant to the society governed by the regime, including less grievance towards the regime and the relatively mild. Nat. sit. y. division within the Jordanian society, other two are relevant to the regime, including. er. io. the maintenance of enough deterrence toward the protesters and the measures taken by the King to distract people’s hatred, and the final one is about the tacit agreement. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. about protest between the regime and the society built since 1989.. engchi. Concerning the Jordanian society, there were division and grievance; however, both of them were of relatively low level. Jordanians shared the same grievance as people in other Arab countries, such as lack of political freedom and unequal economic distribution. However, the unpopular government still provides public services: education, subsidies, medical care for its people, so that the regime could keep its legitimacy in 2011. The Jordanian police are also unpopular among people, but they provided secure and orderly environment for the people. Important of all, in contrast to Libya, Iraq, or Syria, they barely use massive violence against the people (Seeley 32). There were several kinds of division within Jordanian society, but they were relatively mild. The main ethnic division was between Palestinians and Jordanians, the former accounted for about 50% of the whole population, and the latter accounted 14.

(24) for 30% to 35% of the population. It might be reasonable to argue that the Palestinians within Jordan may be the potential objective for mobilizing. Tobin tries to explain why there was no Palestinian riot in 2011 in two ways: first, some of Palestinians think that, identifying themselves as aliens, the protest against the King should be Jordanian business. Second, even if they overcame the regime, they would not want to build their own state in Jordan, because this implies that they give up their right in Palestine, which benefits Israel (Tobin 96-98). Besides, Seeley suggests that Jordanian government has been tactful in resolving tribal disputes (34). In sum, these might explain why the ethnic or tribal factor did not foment the mobilization in 2011. Although there is economic division between poor majority and wealthy minority in in Jordanian society, the new kind of “imagined community” among. 政治大. people blunts the sharpness of conflicts. The wealthier and globalized West Amman attracts people from poorer and traditional East Amman for work and leisure. Under. 立. the impacts of such an environment that the new pattern of work and leisure. ‧ 國. 學. combined with accesses to commercial space and service-sector employment, people imagine themselves as “middle class” and “aspiring cosmopolitans”. The new “imagined community” basing on these symbolic and social affiliations overcomes. ‧. the division from unequal economic distribution and even religious/ethnic/tribal (Tobin 98-100). This kind of cohesion might be a buffer against the. y. Nat. origins. sit. explosion of domestic conflicts in Jordan.. er. io. Concerning the role Jordanian government played during the Arab Spring, it took. al. n. v i n C h and loyal army.UAlso, comparing to Libya and against any rash actions by its qualified engchi. two strategies to control the domestic situation. The first is to keep its deterrence Syria, Jordan’s relatively good relation with other great power eliminated the political opportunity perceived by potential opposition for fear of external intervention (Seeley 33; Tobin 103). In addition to the deterrence, the King also took strategy to distract the focus from the regime. For example, the King distracted people’s focus from the regime’s core: the royal family by making trivial political concessions, such as firing prime minister after prime minister, passing temporary laws, holding improvised elections (Tobin 104-106). Besides, taking advantage of the fear among Jordanians for losing the secure and stable domestic environment, the King distracted people’s attention from domestic difficulties by publicly making a comparison between the mild situation in Jordan to the extreme situation in other countries, such as Egypt and. 15.

(25) Syria. It might let people reconsider if it is worthy to sacrifice the orderly life for pursuing more political and economic rights (Seeley 33; Tobin 106-107). The tradition of protest also made the Jordanian situation during 2011 modest. The Jordanian government requests protestors provide information about the aim, the form, and the spot of demonstration, and the government would permit or block a demonstration after evaluating the demonstration basing on the information. This process constituted an informal negotiation between the regime and the society in advance, and in the process both sides exchange opinions and even constrain their actions: the regime respond its people in peaceful way by constraining the use of violence and the counter-protestors; the protestors keeps their activities disciplined and prioritized the consideration of security and non-violence (Seeley 32-33; Tobin 100-104).. 立. Morocco. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. In 2011, the situation in Morocco was relative constrained, though Morocco shared the similar problems to other Arab countries, including corruption, poverty,. ‧. and unemployment, unequal economic distribution, and lack of democracy. Maddy-Weitzman thinks that there were two kinds of reasons behind why. Nat. sit. y. Morocco could escape from uncontrollable political violence/mobilization. The first is. er. io. the relative high level of political freedom. For instance, Mohammed VI of Morocco allows certain extent of Islamic and liberal activities, and the regime is more tolerant. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. to Amazigh (Berber) cultural movement within Morocco. The second is the response. engchi. taken by Mohammed VI to the protest in 2011. Although he did not give up taking some intimidation against some protestors, to mollify grievance of people, he immediately proclaimed development on the right of peaceful protests and provided some economic concessions, including salaries raise and provision of jobs and subsidies. Also, Mohammed VI established new constitution which, according the observation of Maddy-Weitzman, superficially elevates the power of parliament and prime minister but still keeps the real power for himself. Although many parts of the new constitution are only lib service; one thing might has virtual influence is recognizing Tamazight, Berber’s language (“Is Morocco”). The viewpoint of Daadaoui about 2011 situation in Morocco was different. He thinks that both the problems Mohammed VI facing and the candy-and-stick strategies taken by Mohammed were similar to other leaders in the Arab world. As a 16.

(26) result, the factors making things different comes from the regime type. In other words, monarchy is not easy to be challenged due to its mixed bases on rational-temporal authority and symbolic-religious authority. In addition, monarchy also provides Mohammed VI extra traditional, tribal, and religious capital when governing.. Saudi Arabia Generally speaking, the domestic situation was principally quiet in Saudi Arabia during Arab Spring except for its eastern province, where the Shiite minority flocked. In fact, Saudi Arabia shared similar domestic problems with other Arab countries, such as young unemployment and unequal economic distribution. In addition, the Saudi regime continuously neglected people’s demand for more political rights, such. 政治大 the royal family undermining its impression among its people (Al-Rasheed 21-22). 立 However, Saudi Arabia still could avoid comprehensive demonstration.. as establishment of an elected consultative assembly, and suffered from scandals of. ‧ 國. 學. Saudi regime’s oil wealth used to co-opt its people might explain why the regime escaped the surge of Arab Spring. However, the rising oil revenue since 2003 and the. ‧. increase of public investment in education, infrastructure, and welfare enlarged the economic desires among Saudi people. The economic concession became more and. Nat. sit. y. more difficult to satisfy the increasing desire of its people (Al-Rasheed 21-23). The. er. io. oil wealth still had its influence this time, but it might lose its power in the future. In addition to oil wealth, the support of religious groups was the other pillar for. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. Saudi regime. Wahhabism was the most important ally of the Saudi regime. Also,. engchi. according to Lacroix, the Sahwa, whose ideas is a mixture of Wahhabism in religion and Muslim Brotherhood in politics, was with a huge political mobilizing ability among Saudi people. The good relation with the Sahwa maintained by the Saudi regime might be a reason why there was no massive political violence/mobilization in Saudi Arabia during Arab Spring. As to why minor protests in the eastern province could not inspire huge reaction among the whole population, the answer might lie in the strategy taken by Saudi regime. The riot in Shiite region came from the systematic discrimination by the Saudi regime toward Shiite population and the inspiration from Bahrain’s Shiite riots. However, the Saudi regime prevented Shiite protestors to strike a coalition with the Sunni majority by resorting to sectarianism (Al-Rasheed 23-24; Mathiesen, “Saudi Arabia’s Shiite Problem”; Matthiesen, “A ‘Saudi Spring’”). 17.

(27) Bahrain In 2011, Bahrain experienced serious demonstration, and it even invited the external intervention from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Despites the inspiration of the situation in other countries during Arab Spring, the regime’s systematic discrimination to Shiite majority might be the main reason for demonstration. Mass violence taken by the regime and the intervention of GCC might further radicalize the protests (Zunes).. Oman Under the impact of social media and the success of mobilization in Tunisia and. 政治大 Spring and the Omani protests seldom aimed at Sultan Qaboos. Similar to other Arab 立 countries, the list of grievance among Omani people was so long: in economic aspect, Egypt, Oman experienced only minor and relatively peaceful protests during Arab. ‧ 國. 學. unequal economic distribution, unemployment, low salaries and subsidies, and complaint about roles played by foreign workers, mainly Indians and Pakistanis, in. ‧. Omani economy. In social aspect, lack of educational opportunities, Islamic finance issues, and alcohol license issues were the focus of protests. In political aspect, the. Nat. sit. y. main sources for grievance were corruption and neglecting of people’s demand for. er. io. free press, independent legislative, and judiciary section (Al-Jamali 30; Worrall). Besides, some of protests in Oman during 2011 involved past hatred from. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. previous domestic conflicts, including the sentiment from the past insurgencies of. engchi. Islamists in 1994 and 2004 and Dhofar war in 1970s (Worrall). The reasons behind why Sultan Qaboos regime stayed intact might be generous and immediate concession to the demand from Omani people and limited use of violence (Al-Jamali 30; Worrall).. Algeria Under the economic and political grievance similar to other Arab countries, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s reign did not face as serious challenges as some regimes did during the Arab Spring. To tackle the protests within Algeria, Bouteflika regime took the same strategies as other regimes did, such as economic concession, lifting the state of emergency, and promising political reforms. Also, Bouteflika regime took some violent repression. The carrot-and-stick measure might be the 18.

(28) reasons behind the relative quiet situation. However, there were another explanation: the terrible experience from 1954 independence war and 1991 civil war still haunted in Algerians’ minds and hence prevented the comprehensive mobilization among people. As a result, Bouteflika regime was only in face of relatively weak and divided opposition (Zoubir and Aghrout). Volpi explains why Algeria avoided vital challenge during the Arab Spring by three factors. First, being pseudo-democracy, the Bouteflika regime can not only co-opt and divide the opposition but also receive international recognition. Second, the regime use oil wealth to buy off their people. Last, the regime has both intention and capabilities to repression people. In sum, some literatures on single case still make some cases comparisons,. 政治大. including literature on Libya (Lacher 141; Ahmida 75); Syria (Haddad, “Syria’s Stalemate” 88); Yemen (Fattah 81); Jordan (Seeley 32); Morocco (Maddy-Weitzman,. 立. “Is Morocco”); Saudi Arabia (Al-Rasheed 21; Lacroix 25); Oman (Worral 108);. ‧ 國. 學. Algeria (Zoubir and Aghrout 66, 69-70). However, they are not comprehensive and systematic enough. As a result, in this study I decide to conduct comparison among cases within the frameworks of theory.. ‧. Nat. er. io. sit. y. 1.2.3. Theories for the Onset of Civil War. al. n. v i n a basic understanding about theC bulky h ebody h i U on civil war within a limited n gofcliterature With the help of the concise literature review by Levy and Thompson, I can have. period. This helpful article included two main parts: the first part briefly reviews the. process of debating on civil war; the second part presents the recent development of civil war study. There are mainly three stages for the debate on civil war theory. Analytical attention paid on civil war started between1960s and 1980s, but, at that time, most scholars dealt with issues about civil wars within the framework of explaining political violence/mobilization in general. In the next stage, some scholars thought it is greed, for example, making money from diamond during wartime, that initiates civil wars, but other scholars argues it is grievance, such as socioeconomic inequality and ethnic discrimination, that fuels civil wars. Finding that: it is hard to tell greed from the intention to acquire financial source for maintaining resistance against governments, and grievance is too widespread to predict the onset of civil war, in the 19.

(29) third stage, scholars transferred their attention from motivation, including greed and grievance, to opportunity, that is, preconditions making rebels more possible. Among the theories on civil war, my study selects three theories under discussion, including: Boix, F-L (Fearon and Laitin), and C-H (Collier and Hoeffler) (“Ethnicity”; “Greed”). Though all the three articles took sides between motivation, by Boix, and opportunity, by F-L and C-H, they still put the other side into consideration. Concerning the reasons why I choose these three theories, there are mainly two reasons. First, all of them have importance to the academia. There were widespread debates and intensive reference following the publishing of F-L and C-H. And the importance of Boix lays on its effort to appeal academic focus from opportunities to. 政治大. motivations behind civil war. Second, each of them represented a typical interpretation of civil war. F-L is prone to emphasize viable opportunity while C-h. 立. tends to suggest the importance of profitable opportunity. As to Boix, it tries to. ‧ 國. 學. capture the elusive motivation.. There are three other representative theories worthy to be noted here, including theories by Stewart, Reno, and Ayoob. However, I will not include them for further. ‧. discussion.. y. Nat. According to Stewart, horizontal inequality might be the main factor leading to. sit. the onset of civil war.5 Simply speaking, horizontal inequality means the inequality. er. io. among different groups defined by different group identities, such region, ethnicity,. al. n. v i n C h inequality comeU from inequality horizontal engchi. class, or religion, while vertical inequality refers to unfair distribution of individual’s income. The sources of. in political,. economic, social, and cultural aspects.6. The reason why horizontal inequality is the main cause of civil war rests on that civil war is a kind of organized group activity, and those group identities are so powerful in group mobilization. Although the group identity might be a ideal tool to invoke the passion of population within a specific group, it might be insufficient to. 5. Actually, in Stewart’s study conflicts caused by horizontal inequality include several types of serious violence with political objectives, that is, not only civil war but also separatist conflict and communal conflicts (conflicts without involvement of the incumbent government as a significant party), see Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict” 18. 6 This is the newer typology of horizontal inequality’s sources, see Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict” 13. The old one includes political participation, economic assets, incomes and employment, and social aspects, see Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities as a Source of Conflict” 110-111. 20.

(30) mobilize people to take part in so risky an activity like rebellion without the common dissatisfaction about the wide difference between their group and other group.7 Reno points out an economically motivated causal path to the onset of civil war occurring in so-called “shadow state”. “Shadow state” is “a concept that explains the relationship between corruption and politics” (Reno 45). A typical example for this might be Somalia, which superficially bears de jure sovereignty just like other states but cannot practically govern its people and territory due to its weak formal institution. With weak institution, “shadow state” cannot protect productive population, so that the latter cannot serve as regime’s taxable bases. In contrast, dependency on foreign supports and/or valuable natural resources (and the foreign enclave investment incurred by the natural resources) is the main reason why “shadow state” can be sustained.. 政治大. Under such a situation, the political leader conducts political control through the. 立. networks of personal ties. With foreign supports and/or natural resources as his. ‧ 國. 學. governing bases, the leader has little incentive to enhance the legitimacy and strength of its institution. Instead, he conserves resources and acquires people’s royalty by providing payouts, including material, that is, bestowing subsidies or privileges and/. ‧. or discretionary exercise of power, that is, selective exemption form regulations. To. y. Nat. assure the viability of such political controls, the leader tends to make population less. sit. secure and more materially poor for creating a situation that each individual pursues. er. io. his personal favor to escape from the miserable life caused deliberately by the leader.. n. al. i n C rein and sells private protection to favored societal frictions. heng chi U. v. The leader eliminate institutions providing public goods which may threat his own According to Reno, civil war tends to happened in “shadow state” when its. leader “fails to control free-riding risks” and then lose “the loyalty of followers who comply in return for payouts” (48). Without the provision of public goods, not only state’s agent but also challengers to the state tend to maximize the use of violence in pursuit of their private economic interest (54-55). Ayoob tries to explain why it is so frequently for us to observe that domestic conflicts bother the Third World. Unsuccessful process of state making, namely, building a political authority with enough legitimacy, might be the main cause behind those conflicts. The aims of state making are within specific territory: (1) 7. In other words, what Stewart means is self-perceived inequalities. However, when practically measuring, Stewart still focused on observed inequalities because of the assumption that perception broadly reflect the observed reality, see Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict” 18. 21.

(31) consolidating political authority; (2) extracting resources; (3) maintaining political order. Most important, the monopoly on violence instruments serves as the precondition for the above three aims, and, drawing experience from the state making in Western Europe and North America, the process of monopoly usually brings large costs, including high death toll, forceful expropriation, etc. It takes a large amount of time and needs some coercive means for completing state making. For states in the Third World, the environment for state making is even more rigorous. States in the Third World, as the late-comers of the international community, have endured pressure from state system during the period of state making. During the Cold War, superpower intensively intervened the Third World through financial provision, arm transfers, and even military interfering. In the post-Cold War, the. 政治大. influence of the existed international norms enhanced, especially the norms about human rights, ethno-national self-determination, and judicial sovereignty. On the one. 立. hand, norms on human rights, protecting individual civil and political right, limited. ‧ 國. 學. the choices of means for state making, especially coercive power. On the other hand, self-determination inspired ethnic separation within states, particularly those with weak capability and legitimacy. Furthermore, emphasizing on judicial sovereignty. ‧. made the boundary and existence of a state nearly unchangeable, even for one with. y. Nat. serious internal incongruity.. sit. A variety of difficulties waiting on the road to state making usually led to state. er. io. failure. A collapsing state naturally results in internal conflicts, and in turn continuous. al. n. v i n C toh include Stewart, U The reason why I decide not e n g c h i Reno, and Ayoob for discussion below is out of operational difficulties. For Reno and Ayoob, their theories are not conflicts weaken the capability and the legitimacy of this state once again.. specific enough. For example, Reno does not provide detailed and measurable concept for his “shadow state” and “the moment when the leader in shadow state lose control”; Ayoob presents causal factors too abstract to be measured, such as the legitimacy of a state and the effect from international norms, which will be the obstacle for me to observe the variant between cases in the two aspects. As to Stewart, though horizontal inequality has a detailed definition for measurement, the data requested is too detailed to be collected, especially for states in MENA with opaque economy (Mancini, Stewart, and Brown). Though the literature on civil war is so comprehensive, in below I will focus on three chosen theories of this study, that is, C-H, F-L, and Boix.. 22.

(32) 1.3. Research Design 1.3.1. Research Questions My main concern in this study is: why there was the difference on the level and form of political movement/violence between Arab states during the Arab Spring? Or, when focus on more intensive political violence/mobilization, whether civil war happened? The study tries to assure whether certain existed civil war theories can explain the difference. The theories under discussion, as I will mention in Part 1.2.3,. 政治大. include Boix, C-H, and F-L. And, I will use the fifteen cases, specifically speaking, 2011 situation in fifteen Arab states,8 as touchstone for them to judge their ability to. 立. explain.. ‧ 國. 學. In Chapter 3, I focus on the question: how do the existed theories perform while explaining the difference? And it brings me two further questions: (1) how to effectively and parsimoniously apply the three theories in explaining and (2) what is. ‧. the key factor presented by the theories in explaining.. y. Nat. In Part 3.4.1, what is the best way to effectively and parsimoniously apply the. sit. theories when explaining? With three theories at hand, should I take them all at the. n. al. er. io. same time? Or I should only choose one or two among them? I use the explanatory. iv n within U which. ability, that is, if most cases fit the theoretical prediction, as a standard to make such a. Ch. judgment. Specifically speaking, I would ask:. engchi. theory or which. combination of theories, the cases really experiencing civil war are expected to be cases with civil war. After assuring the way to apply, I would turn to evaluate each individual causal factors mentioned by the theories. Among so many factors presented by the theories, which one might be the necessary condition for the outbreak of the civil war, especially under the context of the Arab Spring? To judge whether an independent variable is necessary for the happening of civil war, in Part 3.4.2 I prepare two questions for each independent variables. First, I would ask if most cases experiencing civil war have value prone to civil war in a specific independent variable? If yes, then I can include it into the possible group of necessary condition. Furthermore, I would ask if most cases without 8. These Arab states includes Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, and Yemen. 23.